LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
DAVIS 


ABRAHAM   I,INCOI<N,   1864. 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN 


AND 


MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES 


SOME  PERSONAL  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  WAP 
AND  POLITICS  DURING  THE  LIN 
COLN  ADMINISTRATION 


WITH  INTRODUCTION  BY  DR.  A.  C.  LAMBDIN 


A.  K.  McCLURE,  LLD. 

FOURTH  EDITION. 


PHILADELPHIA 

THE  TIMES  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

EIGHTH  AND  CHESTNUT 

1892 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNBt 


Copyrighted,  1802.  bv  A.  K.  McCLURE. 


PRESS  OF 


AVIL  PRINTING  Co-,  ELECTROTYPBD  mr 

PHILADELPHIA.  WttTCOTT  &  THOMSON. 

PHILADELPHIA. 


PREFACE. 


THE  chapters  in 
this  volume  make 
n  o  pretensions  t  o 
give  either  a  biog 
raphy  of  Abraham 
Lincoln  or  a  history 
of  his  memorable 
Administration. 
They  were  written 
amidst  the  constant 
pressure  of  editorial 
duties  simply  to  cor 
rect  some  popular  er 
rors  as  to  Lincoln's 
character  and  actions.  So  much  has  been  written  of 
him  by  persons  assuming  to  possess  information  obtained 
in  the  inner  circle  of  his  confidence,  and  such  conflicting 
presentations  of  his  personal  attributes  and  private  and 
public  acts  have  been  given  to  the  public,  that  I  have 
deemed  it  a  duty  to  contribute  what  little  I  could  from 
personal  knowledge,  to  correct  some  common  errors  in 
estimating  his  character,  ability,  and  efforts. 

The  closest  men  to  Abraham  Lincoln,  both  before  and 
after  his  election  to  the  Presidency,  were  David  Davis, 


8  PREFACE. 

Leonard  Swett,  Ward  H.  Lamon,  and  William  H.  Hern- 
don.  Davis  and  Swett  were  his  close  personal  and 
political  counselors;  Lamon  was  his  Marshal  for  Wash 
ington  and  Herndon  had  been  his  law-partner  for  twenty 
years.  These  men,  who  knew  Mr.  Lincoln  better  than 
all  others,  unite  in  testifying  that  his  extreme  caution 
prevented  him  from  making  a  personal  confidant  of  any 
one;  and  my  own  more  limited  intercourse  with  him 
taught  me,  in  the  early  period  of  our  acquaintance,  that 
those  who  assumed  that  they  enjoyed  Lincoln's  confi 
dence  had  little  knowledge  of  the  man.  It  is  the  gen 
erally  honest  but  mistaken  belief  of  confident  ial  relations 
with  Lincoln  on  the  part  of  biographers  and  magazine 
and  newspaper  writers  that  has  presented  him  to  the 
public  in  such  a  confusion  of  attitudes  and  as  possessing 
such  strangely  contradictory  individual  qualities. 

I  saw  Mr.  Lincoln  many  times  during  his  Presidential 
term,  and,  like  all  of  the  many  others  who  had  intimate 
relations  with  him,  I  enjoyed  his  confidence  only  within 
the  limitations  of  the  necessities  of  the  occasion.  I  do 
not  therefore  write  these  chapters  assuming  to  have  been 
the  confidant  of  Mr.  Lincoln;  but  in  some  things  I  did 
see  him  as  he  was,  and,  from  necessity,  knew  what  he 
did  and  why  he  did  it.  What  thus  happened  to  come 
under  my  own  observation  and  within  my  own  hearing 
often  related  to  men  or  measures  of  moment  then  and 
quite  as  momentous  now,  when  the  events  of  the  war 
are  about  to  be  finally  crystallized  into  history. 

My  personal  knowledge  of  occurrences  in  which  Mr. 
Lincoln  and  other  great  actors  in  the  bloody  drama  of 


PREFACE.  g 

our  Civil  War  were  directly  involved  enables  me  to  pre 
sent  some  of  the  chief  characteristics  of  Mr.  Lincoln, 
and  to  support  them  by  facts  and  circumstances  which 
are  conclusive.  I  have,  therefore,  written  only  of  Lin 
coln  and  his  relations  with  the  prominent  chieftains  and 
civilians  with  whom  I  had  more  or  less  intimate  personal 
acquaintance.  The  facts  herein  given  relating  to  lead 
ing  generals  and  statesmen  are  presented  to  illustrate  in 
the  clearest  manner  possible  the  dominating  character 
istics  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  They  may  or  may  not  be  ac 
cepted  by  the  public  as  important,  but  they  have  the 
one  merit  of  absolute  truthfulness. 

Abraham  Lincoln  achieved  more  in  American  states 
manship  than  any  other  President,  legislator,  or  diplomat 
in  the  history  of  the  Republic;  and  what  he  achieved 
brought  no  borrowed  plumes  to  his  crown.  Compelled 
to  meet  and  solve  the  most  momentous  problems  of  our 
government,  and  beset  by  confused  counsels  and  intensi 
fied  jealousies,  he  has  written  the  most  lustrous  records 
of  American  history;  and  his  name  and  fame  must  be 
immortal  while  liberty  shall  have  worshipers  in  any 
land.  To  aid  to  a  better  understanding  of  this  ' '  noblest 
Roman  of  them  all"  is  the  purpose  of  these  chapters; 
and  if  they  shall,  in  the  humblest  degree,  accomplish 
that  end,  I  shall  be  more  than  content. 

The  portraits  in  these  chapters  have  been  selected  with 
scrupulous  care  and  executed  in  the  best  style.  The 
frontispiece  portrait  of  Lincoln  is  the  only  perfect  copy 
of  his  face  that  I  have  ever  seen  in  any  picture.  It  was 


10  PREFACE. 

taken  in  March,  1864,  on  the  occasion  when  he  handed 
Grant  his  commission  as  lieutenant-general.  Two  nega 
tives  were  taken  by  the  artist,  and  only  one  of  them 
"touched  up"  and  copies  printed  therefrom  at  the  time. 
The  other  negative  remained  untouched  until  a  few 
months  ago,  when  it  was  discovered  and  copies  printed 
from  it  without  a  single  change  in  the  lines  or  features 
of  Lincoln's  face.  It  therefore  presents  Lincoln  true  to 
life.  The  other  portraits  of  Lincoln  present  him  as  he 
appeared  when  he  delivered  his  speech  in  Cooper  Insti 
tute,  New  York,  in  1859,  with  the  cleanly-shaven  face 
that  was  always  maintained  until  after  his  election  to  the 
Presidency,  and  as  he  appeared  when  studying  with  his 
son  ' '  Tad ' '  at  his  side.  These  portraits  I  have  selected 
because  they  give  the  most  accurate  presentations  of  the 
man,  and  to  them  are  added  a  correct  picture  of  the 
humble  home  of  his  early  childhood;  of  his  Springfield 
home  of  1860;  of  the  tomb  in  which  his  dust  reposes 
near  Springfield,  111. ;  and  a  fac-simile  of  his  letter  of 
acceptance  in  1860. 

I  am  greatly  indebted  to  the  Lives  of  Lincoln  given  by 
Nicolay  and  Hay — the  most  complete  and  accurate  record 
of  dates  and  events,  military  and  civil,  relating  to  Lin 
coln — by  Mr.  Herndon,  by  Mr.  Lamon,  by  Mr.  Arnold, 
and  by  Mr.  Brooks,  and  to  Mr.  Elaine's  "  Twenty  Years 
in  Congress,"  for  valuable  information  on  many  points 
referred  to  in  these  chapters. 

A.  K.  McCLURK. 
PHILADELPHIA,  1892. 


INTRODUCTION. 


THE  modern  spir 
it,  which  is  essen 
tially  the  democratic 
spirit,  that  has  so 
profoundly  influ 
enced  every  mani 
festation  of  human 
thought,  has 
wrought  a  great 
change  in  the  study 
of  history  and  in 
the  estimate  of  his 
torical  personages. 
To  the  older  writers 
history  was  mainly  a  record  of  the  acts  of  great  men — 
monarchs,  ministers,  and  generals — who  rose  out  of  the 
mist  of  the  past  as  independent  and  irresponsible  agents; 
the  champions  of  opposing  ideas,  it  might  be,  but  them 
selves  the  centres  of  all  interest,  and  to  be  considered 
and  classified  as  heroes  or  villains  according  as  one  liked 
or  disliked  the  general  purpose  of  their  lives.  The  mod 
ern  historian,  on  the  other  hand,  finds  the  material  for 

a  just  estimate  of  times  past  not  in  the  lives  of  the  few 

IT 


1 2  INTR  OD  UCTION. 

as  much  as  in  the  lives  of  the  many — in  the  general 
conditions  of  civilization,  of  which  the  men  of  distinc 
tion  are  only  the  strongest  exponents,  dramatizing  in 
themselves  the  forces  of  their  age. 

Most  of  all  is  this  recognized  concerning  periods  of 
storm  and  stress,  of  war  and  tumult.  Leaders  may 
hasten  or  retard  events,  may  direct  or  misdirect  the 
impulses  of  the  people,  but  they  do  not  create  these 
impulses.  They  are  governed  by  them.  Whether  or 
not  we  accept  that  magnificent  generalization  of  Count 
Tolstoi  in  his  Physiology  of  War  that  makes  Napoleon 
and  Alexander  but  cock-boats  on  the  tide,  and  the 
private  soldier  a  more  genuine  power  than  either  of 
them,  the  time  certainly  is  past  when  one  could  speak 
of  wars  or  revolutions  as  the  capricious  acts  of  indi 
vidual  men,  or  could  profess  to  estimate  the  -  character 
and  achievements  of  these  men  apart  from  the  history 
of  the  people  that  surrounded  them. 

This  does  not  diminish  the  admiration  due  to  the 
heroes  of  history.  If  it  takes  from  them  that  element 
of  the  miraculous  by  which  their  proportions  were  dis 
torted,  it  shows  more  clearly  the  means  and  methods  of 
their  achievement,  which  no  longer  appears  due  to  the 
mere  accident  of  birth,  position,  or  opportunity,  but 
rather  to  the  individual  qualities  by  which  one  man  is 
enabled  to  assert  himself  as  the  representative  of  the 
mass.  Most  of  all  is  this  the  case  in  a  republic,  where 
these  accidents  of  birth  or  place,  while  they  give  oppor 
tunities,  confer  no  privileges;  where  incapacity  may  find 
preferment,  but  where  it  must  be  soon  discovered;  and 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

where,  in  the  long  run,  it  is  the  man  who  best  appre 
ciates  and  can  most  highly  direct  the  forces  of  his  time 
that  earns  his  final  place  among  the  great. 

It  follows  that  while  the  history  of  the  individual  can 
be  studied  only  in  relation  with  his  surroundings,  the 
history  of  a  nation  may  be  exemplified  in  that  of  its 
representative  men.  There  is  no  sharp  dividing-line 
between  history  and  biography.  As  the  poet,  the 
painter,  the  composer  must  be  considered  in  the  light 
of  the  poetry,  the  painting,  the  music  of  his  period, 
which  he  in  turn  illuminates,  so  the  man  of  affairs  can 
only  be  understood  if  we  can  see  him  in  his  relations 
with  his  contemporaries,  as  he  appeared  to  them  and 
they  to  him,  and  as  he  and  they  were  related  to  the  great 
popular  movements  that  controlled  them  all.  And  these 
movements,  in  their  turn,  may  be  best  understood  when 
we  can  see  them  as  they  were  apprehended  by  the  men 
who  had  directly  to  deal  with  them. 

The  history  of  our  civil  war  is  yet  to  be  written.  A 
great  popular  movement  and  counter-movement,  the 
contest,  now  seen  to  have  been  inevitable,  of  ideas  de 
veloped  through  generations,  bearing  results  more  far- 
reaching  than  the  wisest  could  foresee  and  affecting  the 
whole  current  of  the  nation's  life,  requires  the  perspec 
tive  of  a  greater  distance  in  time  than  we  have  reached 
perhaps  even  yet,  for  the  final  view  that  shall  give  to 
every  part  its  just  proportion.  The  soldier  in  battle  sees 
only  that  part  of  the  field  that  is  about  him;  the  colonel 
reports  only  the  movements  of  his  own  regiment;  the 
general  of  his  brigade,  division,  corps;  yet  from  these 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

various  reports  the  military  historian  forms  his  estimate 
of  the  campaign.  Thus  far,  our  records  of  the  war  are 
mainly  in  biography,  personal  narrative,  and  this  for  the 
most  part  of  a  controversial  character,  designed  to  set 
forth  some  one  person's  view,  to  vindicate  his  conduct, 
to  defend  the  policy  of  a  party.  Even  the  purely  mili 
tary  movements  from  1861  to  1865  have  scarcely  yet 
crystallized  in  history,  and  the  vastly  more  important 
political  and  social  history  of  that  great  era  is  still  in 
controversy. 

With  the  exception  of  Mr.  Elaine's  delightful  narra 
tive  of  Twenty  Years  in  Congress,  the  most  comprehen 
sive,  compact,  and  philosophic  summary  that  has  been 
made  of  any  like  experience,  we  have  nothing  relating 
to  this  period  that  approaches  to  the  dignity  of  history. 
The  Life  of  Lincoln  by  Nicolay  and  Hay  is  an  admirable 
compilation  of  the  political  records  of  the  time,  and  its 
narrative  of  public  events  is  invaluable.  But  as  an 
actual  biography  of  Lincoln  it  is  unsatisfactory,  and 
as  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  great  forces  for  which 
Lincoln  stood  it  is  lacking  in  proportion  as  in  insight. 

For  Lincoln  is,  above  all  things,  the  representative  of 
the  people  whose  President  he  was,  the  embodiment  and 
exponent  of  their  convictions,  their  courage,  their  per 
sistence,  their  limitations  as  well  as  their  strength,  their 
homely  as  well  as  their  heroic  attributes.  The  halo  of 
a  martyr's  death  exalted  him,  in  the  eyes  of  those  of  us 
who  came  after,  to  the  plane  of  the  ideal  where  we  lost 
sight  of  the  actual  man.  To  know  Lincoln  as  he  was 
we  must  know  him  in  his  actual  relations  to  the  tre- 


INTR  OD  UCTION.  1 5 

mendous  task  that  devolved  upon  him,  and  to  all  the 
fluctuations  of  that  public  sentiment  whose  support  alone 
could  make  the  execution  of  this  task  possible.  To 
think  of  him  as  a  specially  inspired  genius,  innocent 
of  the  world  and  holding  his  triumphant  way  against 
all  experience  by  some  sort  of  supernatural  insight,  is 
to  do  needless  violence  alike  to  the  philosophy  of  history 
and  to  recorded  fact. 

The  chapters  upon  Lincoln  which  make  up  this  vol 
ume  have  one  supreme  value — that  they  present  a  con 
vincingly  truthful  picture  of  the  man  as  he  appeared  to 
an  experienced  observer  who  was  called  at  various  times 
into  intimate  relations  with  him,  and  who  records  only 
what  he  personally  and  directly  knew  of  Lincoln's  acts 
and  motives  at  certain  critical  and  illustrative  periods, 
and  of  his  attitude  toward  other  actors  in  the  same  great 
drama. 

A  many-sided  character  like  Lincoln's  shows  itself 
under  various  aspects  to  various  men,  and  Mr.  McClure 
makes  it  very  plain  to  us  that  few  if  any  of  those  who 
thought  they  knew  Lincoln  intimately  knew  really  more 
than  the  one  side  he  showed  to  each  of  them.  Much  of 
Mr.  McClure' s  intercourse  with  Lincoln  had  to  do,  from 
time  to  time,  with  what  we  now  call  practical  politics, 
and  his  extraordinary  shrewdness  as  a  politician  is  one 
aspect  of  this  many-sided  character  that  has  not  before 
been  so  intelligently  set  forth.  Yet  this  seems  one  of 
the  great  secrets  of  Lincoln's  success — his  ready  percep 
tion  of  the  popular  current,  his  carefulness  in  guiding 
it,  and  his  ability  to  wait  for  it  if  he  found  himself  in 


1 6  INTR  OD  UCTION. 

danger  of  going  ahead  .too  fast.  No  man  of  his  time 
was  more  earnest  and  sincere  in  his  convictions,  but  he 
could  not  afford  to  risk  them  in  impracticable  experi 
ments.  He  had  to  achieve  results  and  patiently  to  await 
opportunities.  The  ideal  hero  of  the  old-fashioned  his 
torian,  who  must  be  always  heroic,  would  not  have 
waited.  And  he  would  not  have  achieved.  If  those 
to  whom  these  revelations  of  Lincoln's  shrewdness  and 
ingenuity  as  a  practical  politician  bring  something  of  a 
shock  will  only  think  of  the  failures  that  he  witnessed, 
and  what  failure  in  his  case  would  have  meant,  they 
will  not  fear  that  Lincoln's  fame  will  suffer  from  the 
truth. 

It  is  perhaps  best  of  all  in  Mr.  Lincoln's  relations  with 
his  immediate  associates  and  subordinates  that  we  ob 
serve  those  elements  of  shrewd  judgment,  of  patience, 
self-repression,  persistence,  and  abiding  faith  that  are 
such  essential  parts  of  his  character.  His  treatment  of 
Grant  is  a  conspicuous  illustration  not  only  of  his  judg 
ment  of  men,  but  of  that  cautious  policy  that  so  often 
enabled  him  to  carry  his  ends  by  deferring  them.  His 
patient  endurance  with  Stanton,  often  yielding  to  him 
against  his  own  convictions  in  order  to  avoid  a  rupture 
that  would  have  brought  disaster,  and  indeed  his  rela 
tions  with  all  the  leading  members  of  his  Cabinet,  not 
less  than  the  curiously  characteristic  diplomacy  that  re 
sulted  in  the  nomination  of  Andrew  Johnson,  illustrate 
this  same  thoughtful  prudence  that  ever  subordinated 
the  minor  issue  to  the  greater — which  is  the  art  of  the 
statesman. 


IN  TROD  UCTION.  1 7 

This  aspect  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  character  is  dwelt  upon 
here  because  it  is  one  that  has  been  generally  obscured 
in  the  popular  estimate,  but  that  is  absolutely  essential 
to  any  right  estimate  of  the  man  and  his  work.  No  acts 
of  his  administration  have  been  less  understood  than  the 
great  achievement  of  emancipation  and  his  attitude 
toward  the  States  in  rebellion  at  the  close  of  the  war. 
On  both  of  these  points  Mr.  McClure  speaks  with  the 
authority  of  exact  knowledge,  and  he  shows  us  with 
how  little  of  self-assertion,  with  how  much  of  prudent, 
self-repression,  Mr.  Lincoln  approached  these  as  all  other 
great  crises  of  his  career.  He  was  not  more  in  advance 
of  his  time  than  others  were  in  foreseeing  the  inevitable 
destruction  of  slavery;  but  to  him  the  one  great  purpose 
of  the  restoration  of  the  Union  was  ever  paramount,  and 
the  other  must  wait  till  the  exigencies  of  the  war  should 
solve  the  problem  or  bring  the  people,  the  masses  as  well 
as  the  leaders,  to  recognize  an  act  of  emancipation  as  a 
supreme  necessity.  His  own  plan  of  compensated  eman 
cipation  he  brought  forward  in  his  Cabinet,  and  when  it 
was  disapproved  he  folded  it  up  and  put  it  by.  And  so 
he  watched  and  waited  till  the  time  came  when  the 
country  called  for  more  heroic  measures  and  he  could 
speak  as  the  mouthpiece  of  the  nation. 

Again,  at  the  close  of  the  war  he  had  his  own  plan, 
deliberately  formed,  for  the  recall  of  the  legislatures  of 
the  Southern  States  to  resume  their  functions  under  the 
Constitution.  There  can  be  no  dispute  as  to  Lincoln's 
intentions,  as  expressed  in  his  own  directions  concern 
ing  Virginia,  or  his  communication  of  these  intentions  to 

2 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


FACING  PASE 

ABRAHAM    LINCOLN Frontispiece. 

LINCOLN'S  LETTER  OF  ACCEPTANCE,  1860 26 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN,  1859 45 

WINFIELD  SCOTT 58 

ABRAHAM   LINCOLN  AND  "TAD" 73 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN'S  HOMES 86 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN'S  TOMB 99 

HANNIBAL  HAMLIN 116 

SALMON  P.   CHASE 131 

SIMON  CAMERON 148 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON 169 

ULYSSES  S.   GRANT 190 

GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN 209 

WILLIAM  T.   SHERMAN 226 

ANDREW  G.  CURTIN,    1860 247 

LINCOLN'S  LETTER  TO  CURTIN ,264 

ANDREW  G.  CURTIN,   1892 271 

THADDEUS  STEVENS 276 

STEVENS'S  LETTER  TO  MCCLURE 291 

JAMES  BUCHANAN 296 

HORACE  GREELEY 3T3 

GREELEY'S  LETTER  TO  MCCLURE 33° 

JOHN  BROWN 333 

GEORGE  G.  MEADE 354 

GEORGE  H.  THOMAS 354 

FITZ  JOHN  PORTER 354 

G.  K.  WARREN 354 

D.    C.   BUELL 354 

ROBERT  E.  LEE 391 

J.  E.  B.  STUART 400 

LEE'S  LETTER  TO  MCCLURE 411 

SAMUEL  W.  CRAWFORD 424 

20 


CONTENTS. 


LINCOLN  IN  1860 — Ills  First  Nomination  for  President  at  Chicago — 
How  Seward  was  Overthrown — Curtin  and  Lane  Defeated  him  and 
Nominated  Lincoln — The  October  States  decided  it — Seward's  Nomi- 
natioh  would  have  Defeated  Curtin  in  Pennsylvania  and  Lane  in  Indi 
ana  at  the  October  Elections — The  School  Question  made  Seward  Un 
available — The  Bitterness  of  Seward's  Friends  after  his  Defeat  ....  2? 

A  VISIT  TO  LINCOLN— First  Impressions  of  the  New  President- 
Ungraceful  in  Dress  and  Manner — His  Homely  Ways  soon  Forgotten 
in  Conversation — Lincoln's  Midnight  Journey — The  Harrisburg  Dinner 
to  Lincoln  by  Governor  Curtin — Discussion  of  a  Change  of  Route — 
Decided  against  Lincoln's  Protest — Colonel  Scott's  Direction  of  Lin 
coln's  Departure — A  Night  of  Painful  Anxiety — The  Cheering  Message 
of  Lincoln's  Arrival  in  Washington  received 44 

LINCOLN'S  SORE  TRIALS — Without  Hearty  Support  from  any  Party 
— Confused  Republican  Councils — A  Discordant  Cabinet  from  the  Start 
— How  Union  Generals  Failed — A  Memorable  Conference  with  General 
Scott  in  the  White  House — His  Ideas  of  Protecting  the  Capital — The 
People  Unprepared  for  War  and  Unprepared  for  its  Sacrifices  ....  59 

LINCOLN'S  CHARACTERISTICS— The  most  Difficult  of  Characters 
to  Analyze — None  but  Himself  his  Parallel — He  Confided  in  None 
without  Reservation — How  Davis,  Swett,  Lamon,  and  Herndon  Esti 
mated  him — The  Most  Reticent  and  Secretive  of  Men — He  Heard  all 
and  Decided  for  Himself — Among  the  Greatest  in  Statesmanship  and  the 
Master  Politician  of  his  Day — How  his  Sagacity  Settled  the  Mollie 
Maguire  Rebellion  in  Pennsylvania 72 

LINCOLN  IN  POLITICS— His  Masterly  Knowledge  of  Political  Strat 
egy — The  Supreme  Leader  of  his  Party — How  he  held  Warring  Fac 
tions  to  his  Support — His  First  Blundering  Venture  in  his  Presidential 
Contest — He  was  Master  of  Leaders,  and  not  of  Details — His  Inter 
vention  in  the  Curtin  Contest  of  1863 — How  he  made  James  Gordon 
Bennett  his  Friend  when  the  Political  Horizon  was  Dark — His  Strategy 
in  making  a  Faithless  Officer  perform  his  Duty  without  Provoking  Po 
litical  Complications 85 

LINCOLN  AND  EMANCIPATION— Willing  to  Save  or  Destroy  Slav 
ery  to  Save  the  Union — Not  a  Sentimental  Abolitionist — His  Earnest 
Efforts  for  Compensated  Emancipation— Slavery  could  have  been  Saved 
— The  Suicidal  Action  of  the  Border  States — The  Preliminary  Procla 
mation  offered  Perpetuity  to  Slavery  if  the  Rebellion  ended  January  I, 
1863 — How  the  Republic  gradually  Gravitated  to  Emancipation — Lin 
coln  eloquently  Appeals  to  the  Border-State  Representatives — The  Vio 
lent  Destruction  of  Slavery  the  most  Colossal  Suicide  of  History — Ap 
peals  to  Lincoln  to  avoid  Political  Disasters  by  Rejecting  Emancipation 
—He  Builded  Better  than  he  Knew 98 

LINCOLN  AND  HAMLIN— Why  Lincoln  Nominated  Johnson  in  1864 
— A  Southern  War  Democrat  Needed — The  Gloomy  Outlook  of  the 
Political  Battle — Lincoln  would  have  been  Defeated  at  any  Time  in  1864 
before  the  Victories  of  Sherman  at  Atlanta  and  Sheridan  in  the  Valley 
— The  Two  Campaign  Speeches  which  Decided  the  Contest  made  by 
Sherman  and  Sheridan — The  Republican  Leaders  not  in  Sympathy  with 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


FACING  PA6E 

ABRAHAM    LINCOLN Frontispiece. 

LINCOLN'S  LETTER  OF  ACCEPTANCE,  1860 26 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN,  1859 45 

WINFIELD  SCOTT 58 

ABRAHAM   LINCOLN  AND   "TAD" 73 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN'S  HOMES 86 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN'S  TOMB 99 

HANNIBAL  HAMLIN 116 

SALMON  P.   CHASE 131 

SIMON  CAMERON 148 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON 169 

ULYSSES  S.   GRANT 190 

GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN 209 

WILLIAM  T.   SHERMAN 226 

ANDREW  G.  CURTIN,    1860 247 

LINCOLN'S  LETTER  TO  CURTIN ,264 

ANDREW  G.  CURTIN,   1892 271 

THADDEUS  STEVENS 276 

STEVENS' s  LETTER  TO  MCCLURE 291 

JAMES  BUCHANAN 296 

HORACE  GREELEY 313 

GREELEY'S  LETTER  TO  MCCLURE 330 

JOHN  BROWN 333 

GEORGE  G.  MEADE 354 

GEORGE  H.  THOMAS 354 

FITZ  JOHN  PORTER 354 

G.  K.  WARREN 354 

D.   C.   BUELL 354 

ROBERT  E.  LEE 391 

J.  E.  B.  STUART 400 

LEE'S  LETTER  TO  MCCLURE 411 

SAMUEL  W.  CRAWFORD 424 

20 

• 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

LINCOLN  IN  1860 — His  First  Nomination  for  President  at  Chicago — 
How  Seward  was  Overthrown — Curtin  and  Lane  Defeated  him  and 
Nominated  Lincoln — The  October  States  decided  it — Seward's  Nomi 
nation  would  have  Defeated  Curtin  in  Pennsylvania  and  Lane  in  Indi 
ana  at  the  October  Elections — The  School  Question  made  Seward  Un 
available — The  Bitterness  of  Seward's  Friends  after  his  Defeat  ....  27 

A  VISIT  TO  LINCOLN— First  Impressions  of  the  New  President- 
Ungraceful  in  Dress  and  Manner — His  Homely  Ways  soon  Forgotten 
in  Conversation— Lincoln's  Midnight  Journey — The  Harrisburg  Dinner 
to  Lincoln  by  Governor  Curtin — Discussion  of  a  Change  of  Route — 
Decided  against  Lincoln's  Protest — Colonel  Scott's  Direction  of  Lin 
coln's  Departure — A  Night  of  Painful  Anxiety — The  Cheering  Message 
of  Lincoln's  Arrival  in  Washington  received 44 

LINCOLN'S  SORE  TRIALS — Without  Hearty  Support  from  any  Party 
— Confused  Republican  Councils — A  Discordant  Cabinet  from  the  Start 
— How  Union  Generals  Failed — A  Memorable  Conference  with  General 
Scott  in  the  White  House — His  Ideas  of  Protecting  the  Capital — The 
People  Unprepared  for  War  and  Unprepared  for  its  Sacrifices  ....  59 

LINCOLN'S  CHARACTERISTICS— The  most  Difficult  of  Characters 
to  Analyze — None  but  Himself  his  Parallel — He  Confided  in  None 
without  Reservation — How  Davis,  Swett,  Lamon,  and  Herndon  Esti 
mated  him — The  Most  Reticent  and  Secretive  of  Men — He  Heard  all 
and  Decided  for  Himself — Among  the  Greatest  in  Statesmanship  and  the 
Master  Politician  of  his  Day — How  his  Sagacity  Settled  the  Mollie 
Maguire  Rebellion  in  Pennsylvania 72 

LINCOLN  IN  POLITICS— His  Masterly  Knowledge  of  Political  Strat 
egy — The  Supreme  Leader  of  his  Party — How  he  held  Warring  Fac 
tions  to  his  Support — His  First  Blundering  Venture  in  his  Presidential 
Contest — He  was  Master  of  Leaders,  and  not  of  Details — His  Inter 
vention  in  the  Curtin  Contest  of  1863 — How  he  made  James  Gordon 
Bennett  his  Friend  when  the  Political  Horizon  was  Dark — His  Strategy 
in  making  a  Faithless  Officer  perform  his  Duty  without  Provoking  Po 
litical  Complications 85 

LINCOLN  AND  EMANCIPATION— Willing  to  Save  or  Destroy  Slav 
ery  to  Save  the  Union — Not  a  Sentimental  Abolitionist — His  Earnest 
Efforts  for  Compensated  Emancipation — Slavery  could  have  been  Saved 
— The  Suicidal  Action  of  the  Border  States — The  Preliminary  Procla 
mation  offered  Perpetuity  to  Slavery  if  the  Rebellion  ended  January  I, 
1863 — How  the  Republic  gradually  Gravitated  to  Emancipation — Lin 
coln  eloquently  Appeals  to  the  Border-State  Representatives — The  Vio 
lent  Destruction  of  Slavery  the  most  Colossal  Suicide  of  History — Ap 
peals  to  Lincoln  to  avoid  Political  Disasters  by  Rejecting  Emancipation 
— He  Builded  Better  than  he  Knew 98 

LINCOLN  AND  HAMLIN— Why  Lincoln  Nominated  Johnson  in  1864 
—A  Southern  War  Democrat  Needed— The  Gloomy  Outlook  of  the 
Political  Battle — Lincoln  would  have  been  Defeated  at  any  Time  in  1864 
before  the  Victories  of  Sherman  at  Atlanta  and  Sheridan  in  the  Valley 
— The  Two  Campaign  Speeches  which  Decided  the  Contest  made  by 
Sherman  and  Sheridan — The  Republican  Leaders  not  in  Sympathy  with 


22  CONTENTS. 

PAGfe 

Lincoln — The  Question  of  Foreign  Intervention  in  Favor  of  the  Con 
federacy  shaped  Lincoln's  Political  Action — Hamlin's  Letter  admitting 
that  Lincoln  Defeated  him 115 

LINCOLN  AND  CHASE— Secretary  Chase  the  Fly  in  the  Lincoln 
Ointment — His  Presidential  Ambition — He  was  an  Annual  Resigner  of 
his  Portfolio — His  Efforts  to  Defeat  Lincoln — How  Chase's  Presidential 
Movements  grieved  Lincoln — Lincoln's  Story  about  Declining  Chase — 
Lincoln's  Fears  about  his  Renomination — His  Final  Acceptance  of 
Chase's  Resignation — Chase's  Resolve  to  Oppose  Lincoln's  Re-election 
— His  Visits  to  Lincoln  after  Lincoln's  Re-election  was  Assured — He 
Declared  for  Lincoln  Two  Weeks  before  the  Election,  and  Telegraphed 
Congratulations  from  Ohio — His  Appointment  as  Chief-Justice  violently 
Opposed 132 

LINCOLN  AND  CAMERON— Cameron's  Exceptional  Senatorial  Hon 
ors  in  Pennsylvania — The  First  Man  Four  Times  chosen — His  Can 
didacy  for  President  in  1860 — His  Battle  for  the  Cabinet— The  Sander 
son  Compact  with  Davis  at  Chicago — Lincoln  Tendered  Cameron  a 
Cabinet  Portfolio,  and  Revoked  it  Three  Days  later — The  Convulsive 
Contest  in  Pennsylvania — Visit  to  Lincoln,  and  what  he  Said — Cameron 
and  Slavery — His  Report  as  War  Minister  on  Arming  Slaves  recalled 
by  Lincoln  and  Revised — The  True  Story  of  Cameron's  Retirement 
from  the  Cabinet — The  Wonderful  Political  Power  Cameron  created  in 
Pennsylvania 147 

LINCOLN  AND  STANTON— Stanton's  Strange  Medley  of  Attributes 
— The  Fiercest  and  Gentlest  of  Men — Capable  of  the  Grandest  and 
the  Meanest  Actions — Jere  McKibben  Imprisoned — Lincoln  releases 
McKibben  from  Old  Capitol  Prison  -on  Parole — Stanton's  Angry  Re 
sentment — The  Conflict  over  McClellan — Lincoln  Overrules  Stanton's 
Protests — Stanton's  Refusal  to  Execute  Lincoln's  Order — Lincoln's  An 
swer:  "  Mr.  Secretary,  it  will  have  to  be  Done" — Lincoln's  High  Ap 
preciation  of  Stanton's  Public  Services — He  believed  Stanton  to  be  the 
best  War  Minister  he  could  Obtain — Stanton's  Conflict  with  Johnson 
—His  Death 1 70 

LINCOLN  AND  GRANT— Grant's  Trouble  in  Getting  a  Command- 
Given  an  Insubordinate  Regiment — Popular  Demand  for  Grant's  Dis 
missal  after  Shiloh — Lincoln  alone  saved  Grant — "  I  can't  Spare  this 
Man  :  he  Fights" — Lincoln's  Heroic  and  Sagacious  Methods  to  restore 
Grant  to  Public  Confidence — Relieved  of  Command  without  Reproach 
— Restored  when  Fighting  was  Wanted — An  Incident  of  the  Battle  for 
Lincoln's  Re-election — Lincoln  Distrusted  Grant's  Fidelity  to  him — 
"Phil  Sheridan;  he's  all  Right" — Grant's  Explanation  Twelve  Years 
later — Injustice  done  to  Grant  by  Lincoln's  Distrust — Grant  as  a  Con 
versationalist — A  Genial  Guest  in  the  Social.  Circle 189 

LINCOLN  AND  McCLELL  AN— Their  Relations  yet  Disputed  by  their 
Friends — How  History  will  Judge  them — Lincoln  a  Successful  Presi 
dent:  McClellan  an  Unsuccessful  General — Lincoln  was  McClellan's 
Friend — He  Hoped  that  McClellan  would  again  be  Commander-in- 
Chief — McClellan's  Misfortune  in  declining  Command  of  the  Pennsyl 
vania  Reserves — He  was  Called  to  the  Chief  Command  when  neither 
Generals  nor  the  Country  understood  the  Magnitude  or  the  Necessities 
of  the  War — McClellan  would  have  made  the  Best  Confederate  Gen 
eral — Why  Lincoln  Restored  him  to  Command — He  was  the  Great  Or 
ganizer  of  the  War — Grant  the  Great  Aggressive  General :  McClellan 
the  Great  Defensive  General — McClellan's  Devoted  Loyalty  and  Pa 
triotism  208 


CONTENTS.  23 

PAGE 

LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN — Sherman  at  First  sadly  Disappointed  in 
Lincoln — Lincoln's  Early  Distrust  of  Sherman — Sherman  declared  a 
Lunatic  because  he  Understood  the  War — How  Time  justified  his 
Judgment — Sherman  won  Lincoln  and  Grant's  Confidence  at  Shiloh — 
Lincoln's  Strong  Faith  in  Sherman  in  his  Atlanta  Campaign  and  March 
to  the  Sea — Sherman's  Qualities  as  a  Commander — The  Atlanta  Cam 
paign  the  most  Brilliant  of  the  War — Sherman's  Terms  of  Surrender 
given  to  Johnston — They  were  in  Exact  Accord  with  Lincoln's  Instruc 
tions  given  to  Sherman  at  City  Point — Lincoln  and  the  Virginia  Legis 
lature — He  did  what  he  Instructed  Sherman  to  do  in  North  Carolina- 
Lincoln's  Views  of  Reconstruction  looked  solely  to  Peace  and  Cordial 
Reunion 227 

LINCOLN  AND  CURTIN— Their  First  Meeting  at  Harrisburg,  Febru 
ary  22,  1861 — They  were  Always  in  Accord — Curtin  and  Sherman  the 
two  Men  who  Wanted  Great  Armies — The  Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps 
— Rejected  by  the  Government,  then  frantically  Called  for — The  Loyal 
Governors  united  to  call  for  More  Troops  in  June,  1862 — The  Altoona 
Conference  that  made  the  Emancipation  Policy  Successful — Curtin's 
Conference  with  Lincoln  that  brought  the  Loyal  Governors  together — 
Lincoln's  Fidelity  to  Curtin  in  1863 — Curtin  and  Stanton — How  Sol 
diers'  Orphans'  Schools  Originated — Unexampled  Expressions  of  Con 
fidence  in  Curtin  in  1867  and  1869  by  the  Unanimous  Votes  of  the  Leg 
islature 248 

LINCOLN  AND  STEVENS— The  Executive  and  Legislative  Leaders 
of  the  War — Stevens  the  Great  Commoner — Two  Characters  so  Like 
and  yet  so  Unlike — Humanity  Mastered  Lincoln — Stevens  blended  Hu 
manity  with  Fierce  Resentment — Lincoln  and  Stevens's  Personal  Rela 
tions  always  Kind,  but  seldom  Cordial — They  Worked  on  the  Same 
Lines,  but  far  Apart — The  Influence  of  their  Opposing  Qualities  upon 
each  Other — Stevens's  vindictive  Policy  of  Reconstruction — How  it 
would  have  Saved  the  South  from  Desolation — Stevens  as  a  Lawyer — 
His  Defense  of  Hanway — Nominated  for  Congress  when  Dead — His 
Tomb  and  Epitaph 277 

LINCOLN  AND  BUCHANAN— The  Injustice  done  to  the  Memory  of 
Buchanan — He  was  Patriotic  and  Loyal — Lincoln  followed  Buchanan's 
Policy  until  Sumter  was  Fired  on — Buchanan's  Cabinet  Reorganized 
in  Loyalty — Judge  Black  Reversed  the  Policy  of  the  Administration — 
Buchanan's  Debt  to  the  South — He  was  Elected  because  he  was  in 
Sympathy  with  Slavery  Progression — His  Federal  Strict-Construction 
Ideas — His  Prompt  and  Heroic  Action  when  he  saw  the  South  plunge 
into  Rebellion— He  did  not  Reinforce  the  Southern  Forts  because  he 
had  no  Troops — His  Loyalty  to  Lincoln  and  to  the  Country  during  the 
War — His  many  Expressions  of  Lofty  Patriotism — His  Conscientious 
Discharge  of  every  Public  and  Private  Duty 297 

LINCOLN  AND  GREELEY— One  of  the  most  Fretting  of  Lincoln's 
Thorns — They  First  met  in  Congress — Greeley  Opposed  Lincoln's 
Election  over  Douglas — How  Greeley  Aided  Lincoln  in  1860 — He 
Made  the  First  Breach  in  the  Seward  Column — Greeley's  Embarrass 
ment  to  Lincoln  by  advocating  Peaceable  Secession — His  Demand  that 
Force  should  not  be  employed  to  Hold  any  State  in  the  Union — Gree 
ley's  "  On  to  Richmond  !"  Cry,  and  the  Bull  Run  Disaster — His  Arro 
gant  Demand  for  Emancipation — His  Letter  to  Lincoln,  and  Lincoln's 
Answer — Greeley's  Hostility  to  Lincoln's  Renomination,  and  his  Reluc 
tant  Support  of  Lincoln's  Re-election — The  Jewett  Peace  Fiasco — 
Greeley's  Quarrel  with  Grant — His  Candidacy  for  the  Presidency  in 
1872 — The  Cincinnati  Convention — Greeley's  Defeat  and  Sad  Death.  312 


24  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

AN  EPISODE  OF  JOHN  BROWN'S  RAID— Brown's  Visit  to  Cham- 
bersburg — Known  as  "  Dr.  Smith  " — No  Resident  of  the  Town  had 
Knowledge  or  Intimation  of  his  Virginia  Raid — List  of  Brown's 
Harper's  Ferry  Raiders — Capture  of  John  E.  Cook — Dan  Logan  cap 
tured  Cook  in  South  Mountain — Ill-fated  in  several  Chances  to  Escape 
— His  Trial  and  Execution ^A 

OUR  UNREWARDED  HEROES— George  G.  Meade,  George  H. 
Thomas,  Fitz  John  Porter,  G.  K.  Warren,  and  D.  C.  Buell— Meade 
and  Thomas  denied  Just  Honors — Porter,  Warren,  and  Buell  Dis 
graced  by  the  Passion  of  Power — The  Heroes  of  Gettysburg  and  Nash 
ville — The  Reluctant  Atonement  done  to  the  Humiliated  Soldiers — 
Meade's  Soldierly  Qualities  at  Gettysburg — His  Heroic  Character  in 
every  Military  Trial — Thomas's  Disfavor  with  the  Ruling  Military 
Power — His  Soldierly  Ability  displayed  at  Nashville — His  Great  Vic 
tory  won  when  he  had  been  Relieved  of  his  Command — Porter's  Cruel 
and  Brutal  Conviction  by  a  Packed  Tribunal — His  Aggressive  Loyalty 
at  Harrisburg — His  Courage  and  Skill  as  a  Commander — His  Final 
Complete  Vindication  and  Restoration  to  Rank — Warren's  Unjust  Dis 
missal  from  Command  in  the  Last  Battle  of  the  War — How  Military 
Hatred  smote  him  when  he  had  done  most  to  Win  Victory — His  Sad 
Death  before  his  Vindication — Buell's  Wise  and  Heroic  Campaign  in 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee — He  Saved  Grant  from  Annihilation — Re 
lieved  from  Command  by  the  Partisan  Clamor  of  the  Time — The  Rec 
ords  of  his  Military  Commission  suppressed  for  Ten  Years — Stanton's 
Effort  at  Atonement 255 

BORDER-LIFE  IN  WAR-TIMES— The  First  Murmurs  of  the  Civil 
War — The  Strain  upon  the  Border  People — Raids  and  Battles  con 
stantly  Disturbing  them  — How  War  Despoiled  them — Stuart's  First 
Great  Raid  of  the  War — An  Interesting  Evening  with  Confederates — 
How  Hospitality  saved  the  Host  from  Capture — Incidents  of  the  Battle 
of  Antietam — Lee's  Gettysburg  Campaign — The  Unknown  Scout  who 
gave  First  Information  of  Lee's  Advance  on  Gettysburg — A  Confed 
erate  Hospital  Incident — The  Fierce  Passions  of  Civil  War — The  De 
struction  of  Chambersburg  by  McCausland — How  a  Soldier's  Wife 
Saved  her  Home — The  Surrender  of  Lee — Rest  for  the  Border  .  .  .  390 

THE  PENNSYLVANIA  RESERVE  CORPS— Its  Peculiar  Relations 
to  the  State  as  a  Distinct  Organization — Its  many  Heroic  Commanders  : 
McCall,  Meade,  Reynolds,  Ord,  and  Crawford— It  Won  the  First  Vic 
tory  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Dranesville — Under  McDowell — 
Bayard's  Flying  Brigade — The  Reserves  Ten  Thousand  Strong  when 
the  Peninsula  Battles  began — Heroic  Defense  at  Games'  Mills  and 
Mechanicsville — Always  Fighting  on  the  Retreat  to  the  James  River — 
McCall  and  Reynolds  Captured  and  Fourteen  Hundred  Reserves  Killed 
or  Wounded — In  the  Second  Bull  Run  Campaign  under  Reynolds — 
Complimented  by  Pope — In  the  Antietam  Campaign  under  Meade — 
First  to  Open  the  Battle — Opened  the  Fight  at  Fredericksburg,  but  not 
Supported — Ordered  to  Washington — Crawford  called  to  Command — 
Crawford's  Successful  Appeal  to  get  the  Reserves  in  the  Chancellors- 
ville  Campaign — The  Bloody  Struggle  for  Round  Top  at  Gettysburg — 
The  Reserves  Win  it,  and  were  Last  in  Action  on  the  Field— At  Mine 
Run — In  the  Wilderness  Campaign — The  Last  Battles  of  the  Gallant 
Reserves — Crawford's  Farewell  Address — Most  of  them  Re-enlist — 
Only  Twelve  Hundred  Officers  and  Men  return  .  . ' 423 


APPENDIX— The  Nicolay-McClure  Controversy 457 

INDEX 483 


FAC-SIMII.E    OP  UNCOI,N'S  LETTER  OP  ACCEPTANCE. 
[Copied  from  "  Abraham  Lincoln  ;  A  History,"  by  permission  of  its  authors.] 


LINCOLN  IN  1860. 


IT  was  the  unexpected  that  happened  in  Chicago  on 
that  fateful  i8th  of  May,  1860,  when  Abraham 
Lincoln  was  nominated  for  President  of  the  United 
States.  It  was  wholly  unexpected  by  the  friends  of 
Seward;  it  was  hoped  for,  but  not  confidently  expected, 
by  the  friends  of  Lincoln.  The  convention  was  the 
ablest  assembly  of  the  kind  ever  called  together  in  this 
country.  It  was  the  first  national  deliberative  body  of 
the  Republican  party  that  was  to  attain  such  illustrious 
achievements  in  the  history  of  free  government.  The 
first  national  convention  of  that  party,  held  in  Phila 
delphia  in  1856,  was  composed  of  a  loose  aggregation 
of  political  free-thinkers,  embracing  many  usually  de 
nominated  as  ' '  cranks. ' '  The  party  was  without  organ 
ization  or  cohesion;  its  delegates  were  self-appointed  and 
responsible  to  no  regular  constituency.  It  was  the  sud 
den  eruption  of  the  intense  resentment  of  the  people 
of  the  North  against  the  encroachments  of  slavery  in 
Northern  Territories,  and  neither  in  the  character  of 
its  leaders  nor  in  the  record  of  its  proceedings  did  it 
rank  as  a  distinctively  deliberative  body.  It  nomi 
nated  a  romantic  adventurer  for  President — a  man  un 
tried  in  statesmanship  and  who  had  done  little  to 
commend  him  to  the  considerate  judgment  of  the 

nation  as  its  Chief  Magistrate  in  a  period  of  uncom- 

27 


28  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

mon  peril.  The  campaign  that  followed  was  one  of 
unusual  brilliancy,  and  resulted  in  anchoring  nearly  all 
of  the  old  Democratic  States  of  the  West  in  the  Repub 
lican  column.  In  1860  the  principles  of  the  Republican 
party  had  been  clearly  denned;  its  organization  had  been 
perfected  in  every  Northern  State,  and  each  delegate 
to  that  convention  at  Chicago  was  regularly  chosen  and 
represented  a  great  party  inspired  by  a  devotion  to  its 
faith  that  has  seldom  been  equaled  and  never  surpassed 
in  all  our  political  history.  The  halo  of  romance  that 
encircled  General  Fremont,  *  *  the  Pathfinder, ' '  four 
years  before  had  perished,  and  he  was  unthought  of  as 
a  candidate. 

For  nearly  two  years  before  the  meeting  of  the  Chicago 
Convention  in  1860  the  Republican  party  had  one  pre 
eminent  leader  who  was  recognized  as  the  coming  can 
didate  for  President.  The  one  man  who  had  done  most 
to  inspire  and  crystallize  the  Republican  organization 
was  William  H.  Seward  of  New  York.  Certainly,  two- 
thirds  of  the  delegates  chosen  to  the  convention  pre 
ferred  him  for  President,  and  a  decided  majority  went 
to  Chicago  expecting  to  vote  for  his  nomination.  Had 
the  convention  been  held  in  any  other  place  than 
Chicago,  it  is  quite  probable  that  Seward  would  have 
been  successful ;  but  every  circumstance  seemed  to  con 
verge  to  his  defeat  when  the  delegates  came  face  to  face 
in  Chicago  to  solve  the  problem  of  a  Republican  national 
victory.  Of  the  231  men  who  voted  for  Lincoln  on  the 
third  and  last  ballot,  not  less  than  100  of  them  voted 
reluctantly  against  the  candidate  of  their  choice.  It 
was  a  Republican-Seward  convention;  it  was  not  a  Sew- 
ard-Republican  convention.  With  all  its  devotion  to 
Seward  it  yielded  to  a  higher  devotion  to  Republican 
success,  and  that  led  to  the  nomination  of  Abraham 
Lincoln. 


LINCOLN  IN  i860.  29 

I  have  read  scores  of  magazine  and  newspaper  articles 
assuming  to  explain  how  and  why  Lincoln  was  nomi 
nated  at  Chicago  in  1860.  Few  of  them  approach  ac 
curacy,  and  no  one  of  them  that  I  can  recall  tells  the 
true  story.  Lincoln  was  not  seriously  thought  of  for 
President  until  but  a  few  weeks  before  the  meeting  of 
the  National  Convention.  Elaine  has  truly  said  that  the 
State  Convention  of  Illinois,  held  but  a  short  time  before 
the  meeting  of  the  National  Convention,  was  surprised 
at  its  own  spontaneous  and  enthusiastic  nomination  of 
Lincoln.  He  had  been  canvassed  at  home  and  in  other 
States  as  a  more  than  possible  candidate  for  Vice- Presi 
dent.  I  well  remember  Lincoln  mentioning  the  fact 
that  his  own  delegation  from  Illinois  was  not  unitedly  in 
earnest  for  his  nomination,  but  when  the  time  came  for 
casting  their  votes  the  enthusiasm  for  Lincoln  in  Chicago, 
both  inside  and  outside  the  convention,  was  such  that 
they  could  do  no  less  than  give  him  the  united  vote  of 
the  State.  Leonard  Swett,  who  was  one  of  the  most 
potent  of  the  Lincoln  leaders  in  that  struggle,  in  a  letter 
written  to  Mr.  Drummond  on  the  27th  of  May,  1860,  in 
which  he  gives  a  detailed  account  of  the  battle  made  for 
Lincoln,  states  that  8  of  the  22  delegates  from  Illinois 
' '  would  gladly  have  gone  for  Seward. ' '  Thus,  not  only 
in  many  of  the  other  States  did  Lincoln  receive  reluc 
tant  votes  in  that  convention,  but  even  his  own  State 
furnished  a  full  share  of  votes  which  would  have  been 
gladly  given  to  Seward  had  he  been  deemed  available. 
The  first  breach  made  in  the  then  apparently  invin 
cible  columns  of  Seward  was  made  by  Horace  Greeley. 
His  newspaper,  the  Tribune,  was  then  vastly  the  most 
influential  public  journal  on  the  continent,  and  equaled 
in  the  world  only  by  the  Times  of  London.  His  battle 
against  Seward  was  waged  with  tireless  energy  and  con 
summate  skill.  It  was  not  then  known  that  he  had 


30  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

separated  from  immediate  political  association  with  Sew- 
ard  and  Weed.  Had  his  relations  with  those  gentlemen 
been  fully  understood  then,  as  they  were  soon  after  the 
convention,  when  Greeley's  memorable  letter  of  political 
dissolution  was  given  to  the  public,  it  would  have  greatly 
impaired  his  influence  in  opposing  Seward.  But  I  think 
it  just  to  Greeley  to  say  that,  independent  of  all  real  or 
imaginary  wrongs  from  Seward  and  Weed,  he  was  hon 
estly  convinced  that  Seward  was  not  an  available  candi 
date  in  1860.  He  espoused  the  cause  of  Edward  Bates 
of  Missouri,  who  was  a  man  of  most  distinguished  cha 
racter  and  ability,  and  whose  record  appealed  very 
strongly  to  the  more  conservative  elements  of  the  party. 
Indeed,  the  nomination  of  Bates  would  have  been  within 
the  lines  of  possibility,  instead  of  the  nomination  of 
Lincoln,  had  the  convention  been  surrounded  by  local 
influences  in  his  favor  as  potent  as  were  the  local  influ 
ences  for  the  successful  candidate.  The  Pennsylvania 
delegation  in  determining  its  final  choice  gave  Lincoln 
barely  four  majority  over  Bates,  and  but  for  the  fact  that 
Indiana  had  decided  to  give  unanimous  support  to  Lin 
coln  at  an  early  stage  of  the  contest,  Bates  would  have 
been  a  much  more  formidable  candidate  than  he  now 
appears  to  have  been  by  the  records  of  the  convention. 
The  defeat  of  Seward  and  the  nomination  of  Lincoln 
were  brought  about  by  two  men — Andrew  G.  Curtin  of 
Pennsylvania,  and  Henry  S.  Lane  of  Indiana,  and  neither 
accident  nor  intrigue  was  a  material  factor  in  the  strug 
gle.  *  They  not  only  defeated  Seward  in  a  Seward  con- 

*  Mrs.  Henry  S.  Lane  to  the  Author,  September  16,  1891 :  "  I 
read  with  the  greatest  interest  your  excellent  article  in  the  St. 
Louis  Globe- Democrat,  giving  a  history  of  the  convention  which 
nominated  Lincoln.  I  thank  you  for  the  kindly  mention  of  Mr. 
Lane's  name  in  that  memorable  convention.  So  many  different 
versions  of  the  same  have  been  given  the  public  (with  many  mis- 


LINCOLN  IN  1860.  3* 

vention,  but  they  decided  the  contest  in  favor  of  Lincoln 
against  Bates,  his  only  real  competitor  after  Seward. 
Curtin  had  been  nominated  for  Governor  in  Pennsyl 
vania  and  Lane  had  been  nominated  for  Governor  in 
Indiana.  The  States  in  which  their  battles  were  to  be 
fought  were  the  pivotal  States  of  the  national  contest. 
It  was  an  accepted  necessity  that  both  Pennsylvania  and 
Indiana  should  elect  Republican  Governors  in  October  to 
secure  the  election  of  the  Republican  candidate  for  Presi 
dent  in  November.  Curtin  and  Lane  were  naturally  the 
most  interested  of  all  the  great  host  that  attended  the 
Chicago  Convention  in  1860.  Neither  of  their  States 
was  Republican.  In  Pennsylvania  the  name  of  Repub 
lican  could  not  be  adopted  by  the  party  that  had  chosen 
Curtin  for  Governor.  The  call  for  the  convention  sum 
moned  the  opposition  to  the  Democratic  party  to  attend 
the  People's  State  Convention,  and  all  shades  of  antago 
nism  to  the  administration  then  in  power  were  invited  to 
cordial  and  equal  participation  in  the  deliberations  of 
that  body.  The  Republicans  had  made  a  distinct  battle 

takes)  that  I  was  glad  to  see  a  true  one  published  to  vindicate 
the  truth  of  history. 

"  I  was  with  my  husband  in  Chicago,  and  may  tell  you  now, 
as  most  of  the  actors  have  'joined  the  silent  majority,'  what  no 
living  person  knows,  that  Thurlow  Weed,  in  his  anxiety  for  the 
success  of  Seward,  took  Mr.  Lane  out  one  evening  and  pleaded 
with  him  to  lead  the  Indiana  delegation  over  to  Seward,  saying 
they  would  send  enough  money  from  New  York  to  ensure  his 
election  for  Governor,  and  carry  the  State  later  for  the  New  York 
candidate. 

"  His  proposal  was  indignantly  rejected,  as  there  was  neither 
money  nor  influence  enough  in  their  State  to  change  my  hus 
band's  opinion  in  regard  to  the  fitness  and  availability  of  Mr. 
Lincoln  for  the  nomination,  and  with  zeal  and  energy  he  worked 
faithfully  for  his  election,  remained  his  firm  friend  through  his 
administration  till  the  end  came  and  death  crystallized  his  fame. 
With  sincere  thanks,  respectfully." 


32  LINCOLN-  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

for  Governor  three  years  before,  with  David  Wilmot  as 
their  candidate,  against  Isaac  Hazelhurst,  the  American 
candidate,  and  William  F.  Packer,  the  Democratic  can 
didate.  The  result  was  the  election  of  Packer  by  a 
majority  over  the  combined  votes  of  both  the  opposing 
nominees.  The  American  organization  was  maintained 
in  Philadelphia  and  in  many  of  the  counties  of  the  State. 
Fillmore  had  received  a  large  majority  of  the  votes  cast 
for  the  Fremont-Fillmore  Fusion  Electoral  ticket  in  1856 
in  various  sections.  These  elements  had  been  combined 
in  what  was  then  called  the  People's  party  in  Pennsyl 
vania  in  the  State  elections  of  1858  and  1859,  an(^  ^ne 
Democrats  had  been  defeated  by  the  combination,  but 
the  American  element  remained  very  powerful  and  quite 
intense  in  many  localities.  Without  its  aid  the  success 
of  Curtin  was  simply  impossible.  A  like  condition  of 
things  existed  in  Indiana.  The  American  element  had 
polled  over  22,000  votes  for  Fillmore  in  1856,  and  in 
1858,  when  the  same  effort  was  made  in  Indiana  to  unite 
all  shades  of  opposition  to  the  Democracy,  the  combina 
tion  was  defeated  by  a  small  majority.  While  the  anti- 
slavery  sentiment  asserted  itself  by  the  election  of  a 
majority  of  Republicans  to  Congress  in  1858,  the  entire 
Democratic  State  ticket  was  successful  by  majorities 
varying  from  1534  to  2896,  It  was  evident,  therefore, 
that  in  both  Pennsylvania  and  Indiana  there  would  be  a 
desperate  battle  for  the  control  of  the  October  election, 
and  it  was  well  known  by  all  that  if  the  Republicans 
failed  to  elect  either  Curtin  or  L,ane  the  Presidential 
battle  would  be  irretrievably  lost. 

Both  of  the  candidates  presented  in  these  two  pivotal 
States  were  men  of  peculiar  fitness  for  the  arduous  task 
they  had  assumed.  Both  were  admittedly  the  strongest 
men  that  could  have  been  nominated  by  the  opposition 
to  the  Democracy,  and  both  were  experienced  and  con- 


LINCOLN  IN  i860.  33 

summate  politicians.  Their  general  knowledge  of  poli 
tics  and  of  the  bearing  of  all  political  questions  likely  to 
be  felt  in  the  contest  made  them  not  only  wise  counsel 
ors,  but  all  appreciated  the  fact  that  they  were  of  all  men 
the  most  certain  to  advise  solely  with  reference  to  suc 
cess.  Neither  of  them  cared  whether  Seward,  Lincoln, 
Bates,  or  any  of  the  other  men  named  for  President 
should  be  nominated,  if  the  man  chosen  was  certain  to 
be  the  most  available.  They  were  looking  solely  to  their 
own  success  in  October,  and  their  success  meant  the  suc 
cess  of  the  Republican  party  in  the  nation.  With  Lane 
was  John  D.  Defrees,  chairman  of  his  State  committee, 
who  had  been  called  to  that  position  because  he  was  re 
garded  as  best  fitted  to  lead  in  the  desperate  contest 
before  him.  I  was  with  Curtin  and  interested  as  he  was 
only  in  his  individual  success,  as  he  had  summoned  me 
to  take  charge  of  his  October  battle  in  Pennsylvania. 
The  one  thing  that  Curtin,  Lane,  and  their  respective 
lieutenants  agreed  upon  was  that  the  nomination  of 
Seward  meant  hopeless  defeat  in  their  respective  States. 
Lane  and  Defrees  were  positive  in  the  assertion  that  the 
nomination  of  Seward  would  lose  the  Governorship  in 
Indiana.  Curtin  and  I  were  equally  positive  in  declar 
ing  that  the  nomination  of  Seward  would  defeat  Curtin 
in  Pennsylvania. 

There  was  no  personal  hostility  to  Seward  in  the  efforts 
made  by  Curtin  and  Lane  to  defeat  him.  They  had  no 
reason  whatever  to  hinder  his  nomination,  excepting  the 
settled  conviction  that  the  nomination  of  Seward  meant 
their  own  inevitable  defeat.  It  is  not  true,  as  has  been 
assumed  by  many,  that  the  objection  to  Seward  was  be 
cause  of  his  radical  or  advanced  position  in  Republican 
faith.  It  was  not  Seward' s  "irrepressible  conflict"  or 
his  "higher-law"  declarations  which  made  Curtin  and 
Lane  oppose  him  as  the  Republican  candidate.  On  the 
3 


34  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

contrary,  both  of  them  were  thoroughly  anti-slavery 
men,  and  they  finally  accepted  Lincoln  with  the  full 
knowledge  that  he  was  even  in  advance  of  Seward  in 
forecasting  the  ' '  irrepressible  conflict. ' '  Lincoln  an 
nounced  in  his  memorable  Springfield  speech,  delivered 
on  the  iyth  of  June,  1858,  U'A  house  divided  against 
itself  cannot  stand ;'  I  believe  this  Government  cannot 
endure  permanently  half  slave  and  half  free,"  and 
Se ward's  "irrepressible-conflict"  speech  was  not  deliv 
ered  until  the  25th  of  October.*  Lincoln  was  not  only 
fully  abreast  with  Seward,  but  in  advance  of  him  in 
forecasting  the  great  battle  against  slavery.  The  single 
reason  that  compelled  Curtin  and  Lane  to  make  aggres 
sive  resistance  to  the  nomination  of  Seward  was  his  atti 
tude  on  the  school  question,  that  was  very  offensive  to 
the  many  thousands  of  voters  in  their  respective  States, 
who  either  adhered  to  the  American  organization  or 
cherished  its  strong  prejudices  against  any  division  of 
the  school  fund.  It  was  Seward' s  record  on  that  single 
question  when  Governor  of  New  York  that  made  him  an 

*  It  is  an  irrepressible  conflict  between  opposing  and  enduring- 
forces,  and  it  means  that  the  United  States  must  and  will,  sooner 
or  later,  become  either  entirely  a  slaveholding  nation  or  entirely 
a  free-labor  nation .— Seward' s  speech  at  Rochester,  October  25,  1858. 

But  there  is  a  higher  law  than  the  Constitution  which  regu 
lates  our  authority  over  the  domain  and  devotes  it  to  the  same 
noble  purposes.  The  territory  is  a  part,  no  inconsiderable  part, 
of  the  common  heritage  of  mankind  bestowed  upon  them  by  the 
Creator  of  the  universe.  We  are  His  stewards,  and  must  so  dis 
charge  our  trust  as  to  secure,  in  the  highest  obtainable  degree, 
their  happiness. — Seward' s  Senate  speech,  March  n,  1850. 

"  A  house  divided  against  itself  cannot  stand."  I  believe  this 
Government  cannot  endure  permanently  one  half  slave  and  one 
half  free.  I  do  not  expect  the  Union  to  be  dissolved ;  I  do  not 
expect  the  house  to  fall ;  but  I  do  expect  it  will  cease  to  be  di 
vided.  It  will  become  all  one  thing  or  all  the  other.— Lincoln's 
Springfield  speech,  June  17,  1858. 


LINCOLN  IN  i860.  35 

impossible  candidate  for  President  in  1860,  unless  he  was 
to  be  nominated  simply  to  be  defeated.  Had  he  been 
nominated,  the  American  element  in  Pennsylvania  and 
Indiana  would  not  only  have  maintained  its  organi 
zation,  but  it  would  have  largely  increased  its  strength 
on  the  direct  issue  of  hostility  to  Seward.  It  was  -not 
an  unreasonable  apprehension,  therefore,  that  inspired 
Curtin  and  Lane  to  protest  with  all  earnestness  against 
the  nomination  of  Seward.  There  could  be  no  question 
as  to  the  sincerity  of  the  Republican  candidates  for  Gov 
ernor  in  the  two  pivotal  States  when  they  declared  that 
a  particular  nomination  would  doom  them  to  defeat, 
and  it  was  Andrew  G.  Curtin  and  Henry  S.  Lane  whose 
earnest  admonitions  to  the  delegates  at  Chicago  com 
pelled  a  Seward  convention  to  halt  in  its  purpose  and  set 
him  aside,  with  all  his  pre-eminent  qualifications  and 
with  all  the  enthusiastic  devotion  of  his  party  to  him. 
It  was  Curtin  and  Lane  also  who  decided  that  Lincoln 
should  be  the  candidate  after  Seward  had  been  practi 
cally  overthrown.  When  it  became  known  that  Sew 
ard' s  nomination  would  defeat  the  party  in  Pennsylvania 
and  Indiana,  the  natural  inquiry  was,  Who  can  best  aid 
these  candidates  for  Governor  in  their  State  contests? 
Indiana  decided  in  favor  of  Lincoln  at  an  early  stage 
of  the  struggle,  and  her  action  had  much  to  do  in  de 
ciding  Pennsylvania's  support  of  Lincoln.  The  Penn 
sylvania  delegation  had  much  less  knowledge  of  Lincoln 
than  the  men  from  Indiana,  and  there  were  very  few 
original  supporters  of  Lincoln  among  them.  Wilmot 
was  for  Lincoln  from  the  start;  Stevens  was  for  Judge 
McLean;  Reeder  was  for  General  Cameron.  The  dele 
gation  was  not  a  harmonious  one,  because  of  the  hos 
tility  of  a  considerable  number  of  the  delegates  to 
Cameron  for  President,  and  it  was  not  until  the  first 
day  that  the  convention  met  that  Pennsylvania  got  into 


36  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

anything  like  a  potential  attitude.  At  a  meeting  of  the 
delegation  it  was  proposed  that  the  first,  second,  and 
third  choice  of  the  delegates  for  President  should  be 
formally  declared.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  this  propo 
sition  did  not  come  from  the  earnest  supporters  of 
Cameron,  but  it  was  coupled  with  the  suggestion  that 
Cameron  should  be  unanimously  declared  the  first  choice 
of  the  State;  which  was  done.  Stevens  was  stubbornly 
for  McLean,  and  had  a  considerable  following.  He 
asked  that  McLean  be  declared  the  second  choice  of  the 
State,  and,  as  McLean  was  then  known  to  be  practically 
out  of  the  fight,  he  was  given  substantially  a  unanimous 
vote  as  the  second  choice.  The  third  choice  to  be  ex 
pressed  by  the  delegation  brought  the  State  down  to 
practical  business,  as  it  was  well  known  that  both  the 
first  and  second  choice  were  mere  perfunctory  declara 
tions.  The  battle  came  then  between  Bates  and  Lin 
coln,  and  but  for  the  facts  that  Indiana  had  previously 
declared  for  Lincoln,  and  that  Curtin  and  Lane  were 
acting  in  concert,  there  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that 
Bates  would  have  been  preferred.  Much  feeling  was 
exhibited  in  deciding  the  third  choice  of  the  State,  and 
Lincoln  finally  won  over  Bates  by  four  majority.  When 
it  became  known  that  Pennsylvania  had  indicated  Lin 
coln  as  her  third  choice,  it  gave  a  wonderful  impetus  to 
the  Lincoln  cause.  Cameron  and  McLean  were  not 
seriously  considered,  and  what  was  nominally  the  third 
choice  of  the  State  was  accepted  as  really  the  first  choice 
among  possible  candidates.  The  slogan  of  the  Lincoln 
workers  was  soon  heard  on  every  side,  "  Pennsylvania's 
for  Lincoln,"  and  from  the  time  that  Pennsylvania 
ranged  herself  along  with  Indiana  in  support  of  Lincoln 
not  only  was  Seward's  defeat  inevitable,  but  the  nomi 
nation  of  Lincoln  was  practically  assured.  Thus  did 
two  men — Curtin  and  Lane — not  only  determine  Sew- 


LINCOLN  IN  i860.  37 

ard's  defeat,  but  they  practically  determined  the  nomi 
nation  of  Lincoln. 

Notwithstanding  the  substantial  advantages  gained  by 
the  supporters  of  Lincoln  in  the  preliminary  struggles 
at  Chicago,  the  fight  for  Seward  was  maintained  with 
desperate  resolve  until  the  final  ballot  was  taken.  It 
was  indeed  a  battle  of  giants.  Thurlow  Weed  was  the 
Seward  leader,  and  he  was  simply  incomparable  as  a 
master  in  handling  a  convention.  With  him  were  such 
able  lieutenants  as  Governor  Morgan,  and  Raymond  of 
the  New  York  Times,  with  Bvarts  as  chairman  of  the 
delegation,  whose  speech  nominating  Seward  was  the 
most  impressive  utterance  of  his  life.  The  Bates  men 
were  led  by  Frank  Blair,  the  only  Republican  Congress 
man  from  a  slave  State,  who  was  nothing  if  not  heroic, 
aided  by  his  brother  Montgomery,  who  was  a  politician 
of  uncommon  cunning.  With  them  was  Horace  Gree- 
ley,  who  was  chairman  of  the  delegation  from  the  then 
almost  inaccessible  State  of  Oregon.  It  was  Lincoln's 
friends,  however,  who  were  the  "hustlers"  of  that 
battle.  They  had  men  for  sober  counsel  like  David 
Davis ;  men  of  supreme  sagacity  like  Leonard  Swett ; 
men  of  tireless  effort  like  Norman  B.  Judd ;  and  they 
had  what  was  more  important  than  all — a  seething  mul 
titude  wild  with  enthusiasm  for  Abraham  Lincoln.  For 
once  Thurlow  Weed  was  outgeneraled  just  at  a  critical 
stage  of  the  battle.  On  the  morning  of  the  third  day, 
when  the  final  struggle  was  to  be  made,  the  friends  of 
Seward  got  up  an  imposing  demonstration  on  the  streets 
of  Chicago.  They  had  bands  and  banners,  immense 
numbers,  and  generous  enthusiasm ;  but  while  the  Sew 
ard  men  were  thus  making  a  public  display  of  their 
earnestness  and  strength,  Swett  and  Judd  filled  the  im 
mense  galleries  of  the  wigwam,  in  which  the  convention 
was  held,  with  men  who  were  ready  to  shout  to  the  echo 


^8  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

for  Lincoln  whenever  opportunity  offered.  The  result 
was  that  when  the  Seward  men  filed  into  the  convention 
there  were  seats  for  the  delegates,  but  few  for  any  others, 
and  the  convention  was  encircled  by  an  immense  throng 
that  made  the  wigwam  tremble  with  its  cheers  for  the 
"  rail-splitter." 

Twelve  names  had  been  put  in  nomination  for  Presi 
dent,  but  the  first  ballot  developed  to  the  comprehension 
of  all  that  the  struggle  was  between  Seward  and  Lincoln. 
Seward  had  received  173^  votes  and  Lincoln  102.  The 
other  votes  scattered  between  ten  candidates,  the  highest 
of  whom  (Cameron)  received  50^,  all  of  which  were  from 
Pennsylvania  with  the  exception  of  3.  Cameron's  name 
was  at  once  withdrawn,  and  on  the  second  ballot  Seward 
rose  to  184^,  with  Lincoln  closely  following  at  181,  but 
both  lacking  the  233  votes  necessary  to  a  choice.  The 
third  ballot  was  taken  amid  breathless  excitement,  with 
Lincoln  steadily  gaining  and  Seward  now  and  then 
losing,  and  when  the  ballot  ended  Lincoln  had  231)^ 
to  1 80  for  Seward.  Lincoln  lacked  but  2^/2  votes  of  a 
majority.  His  nomination  was  now  inevitable,  and  be 
fore  the  result  was  announced  there  was  a  general 
scramble  to  change  from  the  candidates  on  the  scatter 
ing  list  to  Lincoln.  Cartter  of  Ohio  was  the  first  to 
obtain  recognition,  and  he  changed  four  Ohio  votes 
from  Chase  to  Lincoln,  which  settled  the  nomination. 
Maine  followed,  changing  ten  votes  from  Seward  to 
Lincoln.  Andrew  of  Massachusetts  and  Gratz  Brown 
of  Missouri  next  came  with  changes  to  the  Lincoln 
column,  and  they  continued  until  Lincoln's  vote  was 
swelled  to  354.* 

*  The  following  were  the  ballots  for  President : 

First.         Second.  Third. 

Lincoln   ...       ....  102  181  231^ 

Seward 173^        184^  180 


LINCOLN  IN  i860.  39 

As  soon  as  Ohio  gave  the  necessary  number  of  votes 
to  Lincoln  to  nominate  him  a  huge  charcoal  portrait 
of  the  candidate  was  suddenly  displayed  from  the  gallery 
of  the  wigwam,  and  the  whole  convention,  with  the 
exception  of  the  New  York  delegation,  was  whirled  to 
its  feet  by  the  enthusiasm  that  followed.  It  was  many 
minutes  before  the  convention  could  be  sufficiently 
calmed  to  proceed  with  business.  The  New  York  dele 
gates  had  kept  their  seats  in  sullen  silence  during  all 
this  eruption  of  enthusiasm  for  Lincoln,  and  it  was  long 
even  after  quiet  had  been  restored  that  Bvarts'  tall  form 
was  recognized  to  move  that  the  nomination  be  declared 
unanimous.  He  was  promptly  seconded  by  Andrew  of 
Massachusetts,  who  was  also  an  ardent  supporter  of 
Seward,  and  the  motion  was  adopted  with  a  wild  hurrah 
that  came  spontaneously  from  every  part  of  the  conven 
tion  excepting  the  several  lines  of  seats  occupied  by  the 
seventy  delegates  from  New  York.  Mr.  Evarts'  motion 
for  a  recess  was  unanimously  carried,  and  the  convention 
and  its  vast  audience  of  spectators  hurried  out  to  make 


Cameron 

First. 

Second. 
2 

Third. 

Bates    .... 

A.8 

1C 

22 

Chase  . 

AQ 

JO 

A  2*4 

McLean  .    .    . 

•    •     Vy 

8 

c 

Dayton    .    .    .    , 

Id 

10 

I 

Collamer     .    .    , 
Wade   .... 

10* 

1* 

Read     .... 

.     .                        I 

Sunmer   .    . 

I 

Fremont      .    . 

.     .          .             I 

Clav 

2 

I 

Before  the  third  ballot  was  announced  changes  were  made  to 
Lincoln,  giving  him  354  votes,  or  120  more  than  the  number 
necessary  to  nominate. 

*  Withdrawn. 


4°  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

the  streets  ring  with  shouts  for  the  Illinois  candidate 
for  President. 

Until  after  the  nomination  of  Ivincoln  little  attention 
had  been  given  to  the  contest  for  Vice-President.  Had 
Seward  been  nominated,  Lincoln  would  have  been  unan 
imously  tendered  the  second  place  on  the  ticket,  but 
with  lyincoln  nominated  for  the  first  place  the  leading 
friends  of  Lincoln  at  once  suggested  to  the  friends  of 
Seward  that  they  should  name  the  candidate  for  the 
Vice- Presidency.  Mr.  Greeley  was  sent  to  Governor 
Morgan  to  proffer  the  nomination  to  him  if  he  would 
accept  it,  or  in  case  of  his  refusal  to  ask  him  to  name 
some'  man  who  would  be  acceptable  to  the  friends  of 
Seward.  Governor  Morgan  not  only  declined  to  accept 
it  himself,  but  he  declined  to  suggest  any  one  of  Sew 
ard' s  friends  for  the  place.  Not  only  Governor  Morgan, 
but  Mr.  Bvarts  and  Mr.  Weed,  all  refused  to  be  con 
sulted  on  the  subject  of  the  Vice- Presidency,  and  they 
did  it  in  a  temper  that  indicated  contempt  for  the  action 
of  the  convention.  Hamlin  was  nominated,  not  because 
Seward  desired  it,  for  New  York  gave  him  a  bare  major 
ity  on  the  first  ballot,  but  because  he  was  then  the  most 
prominent  of  the  Democratic-Republicans  in  the  Bast. 
The  contest  was  really  between  Hamlin  and  Cassius  M. 
Clay.  Clay  was  supported  chiefly  because  he  was  a  resi 
dent  of  a  Southern  State  and  to  relieve  the  party  from 
the  charge  of  presenting  a  sectional  ticket ;  but  as  there 
were  no  Southern  electoral  votes  to  be  fought  for,  Ham 
lin  was  wisely  preferred,  and  he  was  nominated  on  the 
second  ballot  by  a  vote  of  367  to  86  for  Clay.*  Not- 

*  The  following  were  the  ballots  for  Vice-President  : 

First.         Second. 

Hamlin      <  194  367 

Clay ioi>£          86 

Hickman 58  18 


LINCOLN  IN  i860.  41 

withstanding  Governor  Morgan's  keen  disappointment 
at  the  defeat  of  Seward,  he  was  easily  prevailed  upon  to 
remain  at  the  head  of  the  National  Committee,  thus 
charging  him  with  the  management  of  the  national 
campaign. 

I  called  on  Thurlow  Weed  at  his  headquarters  during 
the  evening  after  the  nominations  had  been  made,  ex 
pecting  that,  with  all  his  disappointment,  he  would  be 
ready  to  co-operate  for  the  success  of  the  ticket.  I  found 
him  sullen,  and  offensive  in  both  manner  and  expression. 
He  refused  even  to  talk  about  the  contest,  and  intimated 
very  broadly  that  Pennsylvania,  having  defeated  Seward, 
could  now  elect  Curtin  and  Lincoln.  Governor  Curtin 
also  visited  Mr.  Weed  before  he  left  Chicago,  but  re 
ceived  no  word  of  encouragement  from  the  disappointed 
Seward  leader.  *  Weed  had  been  defeated  in  his  greatest 
effort,  and  the  one  great  dream  of  his  life  had  perished. 
He  never  forgave  Governor  Curtin  until  the  day  of  his 
death,  nor  did  Seward  maintain  any  more  than  severely 
civil  relations  with  Curtin  during  the  whole  time  that  he 
was  at  the  head  of  the  State  Department.  I  called  on 

First.         Second. 

Reeder 51*  .    . 

Banks 38^*        •    - 

Davis  (Henry  Winter)  .    .    .      8* 

Dayton      3 

Houston    . 3 

Read i 

*  Withdrawn. 

*  I  called  on  Morgan  the  night  after  the  nomination  was 
made.  He  treated  me  civilly,  but  with  marked  coolness,  and  I 
then  called  on  Weed,  who  was  very  rude  indeed.  He  said  to  me, 
"You  have  defeated  the  man  who  of  all  others  was  most  revered 
by  the  people  and  wanted  as  President.  You  and  Lane  want  to 
be  elected,  and  to  elect  Lincoln  you  must  elect  yourselves." 
That  was  all,  and  I  left  him. — Governor  Curtirfs  Letter  to  the 
Author,  August  18,  1891. 


42  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Seward  but  once  after  the  organization  of  the  Lincoln 
Cabinet,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  soliciting  any  favors 
from  him,  but  he  was  so  frigid  that  I  never  ventured  to 
trespass  upon  him  again.  Three  months  after  the  Chi 
cago  convention,  when  the  battle  in  Pennsylvania  was 
raging  with  desperation  on  both  sides,  I  twice  wrote  to 
Weed  giving  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  State  and 
urging  the  co-operation  of  himself  and  Chairman  Mor 
gan  to  assure  the  success  of  the  ticket  in  October.  He 
made  no  response  to  either  letter,  and  it  so  happened 
chat  we  never  met  thereafter  during  his  life. 

Tlie  contest  in  Pennsylvania  was  really  the  decisive 
battle  of  the  national  campaign.  A  party  had  to  be 
created  out  of  inharmonious  elements,  and  the  commer 
cial  and  financial  interests  of  the  State  were  almost  sol 
idly  against  us.  I  cannot  recall  five  commercial  houses 
of  prominence  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia  where  I  could 
have  gone  to  solicit  a  subscription  to  the  Lincoln  cam 
paign  with  reasonable  expectation  that  it  would  not  be 
resented,  and  of  all  our  prominent  financial  men  I  recall 
only  Anthony  J.  Drexel  who  actively  sympathized  with 
the  Republican  cause.  Money  would  have  been  useless 
for  any  but  legitimate  purposes,  but  the  organization  of 
a  great  State  to  crystallize  incongruous  elements  was  an 
immense  task  and  involved  great  labor  and  expense.  I 
visited  Chairman  Morgan  in  New  York,  presented  the 
situation  to  him,  but  he  was  listless  and  indifferent,  and 
not  one  dollar  of  money  was  contributed  from  New  York 
State  to  aid  the  Curtin  contest  in  Pennsylvania.  The 
entire  contributions  for  the  State  committee  for  that  great 
battle  aggregated  only  $12,000,  of  which  $2000  were  a 
contribution  for  rent  of  headquarters  and  $3000  were 
expended  in  printing.  Three  weeks  before  the  election, 
when  I  felt  reasonably  confident  of  the  success  of  the 
State  ticket,  I  again  visited  Governor  Morgan,  and  met 


LINCOLN  IN  i860.  43 

with  him  Moses  Taylor  and  one  or  two  others,  and  they 
were  finally  so  much  impressed  with  the  importance  of 
carrying  a  Republican  Congress  that  they  agreed  to  raise 
$4300  and  send  it  direct  to  some  six  or  seven  debatable 
Congressional  districts  I  indicated.  Beyond  this  aid  ren 
dered  to  Pennsylvania  from  New  York  the  friends  of  Mr. 
Seward  took  no  part  whatever  in  the  great  October  bat 
tle  that  made  Abraham  Lincoln  President.  Curtin  was 
elected  by  a  majority  of  32,164,  and  Lane  was  elected  in 
Indiana  by  9757.  With  Curtin  the  Republicans  carried 
19  of  the  25  Congressmen,  and  with  Lane  the  Republi 
cans  of  Indiana  carried  7  of  the  n  Congressmen  of  that 
State.  Thus  was  the  election  of  a  Republican  President 
substantially  accomplished  in  October  by  the  success  of 
the  two  men  who  had  defeated  William  H.  Seward  and 
nominated  Abraham  Lincoln  at  Chicago. 


A  VISIT  TO  LINCOLN. 


I  NEVER  met  Abraham  Lincoln  until  early  in  Janu 
ary,  1 86 1,  some  two  months  after  his  election  to  the 
Presidency.  I  had  been  brought  into  very  close  and  con 
fidential  relations  with  him  by  correspondence  during  the 
Pennsylvania  campaign  of  1860.  His  letters  were  fre 
quent,  and  always  eminently  practical,  on  the  then  su 
preme  question  of  electing  the  Republican  State  ticket 
in  October.  It  was  believed  on  all  sides  that  unless 
Pennsylvania  could  be  carried  in  October,  Lincoln's  de 
feat  would  be  certain  in  November.  Pennsylvania  was 
thus  accepted  as  the  key  to  Republican  success,  and  Lin 
coln  naturally  watched  the  struggle  with  intense  interest. 
In  accordance  with  his  repeated  solicitations,  he  was  ad 
vised  from  the  headquarters  of  the  State  Committee,  of 
which  I  was  chairman,  of  all  the  varied  phases  of  the 
struggle.  It  soon  became  evident  from  his  inquiries  and 
versatile  suggestions  that  he  took  nothing  for  granted. 
He  had  to  win  the  preliminary  battle  in  October,  and  he 
left  nothing  undone  within  his  power  to  ascertain  the 
exact  situation  and  to  understand  every  peril  involved 
in  it. 

The  Republican  party  in  Pennsylvania,  although  then 
but  freshly  organized,  had  many  different  elements  and 
bitter  factional  feuds  within  its  own  household,  and  all 
who  actively  participated  in  party  efforts  were  more  or 
less  involved  in  them.  I  did  not  entirely  escape  the  bit- 
44 


(Photo  by  Brady,  Washington.) 

ABRAHAM   UNCOI,N,  1850. 


46  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

terness  that  was  displayed  in  many  quarters.  Had  I 
been  simply  a  private  in  the  ranks,  it  would  have  been 
of  little  consequence  to  Lincoln  whether  I  was  compe 
tent  to  conduct  so  important  a  campaign  or  not ;  but 
when  he  was  advised,  not  only  from  within  the  State, 
but  from  friends  outside  the  State  as  well,  that  the  part}' 
organization  in  Pennsylvania  was  not  equal  to  the  press 
ing  necessities  of  the  occasion,  he  adopted  his  own  cha 
racteristic  methods  to  satisfy  himself  on  the  subject. 

I  had  met  David  Davis  and  Leonard  Swett  for  the  firct 
time  at  the  Chicago  Convention,  and  of  course  we  knew 
little  of  each  other  personally.  Some  time  toward  mid 
summer,  when  the  campaign  in  Pennsylvania  was  well 
under  way,  Davis  and  Swett  entered  my  headquarters 
together  and  handed  me  a  letter  from  Lincoln,  in  which 
he  said  that  these  gentlemen  were  greatly  interested  in 
his  election — that  they  were  on  East  looking  into  the 
contest  generally,  and  he  would  be  pleased  if  I  would 
furnish  them  every  facility  to  ascertain  the  condition  of 
affairs  in  the  State.  I  was  very  glad  to  do  so,  and  they 
spent  two  days  at  my  headquarters,  where  every  informa 
tion  was  given  them  and  the  methods  and  progress  of  the 
organization  opened  to  them  without  reserve.  They  saw 
that  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  Pennsylvania  poli 
tics  the  new  party  had  been  organized  by  the  State  Com 
mittee  in  every  election  district  of  the  State,  and  that 
everything  that  could  be  done  had  been  done  to  put  the 
party  in  condition  for  a  successful  battle. 

After  Davis  and  Swett  had  finished  their  work  and 
notified  me  of  their  purpose  to  leave  during  the  night, 
they  invited  me  to  a  private  dinner  at  which  none  were 
present  but  ourselves.  During  the  course  of  the  dinner 
Swett  informed  me  that  they  were  very  happy  now  to  be 
able  to  tell  me  the  real  purpose  of  their  mission — that 
had  their  information  been  less  satisfactory  they  would 


'A    VISIT   TO   LINCOLN.  47 

have  returned  without  advising  me  of  it.  He  said  that 
they  had  been  instructed  by  Lincoln  to  come  to  Pennsyl 
vania  and  make  personal  examination  into  the  condition 
of  affairs,  especially  as  to  the  efficiency  of  the  party 
organization  of  the  State,  and  that  his  reason  for  doing 
so  was  that  he  had  been  admonished  that  the  direction 
of  the  campaign  by  the  State  Committee  was  incompe 
tent  and  likely  to  result  in  disaster.  They  added  that, 
inasmuch  as  their  answer  to  Lincoln  must  be  that  the 
organization  was  the  best  that  they  had  ever  known  in 
any  State,  they  felt  entirely  at  liberty  to  disclose  to  me 
why  they  had  come  and  what  the  result  of  their  inquiry 
was. 

After  their  return  to  Illinois  letters  from  Lincoln  were 
not  less  frequent,  and  they  were  entirely  confident  in 
tone  and  exhibited  the  utmost  faith  in  the  direction  of 
the  great  Pennsylvania  battle.  I  twice  sent  him  during 
the  campaign — once  about  the  middle  of  August,  and 
again  in  the  latter  part  of  September — a  carefully-pre 
pared  estimate  of  the  vote  for  Governor  by  counties  that 
had  been  made  up  by  a  methodical  and  reasonably  accu 
rate  canvass  of  each  election  district  of  the  State.  The 
first  gave  Governor  Curtin  a  majority  of  12,000,  leaving 
out  of  the  estimate  a  considerable  doubtful  vote.  The 
last  estimate  gave  Curtin  a  majority  of  17,000,  also  omit 
ting  the  doubtful  contingent.  The  result  not  only  justi 
fied  the  estimates  which  had  been  sent  to  him  in  the 
aggregate  majority,  but  it  justified  the  detailed  estimates 
of  the  vote  of  nearly  or  quite  every  county  in  the  State. 

Curtin' s  majority  was  nearly  double  the  last  estimate 
given  him  because  of  the  drift  of  the  doubtful  vote  to 
our  side,  and,  being  successful  in  what  was  regarded  as 
the  decisive  battle  of  the  campaign,  Lincoln  accorded  me 
more  credit  than  I  merited.  From  that  time  until  the 
day  of  his  death  I  was  one  of  those  he  called  into  coun- 


48  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

sel  in  every  important  political  emergency.  Much  as  I 
grieved  over  the  loss  of  the  many  to  me  precious  things 
which  I  had  gathered  about  my  home  in  Chambersburg, 
and  serious  as  was  the  destruction  of  all  my  property 
when  the  vandals  of  McCausland  burned  the  town  in 
1864,  I  have  always  felt  that  the  greatest  loss  I  sustained 
was  in  the  destruction  of  my  entire  correspondence  with 
Abraham  Lincoln. 

About  the  ist  of  January,  1861,  I  received  a  telegram 
from  Lincoln  requesting  me  to  come  to  Springfield.  It 
is  proper  to  say  that  this  invitation  was  in  answer  to  a 
telegram  from  me  advising  him  against  the  appointment 
of  General  Cameron  as  Secretary  of  War.  The  factional 
feuds  and  bitter  antagonisms  of  that  day  have  long  since 
perished,  and  I  do  not  purpose  in  any  way  to  revive 
them.  On  the  3ist  of  December,  Lincoln  had  delivered 
to  Cameron  at  Springfield  a  letter  notifying  him  that  he 
would  be  nominated  for  a  Cabinet  position.  This  fact 
became  known  immediately  upon  Cameron's  return,  and 
inspired  very  vigorous  opposition  to  his  appointment,  in 
which  Governor  Curtin,  Thaddeus  Stevens,  David  Wil- 
mot,  and  many  others  participated.  Although  the  Sen 
ate,  of  which  I  was  a  member,  was  just  about  to  organize, 
I  hastened  to  Springfield  and  reached  there  at  seven 
o'clock  in  the  evening.  I  had  telegraphed  Lincoln  of 
the  hour  that  I  should  arrive  and  that  I  must  return  at 
eleven  the  same  night.  I  went  directly  from  the  depot 
to  Lincoln's  house  and  rang  the  bell,  which  was  answered 
by  Lincoln  himself  opening  the  door.  I  doubt  whether 
I  wholly  concealed  my  disappointment  at  meeting  him. 
Tall,  gaunt,  ungainly,  ill  clad,  with  a  homeliness  of 
manner  that  was  unique  in  itself,  I  confess  that  my  heart 
sank  within  me  as  I  remembered  that  this  was  the  man 
chosen  by  a  great  nation  to  become  its  ruler  in  the  grav 
est  period  of  its  history.  I  remember  his  dress  as  if  it 


A    VISIT  TO   LINCOLN.  49 

were  but  yesterday — snuff-colored  and  slouchy  panta 
loons  ;  open  black  vest,  held  by  a  few  brass  buttons ; 
straight  or  evening  dress-coat,  with  tightly-fitting  sleeves 
to  exaggerate  his  long,  bony  arms,  and  all  supplemented 
by  an  awkwardness  that  was  uncommon  among  men  of 
intelligence.  Such  was  the  picture  I  met  in  the  person 
of  Abraham  Lincoln.  We  sat  down  in  his  plainly  fur 
nished  parlor,  and  were  uninterrupted  during  the  nearly 
four  hours  that  I  remained  with  him,  and  little  by  little, 
as  his  earnestness,  sincerity,  and  candor  were  developed 
in  conversation,  I  forgot  all  the  grotesque  qualities  which 
so  confounded  me  when  I  first  greeted  him.  Before  half 
an  hour  had  passed  I  learned  not  only  to  respect,  but, 
indeed,  to  reverence  the  man. 

It  is  needless  to  give  any  account  of  the  special  mis 
sion  on  which  I  was  called  to  Springfield,  beyond  the 
fact  that  the  tender  of  a  Cabinet  position  to  Pennsylvania 
was  recalled  by  him  on  the  following  day,  although  re 
newed  and  accepted  two  months  later,  when  the  Cabinet 
was  finally  formed  in  Washington.  It  was  after  the 
Pennsylvania  Cabinet  imbroglio  was  disposed  of  that 
Lincoln  exhibited  his  true  self  without  reserve.  For 
more  than  two  hours  he  discussed  the  gravity  of  the  situ 
ation  and  the  appalling  danger  of  civil  war.  Although 
he  had  never  been  in  public  office  outside  the  Illinois 
Legislature,  beyond  a  single  session  of  Congress,  and  had 
little  intercourse  with  men  of  national  prominence  dur 
ing  the  twelve  years  after  his  return  from  Washington, 
he  exhibited  remarkable  knowledge  of  all  the  leading 
public  men  of  the  country,  and  none  could  mistake  the 
patriotic  purpose  that  inspired  him  in  approaching  the 
mighty  responsibility  that  had  been  cast  upon  him  by 
the  people.  He  discussed  the  slavery  question  in  all  its 
aspects  and  all  the  various  causes  which  were  used  as 
pretexts  for  rebellion,  and  he  not  only  was  master  of  the 
4 


50  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

whole  question,  but  thoroughly  understood  his  duty  and 
was  prepared  to  perform  it.  During  this  conversation  I 
had  little  to  say  beyond  answering  an  occasional  ques 
tion  or  suggestion  from  him,  and  I  finally  left  him  fully 
satisfied  that  he  understood  the  political  conditions  in 
Pennsylvania  nearly  as  well  as  I  did  myself,  and  entirely 
assured  that  of  all  the  public  men  named  for  the  Presi 
dency  at  Chicago  he  was  the  most  competent  and  the 
safest  to  take  the  helm  of  the  ship  of  State  and  guide 
it  through  the  impending  storm.  I  saw  many  dark  days 
akin  to  despair  during  the  four  years  which  recorded  the 
crimsoned  annals  from  Sumter  to  Appomattox,  but  I 
never  had  reason  to  change  or  seriously  question  that 
judgment. 

I  next  met  Abraham  Lincoln  at  Harrisburg  on  the  22d 
of  February,  1861,  when  he  passed  through  the  most 
trying  ordeal  of  his  life.  He  had  been  in  Philadelphia 
the  night  before,  where  he  was  advised  by  letters  from 
General  Winfield  Scott  and  his  prospective  Premier, 
Senator  Seward,  that  he  could  not  pass  through  Balti 
more  on  the  23d  without  grave  peril  to  his  life.  His 
route,  as  published  to  the  world  for  some  days,  was 
from  Philadelphia  to  Harrisburg  on  the  morning  of 
the  22d ;  to  remain  in  Harrisburg  over  night  as  the 
guest  of  Governor  Curtin;  and  to  leave  for  Washington 
the  next  morning  by  the  Northern  Central  Railway,  that 
would  take  him  through  Baltimore  about  midday.  A 
number  of  detectives  under  the  direction  of  President 
Felton  of  the  Philadelphia,  Wilmington,  and  Baltimore 
Railroad,  and  Allan  Pinkerton,  chief  of  the  well-known 
detective  agency,  were  convinced  from  the  information 
they  obtained  that  Lincoln  would  be  assassinated  if  he 
attempted  to  pass  through  Baltimore  according  to  the 
published  programme.  A  conference  at  the  Continental 
Hotel  in  Philadelphia  on  the  night  of  the  2ist,  at  which 


A    VISIT   TO   LINCOLN.  51 

Lincoln  was  advised  of  the  admonitions  of  Scott  and 
Seward,  had  not  resulted  in  any  final  determination  as  to 
his  route  to  Washington.  He  was  from  the  first  ex 
tremely  reluctant  about  any  change,  but  it  was  finally 
decided  that  he  should  proceed  to  Harrisburg  on  the 
morning  of  the  22d  and  be  guided  by  events. 

The  two  speeches  made  by  Lincoln  on  the  22d  of  Feb 
ruary  do  not  exhibit  a  single  trace  of  mental  disturbance 
from  the  appalling  news  he  had  received.  He  hoisted 
the  stars  and  stripes  to  the  pinnacle  of  Independence 
Hall  early  in  the  morning  and  delivered  a  brief  address 
that  was  eminently  characteristic  of  the  man.  He  arrived 
at  Harrisburg  about  noon,  was  received  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  by  the  Governor  and  both  branches  of 
the  Legislature,  and  there  spoke  with  the  same  calm  de 
liberation  and  incisiveness  which  marked  all  his  speeches 
during  the  journey  from  Springfield  to  Washington. 
After  the  reception  at  the  House  another  conference  was 
held  on  the  subject  of  his  route  to  Washington,  and, 
while  every  person  present,  with  the  exception  of  Lin 
coln,  was  positive  in  the  demand  that  the  programme 
should  be  changed,  he  still  obstinately  hesitated.  He 
did  not  believe  that  the  danger  of  assassination  was 
serious. 

The  afternoon  conference  practically  decided  nothing, 
but  it  was  assumed  by  those  active  in  directing  Lincoln's 
journey  that  there  must  be  a  change.  Lincoln  dined  at 
the  Jones  House  about  five  o'  clock  with  Governor  Curtin 
as  host  of  the  occasion.  I  recall  as  guests  the  names  of 
Colonel  Thomas  A.  Scott,  Colonel  Sumner,  Colonel  La- 
mon,  Dr.  Wallace,  David  Davis,  Secretary  Slifer,  Attor 
ney-General  Purviance,  Adjutant-General  Russell,  and 
myself.  There  were  others  at  the  table,  but  I  do  not 
recall  them  with  certainty.  Of  that  dinner  circle,  as  I 
remember  them,  only  three  are  now  living — Governor 


52  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Curtin,  Colonel  Lamon,  and  the  writer  hereof.  Mr.  Judd 
was  not  a  guest,  as  he  was  giving  personal  attention  to 
Mrs.  Lincoln,  who  was  much  disturbed  by  the  suggestion 
to  separate  the  President  from  her,  and  she  narrowly  es 
caped  attracting  attention  to  the  movements  which  re 
quired  the  utmost  secrecy. 

It  was  while  at  dinner  that  it  was  finally  determined 
that  Lincoln  should  return  to  Philadelphia  and  go  thence 
to  Washington  that  night,  as  had  been  arranged  in  Phila 
delphia  the  night  previous  in  the  event  of  a  decision  to 
change  the  programme  previously  announced.  No  one 
who  heard  the  discussion  of  the  question  could  efface  it 
from  his  memory.  The  admonitions  received  from  Gen 
eral  Scott  and  Senator  Seward  were  made  known  to  Gov 
ernor  Curtin  at  the  table,  and  the  question  of  a  change 
of  route  was  discussed  for  some  time  by  every  one  with 
the  single  exception  of  Lincoln.  He  was  the  one  silent 
man  of  the  party,  and  when  he  was  finally  compelled  to 
speak  he  unhesitatingly  expressed  his  disapproval  of  the 
movement.  With  impressive  earnestness  he  thus  an 
swered  the  appeal  of  his  friends:  "What  would  the  na 
tion  think  of  its  President  stealing  into  the  Capital  like 
a  thief  in  the  night?"  It  was  only  when  the  other 
guests  were  unanimous  in  the  expression  that  it  was 
not  a  question  for  Lincoln  to  determine,  but  one  for 
his  friends  to  determine  for  him,  that  he  finally  agreed 
to  submit  to  whatever  was  decided  by  those  around  him. 

It  was  most  fortunate  that  Colonel  Scott  was  one  of  the 
guests  at  that  dinner.  He  was  wise  and  keen  in  percep 
tion  and  bold  and  swift  in  execution.  The  time  was 
short,  and  if  a  change  was  to  be  made  in  Lincoln's  route 
it  was  necessary  for  him  to  reach  Philadelphia  by  eleven 
o'  clock  that  night  or  very  soon  thereafter.  Scott  at  once 
became  master  of  ceremonies,  and  everything  that  was 
done  was  in  obedience  to  his  directions.  There  was  a 


A    VISIT   TO   LINCOLN.  53 

crowd  of  thousands  around  the  hotel,  anxious  to  see  the 
new  President  and  ready  to  cheer  him  to  the  uttermost. 
It  was  believed  to  be  best  that  only  one  man  should  ac 
company  Lincoln  in  his  journey  to  Philadelphia  and 
Washington,  and  Lincoln  decided  that  Lamon  should  be 
his  companion.  Colonel  Sumner,  who  felt  that  he  had 
been  charged  with  the  safety  of  the  President-elect,  and 
whose  silvered  crown  seemed  to  entitle  him  to  prece 
dence,  earnestly  protested  against  Lincoln  leaving  his 
immediate  care,  but  it  was  deemed  unsafe  to  have  more 
than  one  accompany  him,  and  the  veteran  soldier  was 
compelled  to  surrender  his  charge.  That  preliminary 
question  settled,  Scott  directed  that  Curtin,  Lincoln,  and 
Lamon  should  at  once  proceed  to  the  front  steps  of  the 
hotel,  where  there  was  a  vast  throng  waiting  to  receive 
them,  and  that  Curtin  should  call  distinctly,  so  that  the 
crowd  could  hear,  for  a  carriage,  and  direct  the  coach 
man  to  drive  the  party  to  the  Executive  Mansion.  That 
was  the  natural  thing  for  Curtin  to  do — to  take  the  Presi 
dent  to  the  Governor's  mansion  as  his  guest,  and  it  ex 
cited  no  suspicion  whatever. 

Before  leaving  the  dining-room  Governor  Curtin  halted 
Lincoln  and  Lamon  at  the  door  and  inquired  of  Lamon 
whether  he  was  well  armed.  Lamon  had  been  chosen 
by  Lincoln  as  his  companion  because  of  his  exceptional 
physical  power  and  prowess,  but  Curtin  wanted  assurance 
that  he  was  properly  equipped  for  defense.  Lamon  at 
once  uncovered  a  small  arsenal  of  deadly  weapons,  show 
ing  that  he  was  literally  armed  to  the  teeth.  In  addition 
to  a  pair  of  heavy  revolvers,  he  had  a  slung-shot  and 
brass  knuckles  and  a  huge  knife  nestled  under  his  vest. 
The  three  entered  the  carriage,  and,  as  instructed  by 
Scott,  drove  toward  the  Executive  Mansion,  but  when 
near  there  the  driver  was  ordered  to  take  a  circuitous 
route  and  to  reach  the  railroad  depot  within  half  an 


54  LINCOLN  AND   M&N    OF   WAR-TIMES. 

hour.  When  Curtin  and  his  party  had  gotten  fairly 
away  from  the  hotel  I  accompanied  Scott  to  the  railway 
depot,  where  he  at  once  cleared  one  of  his  lines  from 
Harrisburg  to  Philadelphia,  so  that  there  could  be  no 
obstruction  upon  it,  as  had  been  agreed  upon  at  Phila 
delphia  the  evening  before  in  case  the  change  should  be 
made.  In  the  mean  time  he  had  ordered  a  locomotive 
and  a  single  car  to  be  brought  to  the  eastern  entrance  of 
the  depot,  and  at  the  appointed  time  the  carriage  arrived. 
Lincoln  and  Lamon  emerged  from  the  carriage  and  en 
tered  the  car  unnoticed  by  any  except  those  interested  in 
the  matter,  and  after  a  quiet  but  fervent  ' '  Good-bye  and 
God  protect  you!"  the  engineer  quietly  moved  his  train 
away  on  its  momentous  mission. 

As  soon  as  the  train  left  I  accompanied  Scott  in  the 
work  of  severing  all  the  telegraph  lines  which  entered 
Harrisburg.  He  was  not  content  with  directing  that  it 
should  be  done,  but  he  personally  saw  that  every  wire 
was  cut.  This  was  about  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening. 
It  had  been  arranged  that  the  eleven  o'clock  train  from 
Philadelphia  to  Washington  should  be  held  until  Lin 
coln  arrived,  on  the  pretext  of  delivering  an  important 
package  to  the  conductor.  The  train  on  which  he  was 
to  leave  Philadelphia  was  due  in  Washington  at  six  in 
the  morning,  and  Scott  kept  faithful  vigil  during  the 
entire  night,  not  only  to  see  that  there  should  be  no  res 
toration  of  the  wires,  but  waiting  with  anxious  solicitude 
for  the  time  when  he  might  hope  to  hear  the  good  news 
that  Lincoln  had  arrived  in  safety.  To  guard  against 
every  possible  chance  of  imposition  a  special  cipher  was 
agreed  upon  that  could  not  possibly  be  understood  by 
any  but  the  parties  to  it.  It  was  a  long,  weary  night  of 
fretful  anxiety  to  the  dozen  or  more  in  Harrisburg  who 
had  knowledge  of  the  sudden  departure  of  Lincoln.  No 
one  attempted  to  sleep.  All  felt  that  the  fate  of  the  na- 


A    VISIT   TO   LINCOLN  55 

tion  hung  on  the  safe  progress  of  Lincoln  to  Washington 
without  detection  on  his  journey.  Scott,  who  was  of 
heroic  mould,  several  times  tried  to  temper  the  severe 
strain  of  his  anxiety  by  looking  up  railway  matters,  but 
he  would  soon  abandon  the  listless  effort,  and  thrice  we 
strolled  from  the  depot  to  the  Jones  House  and  back 
again,  in  aimless  struggle  to  hasten  the  slowly-passing 
hours,  only  to  find  equally  anxious  watchers  there  and  a 
wife  whose  sobbing  heart  could  not  be  consoled.  At  last 
the  eastern  horizon  was  purpled  with  the  promise  of  day. 
Scott  reunited  the  broken  lines  for  the  lightning  messen 
ger,  and  he  was  soon  gladdened  by  an  unsigned  dispatch 
from  Washington,  saying,  u  Plums  delivered  nuts  safely." 
He  whirled  his  hat  high  in  the  little  telegraph  office  as 
he  shouted,  "  Lincoln's  in  Washington,"  and  we  rushed 
to  the  Jones  House  and  hurried  a  messenger  to  the  Ex 
ecutive  Mansion  to  spread  the  glad  tidings  that  Lincoln 
had  safely  made  his  midnight  journey  to  the  Capital. 

I  have  several  times  heard  Lincoln  refer  to  this  jour 
ney,  and  always  with  regret  Indeed,  he  seemed  to 
regard  it  as  one  of  the  grave  mistakes  in  his  public 
career.  He  was  fully  convinced,  as  Colonel  Lamon  has 
stated  it,  that  "  he  had  fled  from  a  danger  purely  imag 
inary,  and  he  felt  the  shame  and  mortification  natural  to 
a  brave  man  under  such  circumstances. ' '  Mrs.  Lincoln 
and  her  suite  passed  through  Baltimore  on  the  23d  with 
out  any  sign  of  turbulence.  The  fact  that  there  was  not 
even  a  curious  crowd  brought  together  when  she  passed 
through  the  city — which  then  required  considerable  time, 
as  the  cars  were  taken  across  Baltimore  by  horses — con 
firmed  Lincoln  in  his  belief.  It  is  needless  now  to  dis 
cuss  the  question  of  real  or  imaginary  danger  in  Lincoln 
passing  through  Baltimore  at  noonday  according  to  the 
original  programme.  It  is  enough  to  know  that  there 
were  reasonable  grounds  for  apprehension  that  an  attempt 


56  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF    WAR-TlJMl^S. 

might  be  made  upon  his  life,  even  if  there  was  not  the 
organized  band  of  assassins  that  the  detectives  believed 
to  exist.  His  presence  in  the  city  would  have  called  out 
an  immense  concourse  of  people,  including  thousands  of 
thoroughly  disloyal  roughs,  who  could  easily  have  been 
inspired  to  any  measure  of  violence.  He  simply  acted 
the  part  of  a  prudent  man  in  his  reluctant  obedience  to 
the  unanimous  decision  of  his  friends  in  Harrisburg 
when  he  was  suddenly  sent  back  to  Philadelphia  to  take 
the  midnight  train  for  Washington,  and  there  was  no 
good  reason  why  he. should  have  regretted  it;  but  his 
naturally  sensitive  disposition  made  him  always  feel 
humiliated  when  it  recurred  to  him. 

The  sensational  stories  published  at  the  time  of  his 
disguise  for  the  journey  were  wholly  untrue.  He  was 
reported  as  having  been  dressed  in  a  Scotch  cap  and 
cloak  and  as  entering  the  car  at  the  Broad  and  Prime 
station  by  some  private  alley-way,  but  there  was  no  truth 
whatever  in  any  of  these  statements.  I  saw  him  leave 
the  dining-room  at  Harrisburg  to  enter  the  carriage  with 
Curtin  and  Lamon.  I  saw  him  enter  the  car  at  the  Har 
risburg  depot,  and  the  only  change  in  his  dress  was  the 
substitution  of  a  soft  slouch  hat  for  the  high  one  he  had 
worn  during  the  day.  He  wore  the  same  overcoat  that 
he  had  worn  when  he  arrived  at  Harrisburg,  and  the 
only  extra  apparel  he  had  about  him  was  the  shawl  that 
hung  over  his  arm.  When  he  reached  West  Philadelphia 
he  was  met  by  Superintendent  Kenney,  who  had  a  car 
riage  in  waiting  with  a  single  detective  in  it.  Lincoln 
and  Ivamon  entered  the  carriage  and  Kenney  mounted 
the  box  with  the  driver.  They  were  in  advance  of  the 
time  for  the  starting  of  the  Baltimore  train,  and  they 
were  driven  around  on  Broad  street,  as  the  driver  was 
informed,  in  search  of  some  one  wanted  by  Kenney  and 
the  detective,  until  it  was  time  to  reach  the  station. 


A    VISIT  TO   LINCOLN.  57 

When  there  they  entered  by  the  public  doorway  on 
Broad  street,  arid  passed  directly  along  with  other  pas 
sengers  to  the  car,  where  their  berths  had  been  engaged. 
The  journey  to  Washington  was  entirely  uneventful,  and 
at  six  in  the  morning  the  train  entered  the  Washington 
station  on  schedule  time.  Seward  had  been  advised,  by 
the  return  of  his  son  from  Philadelphia,  of  the  probable 
execution  of  this  programme,  and  he  and  Washburne 
were  in  the  station  and  met  the  President  and  his  party, 
and  all  drove  together  to  Willard's  Hotel.  Thus  ends 
the  story  of  Lincoln's  midnight  journey  from  Harrisburg 
to  the  National  Capital. 


(Photo  by  Brady,  Washington.) 

LIEUT. -GENERAI,  WINFIELD  SCOTT,  l86l. 


LINCOLN'S  SORE  TRIALS. 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  arrived  in  Washington  on  the 
/v.  2  ^d  of  February,  1861,  to  accept  the  most  appalling 
responsibilities  ever  cast  upon  any  civil  ruler  of  modern 
times.  '  If  he  could  have  commanded  the  hearty  confi 
dence  and  co-operation  of  the  leaders  of  his  own  party, 
his  task  would  have  been  greatly  lessened,  but  it  is  due 
to  the  truth  of  history  to  say  that  few,  very  few,  of  the 
Republican  leaders  of  national  fame  had  faith  in  Lin 
coln's  ability  for  the  trust  assigned  fo  him.  I  could 
name  a  dozen  men,  now  idols  of  the  nation,  whose  open 
distrust  of  Lincoln  not  only  seriously  embarrassed,  but 
grievously  pained  and  humiliated,  him.  They  felt  that 
the  wrong  man  had  been  elected  to  the  Presidency,  and 
only  their  modesty  prevented  them,  in  each  case,  from 
naming  the  man  who  should  have  been  chosen  in  his 
stead.  Looking  now  over  the  names  most  illustrious  in 
the  Republican  councils,  I  can  hardly  recall  one  who  en 
couraged  Lincoln  by  the  confidence  he  so  much  needed. 
Even  Seward,  who  had  been  notified  as  early  as  the  8th 
of  December  that  he  would  be  called  as  Premier  of  the 
new  administration,  and  who  soon  thereafter  had  signi 
fied  his  acceptance  of  the  office  and  continued  in  the 
most  confidential  relations  with  Lincoln,  suddenly,  on 
the  2d  of  March,  formally  notified  Lincoln  of  his  recon 
sideration  of  his  acceptance.  The  only  reason  given  was 
that  circumstances  had  occurred  since  his  acceptance 

59 


60  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

which  seemed  to  render  it  his  duty  "  to  ask  leave  to 
withdraw  that  consent. ' '  The  circumstances  referred  to 
were  the  hopeless  discord  and  bitter  jealousies  among 
party-leaders  both  in  and  out  of  the  Cabinet. 

Lincoln  found  a  party  without  a  policy ;  the  strangest 
confusion  and  bitterest  antagonisms  pervading  those  who 
should  have  been  in  accord,  not  only  in  purpose,  but  in 
earnest  sympathy,  with  him  in  the  discharge  of  his  great 
duties,  and  he  was  practically  like  a  ship  tempest-tossed 
without  compass  or  rudder.  Even  the  men  called  to  his 
Cabinet  did  not  give  Ivincoln  their  confidence  and  co 
operation.  No  two  of  them  seemed  to  have  the  same 
views  as  to  the  policy  the  administration  should  adopt. 
Seward  ridiculed  the  idea  of  serious  civil  war,  and  then 
and  thereafter  renewed  his  bond  for  peace  in  sixty  days, 
only  to  be  protested  from  month  to  month  and  from  year 
to  year.  Chase  believed  in  peaceable  disunion  as  alto 
gether  preferable  to  fraternal  conflict,  and  urged  his 
views  with  earnestness  upon  the  President.  Cameron, 
always  eminently  practical,  was  not  misled  by  any  senti 
mental  ideas  and  regarded  war  as  inevitable.  Welles 
was  an  amiable  gentleman  without  any  aggressive  quali 
ties  whatever,  and  Smith  and  Bates  were  old  and  con 
servative,  while  Blair  was  a  politician  with  few  of  the 
qualities  of  a  statesman. 

A  reasonably  correct  idea  of  the  estimate  placed  upon 
Lincoln's  abilities  for  his  position  may  be  obtained  by 
turning  to  the  eulogy  on  Seward  delivered  by  Charles 
Francis  Adams  in  1873.  Adams  was  a  Republican  mem 
ber  of  Congress  when  Ivincoln  was  chosen  President,  and 
he  was  Lincoln's  Minister  to  England  during  the  entire 
period  of  the  war.  In  eulogizing  Seward  as  the  master 
spirit  of  the  administration  and  as  the  power  behind  the 
throne  stronger  than  the  throne  itself,  he  said:  "I  must 
affirm,  without  hesitation,  that  in  the  history  of  our  gov- 


LINCOLN1  S  SORE    TRIALS.  61 

ernment  down  to  this  hour  no  experiment  so  rash  has 
ever  been  made  as  that  of  electing  to  the  head  of  affairs 
a  man  with  so  little  previous  preparation  for  his  task  as 
Mr.  Lincoln."  Indeed,  Lincoln  himself  seems  to  have 
been  profoundly  impressed  with  his  want  of  fitness  for 
the  position  when  he  was  first  named  as  a  candidate  from 
his  State.  In  1859,  after  he  had  attained  national  repu 
tation  by  his  joint  discussion  with  Douglas  in  the  contest 
for  Senator,  Mr.  Pickett,  the  editor  of  an  Illinois  Repub 
lican  journal,  wrote  to  him,  urging  that  he  should  permit 
the  use  of  his  name  for  President.  To  this  he  answered: 
"  I  must  in  candor  say  I  do  not  think  myself  fit  for  the 
Presidency.  I  certainly  am  flattered  and  gratified  that 
some  partial  friends  think  of  me  in  that  connection,  but 
I  really  think  it  best  for  our  cause  that  no  concerted 
effort,  such  as  you  suggest,  should  be  made."  Seward 
evidently  agreed  with  his  eulogist,  Mr.  Adams.  That  is 
clearly  shown  by  the  fact  that  in  less  than  one  month 
after  the  administration  had  been  inaugurated  he  wrote 
out  and  submitted  to  the  President  a  proposition  to 
change  the  national  issue  from  slavery  to  foreign  war, 
in  which  he  advised  that  war  be  at  once  declared  against 
Spain  and  France  unless  satisfactory  explanations  were 
promptly  received,  and  that  the  enforcement  of  the  new 
policy  should  be  individually  assumed  by  the  President 
himself  or  devolved  on  some  member  of  his  Cabinet. 
He  added  that  while  it  was  not  in  his  special  province, 
"I  neither  seek  to  evade  nor  assume  the  responsibility." 
In  other  words,  Seward  boldly  proposed  to  change  the 
national  issue  by  a  declaration  of  war  against  some  for 
eign  power,  and  to  have  himself  assigned  practically  as 
Dictator.  He  assumed  that  the  President  was  incompe 
tent  to  his  task,  that  his  policy,  if  accepted,  would  be 
committed  to  himself  for  execution,  and  that  he  meant 
to  be  Dictator  is  clearly  proved  by  the  fact  that  in  his 


62  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

formal  proposition  he  provides  that  the  policy  "once 
adopted,  the  debates  on  it  must  end  and  all  agree  and 
abide." 

Outside  of  the  Cabinet  the  leaders  were  equally  dis 
cordant  and  quite  as  distrustful  of  the  ability  of  Lincoln 
to  fill  his  great  office.  Sumner,  Trumbull,  Chandler, 
Wade,  Henry  Winter  Davis,  and  the  men  to  whom  the 
nation  then  turned  as  the  great  representative  men  of  the 
new  political  power,  did  not  conceal  their  distrust  of  Lin 
coln,  and  he  had  little  support  from  them  at  any  time 
during  his  administration.  Indeed,  but  for  the  support 
given  him  by  the  younger  leaders  of  that  day,  among 
whom  Blaine  and  Sherman  were  conspicuous,  he  would 
have  been  a  President  almost  without  a  party.  The  one 
man  who  rendered  him  the  greatest  service  of  all  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  was  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  his  old 
competitor  of  Illinois.  When  the  Republican  leaders 
were  hesitating  and  criticising  their  President,  Douglas 
came  to  the  front  with  all  his  characteristic  courage  and 
sagacity,  and  was  probably  the  most  trusted  of  all  the 
Senators  at  the  White  House.  It  is  not  surprising  that 
there  was  great  confusion  in  the  councils  of  the  Repub 
lican  leaders  when  suddenly  compelled  to  face  civil  war, 
but  it  will  surprise  many  intelligent  readers  at  this  day  to 
learn  of  the  general  distrust  and  demoralization  that  ex 
isted  among  the  men  who  should  have  been  a  solid  pha 
lanx  of  leadership  in  the  crisis  that  confronted  them.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  there  were  no  precedents  in 
history  to  guide  the  new  President.  The  relation  of  the 
States  to  the  National  Government  had  never  been  de 
fined.  The  dispute  over  the  sovereignty  of  the  States 
had  been  continuous  from  the  organization  of  the  Re 
public  until  that  time,  and  men  of  equal  intelligence  and 
patriotism  widely  differed  as  to  the  paramount  authority 
of  State  and  Nation.  Nor  were  there  any  precedents  in 


LINCOLN'S  SORE    TRIALS,  63 

history  of  other  civilizations  that  could  throw  any  light 
upon  the  dark  path  of  Lincoln.  There  have  been  re 
publics  and  civil  wars,  but  none  that  furnish  any  rule 
that  could  be  applied  to  the  peculiar  condition  of  our 
dissevered  States.  The  President  was  therefore  com 
pelled  to  decide  for  himself  in  the  multitude  of  conflict 
ing  counsels  what  policy  the  administration  should  adopt, 
and  even  a  less  careful  and  conservative  man  than  Lin 
coln  would  have  been  compelled,  from  the  supreme  ne 
cessities  which  surrounded  him,  to  move  with  the  utmost 
caution. 

Lincoln  could  formulate  no  policy  beyond  mere  gen 
eralities  declaring  his  duty  to  preserve  the  integrity  of 
the  Union.  He  saw  forts  captured  and  arsenals  gutted 
and  States  seceding  with  every  preparation  for  war,  and 
yet  he  could  take  no  step  to  prepare  the  nation  for  the 
defense  of  its  own  life.  The  Border  States  were  trem 
bling  in  the  balance,  with  a  predominant  Union  senti 
ment  in  most  of  them,  but  ready  to  be  driven  into  open 
rebellion  the  moment  that  he  should  declare  in  favor  of 
what  was  called  "  coercion  "  by  force  of  arms.  Coercion 
and  invasion  of  the  sacred  soil  of  the  Southern  States 
were  terms  which  made  even  the  stoutest  Southern 
Union  man  tremble.  As  the  administration  had  no 
policy  that  it  could  declare,  every  leader  had  a  policy 
of  his  own,  with  every  invitation  to  seek  to  magnify 
himself  by  declaring  it.  The  capital  was  crowded  with 
politicians  of  every  grade.  The  place-seekers  swarmed 
in  numbers  almost  equal  to  the  locusts  of  Egypt,  and  the 
President  was  pestered  day  and  night  by  the  leading 
statesmen  of  the  country,  who  clamored  for  offices  for 
their  henchmen.  I  well  remember  the  sad  picture  of 
despair  his  face  presented  when  I  happened  to  meet  him 
alone  for  a  few  moments  in  the  Executive  Chamber  as 
he  spoke  of  the  heartless  spoilsmen  who  seemed  to  be 


64  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

utterly  indifferent  to  the  grave  dangers  which  threatened 
the  government.  He  said:  "  I  seem  like  one  sitting  in  a 
palace  assigning  apartments  to  importunate  applicants 
while  the  structure  is  on  fire  and  likely  soon  to  perish 
in  ashes." 

Turn  where  Lincoln  might,  there  was  hardly  a  silver 
lining  to  the  dark  cloud  that  overshadowed  him.  The 
Senate  that  met  in  Executive  session  when  he  was  in 
augurated  contained  but  29  Republicans  to  32  Democrats, 
with  i  bitterly  hostile  American,  and  4  vacancies  from 
Southern  States  that  never  were  filled.  It  was  only  by 
the  midsummer  madness  of  secession  and  the  retirement 
of  the  Southern  Senators  that  he  was  given  the  majority 
in  both  branches  of  Congress,  and  when  he  turned  to  the 
military  arm  of  the  government  he  was  appalled  by  the 
treachery  of  the  men  to  whom  the  nation  should  have 
been  able  to  look  for  its  preservation.  If  any  one  would 
study  the  most  painful  and  impressive  object-lesson  on 
this  point,  let  him  turn  to  Greeley's  American  Conflict 
and  learn  from  two  pictures  how  the  stars  of  chieftains 
glittered  and  faded  until  unknown  men  filled  their  places 
and  led  the  Union  armies  to  victory.  In  the  first  volume 
of  Greeley's  history,  which  was  written  just  at  the  begin 
ning  of  the  war  and  closed  with  the  commencement  of 
hostilities,  there  is  a  page  containing  the  portraits  of 
twelve  men,  entitled  "Union  Generals."  The  central 
figure  is  the  veteran  Scott,  and  around  him  are  Fremont, 
Butler,  McDowell,  Wool,  Halleck,  McClellan,  Burnside, 
Hunter,  Hooker,  Buell,  and  Anderson.  These  were  the 
chieftains  in  whom  the  country  then  confided,  and  to 
whom  Lincoln  turned  as  the  men  who  could  be  en 
trusted  with  the  command  of  armies.  In  the  second 
volume  of  Greeley's  history,  published  after  the  close 
of  the  war,  there  is  another  picture  entitled  "Union 
Generals,"  and  there  is  not  one  face  to  be  found  in  the 


LINCOLN'S  SORE    TRIALS.  65 

last  that  is  in  the  first.  Grant  is  the  central  figure  of 
the  Heroes  of  the  Union  at  the  close  of  the  war,  with 
the  faces  of  Sherman,  Sheridan,  Thomas,  Meade,  Han 
cock,  Blair,  Howard,  Terry,  Curtis,  Banks,  and  Gilmore 
around  him.  In  short,  the  military  chieftains  who  saved 
the  Union  in  the  flame  of  battle  had  to  be  created  by 
the  exigencies  of  war,  while  the  men  upon  whom  the 
President  was  compelled  to  lean  when  the  conflict 
began  one  by  one  faded  from  the  list  of  successful 
generals. 

The  ability  of  the  government  to  protect  its  own  life 
when  wanton  war  was  inaugurated  by  the  Southern  Con 
federacy  may  be  well  illustrated  by  an  interview  between 
the  President,  General  Winfield  Scott,  Governor  Curtin, 
and  myself  immediately  after  the  surrender  of  Sumter. 
The  President  telegraphed  to  Governor  Curtin  and  to  me 
as  Chairman  of  the  Military  Committee  of  the  Senate  to 
come  to  Washington  as  speedily  as  possible  for  consulta 
tion  as  to  the  attitude  Pennsylvania  should  assume  in  the 
civil  conflict  that  had  been  inaugurated.  Pennsylvania 
was  the  most  exposed  of  all  the  border  States,  and,  being 
the  second  State  of  the  Union  in  population,  wealth,  and 
military  power,  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  that  she 
should  lead  in  defining  the  attitude  of  the  loyal  States. 
Sumter  was  surrendered  on  Saturday  evening,  the  i3th 
of  April,  1 86 1,  and  on  Monday  morning  Governor  Cur 
tin  and  I  were  at  the  White  House  to  meet  the  President 
and  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  armies  at  ten  o'clock 
in  the  morning. .  I  had  never  before  met  General  Scott. 
I  had  read  of  him  with  all  the  enthusiasm  of  a  boy,  as 
he  was  a  major-general  before  I  was  born,  had  noted 
with  pride  his  brilliant  campaign  in  Mexico,  and  remem 
bered  that  he  was  accepted  by  all  Americans  as  the  Great 
Captain  of  the  Age.  I  assumed,  of  course,  that  he  was 
infallible  in  all  matters  pertaining  to  war,  and  when  I 
5 


66  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OP 

met  him  it  was  with  a  degree  of  reverence  that  I  had 
seldom  felt  for  any  other  mortal. 

Curtin  and  I  were  a  few  minutes  in  advance  of  the  ap 
pointed  time  for  the  conference,  and  as  the  Cabinet  was 
in  session  we  were  seated  in  the  reception-room.  There 
were  but  few  there  when  we  entered  it,  and  a  number  of 
chairs  were  vacant.  We  sat  down  by  a  window  looking 
out  upon  the  Potomac,  and  in  a  few  minutes  the  tall  form 
of  General  Scott  entered.  In  the  mean  time  a  number 
of  visitors  had  arrived  and  every  chair  in  the  room  was 
occupied.  Scott  advanced  and  was  cordially  greeted  by 
Governor  Curtin  and  introduced  to  me.  He  was  then 
quite  feeble,  unable  to  mount  a  horse  by  reason  of  a  dis 
tressing  spinal  affection;  and  I  well  remember  the  punc 
tilious  ideas  of  the  old  soldier,  who  refused  to  accept 
either  Curtin' s  chair  or  mine  because  there  were  not 
three  vacant  chairs  in  the  room,  although  he  could  not 
remain  standing  without  suffering  agony.  We  presented 
the  ludicrous  spectacle  of  three  men  standing  for  nearly 
half  an  hour,  and  one  of  them  feeble  in  strength  and 
greatly  the  senior  of  the  others  in  years,  simply  because 
there  were  not  enough  chairs  for  the  entire  party.  With 
all  his  suffering  he  was  too  dignified  even  to  lean  against 
the  wall,  although  it  was  evident  to  both  of  us  that  he 
was  in  great  pain  from  his  ceremonial  ideas  about  ac 
cepting  the  chair  of  another.  When  we  were  ushered 
into  the  President's  room  the  practical  work  of  our  mis 
sion  was  soon  determined.  The  question  had  been  fully 
considered  by  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War, 
who  was  a  Pennsylvanian.  Governor  Curtin  speedily 
perfected  and  heartily  approved  of  the  programme  they 
had  marked  out,  and  we  had  little  to  do  beyond  inform 
ing  them  how  speedily  it  could  be  executed.  How 
quickly  Pennsylvania  responded  to  the  request  of  the 
government  will  be  understood  when  I  state  that  in  a 

;* 


LINCOLN'S  SORE    TRIALS.  67 

single  day  a  bill  embracing  all  the  features  desired  was 
passed  by  both  branches  and  approved  by  Governor 
Curtin. 

It  was  only  after  the  work  of  Pennsylvania  had  been 
defined  and  disposed  of  that  I  began  to  get  some  insight 
into  the  utterly  hopeless  condition  of  the  government.  I 
found  General  Scott  disposed  to  talk  rather  freely  about 
the  situation,  and  I  ventured  to  question  him  as  to  the 
condition  of  the  capital  and  his  ability  to  defend  it  in 
case  of  an  attack  by  General  Beauregard.  The  answer 
to  the  first  question  I  ventured  was  very  assuring,  coming 
from  one  whom  I  supposed  to  know  all  about  war,  and  to 
one  who  knew  just  nothing  at  all  about  it.  I  asked  Gen 
eral  Scott  whether  the  capital  was  in  danger.  His  an 
swer  was,  ' '  No,  sir,  the  capital  is  not  in  danger,  the  cap 
ital  is  not  in  danger. ' '  Knowing  that  General  Scott 
could  not  have  a  large  force  at  his  command,  knowing 
also  that  General  Beauregard  had  a  formidable  force  at 
his  command  at  Charleston,  and  that  the  transportation 
of  an  army  from  Charleston  to  Washington  would  be  the 
work  of  only  a  few  days,  I  for  the  first  time  began  to 
inquire  in  my  own  mind  whether  this  great  Chieftain 
was,  after  all,  equal  to  the  exceptional  necessities  of  the 
occasion.  I  said  to  him  that,  if  it  was  a  proper  question 
for  him  to  answer,  I  would  like  to  know  how  many  men 
he  had  in  Washington  for  its  defense.  His  prompt  an 
swer  was,  "  Fifteen  hundred,  sir;  fifteen  hundred  men 
and  two  batteries."  I  then  inquired  whether  Washing 
ton  was  a  defensible  city.  This  inquiry  cast  a  shadow 
over  the  old  veteran's  face  as  he  answered,  "  No,  sir; 
Washington  is  not  a  defensible  city. ' '  He  then  seemed 
to  consider  it  necessary  to  emphasize  his  assertions  of 
the  safety  of  the  capital,  and  he  pointed  to  the  Potomac, 
that  was  visible  from  the  President's  window.  Said  he  : 
uYou  see  that  vessel? — a  sloop  of  war,  sir,  a  sloop  of 


68  LINCOLN  AND.  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES, 

war. ' '  I  looked  out  and  saw  the  vessel,  but  I  could  not 
help  thinking,  as  I  looked  beyond  to  Arlington  Heights, 
that  one  or  two  batteries,  even  of  the  ineffective  class  of 
those  days,  would  knock  the  sloop  of  war  to  pieces  in 
half  an  hour. 

As  Johnson,  Cooper,  and  a  number  of  other  able  sol 
diers  had  left  the  army  but  a  short  time  before,  I  felt 
some  anxiety  to  know  who  were  commanding  the  forces 
under  General  Scott  in  Washington.  He  gave  me  their 
names,  and  within  three  days  thereafter  I  saw  that  two 
of  them  had  resigned  and  were  already  in  Richmond 
and  enlisted  in  the  Confederate  service.  My  doubts  mul 
tiplied,  and  a  great  idol  was  shattered  before  I  left  the 
White  House  that  morning.  I  could  not  resist  the  con 
viction  that  General  Scott  was  past  all  usefulness ;  that 
he  had  no  adequate  conception  of  the  contest  before  us  ; 
and  that  he  rested  in  confidence  in  Washington  when 
there  was  not  a  soldier  of  average  intelligence  in  that 
city  who  did  not  know  that  Beauregard  could  capture  it 
at  any  time  within  a  week.  My  anxiety  deepened  with 
my  doubts,  and  I  continued  my  inquiries  with  the  old 
warrior  by  asking  how  many  men  General  Beauregard 
had  at  Charleston.  The  old  chieftain's  head  dropped 
almost  upon  his  breast  at  this  question,  and  a  trace  of 
despair  was  visible  as  he  answered  in  tremulous  tones : 
"  General  Beauregard  commands  more  men  at  Charles 
ton  than  I  command  on  the  continent  east  of  the  fron 
tier."  I  asked  him  how  long  it  would  require  Beaure 
gard  to  transport  his  army  to  Washington.  He  answered 
that  it  might  be  done  in  three  or  four  days.  I  then  re 
peated  the  question,  ' '  General,  is  not  Washington  in 
great  danger  ?' '  The  old  warrior  was  at  once  aroused, 
straightened  himself  up  in  his  chair  with  a  degree  of 
dignity  that  was  crushing,  and  answered — "No,  sir,  the 


LINCOLN'S  SORE   TRIALS.  69 

capital  can' the  taken;  the  capital  can't  be  taken,  sir." 
President  Lincoln  listened  to  the  conversation  with  evi 
dent  interest,  bnt  said  nothing.  He  sat  intently  gazing 
at  General  Scott,  and  whirling  his  spectacles  around  in 
his  fingers.  When  General  Scott  gave  the  final  answer 
that  the  capital  could  not  be  taken,  Lincoln,  in  his 
quaint  way,  said  to  General  Scott,  ' '  It  does  seem  to  me, 
general,  that  if  I  were  Beauregard  I  would  take  Wash 
ington.  ' '  This  expression  from  the  President  electrified 
the  old  war-lion  again,  and  he  answered  with  increased 
emphasis,  "Mr.  President,  the  capital  can't  be  taken, 
sir;  it  can't  be  taken." 

There  was  but  one  conclusion  that  could  be  accepted 
as  the  result  of  this  interview,  and  that  was  that  the 
great  Chieftain  of  two  wars  and  the  worshiped  Captain 
of  the  Age  was  in  his  dotage  and  utterly  unequal  to  the 
great  duty  of  meeting  the  impending  conflict.  Governor 
Curtin  and  I  left  profoundly  impressed  with  the  convic 
tion  that  the  incompetency  of  General  Scott  was  one  of 
the  most  serious  of  the  multiplied  perils  which  then  con 
fronted  the  Republic.  I  need  not  repeat  how  General 
Scott  failed  in  his  early  military  movements ;  how  he 
divided  his  army  and  permitted  the  enemy  to  unite  and 
defeat  him  at  Bull  Run ;  how  General  McClellan,  the 
Young  Napoleon  of  the  time,  was  called  from  his  vic 
tories  in  Western  Virginia  to  take  command  of  the 
army  ;  how  that  change  reinspired  the  loyal  people  of 
the  nation  in  the  confidence  of  speedy  victories  and  the 
overthrow  of  the  rebellion;  how  he  and  his  Chief  soon 
got  to  cross  purposes;  and  how,  after  months  of  quarrel, 
the  old  Chieftain  was  prevailed  upon  to  resign  his  place. 
The  inside  history  of  his  retirement  has  never  been  writ 
ten,  and  it  is  best  that  it  should  not.  President  Lincoln, 
Secretary  Cameron,  and  Thomas  A.  Scott  were  the  only 
men  who  could  have  written  it  from  personal  knowledge, 


7°  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

They  are  dead,  and  an  interesting  chapter  of  history  has 
perished  with  them. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  the  government  at  the  open 
ing  of  our  civil  war.  A  great  soldier  was  at  the  head  of 
our  army,  with  all  his  faculties  weakened  by  the  infirm 
ities  of  age,  and  we  were  compelled  to  grope  in  the  dark 
day  after  day,  week  after  week,  month  after  month,  and 
even  year  after  year,  until  chieftains  could  be  created  to 
lead  our  armies  to  final  victories.  It  must  be  remem 
bered  also  that  public  sentiment  had  at  that  time  no 
conception  of  the  cruel  sacrifices  of  war.  The  fall  of  a 
single  soldier,N  Colonel  Ellsworth,  at  Alexandria  cast  a 
profound  gloom  over  the  entire  country,  and  the  loss  of 
comparatively  few  men  at  Big  Bethel  and  Ball's  Bluff 
convulsed  the  people  from  Maine  to  California.  No  one 
dreamed  of  the  sacrifice  of  life  that  a  desperate  war  must 
involve.  I  remember  meeting  General  Burnside,  Gen 
eral  Heintzelman,  and  one  or  two  other  officers  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Willard's  Hotel  in  December, 
1 86 1.  The  weather  had  been  unusually  favorable,  the 
roads  were  in  excellent  condition,  and  there  was  general 
impatience  at  McClellan's  tardiness  in  moving  against 
Manassas  and  Richmond.  I  naturally  shared  the  impa 
tience  that  was  next  to  universal,  and  I  inquired  of  Gen 
eral  Burnside  why  it  was  that  the  army  did  not  move. 
He  answered  that  it  would  not  be  a  difficult  task  for 
McClellan's  army  to  capture  Manassas,  march  upon 
Richmond,  and  enter  the  Confederate  capital;  but  he 
added  with  emphasis  that  he  regarded  as  conclusive  that 
"It  would  cost  ten  thousand  men  to  do  it."  I  was 
appalled  to  silence  when  compelled  to  consider  so  great 
a  sacrifice  for  the  possession  of  the  insurgents'  capital. 
Ten  times  ten  thousand  men,  and  even  more,  fell  in  the 
battles  between  the  Potomac  and  Richmond  before  the 
bars  fell  from  fbe  Richmond  State  House,  but 


LINCOLN'S  SORE    TRIALS.  7 1 

in  the  fall  of  1861  the  proposition  to  sacrifice  ten  thou 
sand  lives  to  possess  the  Confederate  capital  would  have 
been  regarded  by  all  as  too  appalling  to  contemplate. 
Indeed,  we  were  not  only  utterly  unprepared  for  war, 
but  we  were  utterly  unprepared  for  its  sacrifices  and  its 
bereavements;  and  President  Lincoln  was  compelled  to 
meet  this  great  crisis  and  patiently  await  the  fullness  of 
time  to  obtain  chieftains  and  armies  and  to  school  the 
people  to  the  crimsoned  story  necessary  to  tell  of  the 
safety  of  the  Republic. 


LINCOLN'S  CHARACTERISTICS. 


ABRAHAM  UNCOIyN  was  eminently  human.  As 
-TlL  the  old  lady  said  about  General  Jackson  when  she 
had  finally  reached  his  presence,  "  He's  only  a  man,  after 
all. ' '  Although  much  as  other  men  in  the  varied  quali 
ties  which  go  to  make  up  a  single  character,  taking  him 
all  in  all,  ' '  none  but  himself  can  be  his  parallel. ' '  Of 
all  the  public  men  I  have  met,  he  was  the  most  difficult 
to  analyze.  His  characteristics  were  more  original,  more 
diversified,  more  intense  in  a  sober  way,  and  yet  more 
flexible  under  many  circumstances,  than  I  have  ever 
seen  in  any  other.  Many  have  attempted  to  portray 
Lincoln's  characteristics,  and  not  a  few  have  assumed 
to  do  it  with  great  confidence.  Those  who  have  spoken 
most  confidently  of  their  knowledge  of  his  personal 
qualities  are,  as  a  rule,  those  who  saw  least  of  them 
below  the  surface.  He  might  have  been  seen  every  day 
during  his  Presidential  term  without  ever  reaching  the 
distinctive  qualities  which  animated  and  guided  him, 
and  thus  hundreds  of  writers  have  assumed  that  they 
understood  him  when  they  had  never  seen  the  inner  in 
spirations  of  the  man  at  all.  He  was  a  stranger  to  deceit, 
incapable  of  dissembling;  seemed  to  be  the  frankest  and 
freest  of  conversationalists,  and  yet  few  understood  him 
even  reasonably  well,  and  none  but  Lincoln  ever  thor 
oughly  understood  Lincoln.  If  I  had  seen  less  of  him 
72 


(Photo  by  Gutekunst,  Philadelphia.) 

ABRAHAM   I,1NCOI,N  AND   HIS  SON  TAD. 


74^  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF    WAR-TIMES. 

I  might  have  ventured  with  much  greater  confidence  to 
attempt  a  portrayal  of  his  individuality,  but  I  saw  him 
many  times  when  Presidential  honors  were  forgotten  in 
Presidential  sorrows,  and  when  his  great  heart  throbbed 
upon  his  sleeve.  It  was  then  that  his  uncommon  quali 
ties  made  themselves  lustrous  and  often  startled  and  con 
fused  his  closest  friends. 

I  regard  Lincoln  as  very  widely  misunderstood  in  one 
of  the  most  important  attributes  of  his  character.  It  has 
been  common,  during  the  last  twenty-five  years,  to  see 
publications  relating  to  Lincoln  from  men  who  assumed 
that  they  enjoyed  his  full  confidence.  In  most  and  per 
haps  all  cases  the  writers  believed  what  they  stated,  but 
those  who  assumed  to  speak  most  confidently  on  the  sub 
ject  were  most  mistaken.  Mr.  Lincoln  gave  his  confi 
dence  to  no  living  man  without  reservation.  He  trusted 
many,  but  he  trusted  only  within  the  carefully-studied 
limitations  of  their  usefulness,  and  when  he  trusted  he 
confided,  as  a  rule,  only  to  the  extent  necessary  to  make 
that  trust  available.  He  had  as  much  faith  in  mankind 
as  is  common  amongst  men,  and  it  was  not  because  he 
was  of  a  distrustful  nature  or  because  of  any  specially 
selfish  attribute  of  his  character  that  he  thus  limited  his 
confidence  in  all  his  intercourse  with  men.  In  this  view 
of  Lincoln  I  am  fully  sustained  by  those  who  knew  him 
best.  The  one  man  who  saw  more  of  him  in  all  the 
varied  vicissitudes  of  his  life  from  early  manhood  to  his 
elevation  to  the  Presidency  was  William  H.  Herndon, 
who  was  his  close  friend  and  law-partner  for  a  full  score 
of  years.  In  analyzing  the  character  of  Lincoln  he  thus 
refers  to  his  care  as  to  confidants:  u  Mr.  Lincoln  never 
hadya  confidant,  and  therefore  never  unbosomed  himself 
to  others.  He  never  spoke  of  his  trials  to  me,  or,  so  far 
as  I  knew,  to  any  of  his  friends."  David  Davis,  in 
whose  sober  judgment  Lincoln  had  more  confidence  than 


LttfCOLtf'S    CHARACTERISTICS.  75 

in  that  of  his  other  friends,  and  who  held  as  intimate 
relations  to  him  as  was  possible  by  any,  says:  "I  knew 
the  man  so  well;  he  was  the  most  reticent,  secretive  man 
I  ever  saw  or  expect  to  see. ' ' 

Leonard  Swett  is  well  known  to  have  been  the  one 
whose  counsels  were  among  the  most  welcome  to  Lin 
coln,  and  who  doubtless  did  counsel  him  with  more  free 
dom  than  any  other  man.  In  a  letter  given  in  Herndon's 
Life  of  Lincoln  he  says:  "From  the  commencement  of 
his  life  to  its  close  I  have  sometimes  doubted  whether  he 
ever  asked  anybody's  advice  about  anything.  He  would 
listen  to  everybody;  he  would  hear  everybody;  but  he 
rarely,  if  ever,  asked  for  opinions."  He  adds  in  the 
same  letter:  "As  a  politician  and  as  President  he  arrived 
at  all  his  conclusions  from  his  own  reflections,  and  when 
his  conclusions  were  once  formed  he  never  doubted  but 
what  they  were  right."  Speaking  of  his  generally  as 
sumed  frankness  of  character,  Swett  says,  ' (  One  great 
public  mistake  of  his  [Lincoln's]  character  as  generally 
received  and  acquiesced  in  is  that  he  is  considered  by  the 
people  of  this  country  as  a  frank,  guileless,  and  unso 
phisticated  man.  There  never  was  a  greater  mistake. 
Beneath  a  smooth  surface  of  candor  and  apparent  decla 
ration  of  all  his  thoughts  and  feelings  he  exercised  the 
most  exalted  tact  and  wisest  discrimination.  He  handled 
and  moved  men  remotely  as  we  do  pieces  upon  a  chess 
board.  He  retained  through  life  all  the  friends  he  ever 
had,  and  he  made  the  wrath  of  his  enemies  to  praise 
him.  This  was  not  by  cunning  or  intrigue  in  the  low 
acceptation  of  the  term,  but  by  far-seeing  reason  and 
discernment.  He  always  told  only  enough  of  his  plans 
and  purposes  to  induce  the  belief  that  he  had  communi 
cated  all;  yet  he  reserved  enough  to  have  communicated 
nothing. ' ' 

Mr.  Herndon,  in  a  lecture  delivered  on  Lincoln  to  a 


76  LINCOLN  AND-  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Springfield  audience  in  1866,  said:  "He  [Lincoln]  never 
revealed  himself  entirely  to  any  one  man,  and  therefore 
he  will  always  to  a  certain  extent  remain  enveloped  in 
doubt.  I  always  believed  I  could  read  him  as  thor 
oughly  as  any  man,  yet  he  was  so  different  in  many  re 
spects  from  any  other  one  I  ever  met  before  or  since 
his  time  that  I  cannot  say  I  comprehended  him. ' '  Mr. 
Lamon,  who  completes  the  circle  of  the  men  who  were 
closest  to  Lincoln,  the  man  who  was  chosen  by  Lincoln 
to  accompany  him  on  his  midnight  journey  from  Harris- 
burg  to  Washington,  and  whom  he  appointed  Marshal 
of  the  District  of  Columbia  to  have  him  in  the  closest 
touch  with  himself,  thus  describes  Lincoln  in  his  biog 
raphy:  "  Mr.  Lincoln  was  a  man  apart  from  the  rest  of 
his  kind — unsocial,  cold,  impassive;  neither  a  good  hater 
nor  fond  friend."  And  he  adds  that  Lincoln  umade 
simplicity  and  candor  a  mask  of  deep  feelings  carefully 
concealed,  and  subtle  plans  studiously  veiled  from  all 
eyes  but  one." 

I  have  seen  Lincoln  many  times  when  he  seemed  to 
speak  with  the  utmost  candor,  I  have  seen  him  many 
times  when  he  spoke  with  mingled  candor  and  caution, 
and  I  have  seen  him  many  times  when  he  spoke  but  lit 
tle  and  with  extreme  caution.  It  must  not  be  inferred, 
because  of  the  testimony  borne  to  Lincoln's  reticence 
generally  and  to  his  singular  methods  in  speaking  on 
subjects  of  a  confidential  nature,  that  he  was  ever  guilty 
of  deceit.  He  was  certainly  one  of  the  most  sincere  men 
I  have  ever  met,  and  he  was  also  one  of  the  most  saga 
cious  men  that  this  or  any  other  country  has  ever  pro 
duced.  He  was  not  a  man  of  cunning,  in  the  ordinary 
acceptation  of  the  word;  not  a  man  who  would  mislead 
in  any  way,  unless  by  silence;  and  when  occasion  de 
manded  he  would  speak  with  entire  freedom  as  far  as  it 
was  possible  for  him  to  speak  at  all.  I  regard  him  as 


LINCOLN'S   CHARACTERISTICS.  77 

one  who  believed  that  the  truth  was  not  always  to  be 
spoken,  but  who  firmly  believed,  also,  that  only  the 
truth  should  be  spoken  when  it  was  necessary  to  speak 
at  all. 

Lincoln's  want  of  trust  in  those  closest  to  him  was 
often  a  great  source  of  regret,  and  at  times  of  morti 
fication.  I  have  many  times  heard  Mr.  Swett  and  Mr. 
Lamon,  and  occasionally  Mr.  Davis,  speak  of  his  per 
sistent  reticence  on  questions  of  the  gravest  public  mo 
ment  which  seemed  to  demand  prompt  action  by  the 
President.  They  would  confer  with  him,  as  I  did  my 
self  at  times,  earnestly  advising  and  urging  action  on  his 
part,  only  to  find  him  utterly  impassible  and  incompre 
hensible.  Neither  by  word  nor  expression  could  any 
one  form  the  remotest  idea  of  his  purpose,  and  when  he 
did  act  in  many  cases  he  surprised  both  friends  and  foes. 
When  he  nominated  Mr.  Stanton  as  Secretary  of  War 
there  was  not  a  single  member  of  his  Cabinet  who  had 
knowledge  of  his  purpose  to  do  so  until  it  was  done,  and 
when  he  appointed  Mr.  Chase  Chief-Justice  there  was 
not  a  man  living,  of  the  hundreds  who  had  advised  him 
and  pressed  their  friends  upon  him,  who  had  any  inti 
mation  as  to  even  the  leaning  of  his  mind  on  the  subject. 
I  remember  on  one  occasion,  when  we  were  alone  in  the 
Executive  Chamber,  he  discussed  the  question  of  the 
Chief-Justiceship  for  fully  half  an  hour;  named  the  men 
who  had  been  prominently  mentioned  in  connection  with 
the  appointment;  spoke  of  all  of  them  with  apparent 
freedom;  sought  and  obtained  my  own  views  as  to  the 
wisdom  of  appointing  either  of  them, — and  when  the 
conversation  ended  I  had  no  more  idea  as  to  the  bent  of 
his  mind  than  if  I  had  been  conversing  with  the  Sphinx. 
I  suggested  to  him,  in  closing  the  conversation,  that  his 
views  on  the  subject  were  very  much  more  important 
than  mine,  and  that  I  would  be  very  glad  to  have  them, 


78  LINCOLN  AND  'MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

to  which  he  gave  this  characteristic  answer:  "Well, 
McClure,  the  fact  is  I'm  'shut  pan'  on  that  question." 

Lincoln's  intellectual  organization  has  been  portrayed 
by  many  writers,  but  so  widely  at  variance  as  to  greatly 
confuse  the  general  reader.  Indeed,  he  was  the  most 
difficult  of  all  men  to  analyze.  He  did  not  rise  above 
the  average  man  by  escaping  a  common  mingling  of 
greatness  and  infirmities.  I  believe  he  was  very  well 
described  in  a  single  sentence  by  Mr.  Herndon  when  he 
said:  "The  truth  about  Mr.  Lincoln  is,  that  he  read  less 
and  thought  more  than  any  man  in  his  sphere  in  Amer 
ica."  Tested  by  the  standard  of  many  other  great  men, 
Lincoln  was  not  great,  but  tested  by  the  only  true  stand 
ard  of  his  owi  achievements,  he  may  justly  appear  in 
history  as  one  of  the  greatest  of  American  statesmen. 
Indeed,  in  some  most  essential  attributes  of  greatness  I 
doubt  whether  any  of  our  public  men  ever  equaled  him. 
We  have  had  men  who  could  take  a  higher  intellectual 
grasp  of  any  abstruse  problem  of  statesmanship,  but  few 
have  ever  equaled,  and  none  excelled,  Lincoln  in  the 
practical,  common-sense,  and  successful  solution  of  the 
gravest  problems  ever  presented  in  American  history. 
He  possessed  a  peculiarly  receptive  and  analytical  mind. 
He  sought  information  from  every  attainable  source. 
He  sought  it  persistently,  weighed  it  earnestly,  and  in 
the  end  reached  his  own  conclusions.  When  he  had 
once  reached  a  conclusion  as  to  a  public  duty,  there  was 
no  human  power  equal  to  the  task  of  changing  his  pur 
pose.  He  was  self-reliant  to  an  uncommon  degree,  and 
yet  as  entirely  free  from  arrogance  of  opinion  as  any 
public  man  I  have  ever  known. 

Judged  by  the  records  of  his  administration,  Lincoln 
is  now  regarded  as  the  most  successful  Exectitive  the 
Republic  has  ever  had.  When  it  is  considered  what 
peculiarly  embarrassing  and  momentous  issues  were  pre- 


LINCOLN'S   CHARACTERISTICS.  79 

sented  to  him  for  decision,  and  issues  for  which  history 
had  no  precedents,  it  is  entirely  safe  to  say  that  no  man 
has  ever  equaled  him  as  a  successful  ruler  of  a  free 
people.  This  success  was  due  chiefly  to  one  single  qual 
ity  of  the  man — the  will  of  the  people  was  his  guiding 
star.  He  sprang  from  the  people  and  from  close  to 
Mother  Earth.  He  grew  up  with  the  people,  and  in  all 
his  efforts,  convictions,  and  inspirations  he  was  ever  in 
touch  with  the  people.  When  President  he  looked  solely 
to  the  considerate  judgment  of  the  American  people  to 
guide  him  in  the  solution  of  all  the  vexed  questions 
which  were  presented  to  him.  In  all  the  struggles  of 
mean  ambition  and  all  the  bitter  jealousies  of  greatness 
which  constantly  surged  around  him,  and  in  all  the  con 
stant  and  distressing  discord  that  prevailed  in  his  Cabinet 
during  the  dark  days  which  shadowed  him  with  grief, 
Lincoln  ever  turned  to  study  with  ceaseless  care  the  in 
telligent  expression  of  the  popular  will. 

Unlike  all  Presidents  who  had  preceded  him,  he  came 
into  office  without  a  fixed  and  accepted  policy.  Civil 
war  plunged  the  government  into  new  and  most  per 
plexing  duties.  The  people  were  unschooled  to  the  sad 
necessities  which  had  to  be  accepted  to  save  the  Re 
public.  Others  would  have  rushed  in  to  offend  public 
sentiment  by  the  violent  acceptance  of  what  they  knew 
must  be  accepted  in  the  end.  These  men  greatly  vexed 
and  embarrassed  Lincoln  in  his  sincere  efforts  to  advance 
the  people  and  the  government  to  the  full  measure  of  the 
sacrifices  which  were  inevitable ;  but  Lincoln  waited 
patiently — waited  until  in  the  fullness  of  time  the  judg 
ment  of  the  people  was  ripened  for  action,  and  then,  and 
then  only,  did  Lincoln  act.  Had  he  done  otherwise,  he 
would  have  involved  the  country  in  fearful  peril  both  at 
home  and  abroad,  and  it  was  his  constant  study  of,  and 
obedience  to,  the  honest  judgment  of  the  people  of  the 


80  LINCOLN  AND  -MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

nation  that  saved  the  Republic  and  that  enshrined  him 
in  history  as  the  greatest  of  modern  rulers. 

If  there  are  yet  any  intelligent  Americans  who  believe 
that  Lincoln  was  an  innocent,  rural,  unsophisticated  cha 
racter,  it  is  time  that  they  should  be  undeceived.  I  ven 
ture  the  assertion,  without  fear  of  successful  contradiction, 
that  Abraham  Lincoln  was  the  most  sagacious  of  all  the 
public  men  of  his  day  in  either  political  party.  He  was 
therefore  the  master-politician  of  his  time.  He  was  not 
a  politician  as  the  term  is  now  commonly  applied  and 
understood;  he  knew  nothing  about  the  countless  meth 
ods  which  are  employed  in  the  details  of  political  effort; 
but  no  man  knew  better— indeed,  I  think  no  man  knew 
so  well  as  he  did — how  to  summon  and  dispose  of  polit 
ical  ability  to  attain  great  political  results;  and  this  work 
he  performed  with  unfailing  wisdom  and  discretion  in 
every  contest  for  himself  and  for  the  country. 

A  pointed  illustration  of  his  sagacity  and  of  his  cau 
tious  methods  in  preventing  threatened  evil  or  gaining 
promised  good  is  presented  by  his  action  in  1862  when 
the  first  army  draft  was  made  in  Pennsylvania.  There 
was  then  no  national  conscription  law,  and  volunteering 
had  ceased  to  fill  up  our  shattered  armies.  A  draft  under 
the  State  law  was  necessary  to  fill  a  requisition  made 
upon  Pennsylvania  for  troops.  The  need  for  immediate 
reinforcements  was  very  pressing,  and  in  obedience  to 
the  personal  request  of  both  Lincoln  and  Governor  Cur- 
tin  I  accepted  the  ungracious  task  of  organizing  and 
executing  the  draft  under  the  State  laws.  How  promptly 
the  task  was  executed  may  be  understood  when  I  say  that 
within  sixty  days  the  entire  State  was  enrolled,  quotas 
adjusted,  the  necessary  exemptions  made,  the  draft  exe 
cuted,  and  seventeen  organized  regiments  sent  to  the 
front,  and  without  a  dollar  of  cost  to  either  the  State  or 
National  Governments  for  duties  performed  in  my  office 


LINCOLN'S   CHARACTERISTICS.  8 1 

beyond  the  salaries  of  two  clerks.  While  there  were 
mutterings  of  disloyalty  in  a  very  few  sections  of  Penn 
sylvania,  and  they  only  within  a  very  limited  circle, 
there  was  one  sore  spot  where  open  rebellion  was  threat 
ened.  That  was  Cass  township,  Schuylkill  county.  The 
Mollie  Magtiires  were  then  just  approaching  the  zenith 
of  their  criminal  power,  and  Cass  township  was  the  cen 
tre  of  that  lawless  element.  Thirteen  murders  had  been 
committed  in  that  district  within  a  few  years,  and  not 
one  murderer  had  been  brought  to  punishment.  This 
banded  criminal  organization  was  as  disloyal  to  the  gov 
ernment  as  it  was  to  law,  and  it  was  with  the  utmost  dif 
ficulty  that  even  an  imperfect  enumeration  had  been 
made  and  the  quota  adjusted  to  be  supplied  by  draft. 
The  draft  was  made,  however,  and  on  the  day  fixed  for 
the  conscripts  to  take  the  cars  and  report  at  Harrisburg 
the  criminal  element  of  the  district  not  only  refused  to 
respond  to  the  call,  but  its  leaders  came  to  the  station 
and  drove  other  conscripts  violently  from  the  depot. 

It  was  open,  defiant  rebellion.  I  at  once  reported  the 
facts  to  Secretary  Stanton,  who  promptly  answered,  di 
recting  that  the  draft  should  be  enforced  at  every  hazard, 
and  placing  one  Philadelphia  regiment  and  one  regiment 
at  Harrisburg  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  Governor,  with 
instructions  to  send  them  at  once  to  the  scene  of  revolt. 
Fearing  that  the  Secretary  did  not  fully  comprehend  the 
peril  of  a  conflict  between  the  military  and  the  citizens, 
Governor  Curtin  directed  me  to  telegraph  more  fully  to 
Secretary  Stanton,  suggesting  his  further  consideration 
of  the  subject.  His  answer  was  promptly  given,  repeat 
ing  his  order  for  the  military  to  move  at  once  to  Cass 
township  and  enforce  the  law  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet. 
The  regiments  were  given  marching  orders,  and  reached 
Pottsville  on  the  following  day.  I  felt  that  a  conflict 
between  the  military  and  citizens  in  any  part  of  the  State 


82  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF   WAR-TIMES. 

must  be  very  disastrous  to  the  loyal  cause,  and  after  full 
consultation  with  Governor  Curtin,  in  obedience  to  his 
directions,  I  telegraphed  to  Lincoln  in  cipher  asking  him 
to  consider  the  subject  well.  This  was  in  the  early  part 
of  the  day,  and  I  was  surprised  and  distressed  when  even 
ing  came  without  any  reply.  When  I  entered  the  break 
fast-room  of  the  hotel  the  next  morning  I  saw  seated  at 
the  table  Assistant  Adjutant-General  Townsend  of  the 
United  States  Army.  I  knew  him  well,  and  when  he 
saw  me  he  beckoned  me  to  his  side  and  asked  me  to 
breakfast  with  him.  We  were  out  of  hearing  of  any 
others  at  the  table,  and  he  at  once  stated  to  me  the  pur 
pose  of  his  visit.  He  had  arrived  at  three  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  and  was  waiting  to  see  me  as  soon  as  I  should 
appear.  He  said :  u  I  have  no  orders  to  give  you,  but  I 
came  solely  to  deliver  a  personal  message  from  President 
Lincoln  in  these  words:  '  Say  to  McClure  that  I  am  very 
desirous  to  have  the  laws  fully  executed,  but  it  might  be 
well,  in  an  extreme  emergency,  to  be  content  with  the 
appearance  of  executing  the  laws;  I  think  McClure  will 
understand.'"  To  this  General  Townsend  added:  "I 
have  now  fulfilled  my  mission ;  I  do  not  know  to  what 
it  relates." 

I  of  course  made  no  explanation  to  General  Townsend, 
but  hurried  from  the  breakfast- table  to  summon  Benja 
min  Bannan  from  Pottsville  to  Harrisburg  as  speedily  as 
possible.  He  was  the  commissioner  of  draft  for  that 
county,  a  warm  friend  of  the  President,  and  a  man  of 
unusual  intelligence  and  discretion.  He  reached  Harris- 
burg  the  same  day,  and  Lincoln's  instructions  were 
frankly  explained  to  him.  No  one  had  any  knowledge 
of  them  but  ourselves  and  the  Governor.  Commissioner 
Bannan  appreciated  the  necessity  of  avoiding  a  collision 
between  the  military  and  the  citizens  of  Cass  township, 
but,  said  he,  ' '  How  can  it  be  done  ?  How  can  the  laws 


LINCOLN'S   CHARACTERISTICS.  83 

even  appear  to  have  been  executed  ?' '  I  told  him  that  in 
a  number  of  cases  evidence  had  been  presented,  after  the 
quotas  had  been  adjusted  and  the  draft  ordered,  to  prove 
that  the  quotas  had  been  filled  by  volunteers  who  had 
enlisted  in  some  town  or  city  outside  of  their  townships. 
In  all  such  cases,  where  the  evidence  was  clear,  the  order 
for  the  draft  was  revoked  because  the  complement  of 
men  had  been  filled.  I  said  only  by  such  evidence  from 
Cass  township  could  the  order  for  the  draft  be  revoked 
and  the  arrest  of  the  conscripted  men  for  service  be 
avoided.  He  intuitively  comprehended  the  gravity  of 
the  situation,  and  took  the  first  train  home.  By  the  next 
evening  he  was  back  and  laid  before  me  a  number  of 
affidavits  in  regular  form,  apparently  executed  by  citi 
zens  of  Cass  township,  which,  if  uncontradicted,  proved 
that  their  quota  was  entirely  full.  I  asked  no  explana 
tions,  but  at  once  indorsed  upon  the  testimony  that  as 
the  quota  of  Cass  township  had  been  filled  by  volunteers, 
the  draft  was  inoperative  in  that  district  and  its  con 
scripts  would  not  be  held  to  sendee. 

I  have  never  made  inquiry  into  the  method  of  obtain 
ing  those  affidavits,  and  there  is  none  now  living  who 
could  give  any  information  about  it,  as  Mr.  Bannan  has 
long  since  joined  the  great  majority  beyond.  The  Gov 
ernor  had,  in  the  mean  time,  halted  the  troops  at  Potts- 
ville,  and  as  the  laws  seemed  to  be  executed  in  peace,  the 
regiments  were  ordered  back  by  the  Governor  and  the 
conflict  between  the  military  and  the  Mollie  Maguires 
was  averted.  Stan  ton  never  had  knowledge  of  Lincoln's 
action  in  this  matter,  nor  did  a  single  member  of  his  ad 
ministration  know  of  his  intervention.  Had  Stanton 
been  permitted  to  have  his  sway,  he  would  have  ruled  in 
the  tempest,  and  Pennsylvania  would  have  inaugurated 
a  rebellion  of  her  own  that  might  have  reached  fearful 
proportions,  and  that  certainly  would  have  greatly  para- 


84  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF    WAR-TIMES. 

lyzed  the  power  of  the  loyal  people  of  the  State.  I  am 
quite  sure  that  not  until  after  the  war  was  ended,  and 
probably  not  for  years  thereafter,  did  any  but  Lincoln, 
Curtin,  Bannan,  and  myself  have  any  knowledge  of  this 
important  adjustment  of  the  Cass  township  rebellion. 


LINCOLN  IN   POLITICS. 


IF  Abraham  Lincoln  was  not  a  master  politician,  I  am 
entirely  ignorant  of  the  qualities  which  make  up  such 
a  character.  In  a  somewhat  intimate  acquaintance  with 
the  public  men  of  the  country  for  a  period  of  more  than 
a  generation,  I  have  never  met  one  who  made  so  few 
mistakes  in  politics  as  Lincoln.  The  man  who  could 
call  Seward  as  Premier  of  his  administration,  with  Weed 
the  power  behind  the  Premier,  often  stronger  than  the 
Premier  himself,  and  yet  hold  Horace  Greeley  even 
within  the  ragged  edges  of  the  party  lines,  and  the  man 
who  could  call  Simon  Cameron  to  his  Cabinet  in  Penn 
sylvania  without  alienating  Governor  Curtin,  and  who 
could  remove  Cameron  from  his  Cabinet  without  alien 
ating  Cameron,  would  naturally  be  accepted  as  a  man  of 
much  more  than  ordinary  political  sagacity.  Indeed,  I 
have  never  known  one  who  approached  Lincoln  in  the 
peculiar  faculty  of  holding  antagonistic  elements  to  his 
own  support,  and  maintaining  close  and  often  apparently 
confidential  relations  with  each  without  offense  to  the 
other.  This  is  the  more  remarkable  from  the  fact  that 
Lincoln  was  entirely  without  training  in  political  man 
agement.  I  remember  on  one  occasion,  when  there  was 
much  concern  felt  about  a  political  contest  in  Pennsyl 
vania,  he  summoned  half  a  dozen  or  more  Pennsylvania 
Republicans  to  a  conference  at  the  White  House.  When 

85 


LINCOLN'S  HOME  IN  CHILDHOOD. 


*^jzsS^^  • 


LINCOLN'S  HOME  IN  SPRINGFIELD. 


LINCOLN  IN  POLITICS.  $7 

we  had  gathered  there  he  opened  the  subject  in  his 
quaint  way  by  saying:  "You  know  I  never  was  a  con 
triver;  I  don't  know  much  about  how  things  are  done 
in  politics,  but  I  think  you  gentlemen  understand  the 
situation  in  your  State,  and  I  want  to  learn  what  may 
be  done  to  ensure  the  success  we  all  desire. ' '  He  made 
exhaustive  inquiry  of  each  of  the  persons  present  as  to 
the  danger-signals  of  the  contest,  specially  directing  his 
questions  to  every  weak  point  in  the  party  lines  and 
every  strong  point  of  the  opposition.  He  was  not  con 
tent  with  generalities;  he  had  no  respect  for  mere  enthu 
siasm.  What  he  wanted  was  sober  facts.  He  had  abid 
ing  faith  in  the  people,  in  their  intelligence  and  theii 
patriotism;  and  he  estimated  political  results  by  ascer 
taining,  as  far  as  possible,  the  popular  bearing  of  every 
vital  question  that  was  likely  to  arise,  and  he  formed 
his  conclusions  by  his  keen  intuitive  perception  as  to 
how  the  people  would  be  likely  to  deal  with  the 
issues. 

While  Lincoln  had  little  appreciation  of  himself  as 
candidate  for  President  as  late  as  1859,  the  dream  of 
reaching  the  Presidency  evidently  took  possession  of 
him  in  the  early  part  of  1860,  and  his  first  efforts  to 
advance  himself  as  a  candidate  were  singularly  awkward 
and  infelicitous.  He  had  then  no  experience  whatever 
as  a  leader  of  leaders,  and  it  was  not  until  he  had  made 
several  discreditable  blunders  that  he  learned  how  much 
he  must  depend  upon  others  if  he  would  make  himself 
President.  Some  Lincoln  enthusiast  in  Kansas,  with 
much  more  pretensions  than  power,  wrote  him  in  March, 
1860,  proposing  to  furnish  a  Lincoln  delegation  from  that 
State  to  the  Chicago  Convention,  and  suggesting  that 
Lincoln  should  pay  the  legitimate  expenses  of  organ 
izing,  electing,  and  taking  to  the  convention  the  prom 
ised  Lincoln  delegates.  To  this  Lincoln  replied  that 


LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

( '  in  the  main,  the  use  of  money  is  wrong,  but  for  cer 
tain  objects  in  a  political  contest  the  use  of  some  is  both 
right  and  indispensable. ' '  And  he  added,  ' '  If  you  shall 
be  appointed  a  delegate  to  Chicago  I  will  furnish  $100  to 
bear  the  expenses  of  the  trip. ' '  He  heard  nothing  further 
from  the  Kansas  man  until  he  saw  an  announcement  in 
the  newspapers  that  Kansas  had  elected  delegates  and 
instructed  them  for  Seward.  This  was  Lincoln's  first 
disappointment  in  his  effort  to  organize  his  friends  to 
attain  the  Presidential  nomination,  but  his  philosophy 
was  well  maintained.  Without  waiting  to  hear  from  his 
friend  who  had  contracted  to  bring  a  Lincoln  delegation 
from  Kansas  he  wrote  him,  saying,  UI  see  by  the  dis 
patches  that  since  you  wrote  Kansas  has  appointed  dele 
gates  instructed  for  Seward.  Don't  stir  them  up  to 
anger,  but  come  along  to  the  convention,  and  I  will  do 
as  I  said  about  expenses."  It  is  not  likely  that  that 
unfortunate  experience  cost  Lincoln  his  $100,  but  it  is 
worthy  of  note  that  soon  after  his  inauguration  as  Pres 
ident  he  gave  the  man  a  Federal  office  with  a  comfort 
able  salary. 

When  he  became  seriously  enlisted  as  a  candidate  for 
the  Presidential  nomination,  he  soon  learned  that  while 
he  could  be  of  value  as  an  adviser  and  organizer,  the 
great  work  had  to  be  performed  by  others  than  himself. 
He  gathered  around  him  a  number  of  the  ablest  poli 
ticians  of  the  West,  among  whom  were  Norman  P.  Judd, 
David  Davis,  Leonard  Swett,  O.  M.  Hatch,  and  Mr. 
Medill  of  the  Chicago  Tribune.  These  men  had,  for  the 
first  time,  brought  a  National  Convention  to  the  West, 
and  they  had  the  advantage  of  fighting  for  Lincoln  on 
their  own  ground  with  the  enthusiasm  his  name  inspired 
as  a  potent  factor  in  their  work.  They  went  there  to 
win,  and  they  left  nothing  undone  within  the  range  of 
political  effort  to  give  him  the  nomination.  Two  posi- 


LINCOLN  IN  POLITICS.  89 

tions  in  the  Cabinet,  one  for  Pennsylvania  and  one  for 
Indiana,  were  positively  promised  by  David  Davis  at  an 
early  period  of  the  contest,  when  they  feared  that  there 
might  be  serious  difficulty  in  uniting  the  delegations  of 
those  States  on  Lincoln.  It  is  proper  to  say  that  Lincoln 
had  no  knowledge  of  these  contracts,  and  had  given  no 
such  authority,  and  it  is  proper,  also,  to  say  that  the  con 
tracts  were  made  in  both  cases  with  comparatively  irre 
sponsible  parties  who  had  little  power,  if  any,  in  guiding 
the  actions  of  their  respective  delegations.  Certainly 
Lane  and  Curtin,  who  were  the  most  important  factors 
in  bringing  their  States  to  the  support  of  Lincoln,  not 
only  were  not  parties  to  these  contracts,  but  were  entirely 
ignorant  of  them  until  their  fulfillment  was  demanded 
after  Lincoln's  election.  I  have  good  reason  to  know 
that  in  the  case  of  Pennsylvania  that  contract,  while  it 
did  not  of  itself  make  General  Cameron  Secretary  of 
War,  had  much  to  do  with  resolving  Lincoln's  doubts  in 
favor  of  Cameron's  appointment  in  the  end. 

There  were  no  political  movements  of  national  import 
ance  during  Lincoln's  administration  in  which  he  did 
not  actively,  although  often  hiddenly,  participate.  It 
was  Lincoln  who  finally,  after  the  most  convulsive  efforts 
to  get  Missouri  into  line  with  the  administration,  effected 
a  reconciliation  of  disputing  parties  which  brought  Brown 
and  Henderson  into  the  Senate,  and  it  was  Lincoln  who 
in  1863  took  a  leading  part  in  attaining  the  declination 
of  Curtin  as  a  gubernatorial  candidate  that  year.  Grave 
apprehensions  were  felt  that  Curtin  could  not  be  re- 
elected  because  of  the  bitterness  of  the  hostility  of  Cam 
eron  and  his  friends,  and  also  because  there  were  70,000 
Pennsylvania  soldiers  in  the  field  who  could  not  vote. 
Lincoln  was  Curtin' s  sincere  friend,  but  when  Curtin' s 
supporters  suggested  that  his  broken  health  called  for  his 
retirement,  Lincoln  promptly  agreed  to  tender  Curtin  a 


90  LINCOLN  AND  'MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

first-class  foreign  mission  if  he  decided  to  decline  a  re- 
nomination.  Curtin  accepted  the  proffered  mission,  to 
be  assumed  at  the  close  of  his  term,  and  he  published  his 
acceptance  and  his  purpose  to  withdraw  from  the  field  for 
Governor. 

Curtin' s  declination  was  responded  to  within  a  week 
by  a  number  of  the  leading  counties  of  the  State  per 
emptorily  instructing  their  delegates  to  vote  for  his  re- 
nomination  for  Governor.  It  soon  became  evident  that 
the  party  would  accept  no  other  leader  in  the  desperate 
conflict,  and  that  no  other  candidate  could  hope  to  be 
elected.  Curtin  was  compelled  to  submit,  and  he  was 
nominated  on  the  first  ballot  by  more  than  a  two- thirds 
vote,  although  bitterly  opposed  by  a  number  of  promi 
nent  Federal  officers  in  the  State.  Lincoln  was  disap 
pointed  in  the  result — not  because  he  was  averse  to  Cur 
tin,  but  because  he  feared  that  party  divisions  would  lose 
the  State.  Both  Lincoln  and  Stanton  made  exhaustive 
efforts  to  support  Curtin  after  he  had  been  nominated, 
and  all  the  power  of  the  government  that  could  be 
wielded  with  effect  was  employed  to  promote  his  elec 
tion.  The  battle  was  a  desperate  one  against  the  late 
Chief-Justice  Woodward,  who  was  a  giant  in  intellectual 
strength,  and  who  commanded  the  unbounded  confidence 
and  enthusiastic  support  of.  his  party,  but  Curtin  was 
elected  by  over  15,000  majority. 

One  of  the  shrewdest  of  Lincoln's  great  political 
schemes  was  the  tender,  by  an  autograph  letter,  of  the 
French  mission  to  the  elder  James  Gordon  Bennett.  No 
one  who  can  form  any  intelligent  judgment  of  the  polit 
ical  exigencies  of  that  time  can  fail  to  understand  why 
the  venerable  independent  journalist  received  this  maik 
of  favor  from  the  President.  Lincoln  had  but  one  of 
the  leading  journals  of  New  York  on  which  he  could 

for  positive  support,    That  w  Mr, 


LINCOLN  IN  POLITICS.  91 

New  York  Times.  Mr.  Greeley's  Tribune  was  the  most 
widely  read  Republican  journal  of  the  country,  and  it 
was  unquestionably  the  most  potent  in  moulding  Repub 
lican  sentiment.  Its  immense  weekly  edition,  for  that 
day,  reached  the  more  intelligent  masses  of  the  people 
in  every  State  of  the  Union,  and  Greeley  was  not  in 
accord  with  Lincoln.  Lincoln  knew  how  important  it 
was  to  have  the  support  of  the  Herald,  and  he  carefully 
studied  how  to  bring  its  editor  into  close  touch  with 
himself.  The  outlook  for  Lincoln's  re-election  was  not 
promising.  Bennett  had  strongly  advocated  the  nomi 
nation  of  General  McClellan  by  the  Democrats,  and  that 
was  ominous  of  hostility  to  Lincoln;  and  when  McClel 
lan  was  nominated  he  was  accepted  on  all  sides  as  a  most 
formidable  candidate.  It  was  in  this  emergency  that 
Lincoln's  political  sagacity  served  him  sufficiently  to 
win  the  Herald  to  his  cause,  and  it  was  done  by  the 
confidential  tender  of  the  French  mission.  Bennett  did 
not  break  over  to  Lincoln  at  once,  but  he  went  by  grad 
ual  approaches.  His  first  step  was  to  declare  in  favor  of 
an  entirely  new  candidate,  which  was  an  utter  impossi 
bility.  He  opened  a  leader  on  the  subject  thus:  "Lin 
coln  has  proved  a  failure;  McClellan  has  proved  a  fail 
ure;  Fremont  has  proved  a  failure;  let  us  have  a  new 
candidate."  Lincoln,  McClellan,  and  Fremont  were 
then  all  in  the  field  as  nominated  candidates,  and  the 
Fremont  defection  was  a  serious  threat  to  Lincoln. 
Of  course,  neither  Lincoln  nor  McClellan  declined, 
and  the  Herald,  failing  to  get  the  new  man  it  knew 
to  be  an  impossibility,  squarely  advocated  Lincoln's 
re-election. 

Without  consulting  any  one,  and  without  any  public 
announcement  whatever,  Lincoln  wrote  to  Bennett,  ask 
ing  him  to  accept  the  mission  to  France.  The  offer  was 
declined,  Bennett  valued  the  offer  vety  much  more  than 


92  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

the  office,  and  from  that  day  until  the  day  of  his  death 
he  was  one  of  Lincoln's  most  appreciative  friends  and 
hearty  supporters  on  his  own  independent  line.  The 
tender  of  the  French  mission  to  Bennett  has  been  dis 
puted,  but  I  am  not  mistaken  about  it.  W.  O.  Bartlett, 
a  prominent  member  of  the  New  York  bar,  and  father 
of  the  present  Judge  Bartlett  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
that  State,  had  personal  knowledge  of  Lincoln's  auto 
graph  letter  that  was  delivered  to  Bennett,  and  Judge 
Bartlett  yet  has  the  original  letter,  unless  he  has  parted 
with  it  within  the  last  few  years.  Bennett  was  not  only 
one  of  the  ablest  and  one  of  the  most  sagacious  editors 
of  his  day,  but  he  was  also  one  of  the  most  independent, 
and  in  controversy  one  of  the  most  defiant.  He  was  in 
a  position  to  render  greater  service  to  Lincoln  and  to  the 
country  in  its  desperate  civil  war  than  any  other  one  man 
in  American  journalism.  He  did  not  pretend  to  be  a 
Republican;  on  the  contrary,  he  was  Democratic  in  all 
his  personal  sympathies  and  convictions,  but  he  gave  a 
faithful  support  to  the  war,  although  often  freely  criti 
cising  the  policy  of  the  administration.  He  had  no  de 
sire  for  public  office,  but  he  did  desire,  after  he  had  ac 
quired  wealth  and  newspaper  power,  just  the  recognition 
that  Lincoln  gave  him,  and  I  doubt  whether  any  one 
thing  during  Bennett's  life  ever  gave  him  more  sincere 
gratification  than  this  voluntary  offer  of  one  of  the  first- 
class  missions  of  the  country,  made  in  Mr.  Lincoln's  own 
handwriting,  and  his  opportunity  to  decline  the  same. 
Looking  as  Lincoln  did  to  the  great  battle  for  his  re-elec 
tion,  this  was  one  of  the  countless  sagacious  acts  by 
which  he  strengthened  himself  from  day  to  day,  and  it 
did  much,  very  much,  to  pave  the  way  for  his  over 
whelming  majority  of  1864. 

That  Lincoln  understood  practical  politics  after  he  had 
been  nominated  for  a  second  term  is  very  clearly  illus- 


LINCOLN  IN  POLITICS.  93 

trated  in  the  letter  he  wrote  to  General  Sherman  on  the 
1 9th  of  September,  1864.  The  States  of  Indiana,  Ohio, 
and  Pennsylvania  then  voted  in  October  for  State  offices, 
and  Indiana  was  desperately  contested.  Ohio  was  re 
garded  as  certain,  and  Pennsylvania  had  only  Congress 
men  and  local  officers  to  elect.  The  soldiers  of  Indiana 
could  not  vote  in  the  field,  and  Lincoln's  letter  to  Sher 
man,  who  commanded  the  major  portion  of  the  Indiana 
troops,  appeals  to  him,  in  Lincoln's  usual  cautious  man 
ner,  to  furlough  as  many  of  his  soldiers  home  for  the 
October  election  as  he  could  safely  spare.  His  exact 
language  is :  "  Anything  you  can  safely  do  to  let  your 
soldiers,  or  any  part  of  them,  go  home  to  vote  at  the 
State  election  will  be  greatly  in  point."  To  this  he 
adds:  "This  is  in  no  sense  an  order;  it  is  simply  in 
tended  to  impress  you  with  the  importance  to  the  army 
itself  of  your  doing  all  you  safely  can,  yourself  being  the 
judge  of  what  you  can  safely  do."  While  this  was  "in 
no  sense  an  order, ' '  it  was  practically  a  command  that 
Sherman  promptly  and  generously  obeyed,  and  the  result 
was  that  Morton  was  elected  Governor  by  some  22,000 
majority.  It  was  at  Lincoln's  special  request  that  Gen 
eral  Logan  left  his  command  and  missed  the  march  to 
the  sea,  to  stump  Indiana  and  Illinois  in  the  contest  of 
1864.  He  was  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  impressive  of 
all  the  campaigners  of  the  West,  and  it  was  regarded  by 
Lincoln  as  more  important  that  Logan  should  be  on  the 
hustings  than  in  command  of  his  corps. 

I  recall  a  pointed  illustration  of  Lincoln's  rare  sagacity 
when  confronted  with  embarrassing  political  complica 
tions  that  occurred  in  1862,  when  I  was  in  charge  of  the 
military  department  of  Pennsylvania  pertaining  to  the 
draft  for  troops  made  under  the  State  law.  Harrisburg 
was  an  important  centre  of  military  supplies,  as  well  as 
the  political  centre  of  the  State.  Immense  army  con- 


94  LINCOLN  AND'  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

tracts  were  there  awarded  and  executed  under  officers 
assigned  to  duty  at  that  place.  After  the  draft  had  been 
made  the  conscripts  began  to  pour  into  the  capital  by 
thousands,  and,  as  the  demand  for  reinforcements  in  the 
field  was  very  pressing,  I  called  upon  the  military  officer 
of  the  city  and  urged  upon  him  the  necessity  of  muster 
ing  the  new  men  as  promptly  as  possible.  To  my  sur 
prise,  he  mustered  only  two  companies  the  first  day  out 
of  a  thousand  men.  On  the  second  day,  notwithstand 
ing  my  earnest  appeal  to  him,  he  mustered  no  more  than 
two  companies,  and  on  the  third  day,  when  I  had  over 
5000  men  in  camp,  a  mere  mob  without  organization  or 
discipline,  the  same  tedious  process  of  mustering  was 
continued.  I  telegraphed  Secretary  Stanton  that  I  had 
many  men  in  camp,  and  that  they  were  arriving  in  large 
numbers,  but  that  I  could  not  have  them  mustered — that 
I  could  forward  a  regiment  of  troops  every  day  if  the 
government  would  furnish  the  officers  to  muster  and  or 
ganize  them.  A  prompt  answer  came  that  it  would  be 
done.  The  following  morning  a  new  officer  appeared, 
of  course  subordinate  to  the  commandant  of  the  place 
who  had  charge  of  the  mustering.,  and  he  promptly  mus 
tered  an  entire  regiment  the  first  day.  On  the  following 
morning  he  was  relieved  from  duty  and  ordered  else 
where,  and  the  mustering  again  fell  back  to  two  com 
panies  a  day. 

In  the  mean  time  over  7000  men  had  been  gathered 
into  the  camp,  and  it  was  evident  that  the  question  of 
supplying  the  camp  and  the  interests  of  contractors  had 
become  paramount  to  the  reinforcement  of  the  army.  I 
f  elegraphed  Lincoln  that  I  would  see  him  in  Washing 
ton  that  night,  and  hurried  on  to  correct  the  evil  by  per 
sonal  conference  with  him.  The  case  was  a  very  simple 
one,  and  he  readily  took  in  the  situation.  He  knew  that 
I  had  labored  day  and  night  for  two  months,  without 


LINCOLN  IN  POLITICS.  95 

compensation  or  the  expectation  of  it,  to  hasten  the 
Pennsylvania  troops  to  the  aid  of  our  soldiers  in  the 
field,  and  I  said  to  him  that  if  he  would  send  mustering 
officers  to  organize  them  promptly,  I  would  return  and 
finish  the  work ;  if  not,  I  would  abandon  it  and  go  home. 
Lincoln  was  greatly  pained  at  the  development,  but  he 
understood  that  a  change  of  military  officers  at  Harris- 
burg,  such  as  this  occasion  seemed  to  demand,  would 
involve  serious  political  complications.  He  was  of  all 
things  most  desirous  to  strengthen  our  shattered  armies, 
and  it  was  evident  very  soon  that  he  meant  to  do  so  in 
some  way,  but  without  offense  to  the  political  power  that 
controlled  the  military  assignments  at  Harrisburg.  With 
out  intimating  his  solution  of  the  problem,  he  rang  his 
bell  and  instructed  his  messenger  to  bring  Adjutant-Gen 
eral  Thomas  to  the  Executive  Chamber.  Soon  after  the 
Adjutant-General  appeared,  and  Lincoln  said:  "General, 
what  is  the  military  rank  of  the  senior  officer  at  Harris- 
burg?"  To  which  the  Adjutant-General  replied:  "  Cap 
tain,  sir,"  and  naming  the  officer.  Lincoln  promptly 
said  in  reply :  * '  Bring  me  a  commission  immediately  for 
Alexander  K.  McClure  as  Assistant  Adjutant-General  of 
the  United  States  Volunteers,  with  the  rank  of  major. ' ' 
The  Adjutant-General  bowed  himself  out,  when  I  imme 
diately  said  to  Lincoln  that  I  could  not  consent  to  be  sub 
ject  to  arbitrary  military  orders — that  I  desired  no  com 
pensation  for  the  work  I  performed,  and  I  must  decline 
the  honor  he  proposed  to  confer  upon  me.  In  his  quiet 
way  he  replied:  "Well,  McClure,  try  my  way;  I  think 
that  will  get  the  troops  on  without  delay  and  without 
treading  on  anybody's  toes.  I  think  if  you  will  take 
your  commission  back  to  Harrisburg,  call  upon  the  cap 
tain  in  command  there  to  muster  you  into  the  service  of 
the  United  States,  and  show  him  your  assignment  to 
duty  there,  you  will  have  no  trouble  whatever  in  getting 


9  6  LINCOLN  AND  'MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES, 

the   troops  organized  and  forwarded  as  rapidly  as   you 
wish.     Now  try  it,  won't  you?" 

I  saw  the  wisdom  of  the  suggestion,  and  well  under 
stood  why  the  President  desired  to  avoid  the  offense  that 
would  have  been  given  by  the  removal  of  the  military 
officers,  and  I  agreed  to  try  his  plan.  When  I  returned 
to  Harrisburg  the  next  day  I  sent  for  the  senior  officer  to 
come  to  my  office.  He  came  in  with  all  the  dignity  and 
arrogance  of  an  offended  Caesar  and  spoke  to  me  with 
bare  civility.  I  quietly  handed  him  my  commission, 
requested  him  to  muster  me  into  the  military  service, 
and  also  exhibited  the  order  assigning  me  for  duty  at 
Harrisburg.  When  he  saw  my  commission  his  hat  was 
immediately  removed  and  he  was  as  obsequious  as  he 
had  been  insolent  before.  When  he  had  finished  mus 
tering  me  into  the  service  I  said  to  him,  ' '  I  presume  you 
understand  what  this  means.  I  don't  propose  to  make 
any  display  of  military  authority  or  to  interfere  with 
anything  except  that  which  I  have  immediately  in  hand. 
There  must  be  a  regiment  of  troops  mustered  and  for 
warded  from  this  State  every  day  until  the  troops  in 
camp  are  all  sent  to  the  field.  Good-morning."  He 
immediately  bowed  himself  out,  saluting  in  military 
stylo  as  he  did  so — a  grace  that  I  had  not  yet  mastered 
sufficiently  to  return — and  from  that  day  until  the  camp 
was  emptied  of  conscripts  a  regiment  of  troops  was  mus 
tered  daily  and  forwarded  to  Washington.  That  was  the 
only  military  authority  I  ever  exercised,  and  few  knew 
of  the  military  dignity  I  had  so  suddenly  attained. 
When  the  troops  were  forwarded  to  the  field  and  the 
accounts  settled  I  resigned  my  commission  as  quietly  as 
I  received  it  and  sent  my  resignation  to  the  President, 
who,  as  he  had  voluntarily  promised,  ordered  its  imme 
diate  acceptance.  The  officer  who  was  thus  so  unex 
pectedly  superseded,  and  who  was  so  promptly  made 


LINCOLN  IN  POLITICS.  97 

to  render  efficient  service  to  the  country  by  Lincoln's 
admirable  strategy,  is  no  longer  among  the  living, 
and  I  omit  his  name.  He  learned  how  Lincoln 
could  discipline  a  soldier,  and  he  profited  by  the 
lesson. 


LINCOLN  AND  EMANCIPATION. 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  was  not  a  sentimental  Aboli- 
-T\  tionist.  Indeed,  he  was  not  a  sentimentalist  on 
any  subject.  He  was  a  man  of  earnest  conviction  and 
of  sublime  devotion  to  his  faith.  In  many  of  his  public 
letters  and  State  papers  he  was  as  poetic  as  he  was  epi 
grammatic,  and  he  was  singularly  felicitous  in  the  pathos 
that  was  so  often  interwoven  with  his  irresistible  logic. 
But  he  never  contemplated  the  abolition  of  slavery  until 
the  events  of  the  war  not  only  made  it  clearly  possible, 
but  made  it  an  imperious  necessity.  As  the  sworn  Ex 
ecutive  of  the  nation  it  was  his  duty  to  obey  the  Consti 
tution  in  all  its  provisions,  and  he  accepted  that  duty 
without  reservation.  He  knew  that  slavery  was  the  im 
mediate  cause  of  the  political  disturbance  that  culminated 
in  civil  war,  and  I  know  that  he  believed  from  the  begin 
ning  that  if  war  should  be  persisted  in,  it  could  end  only 
in  the  severance  of  the  Union  or  the  destruction  of  slav 
ery.  His  supreme  desire  was  peace,  alike  before  the  war, 
during  the  war,  and  in  closing  the  war.  He  exhausted 
every  means  within  his  power  to  teach  the  Southern  peo 
ple  that  slavery  could  not  be  disturbed  by  his  administra 
tion  as  long  as  they  themselves  obeyed  the  Constitution 
and  laws  which  protected  slavery,  and  he  never  uttered 
a  word  or  did  an  act  to  justify,  or  even  excuse,  the  South 


LINCOLN'S  TOMB    AT  SPRINGFIELD. 


1 00  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

in  assuming  that  he  meant  to  make  any  warfare  upon 
the  institution  of  slavery  beyond  protecting  the  free  Ter 
ritories  from  its  desolating  tread. 

It  was  not  until  the  war  had  been  in  progress  for 
nearly  two  years  that  Lincoln  decided  to  proclaim  the 
policy  of  Emancipation,  and  then  he  was  careful  to  as 
sume  the  power  as  warranted  .under  the  Constitution  only 
by  the  supreme  necessities  of  war.  There  was  no  time 
from  the  inauguration  of  Lincoln  until  the  ist  of  Janu 
ary,  1863,  that  the  South  could  not  have  returned  to  the 
Union  with  slavery  intact  in  every  State.  His  prelimi 
nary  proclamation,  dated  September  22,  1862,  gave  notice 
that  on  the  ist  of  January,  1863,  he  would  by  public 
proclamation,  "warranted  by  the  Constitution  upon 
military  necessity, ' '  declare  that  *  *  all  persons  held  as 
slaves  within  any  State,  or  designated  part  of  the  State, 
the  people  whereof  shall  then  be  in  rebellion  against  the 
United  States,  shall  be  thenceforward  and  for  ever  free. ' ' 
Every  insurgent  State  had  thus  more  than  three  months' 
formal  notice  that  the  war  was  not  prosecuted  for  the 
abolition  of  slavery,  but  solely  for  the  restoration  of  the 
Union,  and  that  they  could,  by  returning  and  accepting 
the  authority  of  the  National  Government  at  any  time 
before  the  ist  of  January,  1863,  preserve  slavery  indef 
initely.  Lincoln's  letter  to  Horace  Greeley,  written  just 
one  month  before  his  preliminary  Emancipation  Procla 
mation,  presents  in  the  clearest  and  most  concise  manner 
Lincoln's  views  on  the  subject  of  slavery  and  the  Union. 
After  saying  that  if  he  could  save  the  Union  without 
freeing  any  slaves  he  would  do  it;  that  if  he  could  save 
it  by  freeing  all  the  slaves  he  would  do  it;  and  that  if 
he  could  save  it  by  freeing  some  and  leaving  others 
he  would  also  do  that,  he  adds:  "What  I  do  about 
slavery  and  the  colored  race  I  do  because  I  believe  it 
helps  to  save  this  Union,  and  what  I  forbear  I  forbear 


LINCOLN  AND   EMANCIPATION.  IOi 

because  I   do  not  believe  it  would  help  to  save  the 
Union." 

As  President  of  the  Republic,  Lincoln  was  governed 
at  every  step  by  his  paramount  duty  to  prevent  the  dis 
memberment  of  the  nation  and  to  restore  the  Union  and 
its  people  to  fraternal  relations.  The  best  expression  of 
his  own  views  and  aims  in  the  matter  is  given  in  a  single 
brief  sentence,  uttered  by  himself  on  the  I3th  of  Sep 
tember,  1862,  only  nine  days  before  he  issued  the  pre 
liminary  proclamation.  It  was  in  response  to  an  appeal 
from  a  large  delegation  of  Chicago  clergymen,  represent 
ing  nearly  or  quite  all  the  religious  denominations  of  that 
city,  urging  immediate  Emancipation.  He  heard  them 
patiently,  as  he  always  did  those  who  were  entitled  to  be 
heard  at  all,  and  his  answer  was  given  in  these  words: 
1 '  I  have  not  decided  against  the  proclamation  of  liberty 
to  the  slaves,  but  hold  the  matter  under  advisement,  and 
I  can  assure  you  the  matter  is  on  my  mind  by  day  and 
by  night  more  than  any  other.  Whatever  shall  appear 
to  be  God's  will  I  will  do."  However  Lincoln's  relig 
ious  views  may  be  disputed,  he  had  a  profound  belief  in 
God  and  in  God's  immutable  justice,  and  the  sentence  I 
have  just  quoted  tells  the  whole  story  of  Lincoln's  action 
in  the  abolition  of  slavery.  He  did  not  expect  miracles 
— indeed,  he  was  one  of  the  last  men  to  believe  in  mira 
cles  at  all— but  he  did  believe  that  God  overruled  all 
human  actions;  that  all  individuals  charged  with  grave 
responsibility  were  but  the  means  in  the  hands  of  the 
Great  Ruler  to  accomplish  the  fulfillment  of  justice. 
Congressman  Arnold,  whom  Lincoln  once  declared  to 
me  to  be  the  one  member  of  the  House  in  whose  per 
sonal  and  political  friendship  he  had  absolute  faith, 
speaking  of  the  earnest  appeals  made  to  Lincoln  for 
Emancipation,  says:  "Mr.  Lincoln  listened  not  un 
moved  to  such  appeals,  and,  seeking  prayerful  guidance 


102  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

of  Almighty  God,  the  Proclamation  of  Emancipation 
was  prepared.  It  had  been,  in  fact,  prepared  in  July, 
1862." 

Thus  from  July  until  September,  during  which  time 
there  was  the  greatest  possible  pressure  on  Lincoln  for 
an  Emancipation  policy,  his  proclamation  had  been  for 
mulated,  but  his  usual  caution  had  prevented  him  from 
intimating  it  to  any  outside  of  his  Cabinet.  It  was  the 
gravest  step  ever  taken  by  any  civil  ruler  in  this  or  any 
other  land,  and  military  success  was  essential  to  main 
tain  and  execute  the  policy  of  Emancipation  after  it  had 
been  declared.  Had  McClellan  been  successful  in  his 
Peninsula  campaign,  or  had  Lee  been  defeated  in  the 
second  conflict  of  Manassas,  without  bringing  peace,  the 
proclamation  would  doubtless  have  been  issued  with  the 
prestige  of  such  victory.  Under  the  shivering  hesitation 
among  even  Republicans  throughout  the  North,  Lincoln 
felt  that  it  needed  the  prestige  of  a  military  victory  to 
assure  its  cordial  acceptance  by  very  many  of  the  sup 
porters  of  the  government.  The  battle  of  Antietam, 
fought  by  the  only  general  of  that  time  who  had  pub 
licly  declared  against  an  Emancipation  policy,  was  the 
first  victory  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  achieved  in 
1862,  and  five  days  after  the  Antietam  victory  the  pre 
liminary  proclamation  was  issued. 

Only  the  careful  student  of  the  history  of  the  war  can 
have  any  just  conception  of  the  gradual  manner  in  which 
Lincoln  approached  Emancipation.  He  long  and  earn 
estly  sought  to  avoid  it,  believing  then  that  the  Union 
could  be  best  preserved  without  the  violent  destruction 
of  slavery;  and  when  he  appreciated  the  fact  that  the 
leaders  of  the  rebellion  were  unwilling  to  entertain  any 
proposition  for  the  restoration  of  the  Union,  he  accepted 
the  destruction  of  slavery  as  an  imperious  necessity,  but 
he  sought  to  attain  it  with  the  least  possible  disturbance. 


LINCOLN  AND  EMANCIPATION.  103 

The  first  direct  assault  made  upon  slavery  was  "by  Sec 
retary  Cameron's  overruled  annual  report  in  December, 

1 86 1,  in  which  he  advised  the  arming  of  slaves.     The 
first    Congress   that  sat   during  the  war    made  steady 
strides  toward  the  destruction  of  slavery  by  the  passage 
of  five  important  laws.     The  first  abolished  slavery  in 
the  District  of  Columbia;  the  second  prohibited  slavery 
in  all  the  Territories  of  the  United  States;   the  third 
gave  freedom  to  the  escaped  slaves  of  all  who  were  in 
rebellion;  the  fourth  gave  lawful  authority  for  the  enlist 
ment  of  colored  men  as  soldiers;  and  the  fifth  made  a 
new  article  of  war,  prohibiting  any  one  in  the  military 
or  naval  service  from  aiding  in  the  arrest  or  return  of  a 
fugitive   slave   under  pain   of  dismissal.      Slavery  was 
abolished  in  the  District  of  Columbia  as  early  as  April, 

1862,  the  act  having  passed  the  Senate  by  29  to  6,  and 
the  House  by  92  to  38.     A  bill  prohibiting  slavery  in  the 
Territories  was  passed  on  the  i9th  of  June,  and  a  bill 
giving  freedom  to  slaves  of  rebellious  masters  who  per 
formed  military  service  was  passed  on  the  i;th  of  July. 

Thus  was  Congress  steadily  advancing  toward  Eman 
cipation,  and  as  early  as  March,  1862,  Lincoln  had  pro 
posed  his  plan  of  compensated  Emancipation.  On  the 
6th  of  March  he  sent  a  special  message  to  Congress 
recommending  the  adoption  of  the  following  joint  reso 
lution: 

RESOLVED,  That  the  United  States  ought  to  co-operate  with, 
any  State  which  may  adopt  gradual  abolishment  of  slavery,  giv 
ing  to  such  State  pecuniary  aid,  to  be  used  by  such  State,  in  its 
discretion,  to  compensate  for  the  inconvenience,  public  and  pri 
vate,  produced  by  such  change  of  system. 

His  message  very  earnestly  pressed  upon  Congress  the 
importance  of  adopting  such  a  policy,  and  upon  the 
country  the  importance  of  accepting  it,  North  and 
South,  His  concluding  sentence  is;  "In  full  view  of 


104  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

my  great  responsibility  to  my  God  and  to  my  country,  I 
earnestly  beg  the  attention  of  Congress  and  the  people  to 
the  subject"  Again,  when  revoking  General  Hunter's 
order  of  the  9th  of  May,  1862,  declaring  all  slaves  free 
within  his  military  district,  Lincoln  made  a  most  im 
pressive  appeal  to  the  people  of  the  South  on  the  sub 
ject  of  compensated  Emancipation.  He  said:  u  I  do 
not  argue;  I  beseech  you  to  make  the  argument  for 
yourselves.  You  cannot,  if  you  would,  be  blind  to  the 
signs  of  the  times.  .  .  .  The  change  it  contemplates 
would  come  gently  as  the  dews  of  heaven,  not  rending 
or  wrecking  anything.  Will  you  not  embrace  it?  So 
much  good  has  not  been  done  by  any  one  effort  in  all 
past  time  as,  in  the  providence  of  God,  it  is  now  your 
high  privilege  to  do.  May  the  vast  future  not  have  to 
lament  that  you  have  neglected  it"  Soon  after  this 
Lincoln  had  an  interview  with  the  Congressional  dele 
gations  from  the  Border  Slave  States,  at  which  he  again 
earnestly  urged  them  to  accept  compensated  Emanci 
pation.  Speaking  of  that  interview,  Lincoln  said:  "I 
believed  that  the  indispensable  necessity  for  military 
Emancipation  and  arming  the  blacks  would  come  unless 
averted  by  gradual  and  compensated  Emancipation." 
Again  in  July,  1862,  only  two  months  before  he  issued 
the  preliminary  proclamation,  Lincoln  summoned  the 
delegates  from  the  Border  Slave  States  to  a  conference 
with  him,  and  again  most  persuasively  appealed  to  them 
to  accept  gradual  and  compensated  Emancipation.  He 
said  to  them:  "  I  do  not  speak  of  Emancipation  at  once, 
but  of  a  decision  at  once  to  emancipate  gradually. ' '  He 
also  clearly  foreshadowed  to  them  that  if  they  refused  it, 
more  violent  Emancipation  must  come.  He  said :  ( '  The 
pressure  in  this  direction  is  still  upon  me  and  is  increas 
ing.  By  conceding  what  I  now  ask  you  can  relieve  me, 
and  much  more  can  relieve  the  country,  on  this  import- 


LINCOLN  AND  EMANCIPATION.  105 

ant  point."  He  concluded  with  these  eloquent  words: 
"  Our  common  country  is  in  great  peril,  demanding  the 
loftiest  views  and  boldest  action  to  bring  a  speedy  relief. 
Once  relieved,  its  form  of  government  is  saved  to  the 
world;  its  beloved  history  and  cherished  memories  are 
vindicated,  and  its  happy  future  fully  assured  and  ren 
dered  inconceivably  grand.  To  you,  more  than  to  any 
others,  the  privilege  is  given  to  assure  that  happiness 
and  swell  that  grandeur,  and  to  link  your  names  there 
with  for  ever." 

Strange  as  it  may  now  seem,  in  view  of  the  inevitable 
tendency  of  events  at  that  time,  these  appeals  of  Lincoln 
were  not  only  treated  with  contempt  by  those  in  rebel 
lion,  but  the  Border  State  Congressmen,  who  had  every 
thing  at  stake,  and  who  in  the  end  were  compelled  to 
accept  forcible  Emancipation  without  compensation,  al 
though  themselves  not  directly  involved  in  rebellion, 
made  no  substantial  response  to  Lincoln's  efforts  to  save 
their  States  and  people.  Thus  did  the  States  in  rebel 
lion  disregard  repeated  importunities  from  Lincoln  to 
accept  Emancipation  with  payment  for  their  slaves. 
During  long  weary  months  he  had  made  temperate 
utterance  on  every  possible  occasion,  and  by  every 
official  act  that  could  direct  the  attention  of  the  coun 
try  he  sought  to  attain  the  least  violent  solution  of  the 
slavery  problem,  only  to  learn  the  bitter  lesson  that 
slavery  would  make  no  terms  with  the  government,  and 
that  it  was  the  inspiration  of  rebellious  armies  seeking 
the  destruction  of  the  Republic.  Soon  after  his  appeal 
to  the  Congressmen  of  the  Border  States  in  July,  1862, 
Lincoln  prepared  his  Emancipation  Proclamation,  and 
quietly  and  patiently  waited  the  fullness  of  time  for  pro 
claiming  it,  still  hoping  that  peace  might  come  without 
resort  to  the  extreme  measure  of  military  and  uncompen- 
sated  Emancipation.  Seeing  that  the  last  hope  of  any 


io6  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TlMES. 

other  method  of  peace  had  failed,  he  issued  the  prelim 
inary  proclamation  on  the  22d  of  September,  1862,  and 
his  final  proclamation  on  the  ist  of  January  following; 
and  there  never  was  a  day  from  that  time  until  Lin 
coln's  death  that  he  ever  entertained,  even  for  a  mo 
ment,  the  question  of  receding  from  the  freedom  he  had 
proclaimed  to  the  slaves.  But  while  he  was  compelled 
to  accept  the  issue  of  revolutionary  Emancipation,  he 
never  abandoned  the  idea  of  compensated  Emancipation 
until  the  final  overthrow  of  Lee's  army  in  1865.  He 
proposed  it  to  his  Cabinet  in  February  of  that  year,  only 
to  be  unanimously  rejected,  and  I  personally  know  that 
he  would  have  suggested  it  to  Stephens,  Campbell,  and 
Hunter  at  the  Hampton  Roads  Conference  in  February, 
1865,  had  not  Vice-President  Stephens,  as  the  immediate 
representative  of  Jefferson  Davis,  frankly  stated  at  the 
outset  that  he  was  instructed  not  to  entertain  or  discuss 
any  proposition  that  did  not  recognize  the  perpetuity  of 
the  Confederacy.  That  statement  from  Stephens  pre 
cluded  the  possibility  of  Lincoln  making  any  propo 
sition,  or  even  suggestion,  whatever  on  the  subject.  In 
a  personal  interview  with  Jefferson  Davis  when  I  was  a 
visitor  in  his  house  at  Bevoir,  Mississippi,  fifteen  years 
after  the  close  of  the  war,  I  asked  him  whether  he  had 
ever  received  any  intimation  about  Lincoln's  desire  to 
close  the  war  by  the  payment  of  $400,000,000  for  eman 
cipated  slaves.  He  said  that  he  had  not  heard  of  it 
I  asked  him  whether  he  would  have  given  such  in 
structions  to  Stephens  if  he  had  possessed  knowledge 
of  the  fact.  He  answered  that  he  could  not  have  given 
Stephens  any  other  instructions  than  he  did  under  the 
circumstances,  because  as  President  of  the  Confederacy 
he  could  not  entertain  any  question  involving  its  dis 
solution,  that  being  a  subject  entirely  for  the  States 
themselves. 


LINCOLN  AND  EMANCIPATION.  IO^ 

Lincoln  treated  the  Emancipation  question  from  the 
beginning  as  a  very  grave  matter-of-fact  problem  to  be 
solved  for  or  against  the  destruction  of  slavery  as  the 
safety  of  the  Union  might  dictate.  He  refrained  from 
Emancipation  for  eighteen  months  after  the  war  had 
begun,  simply  because  he  believed  during  that  time  that 
he  might  best  save  the  Union  by  saving  slavery,  and  had 
the  development  of  events  proved  that  belief  to  be  cor 
rect  he  would  have  permitted  slavery  to  live  with  the 
Union.  When  he  became  fully  convinced  that  the  safety 
of  the  government  demanded  the  destruction  of  slavery, 
he  decided,  after  the  most  patient  and  exhaustive  con 
sideration  of  the  subject,  to  proclaim  his  Emancipation 
policy.  It  was  not  founded  solely  or  even  chiefly  on  the 
sentiment  of  hostility  to  slavery.  If  it  had  been,  the 
proclamation  would  have  declared  slavery  abolished  in 
every  State  of  the  Union;  but  he  excluded  the  slave 
States  of  Delaware,  Maryland,  and  Tennessee,  and  cer 
tain  parishes  in  Louisiana,  and  certain  counties  in  Vir 
ginia,  from  the  operation  of  the  proclamation,  declaring, 
in  the  instrument  that  has  now  become  immortal,  that 
"which  excepted  parts  are  for  the  present  left  precisely 
as  if  this  proclamation  were  not  issued.'5  Thus  if  only 
military  Emancipation  had  been  achieved  by  the  Presi 
dent's  proclamation,  it  would  have  presented  the  singular 
spectacle  of  Tennessee  in  the  heart  of  the  South,  Mary 
land  and  Delaware  north  of  the  Potomac,  and  nearly  one- 
half  of  Louisiana  and  one-half  of  Virginia  with  slavery 
protected,  while  freedom  was  accorded  to  the  slaves  of 
all  the  other  slaveholding  States.  Lincoln  evidently 
regarded  the  Emancipation  policy  as  the  most  moment 
ous  in  the  history  of  American  statesmanship,  and  as 
justified  only  by  the  extreme  necessity  of  weakening 
the  rebellion  that  then  threatened  the  severance  of  the 
Union. 


108  LINCOLN  AND-  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

From  the  very  day  of  his  inauguration  until  he  issued 
his  Emancipation  Proclamation,  Lincoln  was  constantly 
importuned  by  the  more  radical  element  of  his  supporters 
to  declare  his  purpose  to  abolish  slavery.  Among  them 
were  a  number  of  the  ablest  leaders  of  his  party  in  the 
Senate  and  House,  and  some  of  them  as  impracticable  in 
their  methods  as  they  were  imperious  in  their  demands. 
That  he  was  glad  of  the  opportunity  to  destroy  slavery 
none  can  doubt  who  knew  him,  but  he  patiently  bore  the 
often  irritating  complaints  of  many  of  his  friends  until 
he  saw  that  slavery  and  the  Union  could  not  survive  to 
gether,  and  that  the  country  was  at  least  measurably  pre 
pared  to  accept  and  support  the  new  policy.  He  was 
many  times  threatened  with  open  rebellion  against  his 
administration  by  some  of  the  most  potent  Republicans 
because  of  his  delay  in  declaring  the  Emancipation  pol 
icy,  but  he  waited  until  the  time  had  come  in  the  fall  of 
1862,  when  he  felt  that  it  was  not  only  a  necessity  of  war, 
but  a  political  necessity  as  well.  Another  very  grave 
consideration  that  led  him  to  accept  Emancipation  when 
he  did  was  the  peril  of  England  and  France  recognizing 
the  Confederacy  and  thereby  involving  us  in  war  with 
two  of  the  greatest  powers  of  Europe.  The  pretext  on 
which  was  based  the  opposition  of  England  to  the  Union 
cause  in  the  early  part  of  the  war  was  the  maintenance 
of  slavery  by  the  government  while  prosecuting  a  war 
against  a  slaveholders'  rebellion,  and  it  seemed  to  be  an 
absolute  necessity  that  our  government  should  accept  the 
Emancipation  policy  to  impair  the  force  of  the  public 
sentiment  in  England  that  demanded  the  recognition  of 
the  South  as  an  independent  government.  These  three 
weighty  considerations,  each  in  itself  sufficient  to  have 
decided  Lincoln's  action,  combined  to  dictate  his  Eman 
cipation  policy  in  the  early  fall  of  1862.  The  proclama 
tion  did  not  in  itself  abolish  slavery,  but  the  positive 


LINCOLN  AND  EMANCIPATION.  109 

declaration  in  the  proclamation  ' '  that  the  Executive 
government  of  the  United  States,  including  the  military 
and  naval  authorities  thereof,  will  recognize  and  main 
tain  the  freedom  of  said  persons,"  gave  notice  to  every 
slaveholder  and  promise  to  every  slave  that  every  bond 
man  brought  within  the  lines  of  the  Union  Army  would 
thereafter  be  for  ever  free. 

While  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  inflicted  a  mor 
tal  wound  upon  slavery  and  assured  its  absolute  extinc 
tion,  sooner  or  later,  throughout  the  entire  country,  Lin 
coln  fully  appreciated  the  fact  that  much  was  yet  to  be 
done,  even  beyond  victories  in  the  field,  to  efface  the  blot 
of  slavery  from  the  Republic.  As  early  as  the  i4th  of 
January,  1863,  Representative  Wilson  of  Iowa,  then 
chairman  of  the  Judiciary  Committee,  and  now  a  United 
States  Senator,  reported  a  proposed  amendment  to  the 
Constitution  declaring  slavery  "for  ever  prohibited  in 
the  United  States."  On  the  loth  of  February,  1864, 
Senator  Trumbull  reported  from  the  Judiciary  Com 
mittee  of  that  body  a  proposed  amendment  that  was 
finally  adopted  in  1865,  and  is  now  part  of  the  funda 
mental  law  of  the  nation.  It  was  passed  in  the  Senate 
on  the  1 8th  of  April  by  a  vote  of  38  to  6.  It  was  de 
feated  in  the  House  by  a  vote  of  93  in  its  favor  and  65 
against  it,  lacking  the  requisite  two-thirds.  Seeing  that 
the  amendment  was  lost,  Ashley  of  Ohio  changed  his 
vote  from  the  affirmative  to  the  negative  with  a  view  of 
entering  a  motion  to  reconsider,  and  the  subject  went 
over  until  the  next  session.  On  the  6th  of  January, 
1865,  Ashley  made  his  motion  to  reconsider  and  called 
up  the  proposed  amendment  for  another  vote.  One  of 
the  most  interesting  and  able  debates  of  that  time  was 
precipitated  by  Ashley's  motion,  and  the  notable  speech 
of  the  occasion  was  made  by  Mr.  Rollins  of  Missouri, 
who  had  been  a  large  slaveholder,  and  who  declared  that 


110  LINCOLN  ANti  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

"  the  rebellion  instigated  and  carried  on  by  slaveholders 
has  been  the  death-knell  of  the  institution."  Stevens^ 
the  great  apostle  of  freedom  from  Pennsylvania  and  the 
Great  Commoner  of  the  war,  closed  the  debate,  and 
probably  on  no  other  occasion  in  the  history  of  Congress 
was  such  intense  anxiety  exhibited  as  when  the  roll  was 
called  on  the  adoption  or  rejection  of  the  amendment. 
The  Republicans  did  not  have  two-thirds  of  the  House, 
but  several  Democrats  openly  favored  the  amendment 
and  a  number  of  others  were  known  to  be  uncertain. 
The  first  break  in  the  Democratic  line  was  when  the 
name  of  Coffroth  of  Pennsylvania  was  called,  who 
promptly  answered  ay,  and  was  greeted  with  thunders 
of  applause  in  the  House  and  galleries.  He  was  fol 
lowed  by  Ganson,  Herrick,  Nelson,  Odell,  Radford,  and 
Steele,  Democrats  from  New  York,  by  English  from 
Connecticut,  and  by  McAlister  from  Pennsylvania,  and 
when  the  Speaker  declared  that  the  amendment  had 
been  adopted  by  119  yeas  to  56  nays,  being  more  than 
the  requisite  constitutional  majority,  the  great  battle  of 
Emancipation  was  substantially  won,  and  Lincoln  hailed 
it  with  a  measure  of  joy  second  only  to  his  delight  at 
the  announcement  of  Lee's  surrender.  Before  the  mem 
bers  left  their  seats  salvos  of  artillery  announced  to  the 
people  of  the  capital  that  the  Constitutional  amendment 
abolishing  slavery  had  been  adopted  by  Congress,  and 
the  victorious  leaders  rushed  to  the  White  House  to 
congratulate  Lincoln  on  the  final  achievement  of 
Emancipation. 

The  acceptance  of  the  proposed  amendment  by  the 
requisite  number  of  States  was  not  a  matter  of  doubt, 
and  the  absolute  overthrow  of  slavery  throughout  the 
entire  Republic  dates  from  the  adoption  of  the  amend 
ment  to  the  Constitution  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
on  the  6th  of  January,  1865.  Illinois,  the  home  of  Lin- 


LINCOLN  AND  EMANCIPATION.  in 

coin,  fitly  led  off  in  ratifying  the  amendment.  Massa 
chusetts  and  Pennsylvania  both  ratified  on  the  8th  of 
February,  and  one  of  the  most  grateful  recollections  of 
my  life  is  that  as  a  member  of  the  popular  branch  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Legislature  I  supported  and  voted  for  that 
measure.  Owing  to  the  delay  in  the  meeting  of  Legis 
latures  in  a  number  of  the  States  the  official  proclamation 
of  the  ratification  of  the  amendment  was  not  made  until 
the  1 8th  of  December,  1865,  on  which  day  Secretary 
Seward  formally  declared  to  the  country  and  the  world 
that  the  amendment  abolishing  slavery  had  "become  to 
all  intents  and  purposes  valid  as  a  part  of  the  Constitu 
tion  of  the  United  States. ' '  Lincoln  had  thus  dealt  the 
deathblow  to  slavery  by  his  proclamation,  but  it  was  not 
until  after  he  had  sealed  his  devotion  to  free  government 
by  giving  his  life  to  the  assassin's  hate  that  the  great 
work  was  consummated  and  the  Republic  was  entirely 
free  from  the  stain  of  human  bondage. 

The  most  earnest  discussions  I  ever  had  with  Lincoln 
were  on  the  subject  of  his  Emancipation  Proclamation. 
I  knew  the  extraordinary  pressure  that  came  from  the 
more  radical  element  of  the  Republican  party,  embracing 
a  number  of  its  ablest  leaders,  such  as  Sumner,  Chase, 
Wade,  Chandler,  and  others,  but  I  did  not  know,  and 
few  were  permitted  to  know,  the  importance  of  an 
Emancipation  policy  in  restraining  the  recognition  of 
the  Confederacy  by  France  and  England.  I  was  earn 
estly  opposed  to  an  Emancipation  Proclamation  by  the 
President.  For  some  weeks  before  it  was  issued  I  saw 
Lincoln  frequently,  and  in  several  instances  sat  with  him 
for  hours  at  a  time  after  the  routine  business  of  the  day 
had  been  disposed  of  and  the  doors  of  the  White  House 
were  closed.  I  viewed  the  issue  solely  from  a  political 
standpoint,  and  certainly  had  the  best  of  reasons  for  the 
views  I  pressed  upon  Lincoln,  assuming  that  political 


112  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

expediency  should  control  his  action.  I  reminded  him 
that  the  proclamation  would  not  liberate  a  single  slave — 
that  the  Southern  armies  must  be  overthrown,  and  that 
the  territory  held  by  them  must  be  conquered  by  military 
success,  before  it  could  be  made  effective.  To  this  Lin 
coln  answered:  "  It  does  seem  like  the  Pope's  bull  against 
the  comet;"  but  that  was  the  most  he  ever  said  in  any 
of  his  conversations  to  indicate  that  he  might  not  issue 
it.  I  appealed  to  him  to  issue  a  military  order  as  Com 
mander-in-chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  proclaiming 
that  every  slave  of  a  rebellious  owner  should  be  for  ever 
free  when  brought  within  our  lines.  Looking  simply  to 
practical  results,  that  would  have  accomplished  every 
thing  that  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  achieved;  but 
it  was  evident  during  all  these  discussions  that  Lincoln 
viewed  the  question  from  a  very  much  higher  standpoint 
than  I  did,  although,  as  usual,  he  said  but  little  and 
gave  no  clue  to  the  bent  of  his  mind  on  the  subject. 

I  reminded  Lincoln  that  political  defeat  would  be  in 
evitable  in  the  great  States  of  the  Union  in  the  elections 
soon  to  follow  if  he  issued  the  Emancipation  Proclama 
tion — that  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio, 
Indiana,  and  Illinois  would  undoubtedly  vote  Democratic 
and  elect  Democratic  delegations  to  the  next  Congress. 
He  did  not  dispute  my  judgment  as  to  the  political  effect 
of  the  proclamation,  but  I  never  left  him  with  any  rea 
sonable  hope  that  I  had  seriously  impressed  him  on  the 
subject.  Every  political  prediction  I  made  was  fearfully 
fulfilled  in  the  succeeding  October  and  November  elec 
tions.  New  York  elected  Seymour  Governor  by  10,700 
majority,  and  chose  17  Democratic  and  14  Republican 
Congressmen.  New  Jersey  elected  a  Democratic  Gov 
ernor  by  14,500,  and  4  Democrats  and  i  Republican  to 
Congress.  Pennsylvania  elected  the  Democratic  State 
ticket  by  3500  majority  and  13  Democrats  and  n  Re- 


LINCOLN  AND  EMANCIPATION.  113 

publicans  to  Congress,  with  a  Democratic  Legislature 
that  chose  Buckalew  to  the  United  States  Senate.  Ohio 
elected  the  Democratic  State  ticket  by  5500  majority  and 
14  Democrats  and  2  Republicans  to  Congress,  Ashley  and 
Schenck  being  the  only  two  who  escaped  in  the  political 
Waterloo.  Indiana  elected  the  Democratic  State  ticket 
by  9500  majority  and  7  Democrats  and  4  Republicans  to 
Congress,  with  30  Democratic  majority  in  the  Legis 
lature.  Illinois  elected  the  Democratic  State  ticket  by 
16,500  majority  and  9  Democrats  and  5  Republicans  to 
Congress,  and  28  Democratic  majority  in  the  Legislature. 
Confidently  anticipating  these  disastrous  political  results, 
I  could  not  conceive  it  possible  for  Lincoln  to  success 
fully  administer  the  government  and  prosecute  the  war 
with  the  six  most  important  loyal  Spates  of  the  Union 
declaring  against  him  at  the  polls;  but  Lincoln  knew 
that  the  majority  in  Congress  would  be  safe,  as  the  rebel 
lious  States  were  excluded,  and  the  far  West  and  New 
England  were  ready  to  sustain  the  Emancipation  policy; 
and  he  appreciated,  as  I  did  not,  that  the  magnitude  of 
his  act  cast  all  mere  considerations  of  expediency  into 
nothingness.  He  dared  to  do  the  right  for  the  sake  of 
the  right.  I  speak  of  this  the  more  freely  because,  in 
the  light  of  events  as  they  appear  to-day,  he  rose  to  the 
sublimest  duty  of  his  life,  while  I  was  pleading  the  mere 
expedient  of  a  day  against  a  record  for  human  freedom 
that  must  be  immortal  while  liberty  has  worshipers  in 
any  land  or  clime. 

Lincoln  issued  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  be 
cause  it  was  an  imperious  duty,  and  because  the  time 
had  come  when  any  temporizing  with  the  question 
would  have  been  more  fatal  than  could  possibly  be  any 
temporary  revolt  against  the  manly  declaration  of  right. 
He  felt  strong  enough  to  maintain  the  freedom  he  pro 
claimed  by  the  military  and  naval  power  of  the  govern- 
8 


114  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

ment.  He  believed  it  to  be  the  most  mortal  wound  that 
could  be  inflicted  upon  the  Confederacy.  He  believed 
that  it  would  disarm  the  strong  anti-Union  sentiment 
that  seemed  to  be  fast  pressing  the  English  government 
to  the  recognition  of  the  South,  and  he  believed  that, 
however  public  sentiment  might  falter  for  a  time,  like 
the  disturbed  and  quivering  needle  it  would  surely  settle 
to  the  pole.  He  did  not  issue  it  for  the  mere  sentiment 
of  unshackling  four  millions  of  slaves,  nor  did  he  then 
dream  of  universal  citizenship  and  suffrage  to  freedmen. 
In  the  last  public  address  that  he  ever  delivered,  on  the 
nth  of  April,  1865,  speaking  of  negro  suffrage,  he  said: 
4  ( I  would  myself  prefer  that  suffrage  were  now  conferred 
upon  the  very  intelligent  and  on  those  who  served  our 
cause  as  soldiers. ' '  He  believed  it  to  be  simply  an  act 
of  justice  that  every  colored  man  who  had  fought  for  his 
freedom  and  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Union,  and  was 
honorably  discharged  from  the  military  service,  should 
be  clothed  with  the  right  of  franchise;  and  he  believed 
that  "the  very  intelligent"  should  also  be  enfranchised 
as  exemplars  of  their  race  and  an  inspiration  to  them  for 
advancement.  He  was  always  stubbornly  for  justice, 
stubbornly  for  the  right,  and  it  was  his  sublime  devotion 
to  the  right  in  the  face  of  the  most  appalling  opposition 
that  made  the  name  of  Abraham  Lincoln  immortal  as 
the  author  of  the  Emancipation  Proclamation,  on  which 
he  justly  invoked  "  the  considerate  judgment  of  mankind 
and  the  gracious  favor  of  Almighty  God. ' ' 


LINCOLN  AND  HAMLIN. 


THE  fact  that  Abraham  Lincoln  conceived  and  exe 
cuted  the  scheme  to  nominate  Andrew  Johnson  for 
Vice-President  in  1864  has  been  feebly  disputed,  but  is 
now  accepted  as  the  truth  of  history.  It  was  not  an 
arbitrary  exercise  of  political  power  on  the  part  of  Lin 
coln.  He  had  no  prejudice  against  Hannibal  Hamlin  to 
inspire  him  to  compass  Hamlin' s  defeat.  He  had  no 
special  love  for  Andrew  Johnson  to  lead  him  to  over 
throw  his  old  associate  of  1860  and  make  the  Military 
Governor  of  an  insurgent  State  his  fellow-candidate  for 
1864.  Hamlin  was  not  in  closa  sympathy  with  Lincoln; 
on  the  contrary,  he  was  known  as  one  who  passively 
rather  than  actively  strengthened  a  powerful  cabal  of 
Republican  leaders  in  their  aggressive  hostility  to  Lin 
coln  and  his  general  policy;  but  Lincoln  was  incapable 
of  yielding  to  prejudice,  however  strong,  in  planning  his 
great  campaign  for  re-election  in  1864.  Had  Hamlin 
been  ten  times  more  offensive  than  he  was  to  Lincoln, 
it  would  not  have  halted  Lincoln  for  a  moment  in  favor 
ing  Hamlin' s  renomination  if  he  believed  it  good  politics 
to  do  so.  He  rejected  Hamlin  not  because  he  hated  him ; 
he  accepted  Johnson  not  because  he  loved  him.  He  was 
guided  in  what  he  did,  or  what  he  did  not,  in  planning 
the  great  campaign  of  his  life,  that  he  believed  involved 
the  destiny  of  the  country  itself,  by  the  single  purpose 
of  making  success  as  nearly  certain  as  possible. 

115 


(Photo  by  Brady,  Washington.) 

HANNIBAI,  HAMUlv,    1890. 


LINCOLN  AND  HAMLIN.  117 

Hamlin  was  nominated  for  the  Vice- Presidency  in  1860 
simply  because  he  was  a  representative  Republican  fresh 
from  the  Democratic  party.  Another  consideration  that 
favored  his  selection  was  the  fact  that  his  State  had  been 
carried  into  the  Republican  party  under  his  leadership, 
and  that  its  State  election  in  September  would  be  the 
finger-board  of  success  or  defeat  in  the  national  contest. 
His  position  as  Representative,  Senator,  and  Governor, 
and  his  admitted  ability  and  high  character,  fully  justi 
fied  his  nomination  as  the  candidate  for  Vice- President; 
but  when  elected  there  was  the  usual  steadily  widening 
chasm  between  him  and  the  Executive,  and,  like  nearly 
or  quite  all  Vice- Presidents,  he  drifted  into  the  embrace 
of  the  opposition  to  his  chief.  It  was  this  opposition, 
led  by  men  of  such  consummate  ability  as  Wade  of  Ohio 
and  Henry  Winter  Davis  of  Maryland,  that  admonished 
Lincoln  of  the  necessity  of  putting  himself  in  the  strong 
est  possible  attitude  for  the  then  admittedly  doubtful  bat 
tle  of  1864.  While  the  defeat  of  Lee  at  Gettysburg  and 
the  surrender  of  Vicksburg  the  year  before  had  done 
much  to  inspire  faith  in  the  success  of  the  war,  the  Con 
federacy  was  stubbornly  maintaining  its  armies.  The 
opening  of  the  new  year  of  1864  called  for  large  drafts 
of  men  to  fill  the  thinned  ranks  of  the  Union  forces,  and 
there  was  a  powerful  undertow  of  despondency  among 
the  loyal  people  of  the  North.  The  war  was  costing 
$3,000,000  a  day,  and  after  three  years  of  bloody  conflict 
the  end  was  not  in  view.  The  Republican  leaders  in  the 
early  part  of  1864  were  divided  in  councils,  distracted  by 
the  conflicts  of  ambition,  and  very  many  of  the  ablest  of 
them  regarded  the  defeat  of  the  party  as  not  only  possi 
ble,  but  more  than  probable.  The  one  man  who  fully 
understood  the  peril  and  who  studied  carefully  how  to 
avert  it  was  Abraham  Lincoln. 

Lincoln,  as  was  his  usual  custom,  consulted  with  all 


LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

who  came  within  his  reach,  and  developed  his  views 
from  time  to  time  with  extreme  caution.  In  the  early 
part  of  the  year  he  reached  the  conclusion  that  it  would 
be  eminently  wise  to  nominate  a  conspicuous  War  Demo 
crat  for  Vice- President  along  with  himself  for  President. 
A  number  of  prominent  men  who  acted  with  the  Demo 
cratic  party  in  1860  against  Lincoln's  election,  but  who 
patriotically  entered  the  military  service  and  won  dis 
tinction  by  their  heroism,  represented  a  very  large  class 
of  Democratic  voters  upon  whom  Lincoln  felt  he  must 
rely  for  his  re-election.  Hamlin  had  been  a  Democrat, 
but  he  did  not  come  under  the  class  of  War  Democrats, 
while  Butler,  Dix,  Dickinson,  Johnson,  Holt,  and  others 
represented  a  distinctive  and  very  formidable  class  of 
citizens  who,  while  yet  professing  to  be  Democrats,  were 
ready  to  support  the  war  under  Lincoln  until  it  should 
be  successfully  terminated  by  the  restoration  of  the  Union. 
Lincoln's  first  selection  for  Vice- President  was  General 
Butler.  I  believe  he  reached  that  conclusion  without 
specially  consulting  with  any  of  his  friends.  As  early 
as  March,  1864,  he  sent  for  General  Cameron,  to  whom 
he  proposed  the  nomination  of  Butler,  and  that,  I  as 
sume,  was  his  first  declaration  of  his  purpose  to  any  one 
on  the  subject.  He  confided  to  Cameron  the  mission  to 
Fortress  Monroe  to  confer  confidentially  with  Butler. 
On  that  journey  Cameron  was  accompanied  by  Ex-Con 
gressman  William  H.  Armstrong  of  Pennsylvania,  who 
was  first  informed  of  the  real  object  of  Cameron's  visit 
when  they  were  returning  home,  and  after  Butler  had 
declined  to  permit  his  name  to  be  considered.  Butler 
was  at  that  time  a  strong  man  in  the  loyal  States.  He 
had  not  achieved  great  military  success,  but  his  adminis 
tration  in  New  Orleans  had  made  him  universally  popu 
lar  throughout  the  North,  in  which  the  vindictive  vitu 
peration  of  the  Southern  people  heaped  upon  him  was 


LINCOLN  AND  HAMLlN.  119 

an  important  factor.  Butler's  declination  was  peremp 
tory,  and  Cameron  returned  home  without  learning  in 
what  direction  Lincoln  would  be  likely  to  look  for  a 
candidate  for  Vice- President. 

In  a  later  conference  with  Cameron,  in  which  the 
names  of  Johnson,  Dickinson,  and  Dix  were  seriously 
discussed,  Lincoln  expressed  his  preference  for  Johnson, 
to  which  Cameron,  with  unconcealed  reluctance,  finally 
assented.  While  Lincoln  at  that  time  decided  in  favor 
of  Johnson,  he  did  not  himself  regard  it  as  final.  His 
extreme  caution  and  exceptional  sagacity  made  him 
carefully  consider  all  possible  weak  points  in  Johnson's 
candidacy  before  he  launched  the  movement  for  his 
nomination.  He  summoned  General  Sickles  to  Wash 
ington,  and  sent  him  to  Tennessee  on  a  confidential  mis 
sion  to  examine  and  make  report  to  him  of  the  success 
of  Johnson's  administration  as  Military  Governor.  That 
State  was  in  a  revolutionary  condition  ;  Johnson  was 
charged  with  violent  and  despotic  official  acts,  and  Lin 
coln  meant  to  know  fully  whether  Johnson  might,  by 
reason  of  his  administration,  be  vulnerable  as  a  national 
candidate.  Sickles  had  no  knowledge  of  the  real  pur 
pose  of  his  mission.  The  question  of  nominating  John 
son  for  the  Vice- Presidency  was  never  suggested  or  even 
intimated  to  Sickles,  and  he  fulfilled  his  trust  and  re 
ported  favorably  on  Johnson's  administration,  without 
even  a  suspicion  that  he  was  to  determine  the  destiny 
of  Andrew  Johnson,  make  him  Vice-President  of  the 
United  States,  and  thus  President. 

Lincoln's  purpose  in  seeking  Johnson  as  his  associate 
on  the  national  ticket  in  1864  was  much  more  far  reach 
ing  than  any  but  himself  at  the  time  supposed.  He 
meant  to  guard  against  possible  defeat  by  getting  a 
number  of  the  insurgent  States  in  some  sort  of  line  to 
enable  their  Electoral  votes  to  be  counted  if  needed. 


120  LINCOLN  AND  'MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

His  most  promising  experiment  was  in  Tennessee  under 
the  guidance  of  Johnson,  but  he  obviously  intended  that 
the  States  of  Louisiana,  Arkansas,  and  West  Virginia 
with  Tennessee  should  be  organized  with  the  semblance 
of  full  Statehood  to  make  their  Electoral  votes  available 
should  the  national  contest  be  close.  Had  he  developed 
this  policy  to  his  party  or  to  Congress,  it  would  have 
been  met  with  positive  and  aggressive  opposition,  but 
he  developed  it  in  the  quietest  way  possible.  His  first 
movement  in  that  line  was  to  have  delegations  elected 
to  the  National  Convention  from  the  Southern  States 
named,  and  when  they  appeared  at  the  Baltimore  Con 
vention  on  the  yth  of  June  the  battle  for  their  admission 
was  led  with  consummate  skill  by  the  few  who  under 
stood  Lincoln's  policy.  Tennessee  being  in  the  strong 
est  attitude,  the  delegation  from  that  State  was  selected 
on  which  to  make  the  fight.  It  was  desperately  con 
tested,  because  it  was  then  well  understood  to  mean  the 
nomination  of  Johnson  for  Vice-President;  but  the  Ten 
nessee  delegates  were  admitted  by  more  than  a  two- 
thirds  vote.  With  Tennessee  accepted  as  entitled  to 
representation,  the  contest  was  ended,  and  Louisiana 
and  Arkansas  were  given  the  right  of  representation 
without  a  serious  struggle. 

When  Congress  met  again  after  the  election  in  No 
vember,  and  when  Lincoln's  election  by  an  overwhelm 
ing  popular  as  well  as  Electoral  vote  was  assured,  the 
question  of  counting  the  Electoral  votes  of  Louisiana, 
Tennessee,  and  Arkansas  was  raised  and  elaborately  dis 
cussed  in  both  branches.  As  Lincoln  had  212  Electoral 
votes  to  21  for  McClellan,  exclusive  of  the  votes  of  the 
three  insurgent  States  referred  to,  there  was  no  political 
necessity  to  induce  Congress  to  strain  a  point  for  the  ac 
ceptance  of  these  votes;  and  a  joint  resolution  was  finally 
passed  declaring  "  that  no  valid  election  for  Electors  of 


LINCOLN  AND  HAMLIN.  12  r 

President  and  Vice-President  of  the  United  States"  had 
been  held  in  Louisiana,  Tennessee,  and  Arkansas.  Lin 
coln  approved  the  resolution,  but  took  occasion  by  spe 
cial  message  to  disclaim  approval  of  the  recital  of  the 
preamble.  Had  the  votes  of  these  three  States  been 
needed  to  elect  a  Republican  President,  I  hazard  little  in 
saying  that  they  would  have  been  treated  as  regular  and 
lawful  and  counted  with  the  approval  of  both  the  Senate 
and  House ;  as  they  were  not  needed  and  as  the  develop 
ment  of  these  States  was  Lincoln's  own  conception,  those 
who  were  not  specially  friendly  scored  an  empty  victory 
against  him. 

He  moved  with  masterly  sagacity  at  every  step  in  his 
efforts  to  nominate  Johnson,  and  his  selection  of  General 
Cameron  as  early  as  March  to  be  his  first  ambassador  in 
search  of  a  War  Democrat  for  Vice-President  was  not 
one  of  the  least  of  his  many  shrewd  conceptions.  The 
relations  between  Lincoln  and  Cameron  had  been  some 
what  strained  by  Cameron's  retirement  from  the  Cabinet 
in  1862.  At  least  Lincoln  assumed  that  they  might  be 
somewhat  strained  on  the  part  of  Cameron,  and  he  took 
early  caution  to  enlist  Cameron  in  his  renomination.  He 
knew  the  power  of  Cameron  in  the  manipulation  of  dis 
cordant  political  elements,  and  he  fully  appreciated  the 
fact  that  Cameron's  skill  mfide  him  a  dangerous  oppo 
nent.  He  bound  Cameron  to  himself  by  making  him 
one  of  his  trusted  leadeis  in  the  selection  of  a  candidate 
for  Vice-President.  The  man  who  was  probably  closest 
to  Lincoln  in  this  movement  was  Henry  J.  Raymond, 
but  in  this  as  in  all  Lincoln's  movements  his  confidence 
was  limited  with  each  of  his  trusted  agents.  Raymond 
was  then  editor  of  the  only  prominent  New  York  journal 
that  heartily  supported  Lincoln ;  and  he,  with  the  aid  of 
Seward  and  Weed,  who  early  entered  into  the  movement 
for  the  nomination  of  Johnson,  overthrew  Dickinson  in 


122  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

his  own  State  and  was  the  confessed  Lincoln  leader  in 
the  Baltimore  Convention  of  1864.  With  Dickinson 
beaten  in  New  York  and  with  Hamlin's  forces  demoral 
ized  early  in  the  contest,  the  nomination  of  Johnson  was 
easily  accomplished,  chiefly  because  it  was  what  Lincoln 
desired. 

Neither  Swett  nor  Lamon  had  any  knowledge  of  Lin 
coln's  positive  movement  for  the  nomination  of  Johnson 
until  within  a  day  or  two  of  the  meeting  of  the  conven 
tion.  Colonel  Lamon  has  recently  given  a  description 
of  the  scene  between  Lincoln,  Swett,  and  himself  a  day 
or  two  before  they  went  to  Baltimore  to  aid  in  Lincoln's 
renomination.  Swett  earnestly  and  even  passionately 
protested  against  the  overthrow  of  Hamlin,  but  after 
hearing  Lincoln  fully  on  the  subject  he  consented  to  go 
to  the  convention,  in  which  he  was  a  delegate  from  Illi 
nois,  and  support  the  nomination  of  Johnson;  but  he 
wisely  declared  Holt  to  be  his  candidate,  as  a  foil  to  pro 
tect  Lincoln.  Swett  naturally  felt  uncertain  as  to  how 
the  suggestion  of  Johnson's  name  would  be  received  at 
Baltimore,  as  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the  extent  to 
which  Lincoln  had  progressed  in  the  Johnson  move 
ment.  In  answer  to  his  inquiry  whether  he  was  at  lib 
erty  to  say  that  Lincoln  desired  Johnson's  nomination, 
Lincoln  answered  in  the  negative,  and,  as  quoted  by 
Colonel  Lamon  in  a  recent  public  letter,  said:  "No,  I 
will  address  a  letter  to  Lamon  here  embodying  my  views, 
which  you,  McClure,  and  other  friends  may  use  if  it  be 
found  absolutely  necessary;  otherwise  it  may  be  better 
that  I  shall  not  appear  actively  on  the  stage  of  this 
theatre. ' '  The  letter  was  written  by  Lincoln  and  deliv 
ered  to  Lamon,  who  had  it  with  him  at  Baltimore,  but, 
as  there  was  no  occasion  for  using  it,  it  was  never  shown 
to  any  one  and  was  returned  to  Lincoln  after  the  con 
vention  at  his  request 


LINCOLN  AND  HAMLIN.  123 

How  shrewdly  Lincoln  moved,  and  with  what  extreme 
caution  he  guarded  his  confidence,  is  well  illustrated  by 
the  fact  that  while  he  consulted  Cameron  confidentially 
about  the  nomination  of  Johnson  some  months  before  the 
convention,  and  consulted  me  on  the  same  subject  the 
day  before  the  convention  met,  neither  of  us  supposed 
that  the  other  was  acting  in  the  special  confidence  of 
Lincoln.  On  the  contrary,  I  supposed  that  Cameron  was 
sincerely  friendly  to  Hamlin  and  would  battle  for  his  re- 
nomination,  until  he  finally  proposed  to  me  the  night 
before  the  convention  met  that  we  give  a  solid  compli 
mentary  vote  to  Hamlin,  and  follow  it  with  a  solid  vote 
for  Johnson.  Another  evidence  of  his  extreme  caution 
in  politics  is  given  by  the  fact  that  while  he  carefully 
concealed  from  both  Cameron  and  myself  the  fact  that 
the  other  was  in  his  confidence  in  the  same  movement, 
he  surprised  me  a  few  weeks  before  the  convention  by 
sending  for  me  and  requesting  me  to  come  to  the  con 
vention  as  a  delegate-at-large.  I  had  already  been  unani 
mously  chosen  as  a  delegate  from  my  own  Congressional 
district,  and  was  amazed,  when  I  informed  Lincoln  of 
that  fact,  to  find  that  he  still  insisted  upon  me  going 
before  the  State  Convention  and  having  myself  elected 
as  a  delegate-at-large.  To  all  my  explanations  that  a 
man  in  the  delegation  was  good  for  just  what  he  was 
worth,  whether  he  represented  the  district  or  the  State, 
Lincoln  persisted  in  the  request  that  I  should  come  as  a 
delegate-at-large.  When  I  finally  pressed  him  for  an 
explanation  of  what  seemed  to  me  to  be  a  needless  re 
quest  involving  great  embarrassment  to  me,  he  finally 
with  evident  reluctance  answered :  ' (  General  Cameron 
has  assured  me  that  he  will  be  a  delegate-at-large  from 
your  State,  and  while  I  have  no  reason  to  question  his 
sincerity  as  my  friend,  if  he  is  to  be  a  delegate-at-large 
from  Pennsylvania  I  would  much  prefer  that  you  be  one 


I24  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  CF   WAR  TIMES. 

with,  him."  Had  he  been  willing  to  tell  me  the  whole 
truth,  he  would  have  informed  me  that  Cameron  was  en 
listed  in  the  Johnson  movement,  and  that  he  specially 
desired  at  least  two  of  the  delegates-at-large,  representing 
opposing  factions,  to  be  active  supporters  of  Johnson's 
nomination.  There  could  be  no  other  reasonable  expla 
nation  of  his  earnest  request  to  me  to  accept  the  embar 
rassing  position  of  seeking  an  election  from  the  State 
Convention  when  I  was  already  an  elected  delegate  from 
my  district.  A  fortunate  combination  of  circumstances 
made  it  possible  for  me  to  be  elected  without  a  serious 
contest,  Cameron  and  I  receiving  nearly  a  unanimous 
vote. 

Lincoln  realized  the  fact  that  the  chances  were  greatly 
against  his  re-election  unless  he  should  be  saved  by  the 
success  of  the  Union  army.  There  was  no  period  from 
January,  1864,  until  the  3d  of  September  of  the  same 
year  when  McClellan  would  not  have  defeated  Lincoln 
for  President.  The  two  speeches  of  that  campaign  which 
turned  the  tide  and  gave  Lincoln  his  overwhelming  vic 
tory  were  Sherman's  dispatch  from  Atlanta  on  the  3d  of 
September,  saying:  "  Atlanta  is  ours  and  fairly  won;" 
and  Sheridan's  dispatch  of  the  i9th  of  September  from 
the  Valley,  saying:  "We  have  just  sent  them  (the  enemy) 
whirling  through  Winchester,  and  we  are  after  them  to 
morrow.  ' '  From  the  opening  of  the  military  campaign 
in  the  spring  of  1864  until  ^Sherman  announced  the  cap 
ture  of  Atlanta,  there  was  not  a  single  important  victory 
of  the  Union  army  to  inspire  the  loyal  people  of  the 
country  with  confidence  in  the  success  of  the  war. 
Grant's  campaign  from  the  Rapidan  to  the  James  was 
the  bloodiest  in  the  history  of  the  struggle.  He  had  lost 
as  many  men  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  as  Lee 
ever  had  in  front  of  him,  and  there  was  no  substantial 
victory  in  all  the  sacrifice  made  by  the  gallant  Army  of 


LINCOLN  AND  HAMLIN.  I25- 

the  Potomac.  Sherman  had  been  fighting  continuously 
for  four  months  without  a  decisive  success.  The  people 
of  the  North  had  become  heartsick  at  the  fearful  sacri 
fices  which  brought  no  visible  achievement.  Democratic 
sentiment  had  drifted  to  McClellan  as  the  opposing  can 
didate,  and  so  profoundly  was  Lincoln  impressed  by  the 
gloomy  situation  that  confronted  him  that  on  the  23d  of 
August,  seven  days  before  the  nomination  of  McClellan 
and  ten  days  before  the  capture  of  Atlanta,  he  wrote  the 
following  memoranda,  sealed  it  in  an  envelope,  and  had 
it  endorsed  by  several  members  of  the  Cabinet,  including 
Secretary  Welles,  with  written  instructions  that  it  was 
not  to  be  opened  until  after  the  election: 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 
WASHINGTON,  August  23,  1864. 

This  morning,  as  for  some  days  past,  it  seems  exceedingly 
probable  that  this  administration  will  not  be  re-elected.  Then 
it  will  be  my  duty  to  co-operate  with  the  President-elect  so  as  to 
save  the  Union  between  the  election  and  the  inauguration,  as  he 
will  have  secured  his  election  on  such  grounds  that  he  cannot 
possibly  save  it  afterward.  A.  LINCOLN. 

Nor  was  Lincoln  alone  in  his  apprehension  of  defeat. 
Distrust  and  disintegration  were  common  throughout  the 
entire  Republican  organization,  and  nearly  all  of  the  sin 
cere  supporters  of  Lincoln  were  in  next  to  utter  despair 
of  political  success.  I  spent  an  hour  with  him  in  the 
Executive  Chamber  some  ten  days  before  he  wrote  the 
memoranda  before  given,  and  I  never  saw  him  more  de 
jected  in  my  life.  His  face,  always  sad  in  repose,  was 
then  saddened  until  it  became  a  picture  of  despair,  and 
he  spoke  of  the  want  of  sincere  and  earnest  support  from 
the  Republican  leaders  with  unusual  freedom.  I  dis 
tinctly  remember  his  reference  to  the  fact  that  of  all 
the  Republican  members  of  the  House  he  could  name 


126  LINCOLN'  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

but  one  in  whose  personal  and  political  friendship  he 
could  absolutely  confide.  That  one  man  was  Isaac  N. 
Arnold  of  Illinois.  Stevens,  the  Great  Commoner  of 
the  war,  while  sincerely  desiring  Lincoln's  re-election 
because  he  hated  McClellan  worse  than  he  hated  Lin 
coln,  and  because  he  felt  that  the  election  of  Lincoln 
was  necessary  to  the  safety  of  the  Union,  was  intensely 
bitter  against  Lincoln  personally,  and  rarely  missed  an 
opportunity  to  thrust  his  keenest  invectives  upon  him. 
New  York  had  a  Democratic  Governor  of  matchless  abil 
ity,  and  that  great  State  was  regarded  as  almost  hope 
lessly  lost.  Pennsylvania  was  trembling  in  the  balance, 
as  was  confirmed  by  the  failure  of  the  Republicans  to 
carry  the  State  at  the  October  election,  and  Indiana 
would  have  been  almost  in  rebellion  but  for  the  vic 
tories  of  Sherman  and  Sheridan  during  the  month  of 
September. 

At  this  interview  Lincoln  seemed  to  have  but  one  over 
mastering  desire,  and  that  was  to  attain  peace  on  the  basis 
of  a  restored  Union.  He  took  from  a  corner  of  his  desk 
a  paper  written  out  in  his  own  handwriting,  proposing  to 
pay  to  the  South  $400,000,000  as  compensation  for  their 
slaves,  on  condition  that  the  States  should  return  to  their 
allegiance  to  the  government  and  accept  Emancipation. 
I  shall  never  forget  the  emotion  exhibited  by  Lincoln 
when,  after  reading  this  paper  to  me,  he  said:  "If  I 
could  only  get  this  proposition  before  the  Southern  peo 
ple,  I  believe  they  would  accept  it,  and  I  have  faith  that 
the  Northern  people,  however  startled  at  first,  would  soon 
appreciate  the  wisdom  of  such  a  settlement  of  the  war. 
One  hundred  days  of  war  would  cost  us  the  $400,000,000 
I  would  propose  to  give  for  Emancipation  and  a  restored 
Republic,  not  to  speak  of  the  priceless  sacrifice  of  life 
and  the  additional  sacrifice  of  property;  but  were  I  to 
make  this  offer  now  it  would  defeat  me  inevitably  and 


LINCOLN  AND  tiAMLltf.  127 

probably  defeat  Emancipation. ' '  I  had  seen  him  many 
times  when  army  disasters  shadowed  the  land  and  op 
pressed  him  with  sorrow,  but  I  never  saw  him  so  pro 
foundly  moved  by  grief  as  he  was  on  that  day,  when 
there  seemed  to  be  not  even  a  silvery  lining  to  the  polit 
ical  cloud  that  hung  over  him.  Few  now  recall  the 
grave  perils  to  Lincoln's  re-election  which  thickened 
almost  at  every  turn  in  1864  until  the  country  was  elec 
trified  by  Sherman's  inspiring  dispatch  from  Atlanta, 
followed  by  Sheridan's  brilliant  victories  in  the  Valley 
and  Sherman's  memorable  march  to  the  sea;  and  it  was 
these  grave  perils  and  these  supreme  necessities,  long  un 
derstood  by  Lincoln,  which  made  him,  in  his  broad  and 
sagacious  way,  carefully  view  the  field  for  the  strongest 
candidate  for  Vice- President,  and  finally  led  him  to  nomi 
nate  Andrew  Johnson.  To  Lincoln,  and  to  Lincoln 
alone,  Johnson  owed  his  nomination. 

I  had  no  personal  knowledge  of  Lincoln's  purpose  to 
nominate  Johnson  for  Vice-President  until  the  day  before 
the  Baltimore  Convention  met.  He  telegraphed  me  to 
visit  Washington  before  attending  the  convention,  and  I 
did  so.  He  opened  the  conversation  by  advising  me  to 
give  my  vote  and  active  support  to  Johnson  as  his  asso 
ciate  on  the  ticket.  It  was  evident  that  he  confidently 
relied  on  my  willingness  to  accept  his  judgment  in  the 
matter.  I  had  expected  to  support  the  renomination  of 
Hamlin.  I  had  little  respect  for  Andrew  Johnson,  and 
of  all  the  men  named  for  the  position  he  was  the  last  I 
would  have  chosen  if  I  had  been  left  to  the  exercise  of 
my  own  judgment.  It  is  more  than  probable  that  I 
would  have  obeyed  the  wishes  of  Lincoln  even  if  he  had 
not  presented  the  very  strong  and,  indeed,  conclusive 
reasons  for  his  request;  but  after  hearing  the  arguments 
which  had  led  him  to  the  conclusion  that  Johnson  should 
be  nominated  as  his  associate,  I  was  quite  as  ready  to  ac- 


128  LINCOLN  AND  .MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

cept  the  wisdom  of  the  proposition  as  to  obey  the  wishes 
of  the  President. 

There  was  not  a  trace  of  bitterness,  prejudice,  or  even 
unfriendliness  toward  Hamlin  in  all  that  Lincoln  said 
about  the  Vice-Presidency,  and  he  was  careful  to  say 
that  he  did  not  desire  the  nomination  of  Johnson  to 
gratify  any  personal  preference  of  his  own.  He  natu 
rally  preferred  a  new  man,  as  Hamlin  was  not  in  sympa 
thy  with  Lincoln  personally  or  with  the  general  policy 
of  his  administration,  but  he  preferred  Johnson  for  two 
reasons,  which  he  presented  with  unanswerable  clear 
ness:  First,  he  was  the  most  conspicuous,  most  aggres 
sive,  and  the  most  able  of  all  the  War  Democrats  of  that 
time,  and  was  just  in  the  position  to  command  the  largest 
measure  of  sympathy  and  support  from  that  very  import 
ant  political  element.  Dix,  Dickinson,  Butler,  and  Holt 
had  made  no  such  impressive  exhibition  of  their  loyalty 
as  had  Johnson  in  Tennessee.  He  was  then  just  in  the 
midst  of  his  great  work  of  rehabilitating  his  rebellious 
State  and  restoring  it  to  the  Union,  and  his  loyal  achieve 
ments  were  therefore  fresh  before  the  people  and  certain 
to  continue  so  during  the  campaign.  There  was  really 
no  answer  to  Lincoln's  argument  on  this  point.  Second, 
the  stronger  and  more  imperative  reason  for  Lincoln  pre 
ferring  Johnson  was  one  that  I  had  not  appreciated  fully 
until  he  had  presented  it.  The  great  peril  of  the  Union 
at  that  day  was  the  recognition  of  the  Confederacy  by 
England  and  France,  and  every  month's  delay  of  the 
overthrow  of  the  rebellious  armies  increased  the  danger. 
Extraordinary  efforts  had  been  made  by  Lincoln  to  stim 
ulate  the  Union  sentiment,  especially  in  England,  but 
with  only  moderate  success,  and  there  was  no  safety 
from  one  day  to  another  against  a  war  with  England 
and  France  that  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  success  of 
the  Union  cause.  The  only  possible  way  to  hinder  recog- 


LINCOLN  AND  HAM  LIN.  129 

nition  was  to  show  successful  results  of  the  war  in  restor 
ing  the  dissevered  States  to  their  old  allegiance,  and  Lin 
coln  was  firmly  convinced  that  by  no  other  method  could 
the  Union  sentiment  abroad  be  so  greatly  inspired  and 
strengthened  as  by  the  nomination  and  election  of  a  rep 
resentative  Southern  man  to  the  Vice- Presidency  from 
one  of  the  rebellious  States  in  the  very  heart  of  the  Con 
federacy.  These  reasons  decided  Lincoln  to  prefer  John 
son  for  Vice-President,  and  Lincoln  possessed  both  the 
power  to  make  the  nomination  and  the  wisdom  to  dic 
tate  it  without  jarring  the  party  organization. 

The  fact  that  Lincoln  did  not  make  known  to  Hamlin 
and  his  friends  his  purpose  to  nominate  another  for  Vice- 
President  in  1864  does  not  accuse  him  of  deceit  or  insin 
cerity;  and  the  additional  fact  that  when  the  Convention 
was  in  session  and  he  was  asked  for  a  categorical  answer 
as  to  his  position  on  the  Vice-Presidency,  he  declined  to 
express  his  wishes  or  to  avow  his  interference  with  the 
action  of  the  party,  cannot  be  justly  construed  into  polit 
ical  double-dealing.  It  was  quite  as  much  a  necessity 
for  Lincoln  to  conceal  his  movements  for  the  nomination 
of  Johnson  as  it  was,  in  his  judgment,  a  necessity  for  him 
to  nominate  a  Southern  man  and  a  War  Democrat,  and 
he  simply  acted  with  rare  sagacity  and  discretion  in  his 
movements  and  with  fidelity  to  the  country,  the  safety 
of  which  was  paramount  with  him.  Hamlin  was  pro 
foundly  grieved  over  his  defeat,  as  were  his  many  friends, 
and  had  they  seen  the  hand  of  Lincoln  in  it  they  would 
have  resented  it  with  bitterness;  but  Hamlin  himself  was 
not  fully  convinced  of  Lincoln's  opposition  to  his  renomi- 
nation  until  within  two  years  of  his  death.  I  have  in 
my  possession  an  autograph  letter  from  Hamlin  to  Judge 
Pettis  of  Pennsylvania,  to  whom  Lincoln  had  expressed 
his  desire  for  Johnson's  nomination  on  the  morning  of 
the  day  the  convention  met,  in  which  he  says  that  he 
9 


130  LINCOLN  AKD  MEN-  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

had  seen  and  heard  statements  relating  to  Lincoln's 
action  in  the  matter,  but  he  did  not  believe  them  until 
the  evidence  had  lately  been  made  conclusive  to  his 
mind.  In  this  letter  he  says:  UI  was  really  sorry  to  be 
disabused."  And  he  adds:  "Mr.  L.  [Lincoln]  evidently 
became  some  alarmed  about  his  re-election,  and  changed 
his  position.  That  is  all  I  care  to  say. ' '  I  have  thus  the 
conclusive  evidence  from  Hamlin  himself,  that  in  Sep 
tember,  1889,  he  had  full  knowledge  of  Lincoln's  direct 
intervention  to  nominate  Johnson  for  Vice-President  in 
1864.  Hamlin  gave  an  earnest  support  to  the  ticket, 
believing  that  the  supreme  sentiment  of  Republicanism 
had  set  him  aside  in  the  interest  of  the  public  welfare. 
He  maintained  his  high  position  in  the  party  for  many 
years  thereafter,  filling  the  office  of  Collector  of  Portland 
and  subsequently  returning  to  the  Senate,  where  he 
served  until  he  had  passed  the  patriarchal  age,  and  then 
voluntarily  retired  to  enjoy  the  calm  evening  of  a  well- 
spent  life. 


(Photo  by  Gutekunst,  Philadelphia.) 

SALMON  P.  CHASE. 


LINCOLN  AND  CHASE. 


SALMON  P.  CHASE  was  the  most  irritating  fly  in 
the  Lincoln  ointment  from  the  inauguration  of  the 
new  administration  in  1 86 1. until  the  29th  of  June,  1864, 
when  his  resignation  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was 
finally  accepted.  He  was  an  annual  resigner  in  the  Cabi 
net,  having  petulantly  tendered  his  resignation  in  1862, 
again  in  1863,  and  again  in  1864,  when  he  was  probably 
surprised  by  Mr.  Lincoln's  acceptance  of  it.  It  was 
soon  after  Lincoln's  unanimous  renomination,  and  when 
Chase's  dream  of  succeeding  Lincoln  as  President  had 
perished,  at  least  for  the  time.  He  was  one  of  the  strong 
est  intellectual  forces  of  the  entire  administration,  but  in 
politics  he  was  a  theorist  and  a  dreamer  and  was  unbal 
anced  by  overmastering  ambition.  He  never  forgave 
Lincoln  for  the  crime  of  having  been  preferred  for  Presi 
dent  over  him,  and  while  he  was  a  pure .  and  conscien 
tious  man,  his  prejudices  and  disappointments  were  vastly 
stronger  than  himself,  and  there  never  was  a  day  during 
his  continuance  in  the  Cabinet  when  he  was  able  to  ap 
proach  justice  to  Lincoln.  Like  Sumner,  he  entered 
public  life  ten  years  "before  the  war  by  election  to  the 
Senate  through  a  combination  of  Democrats  and  Free- 
Soilers,  and  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  these  two  most 
brilliant  and  tireless  of  the  great  anti-slavery  leaders  cast 
their  last  votes  for  Democratic  candidates  for  President 
132 


LINCOLN  AND    CHASE.  133 

From  the  day  that  Chase  entered  the  Cabinet  he  seems 
to  have  been  consumed  with  the  idea  that  he  must  be 
Lincoln's  successor  in  1864,  and  to  that  end  he  system 
atically  directed  his  efforts,  and  often  sought,  by  flagrant 
abuse  of  the  power  of  his  department,  to  weaken  his 
chief.  He  will  stand  in  history  as  the  great  financier  of 
the  war;  as  the  man  who  was  able  to  maintain  the  na 
tional  credit  in  the  midst  of  rebellion  and  disruption,  and 
who  gave  the  country  the  best  banking  system  the  world 
has  ever  known.  In  that  one  duty  he  was  practical  and 
amenable  to  wholesome  counsel,  and  his  unblemished 
personal  and  official  integrity  gave  great  weight  to  his 
policy  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  With  all  the  vexa 
tion  he  gave  Lincoln,  and  with  the  many  reasons  he  gave 
his  chief  to  regard  him  as  perfidious,  Lincoln  never 
ceased  to  appreciate  his  value  as  a  Cabinet  officer.  In 
1863,  when  Chase  had  become  an  open  candidate  for  the 
Presidency,  and  when  many  of  his  political  movements 
were  personally  offensive  to  the  President,  Lincoln  said 
of  Chase:  "  I  have  determined  to  shut  my  eyes  so  far  as 
possible  to  everything  of  the  sort.  Mr.  Chase  makes  a 
good  Secretary,  and  I  shall  keep  him  where  he  is.  If  he 
becomes  President,  all  "right.  I  hope  we  may  never  have 
a  worse  man.  I  have  observed  with  regret  his  plan  of 
strengthening  himself."  This  expression  from  Lincoln 
conveys  a  very  mild  idea  of  his  real  feelings  on  the  sub 
ject.  In  point  of  fact,  Lincoln  was  not  only  profoundly 
grieved  at  Chase's  candidacy,  but  he  was  constantly  irri 
tated  at  the  methods  Chase  employed  to  promote  his 
nomination. 

I  never  saw  Lincoln  unbalanced  except  during  the  fall 
of  1863,  when  Chase  was  making  his  most  earnest  efforts 
to  win  the  Republican  nomination.  The  very  widespread 
distrust  toward  Lincoln  cherished  by  Republican  leaders 
gave  him  good  reason  to  apprehend  the  success  of  a  com- 


134  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF   WAR-TIMES. 

bination  to  defeat  him.  Scores  of  national  leaders  were 
at  that  time  disaffected,  but  when  they  were  compelled 
to  face  the  issue  of  his  renomination  or  Republican  de 
feat,  they  finally  yielded  with  more  or  less  ill  grace,  and 
supported  him.  Lincoln  saw  that  if  the  disaffected  ele 
ments  of  the  party  should  be  combined  on  one  strong 
candidate,  his  own  success  would  be  greatly  endangered. 
It  was  the  only  subject  on  which  I  ever  knew  L/incoln 
to  lose  his  head.  I  saw  him  many  times  during  the  sum 
mer  and  fall  of  1863,  when  the  Chase  boom  was  at  its 
height,  and  he  seemed  like  one  who  had  got  into  water 
far  beyond  his  depth.  I  happened  at  the  White  House 
one  night  when  he  was  most  concerned  about  the  Chase 
movement,  and  he  detained  me  until  two  o'clock  in  the 
morning.  Occasionally  he  would  speak  with  great  seri 
ousness,  and  evidently  felt  very  keenly  the  possibility  of 
his  defeat,  while  at  other  times  his  face  would  suddenly 
brighten  up  with  his  never-ending  store  of  humor,  and 
he  would  illustrate  Chase's  attitude  by  some  pertinent 
story,  at  which  he  would  laugh  immoderately.  After 
reviewing  the  situation  for  an  hour,  during  which  I  as 
sured  him  that  Chase  could  not  be  the  Republican  can 
didate,  whoever  might  be,  and  that  I  regarded  his  re- 
nomination  as  reasonably  certain,  I  rose  at  midnight, 
shook  hands  with  him,  and  started  to  go.  He  followed 
me  to  the  end  of  the  Cabinet  table  nearest  his  desk, 
swung  one  of  his  long  legs  over  the  corner  of  it,  and 
stopped  me  to  present  some  new  phase  of  the  Chase  bat 
tle  that  had  just  occurred  to  him.  After  he  had  gotten 
through  with  that  I  again  bade  him  good-night  and 
started  to  the  door.  He  followed  to  the  other  end  of  the 
Cabinet  table,  again  swung  his  leg  over  the  corner  of  it, 
and  started  in  afresh  to  discuss  the  contest  between  Chase 
and  himself. 

It  was  nearly  one  o'clock  when  I  again  bade  Lincoln 


LINCOLN  AND    CHASE.  135 

good-night,  and  got  as  far  as  the  door,  but  when  just 
about  to  open  it  he  called  me  and  with  the  merriest 
twinkling  of  his  eye,  he  said:  "  By  the  way,  McClure, 
how  would  it  do  if  I  were  to  decline  Chase?"  I  was 
surprised  of  course  at  the  novel  suggestion,  and  said  to 
him,  "Why,  Mr.  Lincoln,  how  could  that  be  done?" 
He  answered,  "Well,  I  don't  know  exactly  how  it 
might  be  done,  but  that  reminds  me  of  a  story  of  two 
Democratic  candidates  for  Senator  in  Egypt,  Illinois,  in 
its  early  political  times.  That  section  of  Illinois  was 
almost  solidly  Democratic,  as  you  know,  and  nobody  but 
Democrats  were  candidates  for  office.  Two  Democratic 
candidates  for  Senator  met  each  other  in  joint  debate 
from  day  to  day,  and  gradually  became  more  and  more 
exasperated  at  each  other,  until  their  discussions  were 
simply  disgraceful  wrangles,  and  they  both  became 
ashamed  of  them.  They  finally  agreed  that  either 
should  say  anything  he  pleased  about  the  other  and  it 
should  not  be  resented  as  an  offense,  and  from  that  time 
on  the  campaign  progressed  without  any  special  display 
of  ill  temper.  On  election  night  the  two  candidates, 
who  lived  in  the  same  town,  were  receiving  their  returns 
together,  and  the  contest  was  uncomfortably  close.  A 
distant  precinct,  in  which  one  of  the  candidates  confi 
dently  expected  a  large  majority,  was  finally  reported 
with  a  majority  against  him.  The  disappointed  can 
didate  expressed  great  surprise,  to  which  the  other  can 
didate  answered  that  he  should  not  be  surprised,  as  he 
had  taken  the  liberty  of  declining  him  in  that  district 
the  evening  before  the  election.  He  reminded  the  de 
feated  candidate  that  he  had  agreed  that  either  was  free 
to  say  anything  about  the  other  without  offense,  and 
added  that  under  that  authority  he  had  gone  up  into 
that  district  and  taken  the  liberty  of  saying  that  his 
opponent  had  retired  from  the  contest,  and  therefore  the 


136  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF    WAR-TIMES. 

vote  of  the  district  was  changed,  and  the  declined  can 
didate  was  thus  defeated.  I  think,"  added  Lincoln, 
with  one  of  his  heartiest  laughs,  "I  had  better  decline 
Chase."  It  was  evident  that  the  question  of  inducing 
Chase  to  decline  was  very  seriously  considered  by  Lin- 
coin.  He  did  not  seem  to  know  just  how  it  could  be 
done,  but  it  was  obvious  that  he  believed  it  might  be 
done  in  one  way  or  another,  and  what  he  said  in  jest  he 
meant  in  sober  earnest. 

Lincoln's  anxiety  for  a  renomination  was  the  one 
thing  ever  uppermost  in  his  mind  during  the  third  year 
of  his  administration,  and,  like  all  men  in  the  struggles 
of  ambition,  he  believed  that  his  only  motive  in  his  de 
sire  for  his  own  re-election  was  to  save  the  country, 
rather  than  to  achieve  success  for  himself.  That  he 
was  profoundly  sincere  and  patriotic  in  his  purpose  and 
efforts  to  save  the  Union,  and  that  he  would  willingly 
have  given  his  life  as  a  sacrifice  had  it  been  necessary  to 
accomplish  that  result,  none  can  doubt  who  knew  him ; 
but  he  was  only  human,  after  all,  and  his  ambition  was 
like  the  ambition  of  other  good  men,  often  stronger  than 
himself.  In  this  as  in  all  political  or  administrative 
movements  Lincoln  played  the  waiting  game.  When 
he  did  not  know  what  to  do,  he  was  the  safest  man  in 
the  world  to  trust  to  do  nothing.  He  carefully  veiled 
his  keen  and  sometimes  bitter  resentment  against  Chase, 
and  waited  the  fullness  of  time  when  he  could  by  some 
fortuitous  circumstance  remove  Chase  as  a  competitor, 
or  by  some  shrewd  manipulation  of  politics  make  him  a 
hopeless  one.  His  inexperience  in  the  details  of  politics 
made  him  naturally  distrustful  and  apprehensive  as  to 
his  renomination.  He  could  not,  at  that  early  day,  get 
together  the  political  forces  necessary  to  make  him  feel 
safe  in  the  battle,  and  it  was  not  until  about  the  close  of 
1863  or  early  in  1864  that  he  finally  formulated  in  his 


LINCOLN  AND    CHASE.  137 

mind  his  political  policy,  and  began  the  work  of  consoli 
dating  his  forces  for  action.  He  did  this  with  a  degree 
of  sagacity  and  method  that  would  have  done  credit  to 
the  ripest  politician  of  the  age,  but  there  was  no  time 
until  the  Baltimore  Convention  met  that  Lincoln  felt 
secure.  Even  after  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
delegates  had  been  instructed  in  his  favor,  and  when  to 
all  but  himself  it  was  evident  that  there  could  be  no 
effective  opposition  to  him  in  the  convention,  he  was 
never  entirely  free  from  doubts  as  to  the  result.  Within 
a  month  of  his  nomination,  and  when  his  more  violent 
enemies  had  abandoned  the  effort  to  defeat  him,  as  was 
evidenced  by  the  Fremont  Convention  called  at  Cleve 
land,  he  was  yet  perplexed  with  anxiety  over  the  possi 
bility  of  his  defeat.  In  discussing  the  question  as  late 
as  May,  1864,  I  was  surprised  to  find  the  apprehensions 
he  cherished.  I  told  him  that  his  nomination  was  a 
foregone  conclusion,  and  that  it  was  not  possible  for  any 
combination  to  be  made  that  could  endanger  his  success. 
I  presented  the  attitude  of  the  various  States,  and  re 
ferred  to  their  delegations  to  prove  to  him  that  his  nomi 
nation  must  be  made  on  the  first  ballot  by  a  two-thirds 
vote,  if  not  with  absolute  unity.  To  this  he  responded: 
"Well,  McClure,  what  you  say  seems  to  be  unanswer 
able,  but  I  don't  quite  forget  that  I  was  nominated  for 
President  in  a  convention  that  was  two-thirds  for  the 
other  fellow." 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  official  and  personal  rela 
tions  between  Chase  and  Lincoln  during  the  latter  part 
of  the  year  1863  and  the  early  part  of  1864  were  severely 
strained.  Lincoln  felt  it  deeply,  but  said  little  to  any 
one  on  the  subject,  and  never  permitted  Chase  to  know 
how  keenly  he  grieved  him.  He  knew  that  Chase  sin 
cerely  desired  to  be  honest  in  the  performance  of  his 
public  duty,  and  he  judged  his  infirmities  with  generous 


138  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

charity.  He  fully  appreciated  the  fact,  so  well  stated 
by  Chase's  biographer,  Judge  Warden,  that  Chase  "was 
indeed  sought  less  by  strong  men  and  by  good  men  than 
by  weak  men  and  by  bad  men."  Indeed,  Chase,  with 
all  his  towering  intellect  and  all  his  admitted  devotion 
to  the  country's  cause,  was  the  merest  plaything  of  the 
political  charlatans  who  crossed  his  path,  and  he  was 
thus  made  to  do  many  things  which  were  unworthy  of 
him,  and  which,  with  any  other  than  Lincoln  to  judge 
him,  would  have  brought  him  to  absolute  disgrace.  He 
wrote  many  letters  to  his  friends  in  different  parts  of 
the  country  habitually  complaining  of  Lincoln's  incom- 
petency  and  of  the  hopeless  condition  of  the  war.  In 
none  of  the  many  letters  which  have  reached  the  light 
did  he  give  Lincoln  credit  for  capacity  or  fitness  for  his 
responsible  trust.  In  disposing  of  the  patronage  of  his 
department  he  was  often  fretful  and  generally  ill-advised. 
With  all  these  infirmities  of  temper  and  of  ambition, 
Lincoln  bore  with  Chase  with  marvelous  patience  until 
after  Lincoln's  unanimous  renomination  in  1864,  when 
Chase  sent  his  third  resignation  to  the  President.  In 
his  letter  of  resignation  he  said:  "My  position  here  is 
not  altogether  agreeable  to  you,  and  it  is  certainly  too 
full  of  embarrassment  and  difficulty  and  painful  respon 
sibility  to  allow  in  me  the  least  desire  to  retain  it." 
For  the  first  time  Lincoln  recognized  the  fact  that  he 
and  Chase  could  not  get  along  together,  and  he  promptly 
answered  Chase's  letter  of  resignation  in  the  following 
terse  but  expressive  note:  "  Your  resignation  of  the  office 
of  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  sent  me  yesterday,  is  ac 
cepted.  Of  all  I  have  said  in  commendation  of  your 
ability  and  fidelity  I  have  nothing  to  unsay,  and  yet  you 
and  I  have  reached  a  point  of  mutual  embarrassment  in 
our  official  relation  which  it  seems  cannot  be  overcome 
or  long  sustained  consistently  with  the  public  service." 


LINCOLN  AND    CHASE.  139 

Like  all  irritable  men  who  are  the  prey  of  infirmities, 
Chase  believed,  and  recorded  in  his  diary,  that  the  em 
barrassments  which  arose  between  him  and  Lincoln 
were  not  of  his  creation.  He  thus  expresses  it  in  his 
own  language :  "I  had  found  a  good  deal  of  embarrass 
ment  from  him,  but  what  he  had  found  from  me  I  can 
not  imagine,  unless  it  has  been  caused  by  my  unwilling 
ness  to  have  offices  distributed  as  spoils  or  benefits." 
Chase  retired  from  the  Cabinet  believing  that  he  had 
severed  all  political  relations  with  Lincoln  for  the  re 
mainder  of  his  life,  and  the  last  thing  that  he  then 
could  have  dreamed  of  was  that  his  name  would  ever  be 
considered  by  the  President  for  the  office  of  Chief  Justice 
of  the  United  States. 

When  Chase  retired  from  the  Cabinet,  in  the  latter 
part  of  June,  he  did  not  expect  to  support  Lincoln  for 
re-election.  Within  a  week  thereafter  he  recorded  in  his 
diary  the  fact  that  Senator  Pomeroy  could  not  support 
Lincoln,  and  he  added:  "  I  am  much  of  the  same  senti 
ment,  though  not  willing  now  to  decide  what  duty  may 
demand  next  fall. ' '  But  he  then  hoped  much  from  the 
revolutionary  attitude  of  the  supporters  of  Fremont  and 
the  bold  assault  made  upon  Lincoln  by  Senator  Wade 
and  Representative  Henry  Winter  Davis.  Chase  retired 
to  the  White  Mountains  to  await  events,  and  it  soon  be 
came  evident  that  the  revolt  against  Lincoln  would  not 
materialize.  On  the  contrary,  every  week  brought  way 
ward  stragglers  into  the  Lincoln  camp,  until  at  last  Fre 
mont  himself  had  to  surrender  the  side-show  nomination 
he  had  accepted  and  fall  into  line  in  support  of  the  ad 
ministration,  and  the  manifesto  of  Wade  and  Davis  had 
fallen  upon  listless  ears.  It  soon  became  evident  that  the 
sulking  Republican  leaders  must  choose  between  Lincoln 
and  McClellan — between  supporting  the  war  and  opposing 
the  war,  for  the  McClellan  platform  distinctly  declared 


140  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

the  war  a  failure  and  demanded  the  restoration  of  the 
Union  by  some  other  method  than  an  appeal  to  arms. 
When  Chase  returned  from  his  rest  in  the  mountains  in 
the  latter  part  of  September,  he  visited  Washington,  and 
of  course  paid  his  respects  to  the  President.  It  is  evi 
dent  from  Chase's  own  report  of  his  interview  with  Lin 
coln  that  he  was  not  greatly  inspired  by  Lincoln's  pro 
fessions  of  devotion.  He  notes  the  fact  that  Lincoln  was 
' '  not  at  all  demonstrative,  either  in  speech  or  manner, ' ' 
and  he  adds,  ' '  I  feel  that  I  do  not  know  him. "  It  is 
evident  that  Chase  returned  to  Washington  with  the 
view  of  getting  into  some  sort  of  friendly  relations  with 
the  President.  He  twice  visited  Lincoln  during  his  short 
stay  in  Washington,  and  within  a  week  thereafter  he 
publicly  declared  himself  in  favor  of  Lincoln's  election 
at  his  home  in  Ohio.  He  voted  the  Republican  State 
ticket  in  October,  and  sent  a  congratulatory  telegram  to 
Lincoln  on  the  result  of  the  election. 

It  was  known  to  all  about  Washington  during  the  fall 
of  1864  that  Chief  Justice  Taney  could  not  long  survive, 
and  after  the  first  of  September  he  was  likely  to  die  any 
day.  It  would  be  unjust  to  Chase  to  say  that  he  was  in 
fluenced  in  his  political  action  by  the  hope  of  succeeding 
Chief  Justice  Taney,  but  the  fact  that  his  name  was 
pressed  upon  Lincoln  simultaneously  by  his  friends 
throughout  the  country,  even  before  the  dead  Chief 
Justice  had  been  consigned  to  the  tomb,  proves  that 
Chase  had  cherished  the  hope  of  reaching  that  exalted 
judicial  position.  Taney  died  on  the  I2th  of  October, 
1864,  within  two  weeks  after  Chase  declared  himself  in 
favor  of  the  election  of  Lincoln,  and  on  the  I3th  of  Oc 
tober  Chase's  name  was  on  the  lips  of  all  his  friends  as 
the  man  for  Chief  Justice.  The  movement  was  digni 
fied  by  the  active  and  earnest  efforts  of  Senator  Sumner, 
who  was  in  a  position  to  exert  considerable  influence 
9 


LINCOLN  AND    CHASE.  141 

with  the  President,  although,  on  many  questions  they 
had  seriously  differed.  He  desired  a  Chief  Justice  who 
could  be  trusted  on  the  slavery  question,  and,  believing 
that  Chase  was  the  safest  of  all  on  that  important  issue, 
he  made  an  exhaustive  struggle  to  win  the  position  for 
Chase.  Secretary  Stanton,  who  had  been  in  general 
harmony  with  Chase  in  the  Cabinet,  was  also  his  earnest 
friend  in  the  struggle  for  the  Chief  Justiceship,  but  the 
opposition  aroused  at  the  mention  of  his  name  came  from 
every  part  of  the  country,  and  from  very  many  of  the 
ablest  and  most  earnest  of  Lincoln's  friends.  It  was 
argued  against  Chase  that  while  his  ability  was  admit 
ted,  his  practical  knowledge  of  law  was  limited,  and  that 
he  was  without  legal  training,  because  his  life  had  been 
devoted  almost  exclusively  to  politics.  He  was  elected 
to  the  Senate  a  dozen  years  before  the  war;  he  retired 
from  the  Senate  to  become  Governor  of  Ohio,  in  which 
position  he  served  two  terms,  and  he  was  re-elected  to 
the  Senate  at  the  close  of  his  gubernatorial  service.  He 
gave  up  the  Senatorship  to  enter  the  Cabinet  in  1861,  so 
that  for  many  years  he  had  given  no  thought  or  efforts  to 
the  law,  and  he  was  regarded  by  very  many ,  as  lacking 
in  the  special  training  necessary  to  the  first  judicial  office 
of  the  national  government. 

Strong  as  was  the  hostility  to  Chase's  appointment  in 
every  section  of  the  Union,  the  most  intense  opposition 
came  from  his  own  State  of  Ohio.  The  suggestion  that 
he  should  become  Chief  Justice  was  resented  by  a  large 
majority  of  the  leading  Republicans  of  the  State,  and 
they  severely  tested  Lincoln's  philosophy  by  the  violence 
of  their  opposition,  and  especially  by  the  earnestness 
with  which  they  insisted  that  it  was  an  insult  to  Lin 
coln  himself  to  ask  him  to  appoint  Chase.  Pennsylva 
nia's  most  prominent  official  connected  with  the  admin 
istration,  and  one  of  her  most  learned  lawyers,  Joseph  J. 


142  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Lewis,  then  Commissioner  of  Internal  Revenue,  reflected 
the  general  Republican  sentiment  of  Pennsylvania  by 
his  unusual  proceeding  of  sending  a  formal  protest  to 
Lincoln  against  Chase's  appointment.  He  declared  that 
Chase  ( '  was  not  a  man  of  much  legal  or  financial  know 
ledge;  that  his  selfishness  had  gradually  narrowed  and 
contracted  his  views  of  things  in  general;  that  he  was 
amazingly  ignorant  of  men;  that  it  was  the  opinion  in 
the  department  that  he  really  desired,  toward  the  end  of 
his  term  of  office,  to  injure,  and  as  far  as  possible  to 
destroy,  the  influence  and  popularity  of  the  adminis 
tration." 

I  have,  in  a  previous  chapter,  related  an  interview  I 
had  with  Lincoln  a  short  time  before  he  appointed 
Chase.  It  was  very  evident  from  Lincoln's  manner, 
rather  than  from  what  he  said,  that  he  was  much  per 
plexed  as  to  his  duty  in  the  selection  of  a  Chief  Justice. 
In  that  conversation  he  discussed  the  merits  of  the  half 
dozen  or  more  prominent  men  who  were  suggested  for 
the  place.  It  is  hardly  proper  to  say  that  Lincoln  dis 
cussed  the  matter,  for  the  conversation  was  little  else  on 
his  part  than  a  succession  of  searching  inquiries  to  ob 
tain  the  fullest  expression  of  my  views  as  to  the  merits 
and  demerits  of  the  men  he  seemed  to  have  under  con 
sideration.  As  to  his  own  views  he  was  studiously  reti 
cent.  I  tried  in  various  ways  to  obtain  some  idea  of  the 
leaning  of  his  mind  on  the  subject,  but  did  not  succeed. 
The  many  inquiries  he  made  about  Stanton,  and  the 
earnestness  he  exhibited  in  discussing,  or  rather  having 
me  discuss,  Stanton  as  the  possible  Chief  Justice,  im 
pressed  me  with  the  belief  that  he  was  entertaining  the 
idea  of  appointing  his  Secretary  of  War;  but  he  gave  no 
expression  that  could  have  warranted  me  in  assuming 
that  I  could  correctly  judge  the  bent  of  his  mind  on  the 
subject.  The  fact  that  he  delayed  the  appointment  for 


LINCOLN  AND   CHASE.  143 

nearly  two  months  after  the  death  of  Taney  proves  that 
Lincoln  gave  the  subject  not  only  very  serious  but  pro 
tracted  consideration,  and  I  doubt  whether  he  had  fully 
decided  in  his  own  mind  whom  he  would  appoint  until 
the  6th  of  December,  the  day  that  he  sent  the  name  of 
Chase  to  the  Senate  for  Chief  Justice. 

At  no  time  during  Lincoln's  administration  had  he 
ever  submitted  to  an  equal  pressure  in  deciding  any  pub 
lic  appointment,  and,  excepting  the  Emancipation  Proc 
lamation,  I  doubt  whether  any  question  of  policy  was 
ever  so  earnestly  pressed  and  opposed  by  his  friends  as 
was  the  appointment  of  Chase.  Any  other  President 
than  Lincoln  would  not  have  appointed  Chase.  His 
personal  affronts  to  Lincoln  had  been  continuous  and 
flagrant  from  the  time  he  entered  the  Cabinet  until  he 
resigned  from  it  a  little  more  than  three  years  thereafter, 
and  I  am  quite  sure  that  at  no  time  during  that  period 
did  Lincoln  ever  appeal  to  Chase  for  advice  as  his  friend. 
He  had  many  consultations  with  him,  of  course,  on  mat 
ters  relating  to  the  government,  but  that  Lincoln  regarded 
Chase  as  his  bitter  and  even  malignant  enemy  during  all 
that  period  cannot  now  be  doubted.  The  only  pretense 
of  atonement  that  Chase  had  ever  made  was  his  hesi 
tating  and  ungracious  support  of  Lincoln's  re-election, 
but  only  after  the  brilliant  success  of  the  Union  armies 
under  Sherman  and  Sheridan  had  absolutely  settled  the 
contest  in  Lincoln's  favor.  Grant  overlooked  a  malig 
nant  assault  made  upon  him  by  Admiral  Porter  when  he 
promoted  him  to  succeed  Farragut;  but  in  that  case  Por 
ter's  record  clearly  entitled  him  to  the  distinction,  and 
Grant  simply  yielded  personal  resentment  to  a  public 
duty.  It  was  not  pretended  that  Chase  had  any  claim 
to  the  Chief  Justiceship  on  the  ground  of  eminent  legal 
attainments  or  of  political  fidelity,  and  Lincoln's  appoint 
ment  of  Chase  was  simply  one  of  the  many  exhibitions 


144  LINCOLN  AND  M&N  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

of  the  matchless  magnanimity  that  was  one  of  the  great 
est  attributes  of  his  character.  He  appointed  him  not 
because  he  desired  Chase  for  Chief  Justice  so  much  as 
because  he  feared  that,  in  refusing  to  appoint  him,  he 
might  permit  personal  prejudice  to  do  injustice  to  the 
nation.  * 

Of  course,  Chase  promptly  and  effusively  thanked  the 
President  when  he  learned  that  his  name  had  been  sent 
to  the  Senate  for  Chief  Justice.  In  his  letter  to  Lincoln 
he  said :  ' '  Before  I  sleep  I  must  thank  you  for  this  mark 
of  your  confidence,  and  especially  for  the  manner  in 
which  the  nomination  was  made. ' '  But  before  he  was 

*  You  give  a  wrong  impression  as  to  Chase's  legal  training. 
He  was  a  thorough  student  of  the  law,  and  a  careful,  painstaking 
lawyer  till  he  entered  the  Senate  at  the  age  of  forty -two.  He  even 
was  so  fond  of  law  as  to  take  up  superfluous  drudgery,  editing 
with  notes  and  citations  the  Ohio  Statutes.  He  kept  out  of  poli 
tics  till  he  was  thirty-three.  While  in  the  Senate  he  argued  cases 
in  the  Supreme  Court — as  one  involving  the  title  to  lands  in  and 
about  Keokuk. 

Now,  it  is  the  study  and  practice  a  lawyer  has  before  forty 
which  determine  his  quality  and  equipment  as  a  jurist,  and  these 
are  not  much  affected  by  diversions  afterward.  A  man  culmi 
nates  professionally  by  forty  :  witness  B.  R.  Curtis,  Choate,  Fol- 
lett,  etc.  Edmunds  has  been  in  the  Senate  twenty  or  twenty-five 
years,  but  he  has  not  lost  his  legal  ability  acquired  before  he 
entered  it. 

My  own  impression  is,  from  the  conversations  with  Lincoln 
which  different  persons  have  reported  to  me  and  from  some 
manuscript  letters  of  Sumner,  that  Lincoln  intended  all  along  to 
appoint  Chase,  though  somewhat  doubting  whether  Chase  would 
settle  down  quietly  in  his  judicial  office  and  let  politics  alone. 
That  was  a  sincere  apprehension  which  others  shared,  but  I  do 
not  think  that  Lincoln's  mind  at  all  rested  on  any  other  person. 

I  began  to  write  this  note  only  to  make  the  points  that  Chase 
had  ample  legal  training,  and  that  his  intellect  was  naturally 
judicial.  See  his  able  argument  in  the  Van  Landt  case,  about 
1846. — Edward  L.  Pierce  to  the  Author,  December  7,  1891. 


LINCOLN  AND   CHASE.  145 

three  months  in  the  high  office  conferred  upon  him  by 
Lincoln  he  became  one  of  Lincoln's  most  obtrusive  and 
petulant  critics,  and  his  last  letter  to  Lincoln,  written  on 
the  very  day  of  Lincoln's  assassination,  was  a  harsh  criti 
cism  on  the  President's  action  in  the  Louisiana  case. 
Immediately  after  the  death  of  Lincoln,  writing  to  an 
old  political  associate  in  Ohio,  Chase  said:  "The  schemes 
of  politicians  will  now  adjust  themselves  to  the  new  con 
ditions;  I  want  110  part  in  them."  Indeed,  the  only 
specially  kind  words  from  Chase  to  Lincoln  that  I  have 
been  able  to  discover  in  all  the  publications  giving 
Chase's  views  I  find  in  the  one  expression  of  hearty 
gratitude  and  friendship,  written  on  the  impulse  of  the 
moment,  when  he  was  first  notified  of  his  nomination  to 
the  Chief  Justiceship.  The  new  conditions  of  which  he 
spoke  after  the  death  of  Lincoln,  and  in  which  he  de 
clared  he  could  have  no  part,  speedily  controlled  the  new 
Chief  Justice  in  his  political  actions.  The  leader  of  the 
radical  Republicans  when  he  became  Chief  Justice,  he 
gradually  gravitated  against  his  party  until  he  was  ready 
to  accept  the  Democratic  nomination  for  President  in 
1868,  and  he  never  thereafter  supported  a  Republican 
candidate  for  President.  He  hoped  to  receive  the  Presi 
dential  nomination  from  the  New  York  Convention  of 
1868.  It  had  been  agreed  upon  by  some  who  believed 
that  they  controlled  the  convention  that  Chase  should  be 
nominated,  and  Governor  Seymour  retired  from  the  chair 
at  the  appointed  time,  as  is  generally  believed,  to  make 
the  nomination  to  the  convention;  but  Samuel  J.  Tilden 
had  no  love  for  Chase,  and  it  was  he  who  inspired  the 
spontaneous  movement  that  forced  the  nomination  of 
Seymour  while  he  was  out  of  the  chair,  and  carried  it 
like  a  whirlwind.  Tilden  did  not  guide  the  convention 
to  the  nomination  of  Seymour  because  he  specially  de 
sired  Seymour's  nomination ;  he  did  it  because  he  desired 

JO 


146  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

to  defeat  the  nomination  of  Chase.  The  result  was  the 
keenest  disappointment  to  the  Chief  Justice.  He  defined 
his  political  position  during  the  contest  of  1868  as  fol 
lows:  "The  action  of  the  two  parties  has  obliged  me  to 
resume,  with  my  old  faith,  my  old  position — that  of 
Democrat;  by  the  grace  of  God  free  and  independent." 
After  1868,  Chase  was  unknown  as  a  factor  in  politics. 
In  June,  1870,  he  was  attacked  by  paralysis,  and  from 
that  time  until  his  death,  on  the  7th  of  May,  1873,  he 
was  a  hopeless  invalid.  His  last  political  deliverance 
was  a  feeble  declaration  in  favor  of  Greeley's  election  in 
1872,  when  he  was  shattered  in  mind  and  body.  It  may 
truthfully  be  said  of  him  that  from  1861  until  his  death 
his  public  life  was  one  continued  and  consuming  disap 
pointment,  and  the  constant  training  of  his  mind  to  poli 
tics  doubtless  greatly  hindered  him  in  winning  the  dis 
tinction  as  Chief  Justice  that  he  might  have  achieved 
had  he  given  up  political  ambition  and  devoted  himself 
to  the  high  judicial  duties  he  had  accepted.  While  one 
of  the  greatest  intellects  among  all  the  Republican  lead 
ers,  he  was  an  absolute  failure  as  a  politician,  and  his 
persistence  in  political  effort  made  him  fail  to  improve 
other  opportunities.  His  life  may  be  summed  up  in  the 
single  sentence:  He  was  an  eminently  great,  a  strangely 
unbalanced,  and  a  sadly  disappointed  man. 


LINCOLN  AND  CAMERON. 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  had  more  varied  and  compli- 
<L\  cated  relations  with  Simon  Cameron  than  with  any 
other  Pennsylvanian  during  his  Presidential  term.  In 
deed,  Cameron  fills  more  pages  in  the  annals  of  Penn 
sylvania  politics  than  any  citizen  of  the  State  since  the 
organization  of  our  government.  He  is  the  only  man 
who  was  four  times  elected  to  the  United  States  Senate 
by  the  Pennsylvania  Legislature  until  his  son  attained 
the  same  distinction  as  his  successor,  and  he  would  have 
won  a  fifth  election  without  a  serious  contest  had  he  not 
voluntarily  resigned  to  assure  the  succession  to  his  son. 
Without  great  popular  following,  he  was  the  most  con 
spicuous  of  all  our  Pennsylvania  politicians,  measured 
by  the  single  standard  of  success  in  obtaining  political 
honors  and  power.  He  was  first  elected  to  the  Senate  in 
1845  to  succeed  Buchanan,  who  had  been  transferred  to 
the  Polk  Cabinet.  The  tariff  of  1842  was  then  a  vital 
issue  in  Pennsylvania,  and  Cameron  was  known  as  a 
positive  protectionist.  The  Legislature  was  Democratic, 
and  had  nominated  the  late  Chief  Justice  Woodward 
with  apparent  unanimity  to  succeed  Buchanan ;  but 
Cameron  organized  a  bolt  from  the  Democratic  party, 
commanded  the  solid  Whig  vote  on  the  tariff  issue,  and 
was  thus  elected.  The  Senate  to  which  he  was  chosen 
was  Democratic,  and  he  exhibited  his  peculiar  power 
over  that  body  when  he  served  in  it  by  the  rejection  of 


{Photo  by  Brady,  Washington.) 

SIMON   CAMERON,    1865. 


LINCOLN  AND   CAMERON.  H9 

Judge  Woodward  when  nominated  by  President  Polk  as 
Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  He 
made  a  memorable  record  during  his  early  Senatorial 
service  by  his  earnest  appeal  to  Vice-President  Dallas  in 
favor  of  protection,  when  it  was  known  that  the  repeal 
of  the  tariff  of  1842  would  depend  upon  the  casting  vote 
of  the  Vice-President.  At  the  expiration  of  his  term, 
in  1849,  Cameron  was  a  candidate  for  re-election.  The 
balance  of  power  in  the  Legislature  was  held  by  Native 
American  Representatives  from  Philadelphia,  elected  on 
the  Fusion  ticket.  He  failed,  however,  to  divert  that 
element  from  the  Whigs,  and  abandoned  the  struggle, 
giving  the  field  to  James  Cooper,  the  regular  Whig  can 
didate,  who  was  successful. 

In  1854  a  strange  political  revolution  occurred  in 
Pennsylvania,  in  which  the  new  American  or  Know- 
Nothing  party  elected  the  Whig  candidate  for  Governor 
and  the  Democratic  candidate  for  Canal  Commissioner, 
and  carried  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  Legis 
lature,  embracing  nominees  of  both  parties.  Cameron 
supported  the  Democratic  ticket,  and  made  a  speech  in 
its  favor  the  night  before  election,  but  immediately  after 
the  election  he  associated  himself  with  the  Americans 
and  became  an  aggressive  candidate  for  United  States 
Senator.  This  was  the  beginning  of  the  factional  con 
flict  between  Cameron  and  Curtin  (then  Secretary  of  the 
Commonwealth)  that  continued  as  long  as  they  were  in 
active  political  life.  The  new  party  was  without  leader 
ship  or  discipline,  and  was  speedily  broken  into  frag 
ments  by  a  dozen  aspirants  for  the  Senatorship,  of  whom 
Cameron  and  Curtin  were  the  leading  and  apparently 
only  hopeful  candidates.  The  struggle  became  excep 
tionally  bitter,  the  joint  convention  meeting  and  ad 
journing  from  time  to  time  without  succeeding  in  a 
choice,  until  finally  it  became  a  matter  of  necessity 


15°  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

to  elect  Cameron  or  adjourn  without  an  election;  and 
after  a  protracted  contest  over  that  issue  the  joint  con 
vention  adjourned  sine  die  by  one  majority.  The  next 
Legislature  was  Democratic,  and  Governor  Bigler  was 
chosen.  When  the  Legislature  met  in  1857  the  Demo 
crats  had  three  majority  on  joint  ballot,  and  confidently 
expected  to  elect  a  Senator.  The  late  Colonel  Forney 
was  made  the  candidate  by  the  direct  intervention  of 
President-elect  Buchanan,  who  was  then  just  on  the 
threshold  of  the  enormous  power  and  patronage  of  the 
Presidency.  The  nomination  would  naturally  have  gone 
to  Henry  D.  Foster,  who  was  a  member  of  the  House, 
but  for  the  attitude  assumed  by  Buchanan.  Forney's 
nomination  somewhat  weakened  the  Democratic  lines 
by  the  general  and  clamorous  discontent  of  the  several 
candidates  who  had  hoped  to  win  in  an  open  contest. 
The  Republicans  were  intensely  embittered  against  For 
ney  because  they  believed  that  he,  as  chairman  of  the 
Democratic  State  Committee,  had  controlled  the  October 
election  unfairly  to  defeat  the  Republican  State  ticket 
by  a  small  majority,  and  thus  assured  the  election  of  a 
Democratic  President.  Cameron  had  for  the  first  time 
taken  open  ground  against  the  Democrats  in  1856,  when 
he  was  one  of  the  Republican  candidates  for  elector  at 
large,  and  actively  supported  Fremont's  election.  But 
he  was  not  in  personal  favor  with  most  of  the  Repub 
licans,  and  when  his  name  was  proposed  in  the  Repub 
lican  caucus  as  a  candidate  for  Senator,  it  was  not  seri 
ously  entertained  until  Senator  Penrose  assured  the 
caucus  that  Cameron  could  command  three  Democratic 
votes  if  given  the  solid  support  of  the  Republicans.  A 
confidential  committee  was  appointed  to  ascertain  the 
truth  of  the  statement  by  personal  assurance  from  the 
Democratic  members,  and  after  a  confirmative  report,  in 
which  the  names  of  the  Democratic  members  were  not 


LINCOLN  AND   CAMERON.  15l 

given,  the  Republican  caucus  resolved  to  cast  one  vote 
for  Cameron.  That  resolution  was  carried  out  in  joint 
convention,  and  three  Democratic  Representatives  (Lebo, 
Maneer,  and  Wagonseller)  voted  for  Cameron  and  elected 
him. 

In  1 86 1,  Cameron  resigned  the  Senatorship  to  accept 
the  War  portfolio  under  Lincoln.  Early  in  1862  he  was 
transferred  by  Lincoln  from  the  War  Department  to  the 
Russian  Mission,  and  in  1863  he  had  resigned  his  mission 
and  again  appeared  as  a  candidate  for  United  States  Sen 
ator  to  succeed  Wilmot,  who  had  been  chosen  to  fill 
Cameron's  unexpired  term.  The  Legislature  contained 
one  Democratic  majority  on  joint  ballot.  Wilmot  would 
have  been  unanimously  renominated  had  it  been  possible 
to  elect  him,  but  Cameron  was  nominated  upon  the  posi 
tive  assurance  from  his  friends  that  he  could  command 
one  or  more  Democratic  votes  and  was  the  only  Repub 
lican  who  could  be  successful.  His  nomination  and  the 
contest  that  followed  led  to  an  eruption  that  not  only  pre 
vented  any  Democratic  support,  but  deprived  him  of  a 
solid  Republican  support,  and  Buckalew  was  elected. 
In  1867,  Cameron  and  Curtin  again  locked  horns  on  the 
Senatorship,  and  Cameron  was  successful  after  a  struggle 
of  unexampled  desperation.  Cameron  served  his  full 
term  of  six  years,  and  was  re-elected  in  1873  to  succeed 
himself,  without  a  contest.  Most  of  the  active  oppo 
nents  within  his  party  had  broken  to  the  support  of 
Greeley  in  1872,  and  thereafter  Cameron  was  practically 
supreme  in  the  direction  of  the  Republican  organization. 
He  resigned  in  1877,  when  the  Legislature  was  in  ses 
sion,  and  after  it  had  been  ascertained  that  his  son,  the 
present  Senator  Cameron,  could  be  elected  as  his  suc 
cessor.  Had  Cameron  not  resigned,  he  would  have  been 
elected  to  his  fifth  term  in  1879  ^Y  tne  united  vote  of  his 
party;  but  from  his  retirement  in  1877  until  his  death, 


*52  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

a  dozen  years  later,  he  seemed  to  enjoy  freedom  from  the 
cares  and  perplexities  of  political  life,  and  had  the  grati 
fication  of  seeing  his  son  thrice  elected  to  the  position  he 
had  surrendered  to  him.  He  had  survived  all  the  many 
intensified  asperities  of  his  long  and  active  political  life, 
and  died  at  the  ripe  age  of  fourscore  and  ten  years,  with 
his  faculties  unabated  until  the  long  halt  came.  He  and 
his  son  have  each  attained  the  highest  Senatorial  honors 
ever  awarded  by  Pennsylvania  to  any  of  her  citizens  by 
four  elections  to  the  Senate — an  entirely  exceptional  rec 
ord  of  political  success  in  the  history  of  all  the  States  of 
the  Union.  It  was  often  complained  by  his  foes  that 
Cameron  fought  and  won  unfairly  in  his  political  con 
tests,  but  the  defeated  generals  of  Europe  made  the  same 
complaint  against  Napoleon. 

Cameron  was  a  Senator  when  Lincoln  served  his  single 
term  in  Congress,  but  they  did  not  become  even  acquaint 
ances,  and  he  first  became  involved  in  Lincoln's  political 
life  in  1860,  when  both  were  candidates  for  the  Repub 
lican  nomination  for  President.  Cameron's  candidacy 
was  not  regarded  as  a  serious  effort  to  nominate  him,  but 
the  peculiar  political  situation  in  Pennsylvania  greatly 
favored  him  in  making  himself  the  candidate  of  the 
State,  and  with  his  sagacity  and  energy  in  political 
affairs  he  was  not  slow  to  avail  himself  of  it.  Curtin 
was  the  prominent  candidate  for  Governor,  and  Cameron 
led  Curtin' s  opponents.  Curtin  commanded  the  nomina 
tion  for  Governor,  .and  naturally  enough  desired  a  united 
party  to  assure  his  election.  Cameron  secured  a  majority 
of  votes  in  the  State  Convention  for  President,  and  rea 
sonably  claimed  that  he  was  as  much  entitled  to  the 
united  support  of  the  party  for  President  as  Curtin  was 
entitled  to  it  for  Governor.  The  conflict  between  the 
two  elements  of  the  party  led  to  a  compromise,  by  which 
a  nearly  united  delegation  was  given  to  Cameron  for  a 


LINCOLN  AND   CAMERON.  *53 

complimentary  vote  for  President.  Cameron  himself  be 
lieved,  in  after  years,  that  he  could  have  been  nominated 
and  elected  if  he  had  been  heartily  pressed  by  Pennsyl 
vania.  He  many  times  eluded  me  for  refusing  to  give 
him  an  earnest  support,  saying  that  he  could  have  been 
made  a  successful  candidate,  and  then,  to  use  his  own 
expressive  language,  ' '  We  could  all  have  had  everything 
we  wanted."  While  Cameron  had  a  majority  of  the 
delegation,  a  large  minority  was  more  or  less  bitterly 
opposed  to  him,  and  his  name  was  withdrawn  in  the 
convention  after  the  first  ballot,  because  the  delegation 
would  have  broken.  The  men  who  immediately  repre 
sented  Cameron  on  that  occasion  were  John  P.  Sander 
son,  who  was  subsequently  appointed  to  the  regular  army, 
and  Alexander  Cummings,  whose  confused  use  of  mili 
tary  authority  conferred  upon  him  in  the  early  part  of 
the  war  led  to  a  vote  of  censure  upon  Cameron  by  Con 
gress.  They  knew  before  the  convention  met  that  the 
contest  was  narrowed  down  to  Seward  and  Lincoln,  and 
that  Cameron,  Chase,  and  Bates  were  not  in  the  fight. 
Sanderson  and  Cummings,  with  little  or  no  control  of 
the  delegation,  were  early  in  negotiation  with  David 
Davis,  who  was  specially  in  charge  of  Lincoln's  interest 
in  Chicago,  and  obtained  Davis' s  positive  assurance  that 
if  the  Pennsylvania  delegation  would  support  Lincoln 
and  Lincoln  succeeded  to  the  Presidency,  Cameron  would 
be  appointed  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  This  agreement 
was  not  made  known  at  the  time  to  any  in  the  delega 
tion,  nor  did  it  become  known  to  Lincoln,  at  least  as  a 
positive  obligation,  until  after  the  election. 

The  success  of  Lincoln  at  the  November  election  left 
the  political  situation  in  Pennsylvania  without  change, 
except  that  the  war  of  factions  was  intensified.  Curtin 
did  not  give  even  a  perfunctory  support  to  Cameron  for 
the  Presidency,  and  Cameron  gave  about  the  same  sort 


T54  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES, 

of  support  to  Curtin  for  Governor;  and  when  it  was  an 
nounced,  about  the  ist  of  January,  that  Cameron  had 
been  to  Springfield  and  had  returned  with  the  proffer  of 
a  Cabinet  portfolio,  it  immediately  inspired  the  most  ag 
gressive  opposition  to  his  appointment.  I  was  not  in 
sympathy  with  Cameron,  and  promptly  telegraphed  Lin 
coln,  protesting  against  his  appointment,  to  which  Lin 
coln  answered  urging  me  to  come  immediately  to  Spring 
field.  When  I  met  Lincoln  he  frankly  informed  me  that 
on  the  last  day  of  December  he  had  given  Cameron  a 
letter  tendering  to  him  a  position  in  the  Cabinet,  reserv 
ing  the  right  to  decide  whether  it  should  be  that  of  Sec 
retary  of  the  Treasury  or  Secretary  of  War.  I  explained 
to  the  President,  with  all  the  ardor  of  an  intense  partisan 
in  the  factional  feud,  that  the  appointment  of  Cameron 
would  be  a  misfortune  to  the  party  in  Pennsylvania,  and 
a  misfortune  to  the  President  that  he  must  soon  realize 
after  his  inauguration.  It  is  needless  now  to  review  the 
causes  which  led  to  this  active  and  embittered  hostility 
of  the  friends  of  Curtin  to  Cameron's  political  advance 
ment.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  there  was  persistent 
war  between  these  elements,  and  the  usual  political  de 
moralization  that  ever  attends  such  conflicts  was  pain 
fully  visible  from  the  factional  battles  of  that  time.  I 
saw  that  Lincoln  was  very  much  distressed  at  the  situ 
ation  in  which  he  had  become  involved,  and  he  discussed 
every  phase  of  it  with  unusual  frankness  and  obviously 
with  profound  feeling.  I  did  not  then  know  that  Lin 
coln  had  been  pledged,  without  his  knowledge,  by  his 
friends  at  Chicago  to  the  appointment  of  Cameron,  nor 
did  Lincoln  intimate  it  to  me  during  our  conversation. 
After  an  hour  or  more  of  discussion  on  the  subject  Lin 
coln  dismissed  it  by  saying  that  he  would  advise  me 
further  within  a  very  few  days. 

I  left  Lincoln  conscious  that  I  had  seriously  impressed 


LINCOLN  AND    CAMERON.  155 

him  with  my  views,  but  entirely  unable  to  form  any 
judgment  as  to  what  might  be  his  ultimate  action.  Al 
though  I  left  him  as  late  as  eleven  o'clock  in  the  even 
ing,  he  wrote  Cameron  a  private  letter  dated  the  same 
night,  beginning  with  this  sentence:  "  Since  seeing  you, 
things  have  developed  which  make  it  impossible  for  me 
to  take  you  into  the  Cabinet."  He  added:  "You  will 
say  this  comes  from  an  interview  with  McClure,  and  this 
is  partly  but  not  wholly  true ;  the  more  potent  matter  is 
wholly  outside  of  Pennsylvania,  yet  I  am  not  at  liberty 
to  specify.  Enough  that  it  appears  to  me  to  be  suf 
ficient."  He  followed  with  the  suggestion  that  Came 
ron  should  write  him  declining  the  appointment,  stating 
that  if  the  declination  was  forwarded  he  would  ( '  not 
object  to  its  being  known  that  it  was  tendered  "  to  him. 
He  concluded  by  saying:  "No  person  living  knows,  or 
has  an  intimation,  that  I  write  this  letter,"  and  with  a 
postscript  asking  Cameron  to  telegraph  the  words  "All 
right. ' '  *  lyincoln  also  wrote  me  a  letter  of  a  single  sen- 

*  The  following  is  the  text  of  the  Lincoln  letters  to  Cameron 
on  the  subject  of  the  Cabinet  appointment,  as  given  in  Nicolay 
and  Hay's  life  of  Lincoln,  published  by  the  Century  Company, 
New  York: 

SPRINGFIELD,  ILL.,  December  31,  1860. 
Hox.  SIMON  CAMERON: 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  I  think  fit  to  notify  you  now,  that  by  your  per 
mission  I  shall  at  the  proper  time  nominate  you  to  the  U.  S.  Sen 
ate  for  confirmation  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  or  as  Secretary 
of  War— which  of  the  two  I  have  not  yet  definitely  decided. 
Please  answer  at  your  earliest  convenience. 

Your  obedient  servant, 

A.  LINCOLN. 
(Private.) 

SPRINGFIELD,  ILL.,  Jan.  3,  1861. 
HON.  SIMON  CAMERON: 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  Since  seeing  you  things  have  developed  which 
make  it  impossible  for  me  to  take  you  into  the  Cabinet.  You 
will  say  this  comes  of  an  interview  with  McClure;  and  this  is 


J56  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

tence,  dated  the  same  night,  asking  that  the  accusations 
against  Cameron  should  be  put  in  tangible  shape  for  his 

partly,  but  not  wholly,  true.  The  more  potent  matter  is  wholly 
outside  of  Pennsylvania,  and  yet  I  am  not  at  liberty  to  specify  it. 
Enough  that  it  appears  to  me  to  be  sufficient.  And  now  I  sug 
gest  that  you  write  me  declining  the  appointment,  in  which  case 
I  do  not  object  to  its  being  known  that  it  was  tendered  you. 
Better  do  this  at  once,  before  things  so  change  that  you  cannot 
honorably  decline,  and  I  be  compelled  to  openly  recall  the  tender. 
No  person  living  knows  or  has  an  intimation  that  I  write  this 
letter.  Yours  truly, 

A.  LINCOLN. 

P.  S.  Telegraph  me  instantly  on  receipt  of  this,  saying,  "All 
right."— A.  L. 

(Private  and  confidential^) 

SPRINGFIELD,  ILL.,  Jan.  13,  1861. 
HON.  SIMON  CAMERON: 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  At  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Sanderson,  and  with 
hearty  good- will  besides,  I  herewith  send  you  a  letter  dated 
Jan.  3,  the  same  in  date  as  the  last  you  received  from  me.  I 
thought  best  to  give  it  that  date,  as  it  is  in  some  sort  to  take  the 
place  of  that  letter.  I  learn,  both  by  a  letter  of  Mr.  Swrett  and 
from  Mr.  Sanderson,  that  your  feelings  were  wounded  by  the 
terms  of  my  letter  really  of  the  3d.  I  wrote  that  letter  under 
great  anxiety,  and  perhaps  I  was  not  so  guarded  in  its'  terms  as  I 
should  have  been;  but  I  beg  you  to  be  assured  I  intended  no 
offense.  My  great  object  was  to  have  }*ou  act  quickly,  if  possible 
before  the  matter  should  be  complicated  with  the  Penn.  Senatorial 
election.  Destroy  the  offensive  letter  or  return  it  to  me. 

I  say  to  you  now  I  have  not  doubted  that  you  would  perform 
the  duties  of  a  Department  ably  and  faithfully.  Nor  have  I  for 
a  moment  intended  to  ostracize  your  friends.  If  I  should  make 
a  Cabinet  appointment  for  Penn.  before  I  reach  Washington,  I 
will  not  do  so  without  consulting  you,  and  giving  all  the  weight 
to  your  views  and  wishes  which  I  consistently  can.  This  I  have 
always  intended.  Yours  truly, 

A.  LINCOLN. 
(Inclosure.} 

SPRINGFIELD,  ILL.,  Jan.  3,  1861. 
HON.  SIMON  CAMERON: 

MY  DEAR  SIR;  When  you  were  here,  about  the  last  of  Decem- 


LINCOLN  AND   CAMERON.  J57 

consideration.  I  am  unable  to  quote  literally  any  of  the 
correspondence  with  Lincoln  on  this  subject,  as  all  of 
my  many  letters  received  from  him,  and  the  correspond 
ence  relating  to  the  campaign  and  the  organization  of 
the  administration,  that  I  had  preserved,  were  destroyed 
when  Chambersburg  was  burned  by  McCausland  in  1864. 
I  answered  Lincoln's  very  indefinite  note  by  declining  to 
appear  as  an  individual  prosecutor  of  Cameron,  and  his 
request  for  the  formulation  of  Cameron's  alleged  political 
and  personal  delinquencies  was  not  complied  with. 

Lincoln's  letter  to  Cameron  tendering  him  the  Cabinet 
appointment  had  been  shown  to  some  confidential  friends 
whose  enthusiasm  outstripped  their  discretion,  and  they 
made  public  the  fact  that  Cameron  was  an  assured  mem 
ber  of  the  new  Cabinet.  The  second  letter  from  Lincoln 
to  Cameron,  recalling  the  tender  of  a  Cabinet  office,  was 
not  made  public,  and  doubtless  was  never  seen  beyond 
a  very  small  and  trusted  circle  of  Cameron's  associates; 
but  it  soon  became  known  that  Lincoln  regarded  the 
question  as  unsettled,  and  that  led  to  exhaustive  efforts 
on  both  sides  to  hinder  and  promote  Cameron's  appoint 
ment.  Sanderson,  who  had  made  the  compact  at  Ch'i- 


ber,  I  handed  you  «  letter  saying  I  should  at  the  proper  time 
nominate  you  to  the  Senate  for  a  place  in  the  Cabinet.  It  is  due 
to  you  and  to  truth  for  me  to  say  you  were  here  by  my  invitation, 
and  not  upon  any  suggestion  of  your  own.  You  have  not  as  yet 
signified  to  me  whether  you  would  accept  the  appointment,  and 
with  much  pain  I  now  say  to  you  that  you  will  relieve  me  from 
great  embarrassment  by  allowing  me  to  recall  the  offer.  This 
springs  from  an  unexpected  complication,  and  not  from  any 
change  of  my  view  as  to  the  ability  or  faithfulness  with  which 
you  would  discharge  the  duties  of  the  place. 

I  now  think  I  will  not  definitely  fix  upon  any  appointment  for 
Pennsylvania  until  I  reach  Washington. 

Your  obedient  servant, 

A.  LINCOLN. 


*58  LINCOLN  AND  'MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

cago  with  Davis  for  Cameron's  appointment,  was  sent  at 
once  to  Springfield  to  enforce  its  fulfillment.  He  reason 
ably  complained  that  Lincoln's  letter  to  Cameron  revok 
ing  the  appointment  was  offensively  blunt  and  needed 
explanation,  as  it  gave  no  reason  whatever  for  the  sudden 
change  in  his  judgment.  While  Sanderson  and  other 
prominent  Pennsylvanians  who  visited  Lincoln  about 
the  same  time  failed  to  obtain  from  him  any  assurance 
of  his  purpose  to  appoint  Cameron,  Lincoln  was  pre 
vailed  upon  on  the  I3th  of  January,  ten  days  after  he 
had  written  the  letter  revoking  the  appointment,  to 
write  a  confidential  letter  to  Cameron  apologizing  for 
the  unguarded  terms  in  vyhich  he  had  expressed  himself, 
and  giving  the  assurance  that  he  "  intended  no  offense." 
He  also  enclosed  to  Omeron  a  new  letter,  antedated 
January  3,  which  he  suggested  that  Cameron  should 
accept  as  the  original  of  that  date,  and  destroy  or  re 
turn  the  one  that  had  given  offense.  In  this  letter  he 
said:  u  You  have  not  as  vet  signified  to  me  whether  you 
would  accept  the  appointment,  and  with  much  pain  I 
now  say  to  you  that  you  will  relieve  me  from  great  em 
barrassment  by  allowing  me  to  recall  the  offer."  The 
explanatory  letter  in  which  the  antedated  letter  was  en 
closed  gave  Cameron  only  this  assurance  as  to  Lincoln's 
purpose:  "  If  I  should  make  a  Cabinet  appointment  for 
Pennsylvania  before  I  reach  Washington,  I  will  not  do 
so  without  consulting  you  and  giving  all  the  weight  to 
your  views  and  wishes  which  I  consistently  can. ' '  None 
of  these  letters  were  made  public  by  Cameron,  but  it  was 
well  understood  that  it  was  an  open  fight  for  and  against 
him,  and  Pennsylvania  was  convulsed  by  that  struggle 
from  the  ist  of  January  until  the  Cabinet  was  announced 
after  the  inauguration  of  the  President. 

When  Lincoln  arrived  in  Washington  the  five  mem 
bers  of  the  Cabinet  who  had  been  positively  chosen  were 


LINCOLN  AND  CAMERON.  *50 

Messrs.  Seward,  Bates,  Chase,  Welles,  and  Smith.  The 
ten  days  he  spent  at  the  Capital  before  becoming  Presi 
dent  were  given  up  almost  wholly  to  a  battle  over  the 
two  remaining  Cabinet  portfolios.  The  appointment  of 
Cameron  and  Blair  was  not  finally  determined  until  the 
day  before  the  inauguration,  and  then  the  Cameron  issue 
was  decided  by  the  powerful  intervention  of  Seward  and 
Weed.  They  were  greatly  disappointed  that  Cameron 
had  failed  to  deliver  the  Pennsylvania  delegation  to  Sew 
ard,  as  they  had  been  led  to  expect,  but  they  were  in 
tensely  embittered  against  Curtin  because  he  and  Lane 
had  both  openly  declared  at  Chicago  that  Seward' s  nomi 
nation  would  mean  their  inevitable  defeat.  Looking 
back  upon  that  contest  with  the  clearer  insight  that  the 
lapse  of  thirty  years  must  give,  I  do  not  see  how  Lincoln 
could  have  done  otherwise  than  appoint  Cameron  as  a 
member  of  his  Cabinet,  viewed  from  the  standpoint  he 
had  assumed.  He  desired  to  reconcile  party  differences 
by  calling  his  Presidential  competitors  around  him,  and 
that  opened  the  way  for  Cameron.  He  acted  with  entire 
sincerity,  and  in  addition  to  the  powerful  pressure  for 
Cameron's  appointment  made  by  many  who  were  en 
titled  to  respect,  he  felt  that  he  was  not  free  from  the 
obligation  made  in  his  name  by  Davis  at  Chicago  to 
make  Cameron  a  member  of  his  Cabinet.  The  appoint 
ment  was  not  made  wholly  for  that  reason,  but  that 
pledge  probably  resolved  Lincoln's  doubts  in  Cameron's 
favor,  and  he  was  accepted  as  Secretary  of  War.  That 
there  was  some  degree  of  mutual  distrust  between  Lin 
coln  and  Cameron  was  a  necessity  from  the  circumstances 
surrounding  the  selection;  but  as  there  was  no  very  large 
measure  of  mutual  trust  between  Lincoln  and  any  of  his 
Cabinet  officers,  Cameron's  relations  with  the  President 
were  little  if  any  more  strained  than  were  the  relations 
of  his  brother  constitutional  advisers  with  their  chief; 


LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

and  Cameron's  practical  views  in  the  grave  emergency 
in  which  the  administration  was  placed  were  probably 
of  more  value  to  Lincoln  at  times  than  were  the  coun 
sels  of  most  of  the  Cabinet.  Every  member  had  his 
own  theory  of  meeting  the  appalling  crisis,  from  peace 
able  dismemberment  of  the  Republic  to  aggressive  war, 
while  Lincoln  had  no  policy  but  to  await  events,  and  he 
counseled  with  all  and  trusted  none.  Cameron  entered 
the  Cabinet,  therefore,  with  about  equal  opportunity 
among  his  associates  to  win  and  hold  power  with  the 
President,  and  his  retirement  within  less  than  a  year  was 
not  due  to  any  prejudices  or  apprehensions  which  may 
have  been  created  by  the  bitter  struggle  against  his  ap 
pointment. 

Had  the  most  capable,  experienced,  and  upright  man 
of  the  nation  been  called  to  the  head  of  the  War  Depart 
ment  when  Lincoln  was  inaugurated  in  1861,  it  would 
have  been  impossible  for  him  to  administer  that  office 
without  flagrant  abuses.  The  government  was  entirely 
unprepared  for  war.  It  was  without  armies,  without 
guns,  without  munitions  of  war;  indeed,  it  had  to  im 
provise  everything  needed  to  meet  an  already  well-organ 
ized  Confederate  army.  Contracts  had  to  be  made  with 
such  haste  as  to  forbid  the  exercise  of  sound  discretion 
in  obtaining  what  the  country  needed;  and  Cameron, 
with  his  peculiar  political  surroundings,  with  a  horde 
of  partisans  clamoring  for  spoils,  was  compelled  either 
to  reject  the  confident  expectation  of  his  friends  or  to 
submit  to  imminent  peril  from  the  grossest  abuse  of  his 
delegated  authority.  He  was  soon  brought  under  the 
severest  criticism  of  leading  journals  and  statesmen  of 
his  own  party,  and  Representative  Dawes,  now  Senator 
from  Massachusetts,  led  an  investigation  of  the  alleged 
abuses  of  the  War  Department,  which  resulted  in  a 
scathing  report  against  Cameron's  methods  in  adminis- 


LINCOLN  AND   CAMERON.  161 

tering  the  office,  and  a  vote  of  censure  upon  Cameron  by 
the  House.  Lincoln  promptly  exhibited  the  generous 
sense  of  justice  that  always  characterized  him  by  send 
ing  a  special  message  to  the  House,  exculpating  Came 
ron,  because  the  acts  for  which  he  was  criticised  had  not 
been  exclusively  Cameron's,  but  were  largely  acts  for 
which  the  President  and  Cabinet  were  equally  respon 
sible.  Some  ten  years  later  the  House  expunged  the 
resolution  of  censure.  Notwithstanding  the  message 
of  Lincoln  lessening  the  burden  of  reproach  cast  upon 
Cameron  by  the  House,  popular  distrust  was  very  gen 
eral  as  to  the  administration  of  the  War  Department, 
and  the  demands  for  Cameron's  removal  grew  in  both 
power  and  intensity.  He  was  not  accused  of  individual 
corruption,  but  the  severe  strain  put  upon  the  national 
credit  led  to  the  severest  criticisms  of  all  manner  of  pub 
lic  profligacy,  and  it  culminated  in  a  formal  appeal  to 
the  President  from  leading  financial  men  of  the  country 
for  an  immediate  change  in  the  Minister  of  War. 

I  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  Lincoln  would  have 
appointed  a  new  Secretary  of  War  had  not  public  con 
siderations  made  it  imperative.  His  personal  relations 
with  Cameron  were  as  pleasant  as  his  relations  with  any 
other  of  his  Cabinet  officers,  and  in  many  respects  Came 
ron  was  doubtless  a  valuable  adviser  because  of  his  clear, 
practical,  common-sense  views  of  public  affairs.  The 
one  vital  issue  that  Cameron  very  early  appreciated  was 
that  of  slavery.  As  early  as  May,  1861,  he  wrote  to 
General  Butler,  instructing  him  to  refrain  from  surren 
dering  to  their  masters  any  slaves  who  came  within  his 
lines,  and  to  employ  them  * '  in  the  services  to  which 
they  may  be  best  adapted."  That  was  the  first  step 
taken  by  the  administration  toward  the  overthrow  of 
slavery.  In  August  of  the  same  year  General  Fremont 
issued  a  proclamation  in  Missouri  declaring  the  slaves 
ii 


1 62  LINCOLN  AND  *  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

of  all  those  in  the  Confederate  service  to  be  for  ever  free, 
which  was  a  substantial  emancipation  of  all  slaves  in 
Missouri.  Lincoln  at  once  revoked  the  Fremont  order, 
and  sent  Secretary  Cameron  and  the  Adjutant-General 
to  personally  examine  into  the  situation  in  Missouri  and 
report  upon  it.  Cameron  obviously  sympathized  with 
Fremont's  emancipation  ideas,  and,  instead  of  delivering 
to  Fremont  the  order  for  his  removal  prepared  before  he 
left  Washington,  he  finally  decided  to  bring  it  back  with 
him  and  to  give  Fremont  an  opportunity  to  retrieve  him 
self.  Lincoln,  always  patient,  yielded  to  Fremont's  im 
portunities,  and  permitted  him  to  remain  in  command 
until  October,  when  he  sent  General  Curtis  in  person  to 
deliver  the  order  of  removal,  with  the  single  condition 
that  if  Fremont  "shall  then  have,  in  personal  command, 
fought  and  won  a  battle,  or  shall  then  be  actually  in 
battle,  or  shall  then  be  in  the  immediate  presence  of  the 
enemy  in  expectation  of  a  battle,  it  is  not  to  be  delivered, 
but  held  for  further  orders. ' '  As  Fremont  was  not  near 
a  battle,  he  was  relieved  of  his  command. 

Cameron  pressed  the  slavery  issue  to  the  extent  of  a 
flagrant  outrage  upon  his  chief  by  recommending  the 
arming  of  slaves  in  his  first  annual  report  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  President,  and  sending  it  out  in  printed 
form  to  the  postmasters  of  the  country  for  delivery  to  the 
newspapers  after  having  been  presented  to  Congress. 
The  slavery  question  had  then  become  an  important 
political  theme,  and  politicians  were  shaping  their  lines 
to  get  into  harmony  with  it.  In  this  report  Cameron 
declared  in  unqualified  terms  in  favor  of  arming  the 
slaves  for  military  service.  Lincoln  was  not  only  shocked, 
but  greatly  grieved  when  he  learned  the  character  of 
Cameron's  recommendation,  and  he  at  once  ordered  that 
the  copies  be  recalled  by  telegraph,  the  report  revised, 
and  a  new  edition  printed.  Cameron  submitted  as  grace- 


LINCOLN  AND   CAMERON.  163 

fully  as  possible,  and  revised  his  report,  limiting  his 
recommendations  about  slaves  to  the  suggestion  that 
they  should  not  be  returned  to  their  masters.*  While 
this  episode  did  not  produce  unfriendly  personal  relations 
between  Lincoln  and  Cameron,  it  certainly  was  a  severe 
strain  upon  Lincoln's  trust  in  the  fidelity  of  his  War 


*  It  is  as  clearly  a  right  of  the  government  to  arm  slaves  when 
it  may  become  necessary,  as  it  is  to  use  gunpowder  taken  from 
the  enemy.  What  to  do  with  that  species  of  property  is  a  ques 
tion  that  time  and  circumstance  will  solve,  and  need  not  be 
anticipated  further  than  to  repeat  that  they  cannot  be  held  by  the 
government  as  slaves.  It  would  be  useless  to  keep  them  as  pris 
oners  of  war;  and  self-preservation,  the  highest  duty  of  a  govern 
ment  or  of  individuals,  demands  that  they  should  be  disposed 
of  or  employed  in  the  most  effective  manner  that  will  tend  most 
speedily  to  suppress  the  insurrection  and  restore  the  authority 
of  the  government.  If  it  shall  be  found  that  the  men  who  have 
been  held  by  the  rebels  as  slaves  are  capable  of  bearing  arms  and 
performing  efficient  military  service,  it  is  the  right,  and  may  be 
come  the  duty,  of  the  government  to  arm  and  equip  them,  and 
employ  their  services  against  the  rebels  under  proper  military 
regulation,  discipline,  and  command. — Cameron's  Original  Re 
port,  recalled  by  the  President  for  revision. 

It  is  already  a  grave  question  what  shall  be  done  with  those 
slaves  who  were  abandoned  by  their  owners  on  the  advance  of 
our  troops  into  Southern  territory,  as  at  Beaufort  district  in 
South  Carolina.  The  number  left  within  our  control  at  that 
point  is  very  considerable,  and  similar  cases  will  probably  occur. 
What  shall  be  done  with  them  ?  Can  we  afford  to  send  them  for 
ward  to  their  masters,  to  be  by  them  armed  against  us  or  used  in 
producing  supplies  to  sustain  the  rebellion  ?  Their  labor  may  be 
useful  to  us;  withheld  from  the  enemy,  it  lessens  his  military  re 
sources,  and  withholding  them  has  no  tendency  to  induce  the 
horrors  of  insurrection,  even  in  the  rebel  communities.  They 
constitute  a  military  resource,  and,  being  such,  that  they  should 
not  be  turned  over  to  the  enemy  is  too  plain  to  discuss.  Why 
deprive  him  of  supplies  by  a  blockade,  and  voluntarily  give  him 
men  to  produce  them? — Cameron's  Report \  as  revised  by  direction 
of  the  President. 


1 64  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Minister;  but  Lincoln  was  too  wise  to  put  himself  in 
open  antagonism  to  the  antislavery  sentiment  of  the 
country  by  removing  Cameron  for  his  offensive  and  sur 
reptitious  antislavery  report.  The  financial  pressure  for 
Cameron's  removal  would  probably  have  accomplished 
it  under  any  circumstances,  and  Lincoln  waited  more 
than  a  month  after  the  flurry  over  Cameron's  report. 

There  have  been  many  and  conflicting  accounts  given 
to  the  public  of  Cameron's  retirement  from  the  Lincoln 
Cabinet,  no  one  of  which  is  wholly  correct,  and  most  of 
them  incorrect  in  vital  particulars.  Cameron  had  ver 
bally  assured  the  President  when  censured  by  Congress, 
and  again  when  the  dispute  arose  over  his  annual  report, 
that  his  resignation  was  at  Lincoln's  disposal  at  any 
time,  but  he  had  no  knowledge  of  Lincoln's  purpose  to 
make  a  change  in  the  War  Department  until  he  received 
Lincoln's  letter  in  January,  1862,  informing  him  of  the 
change.  In  Nicolay  and  Hays'  life  of  Lincoln  (volume 
5,  page  128)  is  given  what  purports  to  be  the  letter  de 
livered  to  Cameron  notifying  him  of  the  change.  Lin 
coln  certainly  wrote  that  letter,  as  his  biographers  have 
published  it  from  his  manuscript,  but  it  is  not  the  letter 
that  was  delivered  to  Cameron.  Lincoln  sent  his  letter 
to  Cameron  by  Chase,  who  met  Cameron  late  in  the 
evening  after  he  had  dined  with  Colonel  Forney,  and  he 
delivered  the  letter  in  entire  ignorance  of  its  contents. 
I  happened  to  be  spending  the  evening  with  Colonel 
Thomas  A.  Scott,  then  Cameron's  Assistant  Secretary 
of  War,  when  Cameron  came  in  near  the  midnight  hour 
and  exhibited  an  extraordinary  degree  of  emotion.  He 
laid  the  letter  down  upon  Scott's  table,  and  invited  us 
both  to  read  it,  saying  that  it  meant  personal  as  well  as 
political  destruction,  and  was  an  irretrievable  wrong 
committed  upon  him  by  the  President.  We  were  not 
then,  and  indeed  never  had  been,  in  political  sympathy, 


LINCOLN  AND    CAMERON.  165 

but  our  friendly  personal  relations  had  never  been  inter 
rupted.  He  appealed  to  me,  saying:  "This  is  not  a  po 
litical  affair;  it  means  personal  degradation;  and  while 
we  do  not  agree  politically,  you  know  I  would  gladly 
aid  you  personally  if  it  were  in  my  power."  Cameron 
was  affected  even  to  tears,  and  wept  bitterly  over  what 
he  regarded  as  a  personal  affront  from  Lincoln.  I  re 
member  not  only  the  substance  of  Lincoln's  letter,  but 
its  language,  almost,  if  not  quite,  literally,  as  follows: 
( '  I  have  this  day  nominated  Hon.  Edwin  M.  Stanton  to 
be  Secretary  of  War  and  you  to  be  Minister  Plenipo 
tentiary  to  Russia. ' '  Although  the  message  did  not  go 
to  the  Senate  that  day,  it  had  been  prepared  and  was 
sent  in  pursuance  of  that  notice.  Colonel  Scott,  who 
was  a  man  of  great  versatility  of  resources,  at  once  sug 
gested  that  Lincoln  did  not  intend  personal  offense  to 
Cameron,  and  in  that  I  fully  agreed;  and  it  was  then 
and  there  arranged  that  on  the  following  day  Lincoln 
should  be  asked  to  withdraw  the  offensive  letter;  to  per 
mit  Cameron  to  antedate  a  letter  of  resignation,  and  for 
Lincoln  to  write  a  kind  acceptance  of  the  same.  The 
letter  delivered  by  Chase  was  recalled;  a  new  corre 
spondence  was  prepared,  and  a  month  later  given  to  the 
public. 

Cameron  had  no  knowledge  or  even  suspicion  of  Stan- 
ton  succeeding  him.  Chase  and  Seward,  as  well  as  Cam 
eron,  have  claimed  direct  or  indirect  influence  in  the 
selection  of  Stanton,  but  there  was  not  a  single  member 
of  the  Cabinet  who  knew  of  Stanton' s  appointment  until 
Lincoln  notified  Cameron  of  the  change.  Stanton  had 
been  in  open,  malignant  opposition  to  the  administration 
only  a  few  months  before,  but  he  was  then  the  closest 
friend  and  personal  counselor  of  General  McClellan;  was 
in  hearty  sympathy  with  the  war;  was  resolutely  and  ag 
gressively  honest;  and  Lincoln  chose  him  without  con- 


LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

suiting  any,  as  far  as  I  have  ever  been  able  to  learn, 
unless  it  was  General  McClellan.  One  of  the  many 
good  results  he  expected  from  Stanton  as  War  Minister 
was  entire  harmony  between  him  and  the  general  com 
manding  the  armies. 

Cameron  well  concealed  his  disappointment  at  the 
manner  of  his  retirement  from  the  Cabinet ;  wisely 
maintained  personal  relations  with  Lincoln;  and  when 
he  returned  from  Russia,  after  less  than  a  year  of  service 
as  minister,  he  resumed  active  political  life,  and  was  one 
of  the  earliest  of  the  political  leaders  to  foresee  that  the 
people  would  force  the  renomination  of  Lincoln,  regard 
less  of  the  favor  or  disfavor  of  politicians.  The  early 
movement  in  January,  1864,  in  which  Curtin  cordially 
co-operated,  by  which  the  unanimous  recommendation 
of  the  Republican  members  of  the  Pennsylvania  Legis 
lature  was  given  for  Lincoln's  renomination,  was  sug 
gested  by  Cameron;  and  Lincoln,  with  a  sagacity  that 
never  failed  him,  took  the  earliest  opportunity  to  attach 
Cameron  so  firmly  to  his  cause  that  separation  would  be 
impossible.  His  first  movement  in  that  line  was  the 
Cameron  mission  to  Fortress  Monroe  to  ask  Butler  to 
accept  the  Vice-Presidency.  This  was  in  March,  1864, 
and  Cameron  was  one  of  the  very  few  whom  Lincoln 
consulted  about  the  Vice- Presidency  until  he  finally  set 
tled  upon  the  nomination  of  Johnson,  in  which  Cameron 
reluctantly  concurred,  and  he  went  to  the  Baltimore 
Convention  as  a  delegate-at-large  to  execute  Lincoln's 
wishes.  He  became  chairman  of  the  Republican  State 
Committee  in  Pennsylvania,  and  doubtless  would  have 
been  in  very  close  relations  with  the  President  during 
his  second  term  had  Lincoln's  life  been  spared. 

I  have  written  of  Lincoln  and  Cameron  with  some 
hesitation,  because  during  the  thirty  years  in  which 
Cameron  and  I  were  both  more  or  less  active  in  politics 


LINCOLN  AND    CAMERON.  167 

we  never  were  in  political  sympathy.  He  had  retired 
from  his  first  term  of  Senatorial  service  before  I  had  be 
come  a  voter,  and  was  thirty  years  my  senior.  He  was 
then  a  Democrat  and  I  a  Whig,  and  the  political  hos 
tility  continued  when  in  later  years  we  were  of  the  same 
political  faith.  He  never  was  a  candidate  with  my  sup 
port,  nor  was  I  ever  a  candidate  with  his  support,  even 
when  I  was  the  unanimous  nominee  of  our  party.  We 
differed  radically  in  political  methods,  and  often  in  bit 
terness,  but  our  personal  relations  were  never  strained, 
and  on  occasions  he  confided  in  me  and  received  friendly 
personal  service  that  he  warmly  appreciated.  We  many 
times  had  a  truce  to  attain  some  common  end,  but  it  was 
never  misunderstood  as  anything  more  than  a  truce  for 
the  special  occasion.  When  he  entered  the  Lincoln 
Cabinet  he  knew  that  I  would  gladly  have  aided  him  to 
success,  and  we  seldom  met  without  an  hour  or  more  of 
pleasant  personal  intercourse  over  a  bottle  of  wine,  the 
only  stimulant  he  ever  indulged  in.  In  1873  ne  was 
elected  to  his  fourth  term  to  the  Senate  and  I  was  a 
State  Senator.  An  effort  was  made  by  legislative  mer 
cenaries  to  call  into  the  field  some  man  of  large  fortune 
as  his  competitor.  He  called  on  me,  stated  the  case,  and 
appealed  to  me  to  oppose  the  movement,  as  it  was  ob 
viously  dishonest.  It  was  expected  that  my  opposition 
to  Cameron  would  make  me  willing  to  join  any  move 
ment  for  his  defeat;  but  I  at  once  assured  him  that, 
while  I  would  not  support  his  election,  I  would  earn 
estly  oppose  any  effort  to  force  him  into  the  corrupt 
conciliation  of  venal  legislators.  He  thanked  me,  and 
added:  "I  can  rely  upon  you,  and  I  will  now  dismiss 
the  thieves  without  ceremony. "  The  movement  failed, 
and  he  was  elected  by  the  united  vote  of  his  party,  while 
I  voted  for  the  late  William  D.  Kelley.  No  man  has  so 
strongly  impressed  his  personality  upon  the  politics  of 


l  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Pennsylvania  as  has  Simon  Cameron,  and  the  political 
power  he  organized  is  as  potent  in  the  State  to-day  as  at 
any  time  during  his  life.  He  was  one  of  the  few  men 
who  voluntarily,  retired  from  the  Senate  when  he  could 
have  continued  his  service  during  life.  He  survived  his 
retirement  a  full  dozen  years;  his  intercourse  mellowed 
into  the  gentlest  relations  with  old-time  friends  and  foes, 
and  in  the  ripeness  of  more  than  fourscore  and  ten  sum 
mers  and  in  peaceful  resignation  he  slept  the  dreamless 
sleep  of  the  dead. 


(Photo  by  Brady,  Washington.) 

EDWIN  M.    STANTON,    1865. 


LINCOLN  AND  STANTON. 


OF  all  the  men  intimately  connected  with  Abraham 
Lincoln  during  our  civil  war,  Kdwin  M.  Stanton 
presented  the  strangest  medley  of  individual  attributes. 
He  was  a  man  of  whom  two  histories  might  be  written 
as  widely  diverging  as  night  and  day,  portraying  him  as 
worthy  of  eminent  praise  and  as  worthy  of  scorching 
censure,  and  yet  both  absolutely  true%  His  dominant 
quality  was  his  heroic  mould.  He  could  be  heroic  to  a 
degree  that  seemed  almost  superhuman,  and  yet  at  times 
submissive  to  the  very  verge  of  cowardice.  Like  Lin 
coln,  he  fully  trusted  no  man;  but,  unlike  Lincoln,  he 
distrusted  all,  and  I  doubt  whether  any  man  prominently 
connected  with  the  government  gave  confidence  to  so 
few  as  did  Stanton.  He  in  turn  trusted  and  hated  nearly 
every  general  prominent  in  the  early  part  of  the  war. 
He  was  McClellan's  closest  personal  friend  and  counselor 
when  he  entered  the  Lincoln  Cabinet,  and  later  became 
McClellan's  most  vindictive  and  vituperative  foe.  The 
one  general  of  the  war  who  held  his  confidence  without 
interruption  from  the  time  he  became  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  armies  until  the  close  of  the  war  was  Gen 
eral  Grant,  and  he  literally  commanded  it  by  distinctly 
defining  his  independent  attitude  as  General-in-Chief 
when  he  accepted  his  commission  as  Lieutenant-General. 
He  often  spoke  of,  and  to,  public  men,  military  and  civil, 

with  a  withering  sneer.     I   have  heard  him  scores  of 
170 


LINCOLN  AND   STANTON.  17 1 

times  thus  speak  of  Lincoln,  and  several  timt*>  thus 
speak  to  Lincoln.  He  was  a  man  of  extreme  moods; 
often  petulant,  irritating,  and  senselessly  unjust,  and  at 
times  one  of  the  most  amiable,  genial,  and  delightful 
conversationalists  I  have  ever  met.  He  loved  antago 
nism,  and  there  was  hardly  a  period  during  his  remark 
able  service  as  War  Minister  in  which  he  was  not,  on 
some  more  or  less  important  point,  in  positive  antago 
nism  with  the  President.  In  his  antagonisms  he  was, 
as  a  rule,  offensively  despotic,  and  often  pressed  them 
upon  Lincoln  to  the  very  utmost  point  of  Lincoln's  for 
bearance;  but  he  knew  when  to  call  a  halt  upon  himself, 
as  he  well  knew  that  there  never  was  a  day  or  an  hour 
during  his  service  in  the  Cabinet  that  Lincoln  was  not 
his  absolute  master.  He  respected  Lincoln's  authority 
because  it  was  greater  than  his  own,  but  he  had  little 
respect  for  Lincoln's  fitness  for  the  responsible  duties  of 
the  Presidency.  I  have  seen  him  at  times  as  tender  and 
gentle  as  a  woman,  his  heart  seeming  to  agonize  over 
the  sorrows  of  the  humblest;  and  I  have  seen  him  many 
more  times  turn  away  with  the  haughtiest  contempt  from 
appeals  which  should  at  least  have  been  treated  with  re 
spect.  He  had  few  personal  and  fewer  political  friends, 
and  he  seemed  proud  of  the  fact  that  he  had  more  per 
sonal  and  political  enemies  than  any  prominent  officer 
of  the  government.  Senators,  Representatives,  and  high 
military  commanders  were  often  offended  by  his  wanton 
arrogance,  and  again  thawed  into  cordial  relations  by  his 
effusive  kindness.  Taken  all  in  all,  Edwin  M.  Stanton 
was  capable  of  the  grandest  and  the  meanest  actions  of 
any  great  man  I  have  ever  known,  and  he  has  reared 
imperishable  monuments  to  the  opposing  qualities  he 
possessed. 

Stanton  had  rendered  an  incalculable  service  to  the 
nation  by  his  patriotic  efforts  in   the    Cabinet   of  Bu- 


172  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

chanan.  Cass  had  resigned  from  the  Premiership  be 
cause  he  was  much  more  aggressive  in  his  ideas  of  meet 
ing  rebellion  than  was  the  President.  Attorney-General 
Black  was  promoted  to  the  head  of  the  Cabinet,  and 
Stanton  was  called  in  as  Black's  successor.  It  was  Judge 
Black  who  saved  Buchanan's  administration  from  sud 
den  and  irretrievable  wreck  at  the  outset  of  the  issue, 
and  he  doubtless  dictated  the  appointment  of  Stanton, 
who  was  his  close  personal  friend.  From  the  time  that 
Stanton  entered  the  Buchanan  Cabinet  the  attitude  of 
the  administration  was  so  pointedly  changed  that  none 
could  mistake  it.  He  was  positively  and  aggressively 
loyal  to  the  government,  and  as  positively  and  aggres 
sively  hated  rebellion.  While  Stanton  and  Black  gen 
erally  acted  in  concert  during  the  few  remaining  months 
of  the  Buchanan  administration,  they  became  seriously 
estranged  before  the  close  of  the  Lincoln  administration 
— so  much  so  that  Black,  in  an  article  published  in  the 
Galaxy  of  June,  1870,  said  of  Stanton:  "Did  he  accept 
the  confidence  of  the  President  (Buchanan)  and  the  Cabi 
net  with  a  predetermined  intent  to  betray  it?"  After 
Stanton' s  retirement  from  the  Buchanan  Cabinet  when 
Lincoln  was  inaugurated,  he  maintained  the  closest  con 
fidential  relations  with  Buchanan,  and  wrote  him  many 
letters  expressing  the  utmost  contempt  for  Lincoln,  the 
Cabinet,  the  Republican  Congress,  and  the  general  pol 
icy  of  the  administration.  These  letters,  given  to  the 
public  in  Curtis' s  life  of  Buchanan,  speak  freely  of  the 
"painful  imbecility  of  Lincoln,"  of  the  "venality  and 
corruption ' '  which  ran  riot  in  the  government,  and  ex 
pressed  the  belief  that  no  better  condition  of  things  was 
possible  ' '  until  JefF  Davis  turns  out  the  whole  concern. ' ' 
He  was  firmly  impressed  for  some  weeks  after  the  battle 
of  Bull  Run  that  the  government  was  utterly  overthrown, 
as  he  repeatedly  refers  to  the  coming  of  Davis  into  the 


LINCOLN  AND   STANTON.  173 

National  Capital.  In  one  letter  he  says  that  "  in  less 
than  thirty  days  Davis  will  be  in  possession  of  Washing 
ton;"  and  it  is  an  open  secret  that  Stanton  advised  the 
revolutionary  overthrow  of  the  Lincoln  government,  to 
be  replaced  by  General  McClellan  as  military  dictator. 
These  letters  published  by  Curtis,  bad  as  they  are,  are 
not  the  worst  letters  written  by  Stanton  to  Buchanan. 
Some  of  them  were  so  violent  in  their  expressions  against 
Lincoln  and  the  administration  that  they  have  been 
charitably  withheld  from  the  public,  but  they  remain 
in  the  possession  of  the  surviving  relatives  of  President 
Buchanan.  Of  course,  Lincoln  had  no  knowledge  of 
the  bitterness  exhibited  by  Stanton  to  himself  personally 
and  to  his  administration,  but  if  he  had  known  the  worst 
that  Stanton  ever  said  or  wrote  about  him,  I  doubt  not 
that  he  would  have  called  him  to  the  Cabinet  in  Janu 
ary,  1862.  The  disasters  the  army  suffered  made  Lin 
coln  forgetful  of  everything  but  the  single  duty  of  sup 
pressing  the  rebellion.  From  the  day  that  McClellan 
was  called  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
in  place  of  McDowell,  Stanton  was  in  enthusiastic  accord 
with  the  military  policy  of  the  government.  The  con 
stant  irritation  between  the  War  Department  and  mili 
tary  commanders  that  had  vexed  Lincoln  in  the  early 
part  of  the  war  made  him  anxious  to  obtain  a  War  Min 
ister  who  was  not  only  resolutely  honest,  but  who  was  in 
close  touch  with  the  commander  of  the  armies.  This 
necessity,  with  the  patriotic  record  that  Stanton  had 
made  during  the  closing  months  of  the  Buchanan  ad 
ministration,  obviously  dictated  the  appointment  of  Stan- 
ton.  It  was  Lincoln's  own  act.  Stanton  had  been  dis 
cussed  as  a  possible  successor  to  Cameron  along  with 
many  others  in  outside  circles,  but  no  one  had  any  reason 
to  anticipate  Stanton' s  appointment  from  any  intimation 
given  by  the  President  Lincoln  and  Stanton  had  no 


174  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

personal  intercourse  whatever  from  the  time  of  Lincoln's 
inauguration  until  Stanton  became  his  War  Minister. 
In  a  letter  to  Buchanan,  written  March  i,  1862,  Stanton 
says :  ' '  My  accession  to  my  present  position  was  quite  as 
sudden  and  unexpected  as  the  confidence  you  bestowed 
upon  me-  in  calling  me  to  your  Cabinet."  In  another 
letter,  written  on  the  i8th  of  May,  1862,  he  said:  "I 
hold  my  present  position  at  the  request  of  the  President, 
who  knew  me  personally,  but  to  whom  I  had  not  spoken 
from  the  4th  of  March,  1861,  until  the  day  he  handed 
me  my  commission."  The  appointment  was  made  be 
cause  Lincoln  believed  that  Stan  ton's  loyal  record  in  the 
Buchanan  Cabinet  and  his  prominence  as  the  foe  of  every 
form  of  jobbery  would  inspire  the  highest  degree  of  con 
fidence  in  that  department  throughout  the  entire  country. 
In  that  he  judged  correctly.  From  the  day  that  he  en 
tered  the  War  Office  until  the  surrender  of  the  Confeder 
ate  armies,  Stanton,  with  all  his  vagaries  and  infirmities, 
gave  constant  inspiration  to  the  loyal  sentiment  of  the 
country,  and  rendered  a  service  that  probably  only  Edwin 
M.  Stanton  could  have  rendered  at  the  time. 

Lincoln  was  not  long  in  discovering  that  in  his  new 
Secretary  of  War  he  had  an  invaluable  but  most  trouble 
some  Cabinet  officer,  but  he  saw  only  the  great  and  good 
offices  that  Stanton  was  performing  for  the  imperiled  Re 
public.  Confidence  was  restored  in  financial  circles  by 
the  appointment  of  Stanton,  and  his  name  as  War  Min 
ister  did  more  to  strengthen  the  faith  of  the  people  in  the 
government  credit  than  would  have  been  probable  from 
the  appointment  of  any  other  man  of  that  day.  He  was 
a  terror  to  all  the  hordes  of  jobbers  and  speculators  and 
camp-followers  whose  appetites  had  been  whetted  by  a 
great  war,  and  he  enforced  the  strictest  discipline  through 
out  our  armies.  He  was  seldom  capable  of  being  civil  to 
any  officer  away  from  the  army  on  leave  of  absence  un- 


LINCOLN  AND   STAN  TON.  175 

less  he  had  been  summoned  by  the  government  for  con 
ference  or  special  duty,  and  he  issued  the  strictest  orders 
from  time  to  time  to  drive  the  throng  of  military  idlers 
from  the  capital  and  keep  them  at  their  posts.  He  was 
stern  to  savagery  in  his  enforcement  of  military  law. 
The  wearied  sentinel  who  slept  at  his  post  found  no 
mercy  in  the  heart  of  Stanton,  and  many  times  did  Lin 
coln's  humanity  overrule  his  fiery  minister.  Any  neglect 
of  military  duty  was  sure  of  the  swiftest  punishment,  and 
seldom  did  he  make  even  just  allowance  for  inevitable 
military  disaster.  He  had  profound,  imfaltering  faith  in 
the  Union  cause,  and,  above  all,  he  had  unfaltering  faith 
in  himself.  He  believed  that  he  was  in  all  things  except 
in  name  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  armies  and  the  navy 
of  the  nation,  and  it  was  with  unconcealed  reluctance 
that  he  at  times  deferred  to  the  authority  of  the  Presi 
dent.  He  was  a  great  organizer  in  theory,  and  harsh  to 
the  utmost  in  enforcing  his  theories  upon  military  com 
manders.  He  at  times  conceived  impossible  things,  and 
peremptorily  ordered  them  executed,  and  woe  to  the  man 
who  was  unfortunate  enough  to  demonstrate  that  Stan- 
ton  was  wrong.  If  he  escaped  without  disgrace  he  was 
more  than  fortunate,  and  many,  very  many,  would  have 
thus  fallen  unjustly  had  it  not  been  for  Lincoln's  cautious 
and  generous  interposition  to  save  those  who  were  wan 
tonly  censured.  He  would  not  throw  the  blame  upon 
Stanton,  but  he  would  save  the  victim  of  Stanton's  in 
justice,  and  he  always  did  it  so  kindly  that  even  Stanton 
could  not  complain  beyond  a  churlish  growl. 

Stanton  understood  the  magnitude  of  the  rebellion, 
and  he  understood  also  that  an  army  to  be  effective  must 
be  completely  organized  in  all  its  departments.  He  had 
no  favorites  to  promote  at  the  expense  of  the  public  ser 
vice,  and  his  constant  and  honest  aim  was  to  secure  the 
best  men  for  every  important  position.  As  I  have  said, 


1 76  LINCOLN  AND   M£N  OF    WAR-TIMES. 

he  assumed,  in  his  own  mind,  that  he  was  Commander- 
in-Chief,  and  there  was  nothing  in  military  movements, 
or  in  the  quartermaster,  commissary,  hospital,  secret  ser 
vice,  or  any  other  department  relating  to  the  war,  that 
he  did  not  claim  to  comprehend  and  seek  to  control  in 
his  absolute  way.  *  I  doubt  whether  his  partiality  ever 
unjustly  promoted  a  military  officer,  and  I  wish  that  I 

*  Mr.  Stanton's  theory  was  that  everything  concerned  his  own 
department.  It  was  he  who  was  carrying  on  the  war.  It  was  he 
who  would  be  held  responsible  for  the  secret  machinations  of  the 
enemy  in  the  rear  as  well  as  the  unwarranted  success  of  the  en 
emy  in  front.  Hence  he  established  a  system  of  military  censor 
ship  which  has  never,  for  vastness  of  scope  or  completeness  of 
detail,  been  equaled  in  any  war  before  or  since  or  in  any  other 
country  under  the  sun.  The  whole  telegraphic  system  of  the 
United  States,  with  its  infinite  ramifications,  centered  in  his 
office.  There,  adjoining  his  own  personal  rooms,  sat  Gen.  Eck- 
ert,  Hymer  D.  Bates,  Albert  B.  Chandler,  and  Charles  A.  Tinker, 
— all  of  them  young  men  of  brilliant  promise  and  now  shining 
lights  in  the  electrical  world.  Every  hour  in  the  day  and  night, 
under  all  circumstances,  in  all  seasons,  there  sat  at  their  instru 
ments  sundry  members  of  this  little  group.  The  passage  be 
tween  their  room  and  the  Secretary's  was  unobstructed.  It  was 
an  interior  communication  —they  did  not  have  even  to  go  through 
the  corridor  to  reach  him — and  every  dispatch  relating  to  the  war 
or  party  politics  that  passed  over  the  Western  Union  wires,  North 
or  South,  they  read.  Cipher  telegrams  were  considered  especially 
suspicious,  so  every  one  of  those  was  reported.  The  young  men 
I  have  mentioned  were  masters  of  cipher- translation.  Every 
message  to  or  from  the  President  or  any  member  of  his  house 
hold  passed  under  the  eye  of  the  Secretary.  If  one  Cabinet  Min 
ister  communicated  with  another  over  the  wire  by  a  secret  code, 
Mr.  Stanton  had  the  message  deciphered  and  read  to  him.  If 
Gen.  McClellan  telegraphed  to  his  wife  from  the  front,  Mr.  Stan- 
ton  knew  the  contents  of  every  dispatch.  Hence,  as  far  as  the 
conduct  of  the  war  was  concerned,  Mr.  Stanton  knew  a  thousand 
secrets  where  Mr.  Lincoln  knew  one;  for  the  Secretary's  instruc 
tions  were  that  telegrams  indiscriminately  should  not  be  shown 
to  the  President.—  Albert  E.  H.  Johnson,  Stanton's  confidential 
clerk,  in  Washington  Post,  July  14,  1891, 


LINCOLN  AND   STANTON.  177 

could  say  that  his  prejudices  had  never  hindered  the  pro 
motion  or  driven  from  the  service  faithful  and  competent 
military  commanders.  His  hatreds  were  intense,  im 
placable,  and  yielded  to  the  single  authority  of  Lincoln, 
and  that  authority  he  knew  would  be  exercised  only  in 
extreme  emergencies.  The  effect  of  such  a  War  Minis 
ter  was  to  enforce  devotion  to  duty  throughout  the  entire 
army,  and  it  is  impossible  to  measure  the  beneficent  re 
sults  of  Stanton's  policy  in  our  vast  military  campaigns. 
Great  as  he  was  in  the  practical  administration  of  his 
office  that  could  be  visible  to  the  world,  he  added  im 
measurably  to  his  greatness  as  War  Minister  by  the  im 
press  of  his  wonderful  personality  upon  the  whole  mili 
tary  and  civil  service. 

Stanton's  intense  and  irrepressible  hatreds  were  his 
greatest  infirmity  and  did  much  to  deform  his  brilliant 
record  as  War  Minister.  A  pointed  illustration  of  his 
bitter  and  unreasonable  prejudices  was  given  in  the  case 
of  Jere  McKibben,  whom  he  arbitrarily  confined  in  Old 
Capitol  Prison  without  even  the  semblance  of  a  pretext 
to  excuse  the  act.  The  Constitution  of  Pennsylvania 
had  been  so  amended  during  the  summer  of  1864  as  to 
authorize  soldiers  to  vote  in  the  field.  The  Legislature 
was  called  in  extra  session  to  provide  for  holding  elec 
tions  in  the  army.  It  was  in  the  heat  of  the  Presi 
dential  contest  and  party  bitterness  was  intensified  to  the 
uttermost.  Despite  the  earnest  appeals  of  Governor 
Curtin  and  all  my  personal  importunities  with  promi 
nent  legislators  of  our  own  party,  an  election  law  was 
passed  that  was  obviously  intended  to  give  the  minority 
no  rights  whatever  in  holding  army  elections.  The 
Governor  was  empowered  to  appoint  State  Commis 
sioners,  who  were  authorized  to  attend  the  elections 
without  any  direct  authority  in  conducting  them.  As 

the  law  was  violent  in  its  character  and  liable  to  the 
12 


1 78  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF   WAR-TIMES. 

grossest  abuses,  without  any  means  to  restrain  election 
frauds,  the  Democrats  of  the  State  and  country  justly 
complained  of  it  with  great  earnestness.  The  Governor 
decided,  as  a  matter  of  justice  to  the  Democrats,  to  ap 
point  several  Democratic  Commissioners,  but  it  was  with 
difficulty  that  any  could  be  prevailed  upon  to  accept. 
He  requested  me  to  see  several  prominent  Democrats 
and  obtain  their  consent  to  receive  his  commission  and 
act  under  it.  As  McKibben  had  three  brothers  in  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  I  supposed  it  would  be  pleasant 
for  him  to  make  a  visit  there  in  an  official  way,  and  I 
suggested  it  to  him.  He  promptly  answered:  "Why, 
Stanton  would  put  me  in  Old  Capitol  Prison  before  I 
was  there  a  day.  He  hates  our  family  for  no  other 
reason  that  I  know  of  than  that  my  father  was  one  of 
his  best  friends  in  Pittsburg  when  he  needed  a  friend. ' ' 
I  assured  him  that  Stanton  would  not  attempt  any  vio 
lence  against  a  man  who  held  the  commission  of  the 
Governor  of  our  State,  and  he  finally  consented  to  go, 
having  first  solemnly  pledged  me  to  protect  him  in  case 
he  got  into  any  difficulty. 

McKibben  and  the  other  Commissioners  from  Phila 
delphia  were  furnished  the  election  papers  and  started 
down  to  the  army,  then  quietly  resting  on  the  James 
River.  On  the  second  day  after  he  left  I  received  a  tele 
gram  from  him  dated  Washington,  saying:  "  Stanton  has 
me  in  Old  Capitol  Prison ;  come  at  once. ' '  I  hastened  to 
Washington,  having  telegraphed  to  Lincoln  to  allow  me 
to  see  him  between  eleven  and  twelve  o'clock  that  night, 
when  I  should  arrive.  I  went  direct  to  the  White  House 
and  told  the  President  the  exact  truth.  I  explained  the 
character  of  the  law  of  our  State;  that  I  had  personally 
prevailed  upon  McKibben  to  go  as  a  Commissioner  to 
give  a  semblance  of  decency  to  its  execution;  that  he 
was  not  only  guiltless  of  any  offense,  as  he  knew  how 


LINCOLN  AND   STANTON.  179 

delicately  he  was  situated,  but  that  he  was  powerless  to 
do  any  wrong,  and  I  insisted  upon  McKibben's  imme 
diate  discharge  from  prison.  Lincoln  knew  of  Stanton's 
hatred  for  the  McKibbens,  as  he  had  been  compelled  to 
protect  four  of  McKibben's  brothers  to  give  them  the 
promotion  they  had  earned  by  most  heroic  conduct  in 
battle,  and  he  was  much  distressed  at  Stanton's  act. 
He  sent  immediately  to  the  War  Department  to  get  the 
charge  against  McKibben,  and  it  did  not  require  five 
minutes  of  examination  to  satisfy  him  that  it  was  utterly 
groundless  and  a  malicious  wrong  committed  by  Stanton. 
He  said  it  was  a  ' '  stupid  blunder, ' '  and  at  once  proposed 
to  discharge  McKibben  on  his  parole.  I  urged  that  he 
should  be  discharged  unconditionally,  but  Lincoln's  cau 
tion  prevented  that.  He  said :  "  It  seems  hardly  fair  to 
discharge  McKibben  unconditionally  without  permitting 
Stanton  to  give  his  explanation;"  and  he  added,  "You 
know,  McClure,  McKibben  is  safe,  parole  or  no  parole, 
so  go  and  get  him  out  of  prison. ' '  I  saw  that  it  would 
be  useless  to  attempt  to  change  Lincoln's  purpose,  but  I 
asked  him  to  fix  an  hour  the  next  morning  when  I  could 
meet  Stanton  in  his  presence  to  have  McKibben  dis 
charged  from  his  parole.  He  fixed  ten  o'clock  the  next 
morning  for  the  meeting,  and  then  wrote,  in  his  own 
hand,  the  order  for  McKibben's  discharge,  which  I 
hurriedly  bore  to  Old  Capitol  Prison  and  had  him 
released. 

Promptly  at  ten  o'clock  the  next  morning  I  went  to 
the  White  House  to  obtain  McKibben's  discharge  from 
his  parole.  Lincoln  was  alone,  but  Stanton  came  in  a 
few  minutes  later.  He  was  pale  with  anger  and  his  first 
expression  was:  "Well,  McClure,  what  damned  rebel  are 
you  here  to  get  out  of  trouble  this  morning  ?' '  I  had 
frequently  been  to  Washington  before  when  arbitrary 
and  entirely  unjustifiable  arrests  of  civilians  had  been 


I  So  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR- TIMES. 

made  in  Pennsylvania,  to  have  the  prisoners  discharged 
from  military  custody;  and  as  I  had  never  applied  in 
such  a  case  without  good  reason,  and  never  without  suc 
cess  even  when  opposed  by  Stanton,  he  evidently  meant 
to  square  up  some  old  accounts  with  me  over  McKibben. 
I  said  to  him  and  with  some  feeling:  "Your  arrest  of 
McKibben  was  a  cowardly  act;  you  knew  McKibben 
was  guiltless  of  any  offense,  and  you  did  it  to  gratify  a 
brutal  hatred."  I  told  him  also  that  I  had  prevailed 
upon  McKibben,  against  his  judgment,  to  act  as  a  State 
Commissioner  to  give  a  semblance  of  decency  to  what 
would  evidently  be  a  farcical  and  fraudulent  election  in 
the  army,  and  that  if  he  had  examined  the  complaint 
soberly  for  one  minute,  he  would  have  seen  that  it  was 
utterly  false.  I  told  him  that  I  had  requested  his  ap 
pearance  there  with  the  President  to  have  McKibben 
discharged  from  his  parole,  and  that  I  now  asked  him  to 
assent  to  it.  He  turned  from  me,  walked  hurriedly  back 
and  forth  across  the  room  several  times  before  he  an 
swered,  and  then  he  came  up  to  me  and  in  a  voice  trem 
ulous  with  passion  said:  "I  decline  to  discharge  McKib 
ben  from  his  parole.  You  can  make  formal  application 
for  it  if  you  choose,  and  I  will  consider  and  decide  it." 
His  manner  was  as  offensive  as  it  was  possible  even  for 
Stanton  to  make  it,  and  I  resented  it  by  saying:  "I 
don't  know  what  McKibben  will  do,  but  if  I  were  Jere 
McKibben,  as  sure  as  there  is  a  God  I  would  crop  your 
ears  before.  I  left  Washington. '  *  He  made  no  reply,  but 
suddenly  whirled  around  on  his  heel  and  walked  out  of 
the  President's  room.  Lincoln  had  said  nothing.  He 
was  used  to  such  ebullitions  from  Stanton,  and  after  the 
Secretary  had  gone  he  remarked  in  a  jocular  way, 
"Well,  McClure,  you  didn't  get  on  very  far  with  Stan- 
ton,  did  you?  but  he'll  come  all  right;  let  the  matter 
rest,"  Before  leaving  the  President's  room  I  wrote  out 


LINCOLN  AND   STAN  TON.  I8l 

a  formal  application  to  Stanton  for  the  discharge  of 
McKibben  from  his  parole.  Several  days  after  I  re 
ceived  a  huge  official  envelope  enclosing  a  letter,  all  in 
Stanton' s  bold  scrawl,  saying  that  the  request  for  the 
discharge  of  Jere  McKibben  from  his  parole  had  been 
duly  considered,  and  ' '  the  application  could  not  be 
granted  consistently  with  the  interests  of  the  public 
service. ' '  McKibben  outlived  Stanton,  but  died  a  pris 
oner  on  parole. 

After  such  a  turbulent  interview  with  Stanton  it  would 
naturally  be  supposed  that  our  intercourse  thereafter  would 
be  severely  strained,  if  not  wholly  interrupted ;  but  I  had 
occasion  to  call  at  the  War  Department  within  a  few 
weeks,  and  never  was  greeted  more  cordially  in  my  life 
than  I  was  by  Stanton.  The  election  was  over,  the  mili 
tary  power  of  the  Confederacy  was  obviously  broken,  and 
the  Secretary  was  in  the  very  best  of  spirits.  He  promptly 
granted  what  I  wanted  done,  which  was  not  a  matter  of 
much  importance,  and  it  was  so  cheerfully  and  gener 
ously  assented  to  that  I  carefully  thought  of  everything 
that  I  wanted  from  his  department,  all  of  which  was 
done  in  a  most  gracious  manner.  I  puzzled  my  brain  to 
make  sure  I  should  not  forget  anything,  and  it  finally 
occurred  to  me  that  a  friend  I  much  desired  to  serve  had 
lately  appealed  to  me  to  aid  in  obtaining  promotion  for  a 
young  officer  in  the  quartermaster's  department  whom  I 
did  not  know  personally.  It  seemed  that  this  was  the 
chance  for  the  young  officer.  I  suggested  to  Stanton 

that   Quartermaster  was   reputed   to  be  a  very 

faithful  and  efficient  officer,  and  entitled  to  higher  pro 
motion  than  he  had  received.  Stanton  picked  up  his 
pen,  saying:  "It  will  give  me  great  pleasure,  sir;  what 
is  his  name?"  I  had  to  answer  that  I  could  not  recall 
his  name  in  full,  but  he  took  down  the  officer's  rank  and 
last  name  and  assured  me  that  he  would  be  promptly  pro- 


1 82  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES, 

moted.  I  supposed  that  a  change  of  mood  would  make 
him  forgetful  of  this  promise;  but  the  young  quarter 
master  wore  new  shoulder-straps  within  ten  days,  and 
won  distinction  as  the  chief  of  his  department  in  large 
independent  army  movements  in  Virginia.  I  never  had 
the  pleasure  of  meeting  the  worthy  officer  who  thus  un 
expectedly  secured  his  promotion,  and  he  is  doubtless 
ignorant  to  this  day  of  the  peculiar  way  in  which  it  was 
accomplished. 

Stanton's  hatred  for  McClellan  became  a  consuming 
passion  before  the  close  of  the  Peninsular  campaign. 
When  McClellan  was  before  Yorktown  and  complaining 
of  his  inadequate  forces  to  march  upon  Richmond,  Stan- 
ton  summed  him  up  in  the  following  expression:  "  If  he 
(McClellan)  had  a  million  men,  he  would  swear  the  en 
emy  had  two  millions,  and  then  he  would  sit  down  in 
the  mud  and  yell  for  three."  He  was  impatient  and 
often  fearfully  petulant  in  his  impatience.  He  was  dis 
appointed  in  McClellan  not  marching  directly  upon 
Richmond  by  Manassas,  and  he  was  greatly  disappointed 
again  when  McClellan  laid  siege  to  Yorktown,  but  he 
was  ever  ready  to  congratulate,  in  his  blunt  way,  when 
anything  was  accomplished.  When  General  ' '  Baldy  ' ' 
Smith  made  a  reconnoissance  at  Yorktown  that  produced 
the  first  successful  results  of  that  campaign,  Stanton  an 
swered  McClellan' s  announcement  of  the  movement: 
4 '  Good  for  the  first  lick ;  hurrah  for  Smith  and  the  one- 
gun  battery!"  but  from  that  time  until  the  withdrawal 
of  the  army  from  the  Peninsula,  Stanton  never  found 
occasion  to  commend  McClellan,  and  McClellan  was  a 
constant  bone  of  contention  between  Stanton  and  Lin 
coln.  Lincoln's  patience  and  forbearance  were  marked 
in  contrast  with  Stanton's  violence  of  temper  and  inten 
sity  of  hatred.  McClellan  so  far  forgot  himself  as  to 
telegraph  to  Stanton  after  the  retreat  to  the  James  River: 


LINCOLN  AND   STAN  TON.  183 

"  If  I  save  this  army  now,  I  tell  you  plainly  that  I  owe 
no  thanks  to  you  or  to  any  other  person  in  Washington. 
You  have  done  your  best  to  sacrifice  this  army. ' '  Any 
other  President  than  Lincoln  would  have  immediately 
relieved  McClellan  of  his  command,  and  Stanton  not 
only  would  have  relieved  him,  but  would  have  dismissed 
him  from  the  service.  Lincoln  exhibited  no  resentment 
whatever  for  the  ill-advised  and  insubordinate  telegram 
from  McClellan.  On  the  contrary,  he  seemed  inclined 
to  continue  McClellan  in  command,  and  certainly  ex 
hibited  every  desire  to  sustain  him  to  the  utmost.  In 
a  letter  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  State  on  the  same 
day  that  McClellan' s  telegram  was  received  he  expressed 
his  purpose  to  call  for  additional  troops,  and  said:  "I 
expect  to  maintain  this  contest  until  successful,  or  till 
I  die,  or  I  am  conquered,  or  my  term  expires,  or  Con 
gress  or  the  country  forsakes  me." 

This  was  one  of  the  most  perplexing  situations  in 
which  Lincoln  was  ever  placed.  The  defeat  of  the  army 
would  not,  in  itself,  have  been  so  serious  had  Lincoln 
been  able  to  turn  to  commanders  in  whom  he  could  im 
plicitly  confide.  He  had  abundant  resources  and  could 
supply  all  needed  additional  troops,  but  where  could  he 
turn  for  safe  advice?  He  had,  to  a  very  large  extent, 
lost  faith  in  McClellan.  When  he  counseled  with  Stan- 
ton  he  encountered  insuperable  hatreds,  and  he  finally, 
as  was  his  custom,  decided  upon  his  own  course  of  action 
and  hurried  off  to  West  Point  to  confer  with  General 
Scott.  His  visit  to  West  Point  startled  the  country  and 
quite  as  much  startled  the  Cabinet,  as  not  a  single  mem 
ber  of  it  had  any  intimation  of  his  intended  journey. 
What  passed  at  the  interview  between  Lincoln  and  Scott 
was  never  known  to  any,  so  far  as  I  have  been  able  to 
learn,  and  I  believe  that  no  one  has  pretended  to  have 
had  knowledge  of  it.  It  is  enough  to  know  that  Pope 


184  LINCOLN  AND  MEN   OA   WAR-TlMLS. 

was  summoned  to  the  command  of  a  new  army,  called 
the  Army  of  Virginia,  embracing  the  commands  of  Fre 
mont,  Banks,  and  McDowell,  and  that  Halleck  was  made 
General-in-Chief.  The  aggressive  campaign  of  Lee,  re 
sulting  in  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Run  and  the  utter 
defeat  of  Pope,  brought  the  army  back  into  the  Washing 
ton  intrenchments  in  a  most  demoralized  condition.  It 
was  here  that  Lincoln  and  Stanton  came  into  conflict 
again  on  the  question  of  the  restoration  of  McClellan  to 
command.  Without  consulting  either  the  General-in- 
Chief  or  his  War  Minister,  Lincoln  assigned  McClellan 
to  the  command  of  the  defenses  of  Washington,  and  as 
the  various  commands  of  Pope's  broken  and  demoralized 
army  came  back  into  the  intrenchments  in  utter  confu 
sion  they  thereby  came  again  under  the  command  of 
McClellan. 

When  it  was  discovered  that  McClellan  was  thus  prac 
tically  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  again, 
Stanton  was  aroused  to  the  fiercest  hostility.  He  went 
so  far  as  to  prepare  a  remonstrance  to  the  President  in 
writing  against  McClellan' s  continuance  in  the  com 
mand  of  that  army  or  of  any  army  of  the  Union.  This 
remonstrance  was  not  only  signed  by  Stanton,  but  by 
Chase,  Bates,  and  Smith,  with  the  concurrence  of  Welles, 
who  thought  it  indelicate  for  him  to  sign  it.  After  the 
paper  had  been  prepared  under  Stanton' s  impetuous  lead, 
some  of  the  more  considerate  members  of  the  Cabinet 
who  had  joined  him  took  pause  to  reflect  that  Lincoln 
was  in  the  habit  not  only  of  having  his  own  way,  but  of 
having  his  own  way  of  having  his  own  way,  and  the 
protest  was  never  presented.  Lincoln  knew  McClellan' s 
great  organizing  powers,  and  he  knew  the  army  needed 
first  of  all  a  commander  who  was  capable  of  restoring  it 
to  discipline.  To  use  his  own  expressive  language  about 
the  emergency,  he  believed  that  ' '  there  is  no  one  in 


LINCOLN  AND   STANTON.  185 

the  army  who  can  command  the  fortifications  and  lick 
those  troops  of  ours  into  shape  one-half  as  well  as  he 
could."  It  was  this  conviction  that  made  Lincoln 
forget  all  of  McClellan's  failings  and  restore  him  to 
command,  and  Stan  ton  was  compelled  to  submit  in 
sullen  silence. 

Lincoln's  restoration  of  McClellan  to  command  in  dis 
regard  of  the  most  violent  opposition  of  Stanton  was  only 
one  of  the  many  instances  in  which  he  and  his  War  Min 
ister  came  into  direct  and  positive  conflict,  and  always 
with  the  same  result;  but  many  times  as  Stanton  was 
vanquished  in  his  conflicts  with  Lincoln,  it  was  not  in 
his  nature  to  be  any  the  less  Edwin  M.  Stanton.  As  late 
as  1864  he  had  one  of  his  most  serious  disputes  with  Lin 
coln,  in  which  he  peremptorily  refused  to  obey  an  order 
from  the  President  directing  that  certain  prisoners  of 
war,  who  expressed  a  desire  to  take  the  oath  of  alle 
giance  and  enter  the  Union  army,  should  be  mustered 
into  the  service  and  credited  to  the  quotas  of  certain 
districts.  An  exact  account  of  this  dispute  is  preserved 
by  Provost- Marshal  General  Fry,  who  was  charged  with 
the  execution  of  the  order,  and  who  was  present  when 
Lincoln  and  Stanton  discussed  it.  Stanton  positively 
refused  to  obey  the  order,  and  said  to  Lincoln:  u  You 
must  see  that  your  order  cannot  be  executed. ' '  Lincoln 
answered  with  an  unusually  peremptory  tone  for  him: 
uMr.  Secretary,  I  reckon  you'll  have  to  execute  the 
order."  Stanton  replied  in  his  imperious  way:  u  Mr. 
President,  I  cannot  do  it;  the  order  is  an  improper  one, 
and  I  cannot  execute  it. ' '  To  this  Lincoln  replied  in  a 
manner  that  forbade  all  further  dispute:  u  Mr.  Secretary, 
it  will  have  to  be  done. ' '  A  few  minutes  thereafter,  as 
stated  by  Provost-Marshal  General  Fry  in  a  communica 
tion  to  the  New  York  Tribune  several  years  ago,  Stanton 


1 86  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

issued  instructions  to  him  for  the  execution  of  the  Presi 
dent's  order. 

Notwithstanding  the  many  and  often  irritating  con 
flicts  that  Linc°Tn  had  with  Stanton,  there  never  was  an 
hour  during  Stan  ton's  term  as  War  Minister  that  Lincoln 
thought  of  removing  tiim.  Indeed,  I  believe  that  at  no 
period  during  the  war,  after  Stanton  had  entered  the 
Cabinet,  did  Lincoln  feel  that  any  other  man  could  fill 
Stanton' s  place  with  equal  usefulness  to  the  country. 
He  had  the  most  unbounded  faith  in  Stanton' s  loyalty 
and  in  his  public  and  private  integrity.  He  was  in 
hearty  sympathy  with  Stanton' s  aggressive  earnestness 
for  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  and  at  times  hesitated, 
even  to  the  extent  of  what  he  feared  was  individual  in 
justice,  to  restrain  Stanton' s  violent  assaults  upon  others. 
It  will  be  regretted  by  the  impartial  historian  of  the 
future  that  Stanton  was  capable  of  impressing  his  in 
tense  hatred  so  conspicuously  upon  the  annals  of  the 
country,  and  that  Lincoln,  in  several  memorable  in 
stances,  failed  to  reverse  his  War  Minister  when  he  had 
grave  doubts  as  to  the  wisdom  or  justice  of  his  methods. 
It  was  Stanton' s  fierce  resentment  that  made  just  verdicts 
impossible  in  some  military  trials  which  will  ever  be  his 
toric — notably,  the  unjust  verdict  depriving  Fitz  John 
Porter  at  once  of  his  commission  and  citizenship,  and 
the  now  admittedly  unjust  verdict  that  sent  Mrs.  Surratt 
to  the  gallows.  Lincoln  long  hesitated  before  giving  his 
assent  to  the  judgment  against  Porter,  as  is  clearly  shown 
by  the  fact  that,  with  Pope's  accusations  against  Porter 
fresh  before  him,  he  assented  to  McClellan's  request  and 
assigned  Porter  to  active  command  in  the  Antietam  cam 
paign,  and  personally  thanked  Porter  on  the  Antietam 
field,  after  the  battle,  for  his  services.  Another  enduring 
monument  of  Stanton' s  resentment  is  the  Arlington  Na 
tional  Cemetery.  The  home  of  Lee  was  taken  under  the 


LINCOLN  AND   STANTON.  187 

feeblest  color  of  law  that  Stanton  well  knew  could  not  be 
maintained,  and  the  buildings  surrounded  with  graves 
even  to  the  very  door  of  the  venerable  mansion,  so  that 
it  might  never  be  reclaimed  as  the  home  of  the  Confed 
erate  chieftain.  The  government  made  lestitution  to  the 
Lees  in  obedience  to  the  decision  of  its  highest  court, 
but  the  monument  of  hate  is  imperishable. 

Soon  after  the  surrender  of  Lee,  Stanton,  severely 
broken  in  health  by  the  exacting  duties  he  had  per 
formed,  tendered  his  resignation,  believing  that  his  great 
work  was  finished.  Lincoln  earnestly  desired  him  to  re 
main,  and  he  did  so.  The  assassination  of  Lincoln  called 
him  to  even  graver  duties  than  had  before  confronted 
him.  His  bitter  conflict  with  Johnson  and  his  violent 
issue  with  Sherman  stand  out  as  exceptionally  interest 
ing  chapters  of  the  history  of  the  war.  It  was  President 
Johnson's  attempted  removal  of  Stanton  in  violation  of 
the  Tenure-of-OfHce  Act  that  led  to  the  President's  im 
peachment,  and  Stanton  persisted  in  holding  his  Cabinet 
office  until  Johnson  was  acquitted  by  the  Senate,  when  he 
resigned  and  was  succeeded  by  General  Schofield  on  the  2d 
of  June,  1868.  After  his  retirement  Stanton  never  exhib 
ited  any  great  degree  of  either  physical  or  mental  vigor. 
I  last  saw  him  in  Philadelphia  in  the  fall  of  1868,  where 
he  came  in  answer  to  a  special  invitation  from  the  Union 
League  to  deliver  a  political  address  in  the  Academy  of 
Music  in  favor  of  Grant's  election  to  the  Presidency.  I 
called  on  him  at  his  hotel  and  found  him  very  feeble, 
suffering  greatly  from  asthmatic*  disorders,  and  in  his 
public  address  he  was  often  strangely  forgetful  of  facts 
and  names,  and  had  to  be  prompted  by  gentlemen  on 
the  stage.  It  may  be  said  of  Stanton  that  he  sacrificed 
the  vigor  of  his  life  to  the  service  of  his  country  in  the 
sorest  trial  of  its  history,  and  when  President  Grant 
nominated  him  as  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court,  on  the 


1 88  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TJMES. 

aoth  of  December,  1869,  all  knew  that  it  was  an  empty 
honor,  as  he  was  both  physically  and  mentally  unequal 
to  the  new  duties  assigned  to  him.  Four  days  thereafter 
the  inexorable  messenger  came  and  Edwin  M.  Stantou 
joined  the  great  majority  across  the  dark  river. 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT. 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  and  Ulysses  S.  Grant  were 
^~V  entire  strangers  to  each  other  personally  until  the 
9th  of  March,  1864,  when  Lincoln  handed  Grant  his 
commission  as  Lieutenant-General,  which  made  him 
three  days  later  Commander-in-Chief  of.  all  the  armies 
of  the  Union.  Although  Grant  entered  the  army  as  a 
citizen  of  Lincoln's  own  State,  he  had  resided  there  only 
a  little  more  than  a  year.  When  he  retired  from  the 
army  by  resignation  on  the  3ist  of  July,  1854,  as  a  cap 
tain,  he  selected  Missouri  as  his  home  and  settled  on  a 
farm  near  St.  Louis.  He  had  won  promotion  at  the 
battles  of  Molino  del  Rey  and  Chapultepec  in  the  Mex 
ican  War,  and  was  brevetted  for  special  gallantry.  Dur 
ing  the  nearly  seven  years  between  his  retirement  from 
the  army  and  re-entering  the  military  service  at  the  be 
ginning  of  the  civil  war  he  had  done  little  or  nothing 
to  make  himself  known  to  fame.  He  had  moved  from 
Missouri  to  Galena  early  in  1860  to  improve  his  worldly 
condition  by  accepting  a  salary  of  $600  from  his  two 
brothers,  who  were  then  engaged  in  the  leather  business. 
After  remaining  with  them  for  a  year  his  salary  was  ad 
vanced  to  #800,  and  in  a  letter  to  a  friend  he  exhibited 
his  gratification  at  his  business  success  and  expressed  the 
hope  of  reaching  what  then  seemed  to  be  his  highest 
ambition — a  partnership  in  the  firm.  His  life  in  Galena 
was  quiet  and  unobtrusive  as  was  Grant's  habit  under 

189 


(Photo  by  Gutekunst,  Philadelphia.) 

GENERAI,  U.  S.    GRANT,    1864. 


LINCOLN  AND   GRANT.  19* 

all  circumstances;  and  when  the  first  call  for  troops  was 
issued  and  Grant  brought  a  company  from  Galena  to 
Springfield  without  any  friends  to  press  his  promotion, 
it  is  not  surprising  that,  while  political  colonels  were 
turned  out  with  great  rapidity,  Grant  remained  without 
'a  command.  He  served  on  the  staff  of  Governor  Yates 
for  several  weeks,  giving  him  the  benefit  of  his  military 
experience  in  organizing  new  troops,  but  it  does  not 
seem  to  have  occurred  to  Grant  to  suggest  his  own  ap 
pointment  to  a  command  or  to  Governor  Yates  to  tender 
him  one.  He  returned  to  Galena,  and  on  the  24th  of 
May,  1 86 1,  sent  a  formal  request  to  the  Adjutant-General 
of  the  army  at  Washington  for  an  assignment  to  military 
duty  "  until  the  close  of  the  war  in  such  capacity  as  may 
be  offered. ' '  To  this  no  reply  was  ever  received,  and  a 
month  later  he  made  a  personal  visit  to  the  headquarters 
of  General  McClellan,  then  in  command  of  the  Ohio 
volunteers  at  Cincinnati,  hoping  that  McClellan  would 
tender  him  a  position  on  his  staff;  but  he  failed  to  meet 
McClellan,  and  returned  home  without  suggesting  to 
any  one  a  desire  to  enter  the  service  under  the  Cin 
cinnati  commander. 

It  was  a  wayward  and  insubordinate  regiment  at 
Springfield  that  called  Grant  back  to  the  military  ser 
vice  and  started  him  on  his  matchless  career.  The 
Twenty-first  Illinois  defied  the  efforts  of  Governor  Yates 
to  reduce  it  to  discipline,  and  in  despair  he  telegraphed 
to  the  modest  Captain  Grant  at  Galena,  asking  him  to 
come  and  accept  the  colonelcy.  The  prompt  answer 
came:  UI  accept  the  regiment  and  will  start  imme 
diately."  It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  appearance  of  a 
plain,  ununiformed,  and  modest  man  like  Grant  made 
little  impression  at  first  upon  his  insubordinate  com 
mand,  but  in  a  very  short  time  he  made  it  the  best  dis 
ciplined  regiment  from  the  State,  and  the  men  as  proud 


I92  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

of  their  commander  as  he  was  of  them.  The  story  of 
Grant's  military  achievements  from  Belmont  to  Shiloh 
is  familiar  to  every  reader  of  American  history.  It  was 
Grant's  capture  of  Fort  Henry,  soon  followed  by  the 
capture  of  Fort  Donelson  and  Nashville,  that  opened 
the  second  year  of  the  war  with  such  brilliant  promise 
of  an  early  overthrow  of  the  Confederate  armies.  It  was 
his  sententious  answer  to  General  Buckner  at  Fort  Don 
elson  that  proclaimed  to  the  nation  his  heroic  qualities 
as  a  military  commander.  He  said:  "No  terms  except 
unconditional  and  immediate  surrender  can  be  accepted; 
I  propose  to  move  immediately  upon  your  works. ' '  He 
soon  became  popularly  known  as  ' '  Unconditional  Sur 
render  Grant, ' '  and  while  his  superior  officers,  including 
General-in-Chief  McClellan  and  his  immediate  division 
commander  Halleck,  seemed  to  agree  only  in  hindering 
Grant  in  his  military  movements,  the  country  profoundly 
appreciated  his  victories.  Soon  after  the  capture  of 
Nashville  he  was  ordered  by  Halleck  to  make  a  new 
military  movement  that  was  rendered  impossible  by  im 
mense  floods  which  prevailed  in  the  Western  waters. 
Halleck  reported  him  to  McClellan,  complaining  that  he 
had  left  his  post  without  leave  and  had  failed  to  make 
reports,  etc.,  to  which  McClellan  replied:  u  Do  not  hesi 
tate  to  arrest  him  at  once  if  the  good  of  the  service  re 
quires  it,  and  place  C.  F.  Smith  in  command."  Halleck 
immediately  relieved  Grant  and  placed  Smith  in  com 
mand  of  the  proposed  expedition.  Grant  gave  a  tem 
perate  explanation  of  the  injustice  done  to  him,  but  as 
the  wrong  was  continued  he  asked  to  be  relieved  from 
duty.  In  the  mean  time  Halleck  had  discovered  his 
error,  and  atoned  for  it  by  answering  to  Grant:  "  Instead 
of  relieving  you,  I  wish  you,  as  soon  as  your  new  army 
is  in  the  field,  to  assume  the  immediate  command  and 
lead  it  on  to  new  victories." 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT.  193 

It  was  not  "until  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  fought  on 
the  6th  and  yth  of  April,  1862,  that  Lincoln  was  placed 
in  a  position  to  exercise  a  controlling  influence  in  shap 
ing  the  destiny  of  Grant.  The  first  day's  battle  at  Shiloh 
was  a  serious  disaster  to  the  Union  army  commanded  by 
Grant,  who  was  driven  from  his  position,  which  seems  to 
have  been  selected  without  any  special  reference  to  re 
sisting  an  attack  from  the  enemy,  and,  although  his 
army  fought  most  gallantly  in  various  separate  encoun 
ters,  the  day  closed  with  the  field  in  possession  of  the 
enemy  and  Grant's. army  driven  back  to  the  river.  For 
tunately,  the  advance  of  Buell's  army  formed  a  junction 
with  Grant  late  in  the  evening,  and  that  night  all  of 
Buell's  army  arrived,  consisting  of  three  divisions.  The 
two  generals  arranged  their  plans  for  an  offensive  move 
ment  early  the  next  morning,  and,  after  another  stub 
born  battle,  the  lost  field  was  regained  and  the  enemy 
compelled  to  retreat  with  the  loss  of  their  commander, 
General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  who  had  fallen  early  in 
the  first  day's  action,  and  with  a  larger  aggregate  loss  of 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing  than  Grant  suffered.  The 
first  reports  from  the  Shiloh  battle-field  created  profound 
alarm  throughout  the  entire  country,  and  the  wildest 
exaggerations  were  spread  in  a  floodtide  of  vituperation 
against  Grant.  It  was  freely  charged  that  he  had  ne 
glected  his  command  because  of  dissipation,  that  his 
army  had  been  surprised  and  defeated,  and  that  it  was 
saved  from  annihilation  only  by  the  timely  arrival  of 
Buell. 

The  few  of  to-day  who  can  recall  the  inflamed  condi 
tion  of  public  sentiment  against  Grant  caused  by  the  dis 
astrous  first  day's  battle  at  Shiloh  will  remember  that  he 
was  denounced  as  incompetent  for  his  command  by  the 
public  journals  of  all  parties  in  the  North,  and  with 

almost  entire  unanimity  by  Senators  and  Congressmen 
13 


*94  LINCOLN  AND  MZX  OF  WAR- TIMES. 

without  regard  to  political  faith.  Not  only  in  Washing 
ton,  but  throughout  the  loyal  States,  public  sentiment 
seemed  to  crystallize  into  an  earnest  demand  for  Grant's 
dismissal  from  the  army.  His  victories  of  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson,  which  had  thrilled  the  country  a  short 
time  before,  seemed  to  have  been  forgotten,  and  on  every 
side  could  be  heard  the  emphatic  denunciation  of  Grant 
because  of  his  alleged  reckless  exposure  of  the  army, 
while  Buell  was  universally  credited  with  having  saved 
it.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  owing  to  the  excited  condi 
tion  of  the  public  mind  most  extravagant  reports  gained 
ready  credence,  and  it  was  not  uncommon  to  hear  Grant 
denounced  on  the  streets  and  in  all  circles  as  unfitted  by 
both  habit  and  temperament  for  an  important  military 
command.  The  clamor  for  Grant's  removal,  and  often 
for  his  summary  dismissal,  from  the  army  surged  against 
the  President  from  every  side,  and  he  was  harshly  criti 
cized  for  not  promptly  dismissing  Grant,  or  at  least  re 
lieving  him  from  his  command.  I  can  recall  but  a  single 
Republican  member  of  Congress  who  boldly  defended 
Grant  at  that  time.  Elihu  B.  Washburne,  whose  home 
was  in  Galena,  where  Grant  had  lived  before  he  went 
into  the  army,  stood  nearly  or  quite  alone  among  the 
members  of  the  House  in  wholly  justifying  Grant  at 
Shiloh,  while  a  large  majority  of  the  Republicans  of 
Congress  were  outspoken  and  earnest  in  condemning 
him. 

I  did  not  know  Grant  at  that  time;  had  neither  par 
tiality  nor  prejudice  to  influence  my  judgment,  nor  had  I 
any  favorite  general  who  might  be  benefited  by  Grant's 
overthrow,  but  I  shared  the  almost  universal  conviction 
of  the  President's  friends  that  he  could  not  sustain  him 
self  if  he  attempted  to  sustain  Grant  by  continuing  him 
in  command.  Looking  solely  to  the  interests  of  Lincoln, 
feeling  that  the  tide  of  popular  resentment  was  so  over- 


LINCOLN  AND    GRANT.  1 95 

whelming  against  Grant  that  Lincoln  must  yield  to  it,  I 
had  repeated  conferences  with  some  of  his  closest  friends, 
including  Swett  and  Lamon,  all  of  whom  agreed  that 
Grant  must  be  removed  from  his  command,  and  com 
plained  of  Lincoln  for  his  manifest  injustice  to  himself 
by  his  failure  to  act  promptly  in  Grant's  removal.  So 
much  was  I  impressed  with  the  importance  of  prompt 
action  on  the  part  of  the  President  after  spending  a  day 
and  evening  in  Washington  that  I  called  on  Lincoln  at 
eleven  o'clock  at  night  and  sat  with  him  alone  until  after 
one  o'clock  in  the  morning.  He  was,  as  usual,  worn  out 
with  the  day's  exacting  duties,  but  he  did  not  permit  me 
to  depart  until  the  Grant  matter  had  been  gone  over  and 
many  other  things  relating  to  the  war  that  he  wished  to 
discuss.  I  pressed  upon  him  with  all  the  earnestness  I 
could  command  the  immediate  removal  of  Grant  as  an 
imperious  necessity  to  sustain  himself.  As  was  his  cus 
tom,  he  said  but  little,  only  enough  to  make  me  continue 
the  discussion  until  it  was  exhausted.  He  sat  before  the 
open  fire  in  the  old  Cabinet  room,  most  of  the  time  with 
his  feet  up  on  the  high  marble  mantel,  and  exhibited  un 
usual  distress  at  the  complicated  condition  of  military 
affairs.  Nearly  every  day  brought  some  new  and  per 
plexing  military  complication.  He  had  gone  through  a 
long  winter  of  terrible  strain  with  McClellan  and  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac;  and  from  the  day  that  Grant 
started  on  his  Southern  expedition  until  the  battle  of 
Shiloh  he  had  had  little  else  than  jarring  and  confusion 
among  his  generals  in  the  West.  He  knew  that  I  had 
no  ends  to  serve  in  urging  Grant's  removal,  beyond  the 
single  desire  to  make  him  be  just  to  himself,  and  he  lis 
tened  patiently. 

I  appealed  to  Lincoln  for  his  own  sake  to  remove 
Grant  at  once,  and  in  giving  my  reasons  for  it  I  simply 
voiced  the  admittedly  overwhelming  protest  from  the 


J96  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

loyal  people  of  the  land  against  Grant's  continuance  in 
command.  I  could  form  no  judgment  during  the  con 
versation  as  to  what  effect  my  arguments  had  upon  him 
beyond  the  fact  that  he  was  greatly  distressed  at  this  new 
complication.  When  I  had  .said  everything  that  could 
be  said  from  my  standpoint,  we  lapsed  into  silence. 
Lincoln  remained  silent  for  what  seemed  a  very  long 
time.  He  then  gathered  himself  up  in  his  chair  and 
said  in  a  tone  of  earnestness  that  I  shall  never  forget: 
U7  cart t  spare  this  man;  he  fights  "  That  was  all  he 
said,  but  I  knew  that  it  was  enough,  and  that  Grant  was 
safe  in  Lincoln's  hands  against  his  countless  hosts  of 
enemies.  The  only  man  in  all  the  nation  who  had  the 
power  to  save  Grant  was  Lincoln,  and  he  had  decided  to 
do  it.  He  was  not  influenced  by  any  personal  partiality 
for  Grant,  for  they  had  never  met,  but  he  believed  just 
what  he  said — "I  can't  spare  this  man;  he  fights."  I 
knew  enough  of  Lincoln  to  know  that  his  decision  was 
final,  and  I  knew  enough  of  him  also  to  know  that  he 
reasoned  better  on  the  subject  than  I  did,  and  that  it 
would  be  unwise  to  attempt  to  unsettle  his  determina 
tion.  I  did  not  forget  that  Lincoln  was  the  one  man 
who  never  allowed  himself  to  appear  as  wantonly  defy 
ing  public  sentiment.  It  seemed  to  me  impossible  for 
him  to  save  Grant  without  taking  a  crushing  load  of  con 
demnation  upon  himself;  but  Lincoln  was  wiser  than  all 
those  around  him,  and  he  not  only  saved  Grant,  but  he 
saved  him  by  such  well-concerted  effort  that  he  soon  won 
popular  applause  from  those  who  were  most  violent  in 
demanding  Grant's  dismissal. 

The  method  that  Lincoln  adopted  to  rescue  Grant  from 
the  odium  into  which  he  had,  to  a  very  large  degree,  un 
justly  fallen  was  one  of  the  bravest  and  most  sagacious 
acts  of  his  administration.  Halleck  was  commander  of 
the  military  division  consisting  of  Missouri,  Kentucky, 


LINCOLN  AND    GRANT.  J97 

Tennessee,  and  possibly  other  States,  but  he  remained  at 
his  headquarters  in  St.  Louis  until  after  the  battle  of 
Shiloh.  Lincoln's  first  move  was  to  bring  Halleck  to 
the  field,  where  he  at  once  superseded  Grant  as  com 
mander  of  the  army.  This  relieved  public  apprehen 
sion  and  soon  calmed  the  inflamed  public  sentiment  that 
was  clamoring  for  Grant's  dismissal.  Lincoln  knew  that 
it  would  require  time  for  the  violent  prejudice  against 
Grant  to  perish,  and  he  calmly  waited  until  it  was  safe 
for  him  to  give  some  indication  to  the  country  of  his 
abiding  faith  in  Grant  as  a  military  commander.  Hal 
leck  reached  the  army  at  Pittsburg  Landing  on  the  nth 
of  April,  four  days  after  the  battle  had  been  fought,  and 
of  course  his  presence  on  the  field  at  once  made  him  the 
commanding  officer.  On  the  3<Dth  of  April,  when  the 
public  mind  was  reasonably  well  prepared  to  do  justice 
to  Grant,  an  order  was  issued  assigning  him  ' '  as  second 
in  command  under  the  major-general  commanding  the 
department. ' ' 

This  was  an  entirely  needless  order  so  far  as  mere 
military  movements  were  involved,  and  it  is  one  of  the 
very  rare  cases  in  the  history  of  the  war  in  which  such 
an  order  was  issued.  Orly  under  very  special  circum 
stances  could  there  be  any  occasion  for  an  order  assign 
ing  a  particular  general  as  second  in  command  of  an 
army.  While  the  army  is  within  reach  of  orders  from 
the  commanding  general  there  can  be  no  second  in  com 
mand.  In  case  of  his  death  or  inability  to  take  active 
command  in  battle,  the  military  laws  wisely  regulate  the 
succession,  and  only  in  extraordinary  cases  is  it  departed 
from.  In  this  case  the  purpose  of  it  was  obvious.  Lin 
coln  had  quieted  public  apprehension  by  bringing  Gen 
eral  Halleck  to  the  field  and  thus  relieving  Grant  of 
command  without  the  semblance  of  reproach;  but  he 
desired  to  impress  the  country  with  his  absolute  faith 


I98  LINCOLN  AND    'MEN  OF   WAR- TIMES. 

in  Grant  as  a  military  leader,  and  it  was  for  that  reason 
that  the  special  order  was  issued  assigning  him  as  second 
in  command  of  Halleck's  army.  The  effect  of  that  order 
was  precisely  what  Lincoln  anticipated.  It  made  all 
loyal  men  take  pause  and  abate  or  yield  their  violent 
hostility  to  Grant  in  obedience  to  the  publicly  expressed 
confidence  of  Lincoln.  The  country  knew  that  Lincoln 
best  understood  Grant,  and  from  the  date  of  Grant's  as 
signment  as  second  in  command  of  the  army  the  preju 
dice  against  him  rapidly  perished.  It  was  thus  that 
Lincoln  saved  Grant  from  one  of  the  most  violent  surges 
of  popular  prejudice  that  was  ever  created  against  any 
of  our  leading  generals,  and  on  the  nth  of  July,  when 
it  was  entirely  safe  to  restore  Grant  to  his  command  for 
active  operations,  Halleck  was  ordered  to  Washington 
by  Lincoln  and  assigned  as  commander-in-chief.  Thus 
was  Grant  restored  to  the  command  of  the  army  that  he 
had  lost  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  and  it  was  Lincoln,  and 
Lincoln  alone,  who  saved  him  from  disgrace  and  gave  to 
the  country  the  most  lustrous  record  of  all  the  heroes  of 
the  war. 

I  doubt  whether  Grant  ever  understood  how  Lincoln, 
single  and  alone,  protected  him  from  dishonor  in  the 
tempest  of  popular  passion  that  came  upon  him  after 
the  disaster  at  Shiloh.  Grant  never  was  in  Washington 
until  he  was  summoned  there  early  in  1864  to  be  com 
missioned  as  Lieutenant-General,  and  he  was  entirely 
without  personal  acquaintance  with  Lincoln.  After  he 
became  Commander-in-Chief  he  made  his  headquarters 
in  the  field  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  was  very 
rarely  in  Washington  after  he  crossed  the  Rapidaii  and 
opened  the  campaign  by  the  battles  of  the  Wilderness. 
That  he  frequently  saw  Lincoln  between  February  and 
May  while  perfecting  his  plans  for  army  movements  is 
well  known,  but  Grant  was  one  of  the  most  silent  of 


LINCOLN  AND    GRANT.  1 99 

men  and  most  of  all  reluctant  to  talk  about  himself, 
while  Lincoln  was  equally  reserved  in  all  things  per 
taining  to  himself  personally.  Especially  where  he  had 
rendered  any  service  to  another  he  would  be  quite  un 
likely  to  speak  of  it  himself.  Judging  the  two  men  from 
their  chief  and  very  marked  characteristics,  it  is  entirely 
reasonable  to  assume  that  what  Lincoln  did  to  save 
Grant  from  disgrace  was  never  discussed  or  referred  to 
by  them  in  personal  conversation.  Grant  never,  in  any 
way  known  to  the  public,  recognized  any  such  obligation 
to  Lincoln,  and  no  utterance  ever  came  from  him  indi 
cating  anything  more  than  the  respect  for  Lincoln  due 
from  a  general  to  his  chief. 

I  never  heard  Lincoln  allude  to  the  subject  but  once, 
and  that  was  under  very  painful  circumstances  and  when 
the  subject  was  forced  upon  him  by  myself.  Lincoln 
knew  that  I  had  personal  knowledge  of  his  heroic  effort 
to  rescue  Grant  from  the  odium  that  came  upon  him 
after  Shiloh,  and  an  accidental  occasion  arose  in  the 
latter  part  of  October,  1864,  when  his  relations  to  Grant 
became  a  proper  subject  of  consideration.  The  October 
elections  in  1864,  when  Lincoln  was  a  candidate  for  re 
election,  resulted  favorably  for  the  Republicans  in  Ohio 
and  Indiana,  but  unfavorably  for  them  in  Pennsylvania. 
There  was  no  State  ticket  to  be  elected  in  Pennsylvania 
that  year,  and  the  vote  for  Congress  and  local  officers 
gave  a  small  Democratic  majority  on  the  home  vote  in 
the  State.  McClellan,  a  native  of  Pennsylvania,  was 
the  Democratic  candidate  for  President,  and  State  pride 
naturally  added  to  his  strength.  General  Cameron  was 
chairman  of  the  Republican  State  Committee.  He  was 
well  equipped  for  the  position,  but  was  so  entirely  con 
fident  of  success  that  he  neglected  to  perfect  the  organ 
ization  necessary  to  gain  the  victory,  and  the  prestige  of 
sucqess  fell  to  McClellan.  New  York  was  regarded  as 


200  LINCOLN  AND' MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

extremely  doubtful,  and  there  was  much  concern  felt 
about  the  possibility  of  New  York  and  Pennsylvania 
both  voting  against  Lincoln  in  November.  It  was  not 
doubted  that  the  army  vote  would  give  Pennsylvania  to 
Lincoln,  but  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance,  to  give 
moral  force  and  effect  to  the  triumph,  to  give  Lincoln  a 
majority  on  the  home  vote.  Lincoln  was  much  con 
cerned  about  the  situation,  and  telegraphed  me  to  come 
to  Washington  the  day  after  the  October  election.  I 
went  on  at  once,  and  after  going  over  the  political  situ 
ation  carefully,  Lincoln  asked  me  whether  I  would  be 
willing  to  give  my  personal  services  to  aid  the  State 
Committee  during  the  month  intervening  between  the 
October  and  November  elections.  I  reminded  him  that 
General  Cameron  and  I  were  not  in  political  sympathy, 
and  that  he  would  regard  it  as  obtrusive  for  me  to  volun 
teer  assistance  to  him  in  the  management  of  the  cam 
paign.  To  this  Lincoln  replied:  "Of  course,  I  under 
stand  that,  but  if  Cameron  shall  invite  you  can  you  give 
your  time  fully  to  the  contest?"  I  answered  that  I 
would  gladly  do  so.  He  did  not  suggest  how  he  meant 
to  bring  about  co-operation  between  Cameron  and  my 
self,  but  I  knew  him  well  enough  to  know  that  he  would 
be  very  likely  to  accomplish  the  desired  result.  Two 
days  thereafter  I  received  a  cordial  letter  from  General 
Cameron  inviting  me  to  join  him  at  the  headquarters 
and  assist  in  the  November  contest. 

I  at  once  went  to  Philadelphia,  and  found  Wayne 
MacVeagh  already  with  General  Cameron  in  obedience 
to  a  like  invitation  that  had  been  brought  about  by  Lin 
coln.  MacVeagh  had  been  chairman  of  the  State  Com 
mittee  the  previous  year,  when  Curtin  was  re-elected,  as 
I  had  been  chairman  in  1860  when  Lincoln  was  first 
elected,  and  both  of  us  were  at  the  time  regarded  as 
somewhat  conspicuous  among  the  opponents  of  Came- 


LINCOLN  AND    GRANT.  2OI 

ron.  The  failure  in  Pennsylvania,  contrasted  with  the 
party  successes  in  Ohio  and  Indiana,  was  very  mortify 
ing  to  Cameron,  and  he  was  ready  to  employ  every  avail 
able  resource  to  redeem  the  State  in  November.  There 
was  the  heartiest  co-operation  by  MacVeagh  and  myself, 
all  being  done  under  the  name  and  immediate  direction 
of  Cameron  as  chairman,  and  there  was  not  a  jar  during 
the  month  of  desperate  effort  to  win  the  State  for  Lin 
coln.  I  took  a  private  room  at  another  hotel,  and  never 
was  at  headquarters  except  for  confidential  conference 
with  Cameron  himself;  and,  as  requested  by  Lincoln,  I 
wrote  him  fully  every  night  my  impressions  of  the  prog 
ress  we  were  making.  The  Democrats  were  highly 
elated  by  their  rather  unexpected  success  in  October, 
and  they  made  the  most  desperate  and  well-directed 
battle  to  gain  the  State  for  McClellan.  So  anxious  was 
Lincoln  about  the  campaign  that  after  I  had  been  a 
week  in  co-operation  with  the  State  Committee,  he  sent 
Postmaster-General  Dennison  over  to  Philadelphia  spe 
cially  to  talk  over  the  situation  more  fully  than  it  could 
be  presented  in  my  letters,  and  to  return  the  same  night 
and  make  report  to  him.  It  was  evident  that  we  had 
gained  nothing,  and  I  so  informed  the  Postmaster-Gen 
eral,  and  expressed  great  doubts  as  to  our  ability  to  do 
more  than  hold  our  own,  considering  the  advantage  the 
Democrats  had  in  the  prestige  of  their  October  victory. 
I  told  him,  however,  that  in  another  week  the  question 
could  be  determined  whether  we  were  safe  on  the  home 
vote  in  Pennsylvania,  and  that  if  there  was  reasonable 
doubt  about  it  I  would  notify  Lincoln  and  visit  Wash 
ington. 

A  week  later,  as  I  had  advised  Lincoln  from  day  to 
day,  I  saw  nothing  to  warrant  the  belief  that  we  had 
gained  any  material  advantage  in  the  desperate  battle, 
and  I  telegraphed  Lincoln  that  I  would  see  him  at  ten 


2o2  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF 

o'clock  that  night.  I  found  him  waiting,  and  he  exhib 
ited  great  solicitude  as  to  the  battle  in  Pennsylvania. 
He  knew  that  his  election  was  in  no  sense  doubtful,  but 
he  knew  that  if  he  lost  New  York  and  with  it  Pennsyl 
vania  on  the  home  vote,  the  moral  effect  of  his  triumph 
would  be  broken  and  his  power  to  prosecute  the  war  and 
make  peace  would  be  greatly  impaired.  His  usually  sad 
face  was  deeply  shadowed  with  sorrow  when  I  told  him 
that  I  saw  no  reasonable  prospect  of  carrying  Pennsylva 
nia  on  the  home  vote,  although  we  had  about  held  our 
own  in  the  hand-to-hand  conflict  through  which  we  were 
passing.  "Well,  what  is  to  be  done?"  was  Lincoln's 
inquiry  after  the  whole  situation  had  been  presented  to 
him.  I  answered  that  the  solution  of  the  problem  was  a 
very  simple  and  easy  one — that  Grant  was  idle  in  front 
of  Petersburg;  that  Sheridan  had  won  all  possible  vic 
tories  in  the  Valley;  and  that  if  5000  Pennsylvania  sol 
diers  could  be  furloughed  home  from  each  army  the  elec 
tion  could  be  carried  without  doubt.  Lincoln's  face 
brightened  instantly  at  the  suggestion,  and  I  saw  that 
he  was  quite  ready  to  execute  it.  I  said  to  him :  "Of 
course,  you  can  trust  Grant  to  make  the  suggestion  to 
him  to  furlough  5000  Pennsylvania  troops  for  two 
weeks?"  To  my  surprise,  Lincoln  made  no  answer, 
and  the  bright  face  of  a  few  moments  before  was  in 
stantly  shadowed  again.  I  was  much  disconcerted,  as  I 
supposed  that  Grant  was  the  one  man  to  whom  Lincoln 
could  turn  with  absolute  confidence  as  his  friend.  I  then 
said  with  some  earnestness:  "Surely,  Mr.  President,  you 
can  trust  Grant  with  a  confidential  suggestion  to  furlough 
Pennsylvania  troops?"  Lincoln  remained  silent  and  evi 
dently  distressed  at  the  proposition  I  was  pressing  upon 
him.  After  a  few  moments,  and  speaking  with  empha 
sis,  I  said:  "It  can't  be  possible  that  Grant  is  not  your 
friend;  he  can't  be  such  an  ingrate?"  Lincoln  hesitated 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT.  203 

for  some  time,  and  then  answered  in  these  words:  "  Well, 
McClure,  I  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  Grant  prefers 
my  election  to  that  of  McClellan." 

I  must  confess  that  my  response  to  this  to  me  appalling 
statement  from  Lincoln  was  somewhat  violative  of  the 
rules  of  courteous  conversation.  I  reminded  Lincoln 
how,  in  that  room,  when  I  had  appealed  to  him  to  re 
spect  the  almost  universal  demand  of  the  country  for 
Grant's  dismissal,  he  had  withstood  the  shock  alone  and 
interposed  his  omnipotence  to  save  Grant  when  he  was 
a  personal  stranger.  Lincoln,  as  usual,  answered  intem 
perance  of  speech  by  silence.  I  then  said  to  him:  "  Gen 
eral  Meade  is  a  soldier  and  a  gentleman;  he  is  the  com 
mander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  send  an  order  to 
him  from  yourself  to  furlough  5000  Pennsylvania  soldiers 
home  for  two  weeks,  and  send  that  order  with  some 
trusted  friend  from  the  War  Department,  with  the  sug 
gestion  to  Meade  that  your  agent  be  permitted  to  bring 
the  order  back  with  him. ' '  After  a  little  reflection  Lin 
coln  answered:  "I  reckon  that  can  be  done."  I  then 
said,  ' '  What  about  Sheridan  ?'  *  At  once  his  sad  face 
brightened  up,  like  the  noonday  sun  suddenly  emerging 
from  a  dark  cloud,  as  he  answered:  "  Oh,  Phil  Sheridan; 
he's  all  right."  Before  I  left  his  room  that  night  he  had 
made  his  arrangements  to  send  messengers  to  Meade  and 
Sheridan.  The  order  was  sent  to  Meade,  and  he  per 
mitted  it  to  be  returned  to  the  President,  but  Sheridan 
needed  no  order.  The  10,000  Pennsylvania  soldiers  were 
furloughed  during  the  week,  and  Lincoln  carried  Penn 
sylvania  on  the  home  vote  by  5712  majority,  to  which 
the  army  vote  added  14,363  majority.  It  was  thus  that 
Lincoln  made  his  triumph  in  Pennsylvania  a  complete 
victory  without  what  was  then  commonly  called  the 
' '  bayonet  vote, ' '  and  Lincoln  carried  New  York  by 
6749,  leaving  McClellan  the  worst  defeated  candidate 


204  LINCOLN' AND  MEN  OF  WAR- TIMES 

ever  nominated  by  any  of  the  great  political  patties  of 
the  country. 

I  left  Lincoln  fully  convinced  that  Grant  was  an  in- 
grate,  and  Lincoln  certainly  knew  that  he  permitted  that 
conviction  to  be  formed  in  my  mind.  He  did  not  in  any 
way  qualify  his  remark  about  Grant,  although  it  was  his 
custom  when  he  felt  compelled  to  disparage  any  one  to 
present  some  charitable  explanation  of  the  conduct  com 
plained  of.  The  fact  that  he  refused  to  send  his  request 
to  Grant,  while  he  was  willing  to  send  it  to  Meade, 
proved  that  he  was,  for  some  reason,  disappointed  in 
Grant's  fidelity  to  him;  and  the  enthusiasm  with  which 
he  spoke  of  Sheridan  proved  how  highly  he  valued  the 
particular  quality  that  he  did  not  credit  to  Grant.  I  con 
fess  that  the  conviction  formed  that  day  made  the  name 
of  Grant  leave  a  bad  taste  in  my  mouth  for  many  years. 
I  heartily  supported  his  nomination  for  the  Presidency  in 
1868,  and  was  chairman  of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation 
in  the  Chicago  Convention  that  nominated  him,  because 
I  believed  that  the  chivalrous  victor  of  Appomattox 
would  command  the  highest  measure  of  confidence  from 
the  Southern  people  and  hasten  the  restoration  of  peace 
and  business  prosperity;  but  Grant  and  his  immediate 
friends  knew  that  while  I  earnestly  supported  his  nomi 
nation  and  election,  I  did  not  have  the  confidence  in  him 
that  he  generally  commanded.  I  now  believe  that  Lin 
coln  was  mistaken  in  his  distrust  of  Grant.  It  was  not 
until  after  Grant's  retirement  from  the  Presidency  that  I 
ever  had  an  opportunity  to  hear  his  explanation.  I  re 
membered  that  on  election  night,  when  Grant  was  ad 
vised  at  his  headquarters  in  front  of  Petersburg  of  Lin 
coln's  election,  he  sent  Lincoln  a  dispatch  heartily  con 
gratulating  him  upon  his  triumph.  I  never  heard  Lin 
coln  allude  to  the  subject  again,  and  I  am  therefore 
ignorant  as  to  whether  his  belief  was  ever  changed. 


LINCOLN  AND   GRANT.  205 

I  never  visited  the  White  House  during  Grant's  Presi 
dency,  although  twice  specially  invited  to  do  so  to  con 
sider  what  I  regarded  as  an  impracticable  or  impossible 
political  suggestion,  but  I  accidentally  met  him  in  the 
Continental  Hotel,  soon  after  his  retirement,  in  company 
with  Mr.  Childs.  Grant  came  forward  in  the  most  cor 
dial  manner  and  thanked  me  for  an  editorial  that  had 
appeared  in  The  Times  on  the  day  that  ended  his  Presi 
dential  term,  in  which  I  had  spoken  of  him  and  his 
achievements  as  history  would  record  them,  regardless 
of  the  political  passions  and  prejudices  of  the  day.  The 
meeting  ended  with  an  invitation  to  lunch  with  him  that 
afternoon  at  Mr.  Drexel's  office,  which  I  accepted. 
There  were  present  only  Mr.  Drexel,  Mr.  Childs,  and 
one  or  two  others  connected  with  the  Drexel  house. 
After  luncheon  all  dispersed  but  Grant,  Childs,  and  my 
self,  and  we  had  a  most  delightful  conversation  with 
Grant  for  an  hour  or  more.  I  was  anxious  to  learn,  if 
possible,  what  Grant's  feelings  were  in  the  Presidential 
battle  of  1864.  Without  intimating  to  him  that  Lincoln 
had  doubted  his  fidelity,  I  reminded  him  that  he  had 
maintained  such  a  silent  attitude  that  some  of  Lincoln's 
closest  friends  were  at  a  loss  to  know  his  preference  in 
the  contest.  He  answered  very  promptly  that  he  sup 
posed  none  could  have  doubted  his  earnest  desire  for  the 
re-election  of  Lincoln,  although  he  studiously  avoided 
any  expression,  public  or  private,  on  the  subje-  He 
said:  "  It  would  have  been  obviously  unbecoming  on  my 
part  to  have  given  a  public  expression  against  a  general 
whom  I  had  succeeded  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
army. "  I  do  not  doubt  that  Grant  declared  the  exact 
truth  in  that  statement.  Naturally  silent  and  averse  to 
any  expressions  whatever  on  politics,  he  felt  that  he 
could  not  with  propriety  even  appear  to  assail  a  man 
who  had  failed  and  fallen  in  the  position  that  he  had 


206  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

won  and  maintained.  Thus  for  twelve  years  I  cherished 
a  personal  prejudice  against  Grant  because  of  his  sup 
posed  want  of  fidelity  to  Lincoln  that  I  now  believe  to 
have  been  wholly  unjust.  One  revelation  to  me  at  the 
meeting  with  Grant  at  the  Drexel  luncheon  was  his  re 
markable  and  attractive  powers  as  a  conversationalist. 
He  discussed  politics  during  his  term  and  the  politics  of 
the  future,  public  men  and  public  events,  with  great  free 
dom  and  in  a  manner  so  genial  as  to  amaze  me.  I  had 
shared  the  common  impression  that  Grant  was  always 
reticent,  even  in  the  circle  of  his  closest  friends,  but  the 
three  hours  spent  with  him  on  that  day  proved  that  when 
he  chose  he  could  be  one  of  the  most  entertaining  of  men 
in  the  social  circle. 

It  is  evident  that  from  the  day  that  Grant  became 
Commander-in-Chief,  Lincoln  had  abiding  faith  in  him. 
He  yielded  implicitly  to  Grant's  judgment  in  all  matters 
purely  military;  Grant,  like  all  great  soldiers,  yielded  as 
implicitly  to  Lincoln  in  all  matters  relating  to  civil  ad 
ministration,  and  the  annals  of  history  will  testify  that 
Grant  fulfilled  every  expectation  of  the  government  and 
of  the  loyal  people  of  the  nation  as  military  chieftain. 
Many  have  criticised  some  of  his  military  movements, 
such  as  his  assaults  at  Vicksburg  and  Cold  Harbor  and 
his  battles  in  the  Wilderness,  but  he  met  the  great  need 
of  the  country  and  was  as  heroic  in  peace  as  in  war. 
When  President  Johnson  attempted  to  punish  Lee  for 
treason,  Grant  not  only  admonished  the  President,  but 
notified  him  that  u  the  officers  and  men  paroled  at  Appo- 
mattox  Court-House,  and  since  upon  the  same  terms 
given  to  Lee,  cannot  be  tried  for  treason  so  long  as  they 
preserve  the  terms  of  their  parole;"  and  he  went  so  far 
as  to  declare  that  he  would  resign  his  commission  if  the 
government  violated  the  faith  he  had  given  when  Lee 
surrendered  to  him.  He  fought  more  battles  and  won 


LINCOLN  AND    GRANT.  207 

more  victories  than  any  general  of  any  country  during 
his  generation,  and  when  on  the  23d  of  July,  1885, 
Ulysses  S.  Grant  met  the  inexorable  messenger,  the 
Great  Captain  of  the  Age  passed  from  time  to  eternity. 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN. 


NOT  until  all  the  lingering  personal,  political,  and 
military  passions  of  the  war  shall  have  perished 
can  the  impartial  historian  tell  the  true  story  of  Abra 
ham  Lincoln's  relations  to  George  B.  McClellan,  nor 
will  the  just  estimate  of  McClellan  as  a  military  chief 
tain  be  recorded  until  the  future  historian  comes  to  his 
task  entirely  free  from  the  prejudices  of  the  present. 
Although  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  has  elapsed 
since  the  close  of  the  war,  and  countless  contributions 
have  been  given  to  the  history  of  that  conflict  from 
every  shade  of  conviction  that  survived  it,  McClellan' s 
ability  as  a  military  commander,  and  the  correctness  of 
Lincoln's  action  in  calling  him  to  command  and  in  dis 
missing  him  from  command,  are  as  earnestly  disputed 
to-day  as  they  were  in  the  white  heat  of  the  personal 
and  political  conflicts  of  the  time.  Notwithstanding 
the  bitter  partisan  assaults  which  have  been  made  upon 
McClellan  in  the  violence  of  party  struggles,  at  times 
impugning  his  skill,  his  courage,  and  his  patriotism,  it 
is  safe  to  say  that  fair-minded  men  of  every  political 
faith  now  testify  to  the  absolute  purity  of  his  patriotism, 
to  his  exceptional  skill  as  a  military  organizer,  and  to 
his  courage  as  a  commander.  I  knew  McClellan  well, 
and  I  believe  that  no  reasonably  just  man  could  have 
known  him  without  yielding  to  him  the  highest  measure 

of  personal  respect.     He  was  one  of  the  most  excellent 
208 


(Photo  by  Gutekunst,  Philadelphia.) 

GENERAL,  GEORGE  B.    M'CI<EI<I,AN,    1862. 


210  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

and  lovable  characters  I  have  ever  met,  and  that  he  was 
patriotic  in  everything  that  he  did,  however  he  may 
have  erred,  and  that  he  would  have  given  his  life  as  a 
sacrifice  to  his  army  or  his  country  had  duty  required 
it,  will  not  be  doubted  within  the  circle  of  his  personal 
associations.  I  saw  him  frequently  after  he  came  to 
Washington  heralded  as  the  u  Young  Napoleon,"  to 
perform  the  herculean  task  of  organizing  the  best  army 
that  ever  was  organized  in  any  country  within  the  same 
period  of  time.  I  saw  him  when  he  started  upon  his 
Peninsula  campaign  with  the  hope  of  victory  beaming 
from  his  bright  young  face,  and  I  stood  close  by  his  side 
most  of  the  day  when  he  fought  his  last  battle  at  An- 
tietam.  Only  a  few  months  thereafter  he  was  finally 
relieved  from  his  command,  and  his  military  career 
ended  on  November  5,  1862,  when,  by  order  of  the  Pres 
ident,  he  transferred  his  army  to  General  Burnside  and 
went  to  Trenton,  New  Jersey,  "for  further  orders." 
The  ( '  further  orders ' '  never  came  until  Presidential 
election  day,  1864,  when  McClellan  resigned  his  com 
mission  as  major-general  in  the  army  and  Sheridan  was 
appointed  to  his  place. 

Both  Lincoln  and  McClellan  now  live  only  in  history, 
and  history  will  judge  them  by  their  achievements  as  it 
has  judged  all  mankind.  Lincoln  was  a  successful  Pres 
ident,  and,  like  the  great  Roman  Germanicus,  ' '  fortunate 
in  the  opportunity  of  his  death."  McClellan  was  an  un 
successful  general  and  a  defeated  politician.  Such  will 
be  the  imperishable  records  of  history  as  to  these  two 
men;  but  even  the  next  generation  will  see  continued 
disputation  as  to  McClellan' s  capabilities  as  a  com 
mander,  and  Lincoln  will  be  censured  alike  for  having 
maintained  and  supported  McClellan  as  a  military 
leader,  and  for  having  failed  to  appreciate  and  support 
him  after  having  called  him  to  responsible  command. 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN.  211 

None  the  less,  however,  will  be  the  irrevocable  judgment 
of  history  that  Lincoln  succeeded  and  that  McClellan 
failed.  But  why  did  McClellan  fail  as  a  military  com 
mander?  The  answer  of  his  devoted  partisans  is  that 
he  was  deliberately  hindered  and  embarrassed  in  every 
military  movement,  and  that  he  would  have  achieved 
great  success  had  he  been  supported  as  the  more  success 
ful  generals  later  in  the  war  were  supported  by  the  gov 
ernment.  To  this  comes  the  response  from  the  friends 
of  Lincoln  that  he  earnestly  and  heartily  seconded 
McClellan  to  the  utmost  of  his  resources;  that  he  long 
confided  in  him  when  the  confidence  of  his  friends  had 
been  greatly  shattered ;  that  he  reappointed  him  to  com 
mand  against  his  Cabinet  and  against  the  general  senti 
ment  of  his  party  leaders;  and  that  whatever  failures 
were  suffered  by  McClellan  were  the  result  of  his  own 
incompetency  or  of  the  inability  of  the  government  to 
meet  his  wants. 

It  is  unjust  to  McClellan  to  judge  him  by  the  same 
standard  that  is  applied  to  the  successful  generals  who 
succeeded  him.  I  believe  that  it  was  McClellan' s  great 
est  misfortune  that  he  was  suddenly  called  to  the  daz 
zling  position  of  Commander-in-Chief  when  he  was  a 
comparative  novice  in  great  war  operations  and  without 
the  experience  necessary  to  make  a  great  commander. 
I  believe  that  the  23d  of  April,  1861,  was  the  fateful  day 
that  dated  the  beginning  of  McClellan's  misfortunes. 
He  was  then  in  Cincinnati,  in  charge  of  one  of  the 
railroads  connected  with  that  city.  Pennsylvania  troops 
were  then  being  organized  by  Governor  Curtin,  and  he 
was  in  search  of  a  Pennsylvanian  of  military  education 
and  attainments  to  be  placed  in  command.  He  first 
offered  the  position  to  McClellan,  who  promptly  arranged 
his  business  to  go  to  Harrisburg  in  person  with  the  view 
of  accepting  it,  By  special  request  he  stopped  at  Colum- 


212  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

bus  on  his  way  to  Harrisburg  to  confer  with  Governor 
Dennison  on  some  military  problems  which  were  vexing 
the  Governor  of  Ohio.  He  expected  to  remain  at  Colum 
bus  only  a  few  hours  and  then  proceed  to  Pennsylvania. 
While  in  conference  with  Governor  Dennison  he  was 
tendered  the  commission  of  major-general  commanding 
the  volunteers  of  Ohio,  although  ineligible  because  of 
his  want  of  residence  in  that  State.  The  difficulty  was 
obviated  by  both  branches  of  the  Legislature  passing,  in 
a  few  hours,  a  bill  making  him  eligible,  and  on  the  same 
23d  of  April,  1861,  he  was  commissioned  as  major-gen 
eral  and  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Ohio  State 
troops.  This  led  to  his  skirmishes  in  West  Virginia, 
which  in  that  day  were  magnified  into  great  battles  and 
great  victories,  and,  when  it  became  necessary  to  select 
a  successor  to  Scott  as  Commander-in- Chief,  McClellan 
was  the  only  general  whose  victories  had  attracted  the 
attention  of  the  nation.  He  was  thus  called  to  the  re 
sponsible  position  of  Commander-in-Chief  when  a  little 
over  thirty  years  of  age,  with  no  experience  in  war  be 
yond  a  brief  campaign  in  Mexico,  and  without  the  train 
ing  necessary  to  enable  him  to  comprehend  the  most 
colossal  war  of  modern  times.  Had  he  accepted  the 
command  of  the  Pennsylvania  troops  he  would  doubtless 
have  made  them  the  best  disciplined  and  most  effective 
division  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  would  have  fought 
them  wisely  and  gallantly  in  every  conflict,  and  would 
have  won  distinction  as  a  commander  with  the  experi 
ence  that  would  have  enabled  him  to  maintain  it.  In 
stead  of  floundering  along  in  untrodden  paths  and  com 
mitting  errors  for  others  to  profit  by,  he  would  have  seen 
others  charged  with  the  gravest  responsibility  that  could 
be  assigned  to  any  military  man,  would  have  seen  them 
blunder  and  fall,  and  would  have  been  ripened,  by  his 
own  experience  and  by  the  misfortunes  of  his  superiors, 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAM.  213 

for  the  command  that  he  won  so  suddenly  and  twice  lost 
by  order  of  a  President  who  sincerely  desired  to  be 
McClellan's  friend  and  to  give  him  success. 

McClellan's  fundamental  error,  and  the  one  that  I  be 
lieve  was  the  fountain  of  most,  if  not  all,  his  misfortunes, 
was -in  his  assumption  not  only  that  Lincoln  and  the 
government  generally  were  unfriendly  to  him  when  he 
started  out  on  his  spring  campaign  of  1862,  but  that  they 
deliberately  conspired  to  prevent  him  from  achieving 
military  success.*  This  was  a  fatal  error,  and  it  was 
certainly  most  unjust  to  Lincoln.  If  McClellan  really 
believed  that  the  government  had  predetermined  his 
military  failure  or  if  he  seriously  doubted  its  fidelity, 
it  exhibited  moral  cowardice  on  his  part  to  march  an 
army  into  hopeless  battle.  He  might  have  believed  the 
President,  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  the  administration 
generally  to  have  been  unfriendly  to  him,  and  yet,  rely 
ing  upon  his  ability  to  win  their  confidence  by  winning 
victory,  he  could  have  retained  his  command  with  just 
ice  to  himself  and  to  the  country;  but  his  own  statements 
show  that  he  believed  then  that  he  would  not  be  permit 
ted  to  win  a  victory  or  to  capture  Richmond;  and,  thus 
believing,  he  owed  it  to  himself,  to  the  great  army  he 
had  organized  as  none  other  could  have  organized  it,  and 
to  the  country  to  whose  cause  he  was  undoubtedly  loyal, 
to  resign  the  command  and  put  the  responsibility  upon 

*  Don't  worry  about  the*  wretches  in  Washington.  They  have 
done  nearly  their  worst,  and  can't  do  much  more.  I  am  sure  that 
I  will  win  in  the  end,  in  spite  of  all  their  rascality.  History  will 
present  a  sad  record  of  these  traitors,  who  are  willing  to  sacrifice 
the  country  and  its  army  for  personal  spite  and  personal  aims. 
The  people  will  soon  understand  the  whole  matter. — Gen.  McClel 
lan's  Letter  to  his  Wife,  dated  Yorktown,  April  n,  1862,  in  McClel 
lan's  Own  Story,  page  310. 


LINCOLN  AND  MEN  of  WAR-TIMES. 

those  he  believed  to  be  conspirators  for  the  destruction 
of  himself  and  his  army. 

McClellan  has  not  left  this  question  open  to  dispute. 
In  McClelland  Own  Story,  written  by  himself,  on  page 
150,  he  says:  "They  (the  President  and  others)  deter 
mined  to  ruin  me  in  any  event  and  by  any  me'ans. 
First,  by  endeavoring  to  force  me  into  premature  move 
ments,  knowing  that  a  failure  would  end  my  military 
career;  afterward  by  withholding  the  means  necessary  to 
achieve  success."  On  the  same  page  he  says:  "They 
determined  that  I  should  not  succeed,  and  carried  out 
their  determinations  only  too  well,  at  a  fearful  sacrifice 
of  blood,  time,  and  treasure. "  On  page  151  in  the  same 
book  McClellan  says:  "From  the  light  that  has  since 
been  thrown  on  Stanton's  character  I  am  satisfied  that 
from  an  early  day  he  was  in  this  treasonable  conspir 
acy."  *  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  McClellan  started  on 

*  From  the  light  that  has  since  been  thrown  on  Stanton's  cha 
racter  I  am  satisfied  that  from  an  early  date  he  was  in  this  trea 
sonable  conspiracy,  and  that  his  course  in  ingratiating  himself 
with  me,  and  pretending  to  be  my  friend  before  he  was  in  office, 
was  only  a  part  of  his  long  system  of  treachery.  .  .  . 

I  had  never  seen  Mr.  Stanton,  and  probably  had  not  even  heard 
of  him,  before  reaching  Washington  in  1861.  Not  many  weeks 
after  arriving  I  was  introduced  to  him  as  a  safe  adviser  on  legal 
points.  From  that  moment  he  did  his  best  to  ingratiate  himself 
with  me,  and  professed  the  warmest  friendship  and  devotion.  I 
had  no  reason  to  suspect  his  sincerity,  and  therefore  believed  him 
to  be  what  he  professed.  The  most  disagreeable  thing  about  him 
was  the  extreme  virulence  with  which  he  abused  the  President* 
the  administration,  and  the  Republican  party.  He  carried  this 
to  such  an  extent  that  I  was  often  shocked  by  it. 

He  never  spoke  of  the  President  in  any  other  way  than  as  the 
"original  gorilla,"  and  often  said  that  Du  Chaillu  was  a  fool  to 
wander  all  the  way  to  Africa  in  search  of  what  he  could  so  easily 
have  found  at  Springfield,  Illinois.  Nothing  could  be  more  bitter 
than  his  words  and  manner  always  were  when  speaking  of  the 


LINCOLN  AND   McCLELLAN.  215 

his  Peninsula  campaign  not  merely  believing  that  the 
President  and  the  administration  generally  were  un 
friendly  to  him,  but  really  believing  that  they  had 
formed  a  treasonable  conspiracy  by  which  his  military 
movements  should  be  made  disastrous  and  the  blood  of 
thousands  of  brave  soldiers  sacrificed  to  accomplish 
McClellan' s  overthrow.  This  is  a  monstrous  accusation 
against  Lincoln,  and  but  for  the  fact  that  McClellan  pre 
sents  it  so  clearly  in  language  from  his  own  pen  that 
none  can  mistake,  it  would  seem  incredible  that  he  could 
have  believed  such  a  conspiracy  to  exist,  and  yet  led  a 
great  army  to  defeat  that  treachery  on  the  part  of  the 
government  would  make  inevitable.  In  this  I  am  sure 
that  McClellan  does  both  himself  and  Lincoln  the  gravest 
injustice.  Lincoln  was  the  one  man  of  all  who  was  ut 
terly  incapable  of  deliberately  hindering  military  success 
under  any  circumstances.  There  were  those  who  be 
lieved  it  best  to  protract  the  war  in  order  to  accomplish 
the  overthrow  of  slavery,  but  Lincoln  was  not  of  that 
number.  On  the  contrary,  he  offended  many  when  he 
distinctly  declared  in  his  letter  to  Greeley,  August  22, 
1862:  "  If  there  be  those  who  would  not  save  the  Union 
unless  they  could  at  the  same  time  destroy  slavery,  I  do 
not  agree  with  them.  My  paramount  object  in  this 
struggle  is  to  save  the  Union,  and  it  is  not  either  to  save 
or  to  destroy  slavery.  If  I  could  save  the  Union  without 
freeing  any  slave  I  would  do  it,  and  if  I  could  save  it  by 

administration  and  the  Republican  party.  He  never  gave  them 
credit  for  honesty  or  patriotism,  and  very  seldom  for  any  ability. 
At  some  time  during  the  autumn  of  1861,  Secretary  Cameron 
made  quite  an  abolition  speech  to  some  newly-arrived  regiment. 
Next  day  Stanton  urged  me  to  arrest  him  for  inciting  to  insub 
ordination.  He  often  advocated  the  propriety  of  my  seizing  the 
government  and  taking  affairs  into  my  own  hands. — Gen.  McClel 
lan  in  McClellan's  Own  Story,  pages  151,  152. 


2l6  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

freeing  all  the  slaves  I  would  do  it,  and  if  I  could  save 
it  by  freeing  some  and  leaving  others  alone  I  would  also 
do  that. ' '  What  Lincoln  wanted  was  the  speediest  over 
throw  of  the  rebellion  and  the  restoration  of  the  Union, 
with  or  without  the  destruction  of  slavery;  and  the  as 
sumption  that  he  could  have  been  capable  of  such  a 
treasonable  conspiracy  as  to  deliberately  send  a  general 
to  the  field  with  a  great  army  solely  to  have  that  army 
sacrificed  and  its  commander  dishonored  is  at  war  with 
every  attribute  of  Lincoln's  character.  There  never  was 
the  blood  of  a  soldier  shed  in  battle  that  did  not  bring 
grief  to  the  heart  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  and  there  never 
was  a  disaster  of  the  Union  troops  that  did  not  shadow 
his  face  with  sorrow,  no  matter  whether  he  loved  or  dis 
trusted  the  commander.  I  am  quite  sure  that  the  two 
men  of  all  the  nation  who  most  desired  McClellan' s 
success  in  the  field  were  Lincoln  and  McClellan  them 
selves. 

I  have  said  that  it  is  unjust  to  McClellan  to  compare 
his  achievements  in  the  first  great  campaign  of  the  war 
with  the  achievements  of  Grant  and  Sherman  in  the 
later  campaigns  which  culminated  in  the  overthrow  of 
the  rebellion.  All  the  generals  of  the  early  part  of  the 
war  were  making  object-lessons  to  guide  themselves  and 
those  who  succeeded  them  in  later  conflicts.  In  this 
work  the  many  failed,  and  many  of  the  most  promising 
among  them.  The  few  succeeded  and  made  their  names 
immortal.  One  of  the  greatest  wars  of  history  produced 
but  one  Grant  and  one  Lee;  but  one  Joe  Johnston  and 
one  Tecumseh  Sherman;  but  one  Phil  Sheridan  and  one 
Stonewall  Jackson.  Scores  of  generals  on  both  sides 
had  opportunities  of  winning  the  laurels  of  these  great 
chieftains,  but  none  was  equal  to  the  task.  It  is  no  re 
proach  to  McClellan  to  say  that  Grant  fought  few  bat 
tles  which  McClellan  would  have  fought  under  precisely 


LINCOLN  AND   McCLELLAN.  217 

similar  circumstances.  McClellan  was  an  organizer,  a 
disciplinarian,  and  the  best  defensive  general  in  all  trie 
armies  of  the  late  war.  He  would  have  made  a  greater 
Confederate  leader  than  L,ee  himself.  He  would  never 
have  made  the  exhaustive  and  fruitless  campaigns  of 
the  second  Bull  Run  and  Antietam  which  cost  Lee  one- 
fourth  of  his  army  when  he  had  feeble  means  to  replace 
his  losses.  He  never  would  have  made  an  aggressive 
campaign  to  Gettysburg  when  the  resources  of  the  Con 
federacy  were  so  nearly  exhausted,  and  Pickett's  charge 
would  never  have  been  dreamed  of  by  McClellan.  He 
was  the  greatest  organizer  and  defensive  officer  of  the 
age,  but  the  Union  cause  demanded  swift  and  terrible 
blows  and  countless  sacrifices.  It  had  to  fight  on  fields 
chosen  by  the  enemy.  It  had  often  to  give  two  men  for 
one  in  the  death-lists  of  the  struggles,  but  it  had  bound 
less  resources  to  fill  the  shattered  ranks.  The  most  ag 
gressive  warfare  was  certain  to  bring  the  speediest  vic 
tory  and  with  the  least  sacrifice  of  life  and  treasure  in 
the  end.  Grant  met  this  want.  He  was  the  great  ag 
gressive  general  of  the  war.  He  always  fought  when  he 
should  have  fought,  and  sometimes  fought  when  it  would 
have  been  wiser  to  have  refrained.  Had  he  been  a  South 
ern  general,  he  would  have  been  an  utter  failure,  for  the 
Southern  general  had  to  study  how  to  husband  his  re 
sources;  how  to  protect  the  life  of  every  soldier;  how  to 
fight  only  when  a  thousand  men  could  withstand  two 
thousand;  and  to  that  system  of  warfare  Grant  was  an 
entire  stranger.  He  was  the  embodiment  of  aggressive 
warfare;  McClellan  was  the  embodiment  of  defensive 
warfare,  and  McClellan  was  as  great  as'  Grant  in  his  line, 
and  with  no  greater  limitations  upon  his  military  genius. 
Grant  fought  one  defensive  battle  at  Shiloh  and  lost 
it  and  lost  his  command.  McClellan  fought  only  one 
pitched  battle  as  the  aggressor  at  Antietam,  and  then  he 


218  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

was  strategically  defensive,  while  tactically  aggressive, 
but  his  military  genius  shone  resplendent  in  his  de 
fensive  battles  when  retreating  to  the  James  River.* 
Thus  a  condition  confronted  McClellan  to  which  his 
great  military  genius  and  attainments  were  not  best 
adapted,  and  Grant's  star  rose  and  brightened  as 
McClellan' s  faded,  because  Grant  possessed,  in  the  full 
est  measure,  the  qualities  needed  to  win  peace  and  re 
store  the  Republic. 

No  man  ever  commanded  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
for  whom  the  soldiers  had  so  much  affection  as  they  had 
for  McClellan.  They  knew  that  he  was  a  soldier  and  a 
great  soldier.  They  knew  that  he  would  never  put 
them  into  action  unless  good  generalship  dictated  it. 
They  knew  they  were  safe  from  wanton  sacrifice  while 
under  his  command.  They  knew  that  he  valued  the 
life  of  every  man  with  the  tenderness  of  a  parent,  and 
they  loved  him  because  they  revered  and  trusted  him. 
Lincoln  fully  appreciated  and  greatly  valued  the  devo 
tion  of  the  army  to  McClellan.  He  believed  that  no 
other  general  could  have  so  quickly  organized  and  dis 
ciplined  a  great  army  out  of  entirely  raw  materials  as 
McClellan  had  done,  and  he  never  gave  up  faith  in 
McClellan  until  he  felt  that  he  could  no  longer  trust  the 
destiny  of  the  war  to  his  direction.  He  was  many  times 

*  The  movement  from  Washington  into  Maryland,  which  cul 
minated  in  the  battles  of  South  Mountain  and  Antietam,  was  not 
a  part  of  an  offensive  campaign,  with  the  object  of  the  invasion 
of  the  enemy's  territory  and  an  attack  upon  his  capital,  but  was 
defensive  in  its  purposes,  although  offensive  in  its  character,  and 
would  be  technically  called  a  "defensive-offensive  campaign." 
It  was  undertaken  at  a  time  when  our  army  had  experienced 
severe  defeats,  and  its  object  was  to  preserve  the  national  capital 
and  Baltimore,  to  protect  Pennsylvania  from  invasion,  and  to 
drive  the  enemy  out  of  Maryland. — Gen.  McClellan  in  McClellan' s 
Own  Story,  page  642. 


LINCOLN  AND   McCLELLAN.  219 

justly  fretted  at  McClellan's  complaints  about  military 
matters,  at  his  obtrusive  criticism  about  political  mat 
ters,  and  especially  at  his  insulting  declaration  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  in  a  letter  dated  at  army  headquarters 
on  the  Peninsula,  June  28,  1862,  just  after  his  retreat  to 
the  James  River,  in  which  he  said:  u  If  I  save  this  army 
now,  I  tell  you  plainly  that  I  owe  no  thanks  to  you  or  to 
any  other  person  in  Washington.  You  have  done  your 
best  to  sacrifice  this  army."  This  letter,  although  ad 
dressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  distinctly  embraced  the 
President  in  the  grave  charge  of  conspiracy  to  defeat 
McClellan's  army  and  sacrifice  thousands  of  the  lives  of 
his  soldiers.  None  but  a  man  of  Lincoln's  exceptional 
forbearance  and  patience  would  have  tolerated  McClel- 
lan  in  command  for  a  day  after  such  a  declaration,  writ 
ten  from  the  headquarters  of  a  defeated  army,  but  Lin 
coln  neither  dismissed  nor  reproached  him,  nor,  as  far  as 
I  can  learn,  did  he  ever  allude  to  it. 

Ten  days  after  the  offensive  and  insubordinate  letter 
was  written  Lincoln  visited  McClellan  at  his  headquar 
ters  on  the  James  River.  While  Lincoln  was  there 
McClellan  personally  handed  him  a  letter  dated  July  7, 
1862,  that  was  a  caustic  criticism  of  the  political  and 
military  policy  of  the  administration,  and  assumed  to 
define  not  only  the  military  action  of  the  government, 
but  the  civil  and  political  policy  of  the  government  on 
all  important  questions  relating  to  the  war.  McClellan 
himself  records  the  fact  that  Lincoln  read  the  letter  in 
McClellan's  presence  without  comment,  and  that  he 
never  alluded  to  the  subject  again.  McClellan  vigor 
ously  protested  against  the  withdrawal  of  the  army  from 
the  Peninsula,  but  the  order  was  peremptory,  and  he 
obeyed  it  with  obvious  reluctance.  His  personal  feeling 
toward  Lincoln  and  the  administration  is  clearly  exhib 
ited  in  a  letter  to  his  wife  written  on  the  3ist  of  August 


220  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF    WAR-TIMES. 

and  published  in  McClellarf  s  Oivn  Story,  p.  532.  Speak 
ing  of  Washington,  he  says:  u  As  a  matter  of  self-respect 
I  cannot  go  there."  On  the  ist  of  September,  however, 
he  was  called  to  Washington  and  given  a  verbal  order 
by  General  Halleck,  then  Commander-in-Chief,  to  take 
charge  of  the  defenses  of  Washington.  On  the  follow 
ing  morning  Lincoln  and  Halleck  called  on  General 
McClellan  at  his  house  and  asked  him  to  take  command. 
McClellan  states  that  Lincoln  asked  him  as  a  favor  to  the 
President  to  "resume  command  and  do  the  best  that 
could  be  done."  The  same  day  an  order  was  issued 
from  the  War  Department  by  Halleck  stating  that  "  Ma 
jor-General  McClellan  will  have  command  of  the  fortifi 
cations  of  Washington  and  all  the  troops  for  the  defense 
of  the  capital."  The  manner  of  the  restoiation  of 
McClellan  to  command  has  given  rise  to  latitudinous 
dispute,  but  the  short  story  is  that  most  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  had  been  put  under  command  of  General 
Pope  in  his  disastrous  battles  of  the  second  Bull  Run 
campaign,  and  both  the  armies  of  McClellan  and  Pope 
were  compelled  to  retreat  into  the  Washington  defenses 
in  a  very  demoralized  condition. 

No  man  better  understood  McClellan' s  value  as  an 
organizer  and  as  a  defensive  commander  than  Lincoln, 
and  he  solved  the  problem  himself  by  calling  McClellan 
to  the  new  command  because  he  believed  the  capital  to 
be  in  danger  and  McClellan  the  best  man  to  protect  it. 
If  he  ever  consulted  any  one  on  the  subject,  the  fact  has 
never  been  given  to  the  public  in  any  authentic  form. 
Had  he  consulted  his  Cabinet,  it  would  have  been  next 
to  unanimous  against  giving  McClellan  any  command 
whatever,  and  the  administration  leaders  in  both  branches 
of  Congress  would  also  have  been  nearly  unanimous  in 
demanding  McClellan' s  dismissal  from  command.  Lin 
coln  acted  in  this  case,  as  was  his  custom  in  all  severe 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN.  221 

trials,  on  his  own  personal  responsibility,  and  Lincoln, 
and  Lincoln  alone,  is  responsible  for  calling  McClellan 
to  command  the  defenses  of  Washington  and  for  per 
mitting  McClellan,  under  that  assignment,  to  take  the 
field  for  the  Antietam  campaign  without  any  special 
orders  from  the  government.  The  assumption  that  Lin 
coln  simply  consulted  his  fears  in  restoring  McClellan  to 
command  is  an  absurdity.  There  were  twenty  generals 
in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  in  Pope's  army  who 
could  have  taken  command  of  the  complete  defenses  of 
Washington,  constructed  under  McClellan' s  faultless  en 
gineering  skill,  and  protected  the  capital  against  double 
the  number  of  men  Lee  had  in  his  entire  army.  That 
McClellan  handled  the  demoralized  army  better  than  any 
other  could  have  done  I  do  not  doubt,  but  that  he  was  a 
necessity  to  save  the  capital  is  not  to  be  considered  for 
a  moment.  It  is  obvious  also  that  Lincoln  believed 
McClellan  to  be  the  best  man  to  command  the  army  in 
the  campaign  in  pursuit  of  Lee,  but  he  was  prudent 
enough  to  avoid  any  specific  order  to  McClellan  assign 
ing  him  to  the  command.  He  put  McClellan  in  position 
to  take  the  command  to  move  against  Lee,  and  McClel 
lan,  always  obedient  to  what  he  believed  to  be  his  duty, 
availed  himself  of  it  and  fought  the  battle  of  Antietam. 
So  far  from  Lincoln  being  unfriendly  to  McClellan 
when  he  started  on  his  spring  campaign  of  1862,  there 
is  the  strongest  evidence  in  support  of  the  belief  that 
Lincoln  hoped  for  McClellan' s  success  and  earnestly  de 
sired  him  to  win  his  way  back  as  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  armies.  It  was  on  March  n,  1862,  that  Lincoln 
relieved  McClellan  from  his  position  of  Commander-in- 
Chief  and  limited  him  to  the  command  of  his  own  im 
mediate  army,  but  no  Commander-in-Chief  was  ap 
pointed  until  July  n,  1862.  Had  Lincoln  intended  that 
McClellan  should  never  return  to  the  command  of  all  the 


222  LINCOLN  AND  MEN   OF   WAR-TIMES. 

armies,  lie  certainly  would  have  appointed  Halleck  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  before  the  nth  of  July.  It  is  known 
that  General  Scott,  when  he  retired  from  the  command, 
desired  the  appointment  of  Halleck  as  his  successor,  and 
McClellan  himself  was  in  doubt  for  some  weeks  whether 
he  or  Halleck  would  be  called  to  the  supreme  command. 
After  McClellan,  Halleck  was  the  one  man  to  whom  Lin 
coln  turned  as  the  most  competent  for  Commander-in- 
Chief,  but  he  delayed  rilling  the  position  not  only  until 
after  the  disastrous  close  of  the  Peninsula  campaign,  but 
for  two  weeks  after  McClellan' s  insulting  letter  to  Stan- 
ton  and  four  days  after  McClellan' s  offensive  political 
letter  handed  to  the  President  at  Harrison's  Landing.  It 
was  not  until  McClellan  had  proclaimed  himself  a  polit 
ical  as  well  as  a  military  general  on  the  yth  of  July, 
1862,  that  Lincoln  abandoned  all  hope  of  McClellan  ever 
regaining  the  position  of  Commander-in-Chief,  and  four 
days  thereafter  he  called  Halleck  to  that  task.  I  many 
times  heard  Lincoln  discuss  McClellan.  I  do  not  mean 
that  he  usually  or  even  at  any  time  expressed  fully  his 
views  as  to  McClellan,  but  I  have  reason  to  know  that 
with  all  the  troubles  he  had  with  him  about  moving  in 
the  early  part  of  1862  and  about  the  Peninsula  campaign, 
he  sincerely  and  earnestly  hoped  that  McClellan  would 
capture  Richmond  and  thus  reinstate  himself  as  Com 
mander-in-Chief  of  the  armies,  with  his  laurels  fairly 
won  and  his  ability  to  maintain  them  clearly  demon 
strated. 

If  Lincoln  had  been  capable  of  resentment  against 
McClellan  or  against  any  of  his  military  leaders,  many 
heads  would  have  fallen  that  were  saved  by  Lincoln's 
patience  and  generosity.  He  knew  that  McClellan  and 
more  than  one  other  general  had  at  times  listened  to  the 
whispers  of  a  military  dictatorship.  McClellan  states, 
on  page  152  of  his  own  book,  that  Stan  ton  once  urged 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN. 

him  to  arrest  Secretary  Cameron  for  inciting  to  insubor 
dination  by  making  an  Abolition  speech  to  a  newly- 
arrived  regiment,  and  he  adds:  "  He  (Stanton)  often  ad 
vocated  the  propriety  of  my  seizing  the  government  and 
taking  affairs  in  my  own  hands. "  In  a  letter  to  his  wife, 
dated  August  9,  1861,  also  published  in  his  own  volume, 
page  85,  McClellan  refers  to  the  fact  that  he  is  earnestly 
pressed  by  letter  after  letter  and  conversation  after  con 
versation  to  save  the  nation  by  assuming  the  powers  of 
the  President  as  dictator.  Writing  in  the  free  confidence 
of  a  devoted  husband  to  a  devoted  wife,  he  said:  "  As  I 
hope  one  day  to  be  united  with  you  for  ever  in  heaven  I 
have  no  such  aspiration.  I  would  cheerfully  take  the 
dictatorship  and  agree  to  lay  down  my  life  when  the 
country  is  saved. ' '  Had  Lincoln  been  jealous  of  McClel 
lan' s  power,  he  had  ample  opportunity  to  relieve  him 
from  command  long  before  he  did,  but  he  never  feared 
those  who  prattled  about  the  dictatorship,  although  well 
informed  of  the  many,  including  some  prominent  gen 
erals,  who  had  advised  it.  His  generosity  to  military 
men  who  committed  such  follies  is  clearly  exhibited  in 
his  letter  of  January  26,  1863,  to  General  Hooker,  notify 
ing  him  of  his  assignment  to  the  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  Hooker  was  one  of  those  who  had  be 
lieved  in  a  military  dictatorship,  and  Lincoln  believed 
that  Hooker  had  not  given  cordial  support  to  General 
Burnside  when  he  was  in  command  of  the  army.  To 
use  Lincoln's  own  plain  language,  he  told  Hooker  that 
he  had  done  ' '  a  great  wrong  to  the  country  and  to  a 
most  meritorious  and  honorable  brother-officer."  He 
then  said  to  Hooker:  "I  have  heard,  in  such  a  way  as 
to  believe  it,  of  your  recently  saying  that  both  the  army 
and  the  government  needed  a  dictator.  Of  course  it  was 
not  for  this,  but  in  spite  of  it,  that  I  have  given  you  the 
command.  Only  those  generals  who  gain  success  can  be 


224  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

dictators.  What  I  now  ask  of  you  is  military  success, 
and  I  will  risk  the  dictatorship. ' '  Thus  did  Lincoln  as 
sign  Hooker  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  when  he  knew  that  Hooker  had  been  guilty  of  the 
failure  to  support  his  commanding  officer  in  important 
military  movements,  and  that  he  had  advised  a  dictator 
to  usurp  the  prerogatives  of  the  President.  He  believed 
McClellan  to  be  in  political  sympathy  with  the  men  who 
were  most  implacably  hostile  to  his  administration,  but 
he  was  sagacious  enough  to  know  that  military  success 
under  any  general  of  his  appointment  would  give  polit 
ical  success  to  the  administration;  and  I  am  certain  that 
he  would  have  preferred  McClellan  as  the  conqueror  of 
Richmond  in  1862,  and  would  gladly  have  restored  him 
to  the  command  of  all  the  armies,  knowing  that  the  vic 
tory  would  have  been  as  much  the  victory  of  Lincoln  as 
the  victory  of  McClellan. 

I  saw  Lincoln  many  times  during  the  campaign  of 
1864,  when  McClellan  was  his  competitor  for  the  Presi 
dency.  I  never  heard  him  speak  of  McClellan  in  any 
other  than  terms  of  the  highest  personal  respect  and 
kindness.  He  never  doubted  McClellan' s  loyalty  to  the 
government  or  to  the  cause  that  called  him  to  high  mili 
tary  command.  But  he  did  believe,  until  after  the  cap 
ture  of  Atlanta  by  Sherman  and  Sheridan's  victories  in 
the  Valley,  which  settled  the  political  campaign  in  favor 
of  Lincoln,  that  McClellan  was  quite  likely  to  be  elected 
over  him,  and  that  if  elected,  with  all  his  patriotism  and 
loyalty  to  the  Union,  he  would  be  powerless  to  prevent 
the  dissolution  of  the  Republic.  The  convention  that 
nominated  McClellan  for  President  met  only  a  few  days 
before  Sherman  captured  Atlanta.  There  had  been  no 
important  victories  for  any  of  the  Union  armies  until 
that  time  during  the  year  1864,  and  there  had  been  great 
sacrifice  of  life  in  both  Sherman's  and  Grant's  campaigns. 


LINCOLN  AND   McCLELLAN.  225 

The  convention  that  nominated  McClellan  voiced  the 
sentiment  that  regarded  the  war  as  a  failure,  and  it  was 
so  declared  in  the  platform  in  the  clearest  terms,  with 
the  call  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities  because  of  the  fail 
ure  to  obtain  peace  by  force  of  arms.  Lincoln  believed 
that  McClellan,  if  elected,  would  be  coerced  into  a  pol 
icy  of  humiliating  peace  and  the  loss  of  all  the  great 
issues  for  which  so  much  blood  and  treasure  had  been 
sacrified.  But  that  he  ever  cherished  the  semblance  of 
resentment  against  McClellan,  even  when  McClellan  was 
offensively  insubordinate  as  a  military  man  and  equally 
offensive  in  assuming  to  define  the  political  policy  of  the 
administration,  I  do  not  for  a  moment  believe.  Had 
McClellan  understood  Lincoln  half  as  well  as  Lincoln 
understood  McClellan,  there  never  would  have  been 
serious  discord  between  them.  It  was  the  creation  of 
what  I  believe  to  be  McClellan' s  entirely  unwarranted 
distrust  of  Lincoln's  personal  and  official  fidelity  to  him 
as  a  military  commander,  and  that  single  error  became  a 
seething  cauldron  of  woe  to  both  of  them  and  a  consum 
ing  misfortune  to  McClellan. 

Lincoln's  position  in  history  is  secure,  but  it  is  doubt 
ful  whether  the  impartial  historian  of  the  future  will  give 
McClellan  his  full  measure  of  justice.  History  records 
results — only  achievements  and  failures.  It  will  tell  of 
McClellan  that  he  was  an  unsuccessful  military  chieftain, 
and  that  on  his  own  record  in  an  appeal  to  the  country 
he  was  the  most  overwhelmingly  defeated  candidate  for 
President  in  the  history  of  the  present  great  parties  of 
the  nation;  but  no  truthful  historian  can  fail  to  say  of 
him  that  he  was  one  of  the  great  military  geniuses  of  his 
day,  one  of  the  purest  of  patriots,  and  one  of  the  most 
loyal  of  men  in  the  great  battle  for  the  preservation  of 
the  Union. 
15 


(Photo  by  Sarony,  New  York  ) 

GENERAL  WILLIAM   T.    SHERMAN,    1890. 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN. 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  and  William  T.  Sherman  had 
£\-  never  met  until  Sherman  came  to  Washington  to 
visit  his  brother,  the  present  Senator  Sherman,  ten  days 
after  Lincoln's  inauguration.  Sherman's  mission  to  the 
capital  was  not  to  obtain  a  command.  He  had  resigned 
as  president  of  a  military  institute  in  Louisiana,  because, 
as  he  frankly  said  to  the  State  officials  who  controlled 
the  institution,  he  could  not  remain  and  owe  allegiance 
to  a  State  that  had  withdrawn  from  the  Union.  In  his 
letter  of  resignation,  dated  January  18,  1861,  he  said: 
' '  Should  Louisiana  withdraw  from  the  Federal  Union,  I 
prefer  to  maintain  my  allegiance  to  the  Constitution  as 
long  as  a  fragment  of  it  survives,  and  my  longer  stay 
here  would  be  a  wrong  in  every  sense  of  the  word." 
He  left  New  Orleans  about  the  ist  of  March  to  make  his 
home  in  the  North.  Like  Grant,  he  tendered  his  ser 
vices  to  the  government,  but,  again  like  Grant,  his  offer 
was  not  answered.  His  first  meeting  with  Lincoln  was 
in  company  with  his  Senator  brother  to  pay  a  brief  visit 
of  courtesy  to  the  President.  After  the  Senator  had 
transacted  some  political  business  with  Lincoln,  he 
turned  to  his  brother  and  said:  u  Mr.  President,  this  is 
my  brother,  Colonel  Sherman,  who  is  just  up  from  Lou 
isiana;  he  may  give  you  some  information  you  want." 
To  this  Lincoln  replied,  as  reported  by  Sherman  him 
self:  "Ah!  How  are  they  getting  along  down  there?" 

227 


228  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

Sherman  answered:  "  They  think  they  are  getting  along 
swimmingly;  they  are  prepared  for  war."  To  which 
Lincoln  responded:  "  Oh,  well,  I  guess  we'll  manage  to 
keep  house."  Sherman  records  in  his  Memoirs  that 
he  was  ' '  sadly  disappointed, ' '  and  that  he  ( '  broke  out 
on  John,  damning  the  politicians  generally,"  saying: 
"  You  have  got  things  in  a  hell  of  a  fix;  you  may  get 
them  out  as  best  you  can."  Sherman  then,  as  ever,  was 
ruggedly  honest  and  patriotic,  and  often  more  impressive 
than  elegant  in  his  manner  of  speech.  Some  old  St. 
L,ouis  friends  had  obtained  for  him  the  presidency  of  a 
street-railway  of  that  city  at  a  salary  of  #2500.  Speak 
ing  of  this  position,  he  says:  "This  suited  me  exactly,  and 
I  answered  Turner  that  I  would  accept  with  thanks. ' ' 

Before  Sherman  was  comfortably  installed  in  his  posi 
tion  as  street-railway  president,  Postmaster-General  Blair 
telegraphed  him,  on  the  6th  of  April,  asking  him  to 
accept  a  chief  clerkship  in  the  War  Department,  with 
the  assurance  that  he  would  be  made  Assistant  Secretary 
of  War  when  Congress  met.  Sherman  answered  with 
the  laconic  dispatch:  UI  cannot  accept."  In  a  letter 
written  at  the  same  time  to  Blair  he  says  that  after  his 
visit  to  Washington,  where  he  saw  no  chance  of  em 
ployment,  he  had  gone  to  St.  Louis,  accepted  an  official 
position  and  established  his  home,  and  that  he  was  not 
at  liberty  to  change.  He  added  that  he  was  thankful 
for  the  compliment,  and  that  he  wished  "the  adminis 
tration  all  success  in  its  almost  impossible  task  of  gov 
erning  this  distracted  and  anarchical  people."  A  few 
days  thereafter  General  Frank  Blair  called  on  Sherman 
and  said  that  he  was  authorized  to  select  a  brigadier-gen 
eral  to  command  the  Department  of  Missouri,  and  he  ten 
dered  the  position  to  Sherman,  who  declined  it,  and  Gen 
eral  L,yon  was  then  appointed.  Feeling,  however,  as  the 
clouds  of  war  darkened  upon  the  country,  that  his  ser- 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN.  2  29 

vices  might  be  needed,  on  the  8th  of  May  Sherman  ad 
dressed  a  formal  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  again 
tendering  his  services  to  the  government,  and  on  the 
i4th  of  the  same  month  he  was  appointed  colonel  of  the 
Thirteenth  regiment  of  regulars.  On  the  2oth  of  June 
he  reported  at  Washington  in  obedience  to  orders  from 
General  Scott,  who  assigned  him  to  inspection  duty;  and 
before  the  movement  was  made  to  Manassas,  Sherman 
was  ordered  to  the  command  of  a  brigade  of  Hunter's 
division,  and  in  that  position  was  in  the  first  battle  of 
the  war. 

Sherman  was  one  of  the  very  few  generals  who  seldom 
grieved  Lincoln.  While  he  was  one  of  the  most  volum 
inous  of  writers  on  every  phase  of  the  war  and  every 
question  arising  from  it,  he  never  assumed  to  be  wiser 
than  the  government,  and  he  never  committed  a  serious 
blunder.  He  had  the  most  profound  contempt  for  poli 
ticians  in  and  out  of  the  army,  and  for  political  methods 
generally,  and  his  bluntness  of  both  manner  and  expres 
sion  emphasized  his  views  and  purposes  so  that  none 
could  misunderstand  them.  Naturally  impulsive,  he 
often  felt  keenly  the  many  complications  which  sur 
rounded  all  great  generals,  and  he  spoke  and  wrote  with 
unusual  freedom,  but  always  within  the  clearest  lines  of 
military  subordination.  He  was  an  earnest,  ardent,  out 
spoken  patriot,  and  had  more  controversy  than  any  other 
general  with  the  single  exception  of  McClellan;  but  I 
doubt  whether  there  is  a  single  important  utterance  of 
Sherman's  during  the  four  long  years  of  war,  when  new 
and  grave  problems  had  to  be  met  and  solved  from  time 
to  time,  that  he  would  have  recalled  in  the  later  years 
of  his  life.  He  had  learned  to  cherish  the  most  pro 
found  respect  for  I/incoln,  although  they  never  met  after 
his  first  introduction  to  the  President  during  the  early 
period  of  the  war,  until  the  spring  of  1865  at  City  Point, 


230  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

after  Sherman  had  made  his  march  to  the  sea  and  his 
great  campaign  had  practically  ended  at  Raleigh,  North 
Carolina. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Lincoln's  earliest  impressions 
of  Sherman  were  quite  as  unfavorable  to  Sherman  as 
were  Sherman's  early  impressions  of  Lincoln.  It  was 
not  until  Sherman  had  been  assigned  to  Kentucky,  along 
with  General  Anderson,  that  he  attracted  the  attention 
of  the  country.  Along  with  a  number  of  others  he  had 
won  his  star  at  Bull  Run,  and  on  the  24th  of  August  he 
was  sent  with  Anderson  to  Louisville.  Anderson's  feeble 
health  soon  demanded  that  he  should  be  relieved,  and 
Sherman  was  thus  left  in  command.  The  position  of 
Kentucky  was  a  most  delicate  and  important  one.  Sher 
man  succeeded  to  the  command  on  the  8th  of  October, 
and  within  a  few  weeks  thereafter  it  was  whispered 
throughout  Washington  that  he  was  a  lunatic.  This 
belief  was  accepted  in  most  if  not  all  military  circles  at 
the  capital,  and  was  doubtless  shared  by  Lincoln  himself, 
as  in  little  more  than  two  months  after  Sherman  had  as 
sumed  command  in  Kentucky  he  was  ordered  to  report 
at  Benton  Barracks,  St.  Louis,  and  General  Buell  was 
assigned  as  his  successor.  The  attitude  of  Kentucky  at 
tracted  very  general  interest  throughout  the  country,  and 
the  repeated  changes  of  commanders  caused  great  solici 
tude.  I  remember  calling  on  Colonel  Scott,  Assistant 
Secretary  of  War,  on  the  day  that  the  announcement 
was  made  of  Sherman's  transfer  to  Missouri  and  Buell' s 
appointment  to  Kentucky,  and  asking  him  what  it 
meant.  Scott  answered:  "Sherman's  gone  in  the 
head;"  and  upon  inquiry  I  found  that  Scott  simply 
voiced  the  general  belief  of  those  who  should  have  been 
best  informed  on  the  subject.  Reports  were  published 
in  all  the  leading  newspapers  of  the  country  speaking 
of  Sherman  as  mentally  unbalanced,  and  it  naturally 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN.  231 

mortified  the  blunt,  straightforward  soldier  to  the  last 
degree.  General  Halleck,  in  a  letter  to  McClellan  ask 
ing  for  more  officers,  said:  UI  am  satisfied  that  General 
Sherman's  physical  and  mental  system  is  so  completely 
broken  by  labor  and  care  as  to  render  him,  for  the  pres 
ent,  unfit  for  duty.  Perhaps  a  few  weeks'  rest  may  re 
store  him."  But  it  is  only  just  to  Sherman  to  say  that 
the  chief  reason  for  the  military  authorities  in  Washing 
ton  assuming  that  he  was  a  lunatic  was  his  report  soon 
after  assuming  command  in  Kentucky,  stating  that  it 
would  require  an  army  of  60,000  men  to  hold  Kentucky 
and  200,000  men  to  open  the  Mississippi  and  conquer  the 
rebellion  in  the  South-west.  This  was  at  that  time  re 
garded  as  conclusive  evidence  of  his  insanity,  and  his 
mental  condition  was  a  matter  of  almost  daily  discussion 
in  the  public  journals,  with  Halstead's  Cincinnati  Com 
mercial,  published  in  Sherman's  own  State,  leading  the 
attack  against  his  mental  capacity. 

When  Secretary  Cameron  and  Adjutant-General 
Thomas  were  returning  from  their  investigation  of 
General  Fremont's  department,  soon  after  Sherman  had 
assumed  command  of  Kentucky,  Sherman  took  special 
measures  to  prevail  upon  Cameron  to  stop  over  in  Louis 
ville  and  personally  inquire  into  the  condition  of  that 
State.  Cameron  did  so,  and  had  a  confidential  confer 
ence  with  Sherman  at  the  Gait  House,  in  which  Sherman 
said  to  Cameron  that  for  the  purpose  of  defense  in  Ken 
tucky  he  should  have  60,000  men,  and  for  offensive 
movements  200,000  would  be  necessary.  Cameron's  an 
swer,  as  reported  by  Sherman  himself,  was:  u  Great  God! 
where  are  they  to  come  from?"  That  demand  of  Sher 
man's  convinced  Cameron  that  Sherman  was  mentally 
unbalanced,  and  on  his  return  to  Washington  he  united 
with  all  the  military  authorities  of  that  day  in  ridiculing 
Sherman's  demand.  Those  who  have  distinct  recollec- 


232  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

tions  of  the  war,  as  well  as  every  intelligent  reader  of  its 
history,  need  not  now  be  reminded  that  Sherman  was  the 
only  military  man  of  that  day  who  thoroughly  and  accu 
rately  appreciated  the  situation  in  the  South-west,  and 
that  his  original  estimate  of  the  forces  necessary  to  over 
throw  the  rebellion  in  that  section  of  the  country  is 
proved  to  have  been  substantially  correct.  Buell,  who 
succeeded  Sherman  in  command  of  Kentucky,  had 
nearly  60,000  men  when  he  was  ordered  to  Grant  at 
Shiloh,  and  fully  200,000  men  were  reapers  in  the  har 
vest  of  death  before  the  rebellion  was  conquered  in  the 
South-west  and  the  Father  of  Waters  again  ' '  went  un- 
vexed  to  the  sea." 

Sherman  was  not  permitted  to  take  the  field  until  after 
the  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  and  the  city 
of  Nashville.  From  December  23,  1861,  to  the  I3th  of 
February,  1862,  he  was  in  charge  of  the  St.  Louis  bar 
racks  as  military  instructor.  He  was  first  ordered  from 
St.  Louis  to  take  command  of  the  post  at  Paducah,  Ken 
tucky,  where  he  remained  until  the  loth  of  March,  when 
he  was  placed  in  command  of  a  division  and  ordered  to 
join  Grant  for  the  Shiloh  campaign.  It  will  be  remem 
bered  that  he  exhibited  great  skill  and  courage  as  a  gen 
eral  during  the  disastrous  first  day  at  Shiloh.  That  was 
the  first  action  in  which  Sherman  had  an  opportunity  to 
prove  his  ability  as  a  military  commander,  and  it  is  safe 
to  say  that  from  that  day  until  the  close  of  the  war  Grant 
regarded  him  as  the  best  lieutenant  in  his  entire  army. 
He  was  with  Grant  at  Vicksburg,  shared  Grant's  victory 
at  Missionary  Ridge,  and  when  the  Atlanta  campaign 
was  determined  upon  in  the  spring  of  1864  there  was  no 
question  in  military  circles  as  to  the  pre-eminent  fitness 
of  Sherman  to  take  the  command.  His  campaign  from 
Chattanooga  to  Atlanta  was  one  of  the  most  brilliant  of 
all  the  campaigns  of  the  war.  It  exhibited  the  most  ac- 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN.  23$ 

complished  military  strategy  coupled  with  trie  wisest  di 
rection  of  an  army  that  had  to  contend  with  an  enemy 
always  intrenched  and  to  fight  every  battle  under  the 
greatest  disadvantages.  Many  even  of  our  successful 
military  campaigns  have  been  severely  criticised,  but  I 
doubt  whether  any  intelligent  military  man  at  home  or 
abroad  has  ever  found  fault  with  Sherman's  generalship 
in  his  Atlanta  campaign.  With  all  his  natural  impetu 
osity  of  temper,  he  was  always  clear-headed  and  abun 
dant  in  caution  when  charged  with  the  command  of  an 
army.  In  his  march  to  Atlanta  he  was  passing  through 
a  country  that  was,  to  use  his  own  language,  ' '  one  vast 
fort, ' '  and  with  ' '  at  least  fifty  miles  of  connected  trenches 
with  abatis  and  finished  batteries. ' '  With  the  single  ex 
ception  of  his  assault  upon  Johnston's  lines  at  Kenesaw 
he  did  not  meet  with  a  serious  reverse  until  he  entered 
Atlanta,  and  it  was  his  dispatch  to  Lincoln,  announcing 
the  capture  of  that  city,  that  reversed  the  political  tide 
of  the  country  and  assured  Lincoln's  re-election. 

Sherman's  march  to  the  sea,  that  furnished  the  most 
romantic  story  of  the  civil  war,  was  really  a  holiday  pic 
nic  as  compared  with  the  march  from  Chattanooga  to 
Atlanta.  On  the  i2th  of  November,  1864,  Sherman 
severed  communications  with  the  North,  and  started  for 
Savannah  with  a  picked  army  full  60,000  strong,  and  on 
the  loth  of  December  he  was  in  front  of  the  Confederate 
defenses  of  Savannah.  On  the  I3th,  after  the  capture 
of  Fort  McAllister,  he  had  opened  communications  with 
the  Union  squadron  and  was  enabled  to  obtain  the  sup 
plies  his  army  so  much  needed.  Thus  for  more  than 
one  entire  month  the  country  had  no  word  whatever 
from  General  Sherman  except  in  the  vague  and  often 
greatly  exaggerated  reports  which  came  from  the  South 
ern  newspapers.  I  saw  Lincoln  several  times  during 
Sherman's  march,  and  while  he  did  not  conceal  his 


234  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

anxiety  concerning  him,  he  always  frankly  expressed  his 
unbounded  confidence  in  Sherman's  ability  to  execute 
what  he  had  undertaken.  He  had  the  strongest  faith  in 
Sherman  as  a  military  commander.  On  one  occasion 
during  Sherman's  march,  when  he  had  been  out  for  two 
or  three  weeks,  I  called  at  the  War  Department  and  as 
certained  that  no  word  had  been  received  from  him,  and 
that  none  need  be  expected  for  some  days  to  come.  I 
went  from  the  War  Department  to  the  White  House,  and 
after  a  brief  conference  with  Lincoln,  in  which  Sherman 
was  not  alluded  to  at  all,  I  bade  him  good-day  and  started 
to  leave  the  room.  Just  as  I  reached  the  door  he  turned 
round  and  with  a  merry  twinkling  of  the  eye  he  said: 
"  McClure,  wouldn't  you  like  to  hear  something  from 
Sherman?"  The  inquiry  electrified  me  at  the  instant, 
as  it  seemed  to  imply  that  Lincoln  had  some  information 
on  the  subject.  I  immediately  answered:  "Yes,  most 
of  all  I  should  like  to  hear  from  Sherman."  To  this 
Lincoln  answered  with  a  hearty  laugh:  "Well,  I'll  be 
hanged  if  I  wouldn't  myself."  When  Sherman  reached 
Savannah,  Lincoln  overflowed  with  gratitude  to  him  and 
his  army.  He  then  felt  fully  assured  that  the  military 
power  of  the  rebellion  was  hopelessly  broken. 

The  names  of  Lincoln  and  Sherman  are  indissolubly 
linked  together  in  the  yet  continued  dispute  over  Lin 
coln's  original  views  on  reconstruction,  as  Sherman 
claimed  to  represent  them  in  the  terms  of  the  first  sur 
render  of  Johnston  to  Sherman  at  Durham  Station,  North 
Carolina.  On  the  i8th  of  April,  1865,  Sherman  and 
Johnston  met  at  the  house  of  Mr.  Bennet  to  agree  upon 
the  terms  for  the  surrender  of  Johnston's  army.  On  the 
1 2th  of  April  Sherman  had  announced  to  his  army  the 
surrender  of  Lee.  Two  days  later  a  flag  of  truce  was 
received  from  Johnston  proposing  ' '  to  stop  the  further 
effusion  of  blood  and  devastation  of  property,"  and  sug- 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN. 

gesting  that  the  civil  authorities  of  the  States  be  per 
mitted  ' '  to  enter  into  the  needful  arrangements  to  termi 
nate  the  existing  war."  Sherman's  answer  of  the  same 
date  said :  "I  am  fully  empowered  to  arrange  with  you 
any  terms  for  the  suspension  of  further  hostilities  be 
tween  the  armies  commanded  by  you  and  those  com 
manded  by  myself. ' '  An  interview  with  Johnston  hav 
ing  been  arranged  by  a  staff  officer,  Sherman  started 
from  Raleigh  on  the  iyth  to  fill  the  appointment  with 
Johnston.  When  he  was  about  to  enter  the  car  he  was 
stopped  by  a  telegraph-operator,  who  gave  him  the  start 
ling  information  of  the  assassination  of  Lincoln  on  the 
1 4th.  He  gave  orders  that  no  publicity  should  be  given 
to  the  death  of  Lincoln,  and  he  did  not  even  inform  the 
staff  officers  accompanying  him.  As  soon  as  he  was 
alone  with  Johnston  he  communicated  to  him  the  fact 
of  Lincoln's  assassination,  and  he  adds  that  "the  per 
spiration  came  out  in  large  drops  on  his  (Johnston's) 
forehead,  and  he  did  not  attempt  to  conceal  his  distress." 
This  conference  with  Johnston  did  not  result  in  formu 
lating  the  terms  of  surrender.  Johnston  did  not  assume 
to  possess  authority  to  surrender  all  the  various  armies 
yet  in  the  field,  but  as  Jefferson  Davis,  with  Breckenridge, 
his  Secretary  of  War,  and  Reagan,  his  Postmaster-Gen 
eral,  was  within  reach  of  Johnston,  he  proposed  to  meet 
Sherman  on  the  following  day,  when  he  hoped  to  have 
authority  to  surrender  the  entire  Confederate  armies  re 
maining  in  the  service.  When  they  met  again  Brecken 
ridge  was  with  Johnston  without  assuming  to  act  in  any 
official  capacity,  and  the  terms  of  surrender  were  formu 
lated  and  signed  by  Sherman  and  Johnston.  So  far  as 
the  purely  military  terms  were  involved,  they  were  prac 
tically  the  same  as  those  agreed  to  by  Grant  and  Lee  at 
Appomattox.  The  third  article  of  the  basis  of  agree 
ment  provided  for  * '  the  recognition  by  the  Executive  of 


236  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

the  United  States  of  the  several  State  governments  on 
their  officers  and  legislatures  taking  the  oath  prescribed 
by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States."  The  fifth 
article  provided  for  substantial  amnesty,  so  far  as  in  the 
power  of  the  President,  to  all  who  accepted  the  terms  of 
surrender,  who  should  be  protected  in  "their  political 
rights  and  franchise  as  well  as  their  rights  of  person  and 
property. ' '  It  was  provided  also  that  the  armies  of  Sher 
man  and  Johnston  should  refrain  from  all  warlike  move 
ments  until  the  terms  of  surrender  were  finally  accepted, 
and  in  the  event  of  failure  forty-eight  hours'  notice 
should  be  given  by  either  side  for  the  resumption  of 
hostilities.  Sherman  transmitted  the  agreement  to  the 
government  through  Grant,  and  Stanton  published  the 
disapproval  by  the  administration  with  most  offensive 
reflections  upon  Sherman. 

But  for  the  dispute  that  arose  over  Sherman's  original 
terms  of  surrender  with  Johnston,  Lincoln's  views  as  to 
reconstruction  would  never  have  been  crystallized  in  his 
tory.  The  fact  that  Sherman  claimed  to  act  under  the 
direct  authority  of  Lincoln  in  the  terms  he  gave  to  John 
ston  and  to  the  civil  governments  of  the  insurgent  States 
brings  up  the  question  directly  as  to  Lincoln's  contem 
plated  method  of  closing  the  war;  and  it  is  notable  that 
many  of  Lincoln's  biographers  have  injected  partisan 
prejudice  into  history  and  have  studiously  attempted  to 
conceal  Lincoln's  ideas  as  to  the  restoration  of  the  Union. 
Whether  he  was  right  or  wrong,  it  is  due  to  the  truth  of 
history  that  his  convictions  be  honestly  presented.  The 
plain  question  to  be  considered  is  this:  Did  or  did  not 
Lincoln  expressly  suggest  to  Sherman  the  terms  he  gave 
to  Johnston  in  his  original  agreement  of  surrender  ?  If 
he  did,  it  clearly  portrays  Lincoln's  purposes  as  to  recon 
struction  and  fully  vindicates  Sherman.  If  he  did  not 
thus  suggest  and  instruct  Sherman,  then  Sherman  is  a 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN.  237 

deliberate  falsifier;  and  who  is  prepared  to  doubt  the  in 
tegrity  of  any  positive  statement  made  by  William  T. 
Sherman  ?  There  were  four  persons  present  at  the  con 
ference  held  at  City  Point  on  the  28th  of  March,  1865. 
They  were  Lincoln,  Grant,  Sherman,  and  Admiral  Por 
ter.  It  was  before  these  men  that  Lincoln  freely  dis 
cussed  the  question  of  ending  the  war,  and  in  Sherman's 
Memoirs  he  says:  "Mr.  Lincoln  was  full  and  frank  in 
his  conversation,  assuring  me  that  in  his  mind  he  was  all 
ready  for  the  civil  reorganization  of  affairs  at  the  South 
as  soon  as  the  war  was  over."  Had  Lincoln  stopped 
with  the  general  assurance  of  his  purpose  to  restore  the 
South  to  civil  government,  it  might  be  plausible  to  as 
sume  that  Sherman  misinterpreted  his  expressions,  but 
Sherman  adds  the  following  positive  statement:  uHe 
(Lincoln)  distinctly  authorized  me  to  assure  Governor 
Vance  and  the  people  of  North  Carolina  that  as  soon  as 
the  rebel  armies  laid  down  their  arms  and  resumed  their 
civil  pursuits  they  would  at  once  be  guaranteed  all  their 
rights  as  citizens  of  a  common  country ;  and  that  to  avoid 
anarchy  the  State  governments  then  in  existence,  with 
their  civil  functionaries,  would  be  recognized  by  him  as 
the  governments  de  facto  till  Congress  could  provide 
others* ' '  *  There  was  no  possibility .  for  Sherman  to 

*  Your  note  of  the  26th  inst.,  enclosing  proof  sheet  of  your 
article  on  Lincoln  and  Sherman,  has  been  received  and  very  care 
fully  read.  I  have  no  criticisms  to  make,  for  I  think  it  is  a  just 
and  fair  delineation,  well  stated,  of  the  character  of  these  two 
conspicuous  actors  in  the  war  of  the  Rebellion.  I  remember 
very  well  the  interview  with  Mr.  Lincoln  in  March,  1861.  A 
good  deal  more  was  said  than  you  have  noted.  Among  other 
things,  I  remember  that  Lincoln  said  to  Sherman:  "I  guess  we 
will  get  along  without  you  fellows,"  or  some  such  remark,  mean 
ing  that  he  thought  there  would  be  no  war.  This  was  the  remark 
that  made  the  most  impression  upon  Captain  Sherman,  as  he  was 
then  called,  and  led  him  to  a  want  of  confidence  in  I^ncolnj  who 


238  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIME^ 

mistake  this  expression  of  Lincoln.  He  was  distinctly 
instructed  to  assure  the  Governor  of  North  Carolina,  the 
State  in  which  Sherman's  army  was  then  operating,  that 
upon  the  surrender  of  the  insurgent  forces  all  would  be 
guaranteed  their  rights  as  citizens,  and  the  civil  govern 
ments  then  in  existence  would  be  recognized  by  Lincoln. 
There  was  no  chance  for  misunderstanding  on  this  point. 

did  not  seem  to  appreciate  the  condition  of  the  South  and  the 
peril  in  which  the  whole  country  was  then  involved.  During 
General  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea  I  went  to  Lincoln  as  you 
did.  I  was  somewhat  troubled  by  the  reports  from  rebel  sources 
that  General  Sherman  had  been  flanked  and  that  this  wing  or 
that  wing  had  been  driven  back,  etc.,  and  went  to  Lincoln  for 
encouragement,  and  asked  him  if  he  knew  anything  about  the 
correctness  of  these  reports.  Lincoln  said,  "Oh  no.  I  know 
what  hole  he  went  in  at,  but  I  can't  tell  what  hole  he  will  come 
out  of,"  but  seemed  to  be  entirely  confident  that  he  would  come 
out  safely. 

In  respect  to  the  conditional  arrangement  made  between  Gen 
eral  Sherman  and  General  Johnston  for  the  surrender  of  John 
ston's  army  your  statement  agrees  entirely  with  what  I  under 
stood  from  General  Sherman  a  few  days  after  the  surrender.  I 
went  with  General  Sherman  on  his  return  from  the  interview 
with  Lincoln  to  Goldsborough,  N.  C.,  where  the  army  was  en 
camped,  and  was  fully  advised  by  General  Sherman  of  the  con 
ference  between  Lincoln,  Grant,  Porter,  and  himself  at  Hampton 
Roads.  I  did  not  at  .the  time  agree  with  the  generous  policy  pro 
posed  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  but  at  the  meeting  with  Johnston  General 
Sherman  acted  upon  it  in  exact  accordance  with  what  he  under 
stood  were  the  instructions  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  afterward  com 
plained  bitterly  at  the  injustice  done  him  for  obeying  what  he 
regarded  as  the  orders  of  the  President.  Immediately  after  Stan- 
ton's  cruel  statement  of  his  reasons  for  setting  aside  the  agree 
ment  between  Sherman  and  Johnston,  I  wrote  a  reply  which  was 
published  in  Washington,  stating  my  view  of  this  agreement  at 
that  time.  I  have  not  seen  it  since,  but  I  have  no  doubt  if  you 
have  access  to  it  you  will  find  it  supports  the  statements  you 
now  make.  You  are  at  liberty  to  use  the  contents  of  this  letter 
or  any  part  of  it  at  your  discretion.— Senator  John  Sherman  to 
the  Author,  January  29,  1892. 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN.  239 

Either  Lincoln  thus  instructed  Sherman  or  Sherman 
states  what  is  deliberately  untrue. 

These  were  the  last  instructions  that  Sherman  received 
from  Lincoln  or  from  the  government  until  the  surrender 
of  Johnston.  In  a  little  more  than  two  weeks  thereafter 
Lincoln  was  assassinated,  and  the  only  event  that  could 
have  been  regarded  as  an  additional  guide  for  Sherman 
was  the  surrender  of  Lee,  in  which  all  the  rights  that 
Sherman  accorded  to  Johnston's  army  were  given  to 
Lee's  army  by  Grant.  The  testimony  of  Lincoln  could 
not  be  had  after  the  issue  was  raised  with  Sherman,  as 
Lincoln  was  then  dead;  but  Sherman  knew  that  on  the 
6th  of  April,  Lincoln  had  authorized  the  reconvening 
of  the  Virginia  Legislature,  and  thus  felt  sure  that  Lin 
coln  was  doing  in  Virginia  precisely  what  he  had  in 
structed  Sherman  to  do  in  North  Carolina.  Grant, 
always  reticent  in  matters  of  dispute  except  when  tes 
timony  was  a  necessity,  was  not  called  upon  to  express 
any  opinion  as  to  the  correctness  of  Sherman's  under 
standing  of  Lincoln's  instructions.  General  Badeau, 
who  was  with  Grant  at  the  time  he  received  Stan  ton's 
offensive  revocation  of  the  agreement  between  Sherman 
and  Johnston,  says  that  Grant  pronounced  Stanton's  ten 
reasons  for  rejecting  the  terms  of  surrender  to  be  "in 
famous."  An  entirely  new  condition  had  been  pro 
duced  by  the  murder  of  Lincoln  and  the  succession  of 
Johnson,  and  had  Sherman  been  advised  of  the  frenzy 
of  public  sentiment  that  followed  the  assassination  of  the 
President,  he  probably  would  not  have  obeyed  Lincoln's 
instructions  by  giving  the  promise  that  the  government 
would  recognize  the  Confederate  civil  authorities  of  the 
States. 

The  tragic  death  of  Lincoln  aroused  public  sentiment 
to  the  highest  point  of  resentment.  The  new  President 
was  ostentatious  in  his  demand  for  vengeance  upon  the 


240  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Southern  leaders.  Stanton  was  most  violent  in  his  cry 
for  the  swiftest  retribution,  and  it  was  in  this  changed 
condition  of  sentiment  and  of  authority  that  Sherman's 
terms,  accorded  to  Johnston  in  obedience  to  the  peaceful 
purposes  of  Lincoln,  were  sent  to  the  government  for 
approval  or  rejection.  Stanton  immediately  proclaimed 
the  rejection  of  the  terms  of  surrender  in  a  dispatch  given 
to  the  public  press,  in  which  he  denounced  Sherman  with 
unmingled  ferocity  as  having  acted  without  authority  and 
surrendered  almost  every  issue  for  which  the  war  had  been 
fought.  So  violent  was  this  assault  upon  Sherman  from 
Stanton  that  soon  after,  when  Sherman's  victorious  army 
was  reviewed  in  Washington  by  the  President  and  Sec 
retary  of  War,  Sherman  refused  the  proffered  hand  of 
Stanton  before  the  multitude.  President  Johnson  subse 
quently  assured  Sherman  that  Stanton's  public  reflection 
upon  him  had  not  been  seen  by  the  President  nor  any 
of  Stanton's  associates  of  the  Cabinet  until  it  had  been 
published.  Admiral  Porter,  who  was  the  remaining  wit 
ness  to  the  instructions  received  by  Sherman,  took  down 
notes  immediately  after  the  conference  ended,  and  within 
a  year  thereafter  he  furnished  Sherman  a  statement  of 
what  had  occurred,  in  which  he  fully  and  broadly  sus 
tained  Sherman  as  to  Lincoln's  instructions.  I  assume, 
therefore,  that  it  is  true  beyond  all  reasonable  dispute 
that  Sherman  in  his  original  terms  of  Johnston's  sur 
render  in  North  Carolina  implicitly  obeyed  the  direc 
tions  of  Lincoln,  and  was  therefore  not  only  fully  jus 
tified  in  what  he  did,  but  would  have  been  false  to  his 
trust  had  he  insisted  upon  any  other  terms  than  those  he 
accepted. 

This  issue  made  with  General  Sherman  and  feebly 
sustained  by  a  few  partisan  historians  of  the  time  has 
led  intelligent  students  to  study  carefully  Lincoln's  ideas 
pf  reconstruction,  and  they  should  be  correctly  uncler- 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN.  241 

stood  to  correctly  estimate  Lincoln's  character.  I  fre 
quently  saw  Lincoln  during  trie  summer  and  fall  of  1864 
and  winter  of  1865.  Some  time  in  August,  1864,  I  spent 
several  hours  with  him  alone  in  the  White  House,  when 
he  spoke  most  earnestly  about  the  closing  of  the  war. 
He  had  but  a  single  purpose,  and  that  was  the  speedy 
and  cordial  restoration  of  the  dissevered  States.  He 
cherished  no  resentment  against  the  South,  and  every 
theory  of  reconstruction  that  he  ever  conceived  or  pre 
sented  was  eminently  peaceful  and  looking  solely  to  re- 
attaching  the  estranged  people  to  the  government.  I 
was  startled  when  he  first  suggested  that  it  would  be 
wise  to  pay  the  South  $400,000,000  as  compensation  for 
the  abolition  of  slavery,  but  he  had  reasoned  well  on  the 
subject,  and  none  could  answer  the  arguments  he  ad 
vanced  in  favor  of  such  a  settlement  of  the  war.  He 
knew  that  he  could  not  then  propose  it  to  Congress  or  to 
the  country,  but  he  clung  to  it  until  the  very  last.  He 
repeatedly  renewed  the  subject  in  conversations  when  I 
was  present,  and  on  the  5th  of  February,  1865,  he  went 
so  far  as  to  formulate  a  message  to  Congress,  proposing 
the  payment  of  $400,000,000  for  emancipation,  and  sub 
mitted  it  to  his  Cabinet,  only  to  be  unanimously  rejected. 
Lincoln  sadly  accepted  the  decision  of  his  Cabinet,  and 
filed  away  the  manuscript  message  with  this  indorsement 
thereon,  to  which  his  signature  was  added :  ' '  February  5, 
1865.  To-day  these  papers,  which  explain  themselves, 
were  drawn  up  and  submitted  to  the  Cabinet  and  unani 
mously  disapproved  by  them."  When  the  proposed 
message  was  disapproved  Lincoln  soberly  asked :  ( '  How 
long  will  the  war  last  ?' '  To  this  none  could  make  an 
swer,  and  he  added:  "  We  are  spending  now  in  carrying 
on  the  war  $3,000,000  a  day,  which  will  amount  to  all 
this  money,  besides  all  the  lives." 

At  Lincoln's  conference  \yith  Sherman  and  Grant  at 


242  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OP  WAR-TIMES, 

City  Point  on  the  28th  of  March  he  exhibited  profound 
sorrow  at  the  statement  of  these  generals  that  another 
great  battle  would  probably  have  to  be  fought  before 
closing  the  war.  Sherman  says  that  "Lincoln  ex 
claimed  more  than  once  that  there  had  been  blood 
enough  shed,  and  asked  us  if  another  battle  could  not 
be  avoided. "  His  great  desire  was  to  attain  peace  with 
out  the  sacrifice  of  a  single  life  that  could  be  saved,  and 
he  certainly  desired  that  there  should  be  no  policy  of 
retribution  upon  the  Southern  people.  He  intimated  to 
Sherman  very  broadly  that  he  desired  Jefferson  Davis  to 
escape  from  the  country.  Sherman  in  his  Memoirs  re 
peats  a  story  told  by  Lincoln  to  him  illustrative  of  his 
wish  that  Davis  should  escape  ' '  unbeknown  to  him ;' ' 
and  in  discussing  the  same  subject  in  the  White  House 
in  the  presence  of  Governor  Curtin,  Colonel  Forney,  sev 
eral  others,  and  myself,  he  told  the  same  story  to  illus 
trate  the  same  point,  obviously  intending  to  convey  very 
clearly  his  wish  that  the  Southern  leaders  should  escape 
from  the  land  and  save  him  the  grave  complications 
which  must  follow  their  arrest.  Secretary  Welles,  in  an 
article  in  the  Galaxy,  quotes  Lincoln  as  saying  on  this 
subject:  u  No  one  need  expect  he  would  take  any  part  in 
hanging  or  killing  these  men,  even  the  worst  of  them. 
Frighten  them  out  of  the  country;  open  the  gates;  let 
down  the  bars,  scare  them  off.  Enough  lives  have  been 
sacrificed ;  we  must  extinguish  our  resentments  if  we  ex 
pect  harmony  and  union. ' ' 

Lincoln's  greatest  apprehension  during  the  last  six 
months  of  the  war  was  that  the  South  would  not  return 
to  the  Union  and  recognize  the  authority  of  the  govern 
ment.  He  knew  that  the  military  power  of  the  rebellion 
was  broken,  but  he  knew  that  the  bitterness  that  pre 
vailed  among  the  Southern  people  would  "be  an  almost 
insuperable  barrier  to  anything  like  cordial  reconstruc- 


LINCOLN  AND   SHERMAN.  243 

tion.  He  knew  that  they  were  impoverished,  and  he 
feared  almost  universal  anarchy  in  the  South  when  the 
shattered  armies  of  the  Confederacy  should  be  broken 
up,  and,  instead  of  a  restoration  of  peace  and  industry 
or  anything  approaching  friendly  relations  between  the 
Southern  people  and  the  government,  he  anticipated 
guerilla  warfare,  general  disorder,  and  utter  hopelessness 
of  tranquility  throughout  the  rebellious  States.  It  was 
this  grave  apprehension  that  made  Lincoln  desire  to  close 
the  war  upon  such  terms  as  would  make  the  Southern 
people  and  Southern  soldiers  think  somewhat  kindly  of 
the  Union  to  which  they  were  brought  back  by  force  of 
arms.  It  was  this  apprehension  that  made  him  instruct 
Sherman  to  recognize  the  civil  governments  of  the  South 
until  Congress  should  take  action  on  the  subject,  and 
that  made  him  personally  authorize  General  Weitzel  to 
permit  the  Virginia  State  government  to  reconvene,  as 
he  himself  stated  it,  to  "take  measures  to  withdraw  the 
Virginia  troops  and  their  support  from  resistance  to  the 
general  government."  He  meant  to  do  precisely  what 
Sherman  agreed  to  do  in  his  terms  with  Johnston.  On 
Lincoln's  return  to  Washington  from  Weitzel's  head 
quarters  in  Richmond  he  was  surprised  to  find  that  his 
consent  to  the  reassembling  of  the  Virginia  State  gov 
ernment,  like  his  proposed  message  offering  $400,000,000 
as  compensation  for  slavery,  was  disapproved  by  the  Cab 
inet,  and  that  it  was  likely  to  be  disapproved  by  the 
country.  He  was  greatly  distressed,  and  hesitated  some 
time  before  he  attempted  to  extricate  himself  from  the 
complication.  Secretary  Welles,  in  the  Galaxy  of  April, 
1872,  page  524,  speaking  of  the  question  in  the  Cabinet, 
says:  "The  subject  had  caused  general  surprise,  and  on 
the  part  of  some  dissatisfaction  and  irritation. "  Stanton 
and  Speed  were  especially  disturbed  about  it,  and  Secre 
tary  Welles  quotes  Lincoln  as  finally  saying  that  he  "  was 


244  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

surprised  that  his  object  and  the  movement  had  been  so 
generally  misconstrued,  and  under  the  circumstances  per 
haps  it  was  best  the  proceeding  should  be  abandoned." 

In  the  mean  time  Lee's  army  had  surrendered,  and 
Lincoln  was  given  a  reasonable  opportunity  to  stop  the 
proposed  meeting  of  the  Virginia  Legislature;  and  on 
the  1 2th  of  April  he  wrote  to  General  Weitzel  that  as 
the  proposed  meeting  had  been  misconstrued,  and  that 
as  Grant  had  since  captured  the  Virginia  troops,  so  that 
they  could  not  be  withdrawn  by  the  Virginia  Legislature, 
his  letter  to  Judge  Campbell  should  be  recalled  and  the 
legislature  not  allowed  to  assemble;  but  if  any  had  come 
in  pursuance  of  the  order  to  allow  them  a  safe  return  to 
their  homes.  In  his  interview  with  Judge  Campbell  and 
others  in  relation  to  the  proposed  assembling  of  the  Vir 
ginia  Legislature,  Lincoln  had  distinctly  agreed  that  if 
Virginia  could  be  peaceably  restored  to  the  Union,  con 
fiscation  should  be  remitted  to  the  people.  The  evidence 
is  multiplied  on  every  side  that  Lincoln  intended  to  give 
the  Virginians  exemption  from  all  the  retributory  laws 
of  war,  including  amnesty  to  all  who  obeyed  the  govern 
ment,  just  as  Sherman  provided  in  his  terms  of  surrender 
with  Johnston;  but  he  was  halted  in  his  purpose,  as  he 
was  halted  in  his  proposed  compensated  emancipation, 
by  the  bitter  resentments  of  the  time,  which  prevailed 
not  only  in  his  Cabinet,  but  throughout  the  country. 
Had  he  been  able  to  see  Sherman  after  he  had  revoked 
the  authority  for  the  Virginia  Legislature  to  assemble, 
he  would  doubtless  have  modified  his  instructions  to  him, 
but  Lincoln  never  again  communicated  with  Sherman. 
Two  days  after  his  revocation  of  the  Weitzel  order  he 
was  assassinated,  and  four  days  after  Lincoln's  assassina 
tion  Sherman  made  his  terms  of  surrender  with  John 
ston.  Had  Lincoln  been  alive  when  Sherman's  firs': 
report  of  Johnston's  surrender  was  received  in 


LINCOLN  AND   SHERMAN.  245 

ton,  his  experience  in  assenting  to  the  reassembling  of 
the  Virginia  State  government  would  doubtless  have 
made  him  disapprove  the  terms  given  to  Johnston  in 
obedience  to  Lincoln's  instructions  to  Sherman;  but  he 
would  have  cast  no  reproach  upon  the  heroic  victor  of 
Atlanta  and  Savannah,  and  would  have  manfully  as 
sumed  his  full  share  of  responsibility  for  Sherman's 
action.*  What  policy  of  reconstruction  Lincoln  would 

*  In  a  recent  publication  which  I  understand  to  be  a  fragment 
of  a  forthcoming  book  from  your  pen  you  referred  to  the  terms 
of  surrender  which  Gen.  Sherman  agreed  to  with  Gen.  Jo  John 
ston  at  the  close  of  the  civil  war.  You  express  the  opinion  that 
had  Mr.  Lincoln  been  alive  he  would  have  rejected  these  terms, 
but  you  censure  Mr.  Stanton  very  emphatically  for  publishing 
the  reasons  for  their  disapproval.  You  seem  to  think  that  Mr. 
Stanton  in  stating  these  reasons  to  Gen.  John  A.  Dix,  and  per 
mitting  their  publication,  was  guilty  of  a  wanton  and  unneces 
sary  assault  on  Gen.  Sherman.  In  reply  to  your  criticism  I  beg 
leave  to  submit  to  you  the  opposite  view  from  yours  expressed  in 
a  letter  written  at  the  time  by  a  statesman  of  calm  temper  and 
good  judgment.  The  letter  is  as  follows: 

WOODSTOCK,  VT.,  June  I4th,  1865. 
DEAR  SIR: 

Gen.  Sherman  promulgated  to  his  army  and  the  world  his  ar 
rangements  with  Johnston.  Indeed,  the  armistice  could  be  in  no 
other  way  accounted  for,  and  the  army  were  gratified  with  the  ex 
pectation  of  an  immediate  return  home. 

To  reject  that  arrangement  was  clearly  necessary,  and  to  do  it 
without  stating  any  reason  for  it  would  have  been  a  very  danger 
ous  experiment,  both  to  the  public  and  the  army.  Indeed,  many 
had  serious  apprehensions  of  its  effect  on  the  army  even  with  the 
conclusive  reasons  which  wrere  given.  Should  not  this  view  be 
presented  in  any  and  every  true  manifesto  of  the  case  ? 

Yours  respectfully, 

J.     COIyIvAME)R. 

HON.  E.  M.  STANTON: 

There  is  no  ground  for  the  belief  that  Mr.  Stanton  had  any 
other  motive  in  the  action  he  took  than  to  guard  against  the 


246  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

have  adopted  had  he  lived  to  complete  his  great  work 
cannot  now  be  known;  but  it  is  entirely  safe  to  assume 
that,  while  he  would  have  yielded  to  the  mandatory  sen 
timent  of  the  nation,  he  would  in  the  end  have  taught 
the  country  that  ' '  with  malice  toward  none,  with  char 
ity  for  all, ' '  he  could  assure  the  world  that  ' '  government 
of  the  people  by  the  people  and  for  the  people  shall  not 
perish  from  the  earth." 

danger  of  disturbances  in  the  army  and  throughout  the  country, 
which  might  have  resulted  had  the  inadmissible  terms  been  re 
jected  without  explanation. — Hon.  George  C.  Gorham  to  the  Au 
thor,  February  16,  1892. 


(From  Sypher's  Pennsylvania  Reserves.) 

ANDREW  G.  CURTIN,  l86o. 


LINCOLN  AND  CURTIN. 


ANDREW  G.  CURTIN  has  written  the  most  brilliant 
-tV  chapters  in  the  annals  of  our  great  civil  conflict  by 
his  official  record  as  Governor  of  Pennsylvania.  I  am 
not  unmindful,  in  paying  this  high  tribute  to  the  great 
War  Governor  of  the  Union,  that  there  are  many  Penn 
sylvania  names  that  have  become  memorable  for  their 
heroism  in  the  struggle  for  the  preservation  of  our  free 
institutions.  Nor  am  I  unmindful  that  Pennsylvania 
has  within  her  borders  the  great  battle-field  of  the  war, 
and  that  the  names  of  such  Pennsylvania  heroes  as 
Meade,  Reynolds,  and  Hancock  are  inseparably  linked 
with  the  decisive  victory  that  gave  assured  safety  and 
unsullied  freedom  to  the  Union.  While  Pennsylvania 
heroism  was  making  itself  immortal  on  every  battle-field 
of  the  war,  the  civil  administration  of  the  State  was 
more  intimately  involved  with  every  issue  growing  out 
of  the  war  than  that  of  any  other  State  of  the  Republic. 
Pennsylvania  was  second  only  to  New  York  in  popu 
lation  and  physical  power,  and  first  of  all  in  the  import 
ance  of  her  position  and  in  moulding  the  policy  of  the 
States  and  their  relations  to  the  parent  government. 
Bordered  by  slave  commonwealths  from  her  eastern  to 
her  western  lines,  and  more  exposed  to  the  perils  of  war 
than  any  of  the  other  loyal  States,  her  people  were  con 
servative  to  the  utmost  limits  of  positive  loyalty  to  the 
Union.  In  January,  1861,  when  Curtin  was  inaugurated 
248 


LINCOLN  AND   CUR  TIN.  249 

as  Governor,  not  a  single  Northern  State  had  officially 
denned  its  relations  to  the  Union  or  its  attitude  as  to  the 
threatened  civil  war,  and  any  utterance  from  a  State  of 
such  pre-eminent  physical  and  political  power  could  not 
but  make  its  impression  on  every  State  of  the  Union, 
North  and  South. 

Few  of  the  present  day  can  have  any  just  appreciation 
of  the  exceptional  delicacy  and  grave  responsibility  of 
the  position  of  the  new  Governor  of  Pennsylvania.  An 
ill-advised  utterance  from  him  might  have  wantonly  in 
flamed  the  war  spirit  of  the  South  or  chilled  the  loyal 
devotion  of  the  North.  He  was  called  upon  to  define, 
in  advance  of  all  the  other  States,  the  position  of  the 
North  when  confronted  by  armed  treason,  and  there 
were  no  precedents  in  our  history  to  guide  him.  His 
inaugural  address  was  prepared  entirely  by  himself  be 
fore  he  came  to  the  capital  to  assume  his  most  respon 
sible  trust.  Before  he  delivered  it  he  summoned  to  his 
council  a  number  of  the  most  intelligent  and  considerate 
men  of  both  parties  in  the  State,  but  after  careful  and 
dispassionate  reflection  upon  every  sentence  of  the  docu 
ment  it  was  not  substantially  changed  in  any  particular, 
and  the  highest  tribute  that  history  could  pay  to  his 
statesmanship  is  in  the  fact  that  the  position  of  his  great 
State,  and  its  relations  with  the  general  government  as 
defined  in  that  address,  were  accepted  by  every  loyal 
State  and  vindicated  alike  by  the  loyal  judgment  of  the 
nation  and  by  the  arbitrament  of  the  sword. 

Curtin  stood  single  among  the  public  men  of  Pennsyl 
vania  in  1860  as  a  popular  leader.  His  strength  was 
with  the  people  rather  than  in  political  invention.  He 
had  made  himself  conspicuously  known  by  his  services 
as  Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth  when  that  officer  was 
charged  with  the  control  of  the  school  system.  It  was 
he  who  first  organized  a  distinct  department  to  extend 


250  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

and  elevate  our  schools,  and  he  succeeded  in  greatly 
liberalizing  our  educational  system  and  starting  it  on 
the  high  way  to  its  present  matchless  advancement.  As 
early  as  1844  he  had  made  himself  known  as  one  of  the 
most  eloquent  stump-speakers  of  the  State,  and  from  that 
time  until  his  nomination  for  Governor  in  1860  he  was  in 
the  forefront  of  every  political  contest,  and  was  greeted 
with  boundless  enthusiasm  by  his  political  followers 
wherever  he  appeared.  When  the  great  battle  of  1860 
was  to  be  fought  Pennsylvania  was  accepted  by  all  as  a 
doubtful  State,  and  as  her  vote  in  October  would  be  the 
unerring  finger-board  of  national  victory  or  defeat  in 
November,  it  became  not  only  a  State  but  a  national 
necessity  for  the  Republicans  to  nominate  their  most 
available  candidate  to  lead  in  that  pivotal  contest.  The 
Republican  people,  almost  as  with  one  voice,  demanded 
the  nomination  of  Curtin,  and  there  would  have  been  no 
other  name  presented  to  the  convention  but  for  the  pecu 
liar  political  complications  arising  from  General  Came 
ron  being  a  candidate  for  President  before  the  same  con 
vention,  and  bitterly  hostile  to  Curtin.  But  despite  the 
peculiar  power  of  Cameron  as  an  organizer  and  manager 
of  political  conventions,  he  was  finally  compelled  to 
assent  to  Curtin' s  nomination  without  being  able  to 
obtain  an  earnestly  united  delegation  in  his  favor  for 
President.  When  Curtin  was  called  before  the  conven 
tion  to  accept  the  leadership  conferred  upon  rjim,  he 
aroused  the  enthusiasm  of  that  body  and  of  his  party 
friends  throughout  the  State  by  declaring  that  he  ac 
cepted  the  flag  of  the  convention  and  would  carry  it  in 
the  front  of  battle  from  Lake  Brie  to  the  Delaware;  and 
he  grandly  fulfilled  his  promise.  He  was  one  of  the 
most  magnetic  popular  speakers  Pennsylvania  has  ever 
known,  combining  matchless  wit,  keen  invective,  and 
persuasive  argument  with  singular  felicity,  and  his  tow- 


LINCOLN  AND   CURTIN.  251 

ering  and  symmetrical  form  and  his  genial  face  and 
manner  made  him  the  most  effective  of  all  our  men  on 
the  hustings.  He  was  aggressive  from  the  day  he  entered 
the  battle  until  it  closed  with  his  magnificent  victory  that 
declared  him  Governor  by  a  majority  of  over  thirty-two 
thousand. 

Many  circumstances  combined  to  bring  Lincoln  and 
Curtin  into  the  closest  official  and  personal  relations 
from  Lincoln's  nomination  until  his  death.  As  I  have 
shown  in  a  previous  chapter,  the  nomination  of  Lincoln 
was  made  possible  by  two  men — Henry  S.  Lane  of  Indi 
ana  and  Curtin  of  Pennsylvania.  Both  would  have  been 
defeated  had  Seward  been  nominated,  and  Curtin' s  first 
great  struggle  to  give  himself  even  a  winning  chance  in 
Pennsylvania  was  his  effort  to  defeat  the  nomination  of 
Seward  at  Chicago.  After  that  had  been  accomplished 
he  united  with  Lane  to  nominate  Lincoln.  He  and  Lin 
coln  never  met  until  Curtin  received  the  President-elect 
on  his  way  to  Washington  on  the  22d  of  February,  1861, 
and  it  was  at  the  dinner  given  to  Lincoln  by  Curtin  on 
the  evening  of  that  day  that  Lincoln's  route  was  changed 
and  he  suddenly  started  on  his  memorable  midnight  jour 
ney  to  the  national  capital.  The  appointment  of  Came 
ron  to  the  Lincoln  Cabinet  was  regarded  by  Curtin  as 
unfortunate,  and  would  have  made  very  strained  rela 
tions  between  Lincoln  and  Curtin  had  not  both  been 
singularly  generous  in  all  their  impulses  and  actions. 
Notwithstanding  the  frequent  irritating  complications 
which  arose  between  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Gov 
ernor  in  the  organization  of  troops  in  the  early  part  of 
the  war,  there  never  was  a  shadow  upon  the  relations 
of  these  two  men.  Curtin  was  profoundly  loyal  and  an 
enthusiast  in  everything  pertaining  to  the  war.  He  was 
proud  of  his  great  State,  and  especially  of  the  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  heroes  she  sent  to  the  field,  and  so  tire- 


252  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF   WAR-TIMES, 

less  in  his  great  work  that  he  always  commanded  the 
sincerest  affection  and  confidence  of  the  President.  Al 
though  often  disappointed  in  the  political  action  of  the 
national  administration,  and  at  times  keenly  grieved  per 
sonally  because  of  political  honors  unworthily  conferred, 
or  withheld  from  those  he  deemed  most  worthy  of  them, 
he  never  for  a  moment  lost  sight  of  his  paramount  duty 
to  give  unfaltering  support  to  the  government  in  the 
great  struggle  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Union. 

The  two  men  of  the  country  who  are  distinctly  upon 
record  as  having  appreciated  the  magnitude  of  the  war 
when  it  first  began  are  General  Sherman  and  Governor 
Curtin.  Sherman  was  judged  a  lunatic  and  relieved  of 
his  command  in  Kentucky  because  he  told  the  govern 
ment  the  exact  truth  as  to  the  magnitude  of  the  rebellion 
in  the  South-west  and  the  forces  necessary  to  overthrow 
it.  In  a  little  time  the  country  began  to  appreciate  Sher 
man's  military  intelligence.  He  was  finally  permitted  to 
go  to  the  front  in  command  of  a  division,  and  in  his  first 
battle  he  proved  himself  to  be  one  of  the  most  skillful 
and  courageous  of  our  generals.  Curtin  proved  his  ap 
preciation  of  the  necessities  of  our  imperiled  government 
by  issuing  his  proclamation  on  the  25th  of  April,  1861, 
calling  for  twenty-five  additional  regiments  of  infantry 
and  one  of  cavalry  to  serve  for  three  years  or  during  the 
war,  in  addition  to  the  quota  furnished  by  Pennsylvania 
under  the  President's  call  of  April  15,  1861,  summoning 
75,000  three  months'  men  to  the  field.  This  call  of  Cur 
tin  was  made  without  the  authority  of  the  general  gov 
ernment,  and  entirely  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
President  or  Secretary  of  War.  Pennsylvania  and  the 
whole  loyal  North  had  been  cut  off  from  all  communi 
cation  with  the  national  capital  for  several  days  by  trea 
sonable  rioters  in  Baltimore,  who  burned  the  railroad 
bridges  and  prevented  all  railroad  or  even  telegraphic 


LINCOLN  AND   CURTIN.  253 

communication  with  Washington.  In  this  grave  emer 
gency,  although  Pennsylvania  had  furnished  every  man 
called  for  by  the  government,  and  had  offered  many  more 
than  the  quota,  after  the  most  careful  study  of  the  situ 
ation  with  General  Robert  Patterson  and  Colonel  Fitz 
John  Porter,  then  serving  as  Assistant  Adjutant-General, 
and  a  number  of  civilians  who  were  heartily  sustaining 
Curtin  in  his  arduous  labors,  it  was  decided  to  assume 
the  responsibility  of  calling  out  twenty-six  additional 
regiments  for  service  under  the  general  government,  be 
cause  it  was  believed  by  all  that  they  would  be  needed  as 
speedily  as  they  could  be  obtained.  * 

The  requisition  for  troops  made  by  Pennsylvania  was 
in  pursuance  of  the  unanimous  judgment  of  the  military 
and  civil  authorities  then  at  Harrisburg,  and  it  was  not 
doubted  that  the  government  would  gratefully  accept 
them.  The  response  to  Curtin' s  proclamation  for  vol- 

*  HEADQUARTERS 
MILITARY  DEPARTMENT  OF  WASHINGTON, 

PHILADELPHIA,  April  25th,  1861. 
SIR: 

I  feel  it  my  duty  to  express  to  you  my  clear  and  decided  opin 
ion  that  the  force  at  the  disposal  of  this  department  should  be 
increased  without  delay. 

I  therefore  have  to  request  Your  Excellency  to  direct  that  • 
twenty-five  additional  regiments  of  infantry  and  one  regiment 
of  cavalry  be  called  for  forthwith,  to  be  mustered  into  the  service 
of  the  United  States. 

Officers  will  be  detailed  to  inspect  and  muster  the  men  into 
service  as  soon  as  I  am  informed  of  the  points  of  rendezvous 
which  may  be  designated  by  Your  Excellency. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  great  respect, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

R.  PATTERSON, 

Major-  General. 

His  Excellency  ANDREW  G.  CURTIN, 
Governor  of  Pennsylvania. 


254  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

unteers  was  unexampled,  and  in  the  few  days  during 
which  Harrisburg  was  without  communication  with 
Washington  thousands  of  patriotic  men  were  crowding 
the  trains  for  the  capital  from  every  part  of  the  State 
to  enter  the  military  service.  To  the  utter  surprise  of 
the  Governor  and  the  commander  of  the  department, 
the  first  communication  received  from  Washington  after 
notice  of  this  requisition  for  additional  troops  had  been 
forwarded  was  a  blunt  refusal  to  receive  any  of  the  regi 
ments  under  the  new  call;  and  to  emphasize  the  attitude 
of  the  government  and  its  appreciation  of  the  magnitude 
of  the  war,  Secretary  Cameron  stated  in  a  dispatch  to  the 
Governor  not  only  that  the  troops  could  not  be  received, 
but  "that  it  was  more  important  to  reduce  than  enlarge 
the  number. ' '  Earnest  appeals  were  made  to  the  Presi 
dent  and  the  War  Department  from  the  Governor  and 
General  Patterson  to  have  these  troops,  or  at  least  part 
of  them,  accepted,  but  every  such  appeal  was  met  with 
a  positive  refusal.  John  Sherman,  then  as  now  Senator 
from  Ohio,  was  a  volunteer  aide  on  General  Patterson's 
staff,  and  he  fully  agreed  with  the  authorities  at  Harris- 
burg  that  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  govern 
ment  that  the  additional  Pennsylvania  troops  be  accepted. 
In  view  of  his  important  political  position  and  presumed 
influence  with  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War,  he 
was  hurried  to  Washington  as  soon  as  communications 
were  opened  to  make  a  personal  appeal  for  the  accept 
ance  of  the  troops.  On  the  3oth  of  May,  five  days  after 
the  requisition  had  been  made,  he  wrote  General  Patter 
son  from  Washington,  stating  that  he  had  entirely  failed 
to  persuade  the  government  to  accept  any  part  of  these 
new  regiments.  It  was  not  within  the  power  of  the  gov 
ernment  to  depose  Governor  Curtin  and  order  him  to 
some  military  barracks  as  a  lunatic,  but  it  could  rebuke 
him  for  proposing  to  furnish  a  large  number  of  addi- 


LINCOLN  AND   CURTIN.  255 

tional  troops,  when,  as  subsequent  events  proved,  the 
government  had  the  most  pressing  need  for  them.  For 
tunately  for  the  government  and  for  the  complete  vindi 
cation  of  the  broad  sagacity  and  heroic  fidelity  of  Curtin, 
he  resolved  to  perform  his  duty  to  his  State  and  nation 
regardless  of  the  Washington  authorities. 

After  a  bitter  contest,  in  which  some  prominent  Re 
publicans  opposed  the  Governor's  recommendations,  a 
bill  had  been  passed  by  the  Legislature  some  weeks  be 
fore  appropriating  half  a  million  of  dollars  to  provide  for 
the  defense  of  the  State,  and  he  had  issued  his  call  for 
an  extraordinary  session  of  the  Legislature  as  early  as 
the  2oth  of  April  to  meet  the  great  issue  of  civil  war. 
He  revoked  his  proclamation  for  additional  regiments 
called  for  by  General  Patterson's  requisition,  but  much 
more  than  one-half  the  number  called  for  had  already 
volunteered,  and  were  practically  in  charge  of  the  State 
for  organization.  When  the  special  session  of  the  Leg 
islature  met  on  the  3oth  of  April  he  sent  an  earnest  mes 
sage  calling  for  the  organization  of  the  volunteers  then 
in  camp  into  fifteen  regiments  as  a  State  corps,  but  to  be 
subject  to  the  call  of  the  United  States  in  any  emergency. 
It  was  this  brave  action  of  Curtin  that  gave  us  the  Penn 
sylvania  Reserve  Corps,  whose  heroism  crimsoned  nearly 
every  battle-field  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  These 
troops  were  organized  not  only  without  the  aid  of  the 
national  government,  but  in  defiance  of  its  refusal  to 
accept  them  and  of  its  positive  declarations  that  they 
could  not  and  would  not  be  needed.  It  was  a  most 
heroic  policy  on  the  part  of  Curtin.  It  involved  a  loan 
of  $3,000,000  when  the  credit  of  the  State  was  severely 
strained,  and  every  partisan  or  factional  foe  was  inspired 
to  opposition  by  the  known  fact  that  the  national  govern 
ment  declared  additional  troops  to  be  entirely  unneces 
sary.  The  Legislature  and  the  people  had  faith  in  Cur- 


256  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

tin,  had  faith  in  his  integrity,  his  patriotism,  and  his 
judgment,  of  the  nation's  peril,  and  the  bill  creating  a 
loan  and  organizing  fifteen  regiments  of  the  Reserve 
Corps  was  passed  by  an  overwhelming  majority  in  both 
branches  of  the  Legislature.  He  had  around  him  a 
number  of  leading  men  of  both  parties  who  cheerfully 
gave  their  time  and  ceaseless  labor  to  assist  him.  Among 
those  I  recall  who  sat  in  his  councils  by  day  and  night  to 
strengthen  his  hands  by  voluntary  service  on  his  staff 
were  such  men  as  the  late  Thomas  A.  Scott,  John  A. 
Wright,  R.  Biddle  Roberts,  Reuben  C.  Hale,  and  John 
B.  Parker,  and  Craig  Biddle  and  Joseph  E.  Potts,  who 
yet  survive.  These  men,  as  well  as  the  military  officers 
on  duty  in  Pennsylvania  with  General  Patterson,  all 
heartily  concurred  in  the  policy  of  the  Governor  and 
shared  his  vindication  at  an  early  day. 

Even  before  the  disastrous  battle  of  Bull  Run  was 
fought  on  the  2ist  of  July,  two  of  the  Reserve  regiments 
were  called  for  by  the  government  to  march  to  Cumber 
land  to  the  relief  of  Colonel  Wallace,  and  the  regiments 
commanded  by  Colonel  Charles  J.  Biddle  and  Colonel 
Simmons  and  a  battery  of  artillery  were  on  the  march 
the  same  day  the  order  was  received,  and  soon  thereafter 
the  Tenth  regiment  followed.  Notwithstanding  the  re 
fusal  to  entertain  the  question  of  accepting  these  troops, 
Curtin  again  tendered  the  Reserve  Corps  to  the  govern 
ment  on  the  1 8th  of  July,  just  before  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  and  the  same  day  brought  orders  from  the  War 
Department  that  four  regiments  should  be  sent  to  Ha- 
gerstown  and  the  remaining,  exclusive  of  those  in  West 
Virginia,  should  be  sent  to  Baltimore.  These  regiments 
were  encamped  at  Pittsburg,  Easton,  West  Chester,  and 
Harrisburg,  and  the  Governor  at  once  ordered  them  to 
march  as  requested  by  the  Washington  authorities.  His 
answer  to  the  request  to  forward  the  troops  was  in  these 


LINCOLN  AND   CUR  TIN.  257 

words:  u  All  the  regiments  have  been  ordered  to  Harris- 
burg  in  obedience  to  your  dispatch  just  received,  and  on 
arrival  will  be  immediately  forwarded  to  the  seat  of  war, 
as  previously  ordered.  If  there  is  not  time  to  muster 
them  in  at  this  place,  mustering  officers  can  follow  them 
into  the  field."  Had  these  troops  been  on  the  battle 
field  of  Bull  Run,  as  they  could  have  been  had  not  the 
government  persistently  refused  to  accept  them,  it  would 
have  given  an  overwhelming  preponderance  of  numbers 
to  the  Union  forces,  and  doubtless  reversed  the  disaster 
of  that  day.  On  the  night  of  July  2ist,  when  the  gov 
ernment  learned  that  the  army  had  been  routed  at  Bull 
Run,  most  frantic  appeals  were  made  to  Curtin  from  the 
Washington  authorities  to  hasten  his  troops  to  the  front 
to  save  the  National  Capital,  and  within  twenty-four 
hours  after  the  retreat  of  McDowell's  army  into  the 
Washington  fortifications  the  welcome  tread  of  the  Penn 
sylvania  Reserves  was  heard  on  Pennsylvania  Avenue, 
and  the  panic  was  allayed  and  confidence  restored  by 
regiment  after  regiment  of  the  once-rejected  troops 
hurrying  to  Washington.  One  dispatch  from  the  War 
Department  thus  appeals  to  Curtin:  "  Get  your  regiments 
at  Harrisburg,  Easton,  and  other  points  ready  for  imme 
diate  shipment.  Lose  no  time  in  preparing.  Make 
things  move  to  the  utmost."  Another  dispatch  said: 
"To-morrow  won't  do  for  your  regiments;  you  must 
have  them  to-night.  Send  them  to-night.  It  is  of  the 
utmost  importance."  Another  appeal  to  him  said:  "  Stop 
the  regiment  at  Green  castle,  and  send  it  to  Washington 
to-night.  Do  not  fail. ' '  Thus  the  war  authorities  that 
had  treated  with  contempt  the  appeals  of  Curtin  to  accept 
the  troops  he  had  called  for  when  cut  off  from  the  na 
tional  capital,  in  a  few  months  thereafter  sent  the  most 
earnest  appeals  to  him  to  save  them  from  their  own  folly 
17 


258  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  Of   WAR-TIMES. 

by  forwarding  the  troops  he  had  organized  in  defiance  of 
their  protest. 

I  speak  advisedly  when  I  say  that  there  was  not  a  sin 
gle  new  phase  of  the  war  at  any  time  that  did  not  sum 
mon  Curtin  to  the  councils  of  Lincoln.  He  was  the  first 
man  called  to  Washington  after  the  surrender  of  Sumter, 
and  I  accompanied  him  in  obedience  to  a  like  summons 
to  me  as  chairman  of  the  Military  Committee  of  the  Sen 
ate.  Pennsylvania  was  to  sound  the  keynote  for  all  the 
loyal  States  of  the  North  in  the  utterance  of  her  loyal 
Governor,  and  her  action  was  to  be  the  example  for 
every  other  State  of  the  Union.  How  grandly  Curtin 
performed  that  duty  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  he  organ 
ized  and  furnished  to  the  national  government  during 
the  war  367,482  soldiers,  and  organized,  in  addition  to 
that  number,  87,000  for  domestic  defense  during  the 
same  period.  New  duties  and  grave  responsibilities 
were  multiplied  upon  him  every  week,  but  he  was  al 
ways  equal  to  them,  and  was  a  tireless  enthusiast  in  the 
performance  of  his  labors.  Three  times  during  the  war 
was  his  State  invaded  by  the  enemy,  and  at  one  time 
90,000  of  L,ee's  army,  with  L,ee  himself  at  their  head, 
were  within  the  borders  of  our  State  on  their  way  to 
their  Waterloo  at  Gettysburg.  While  responding  with 
the  utmost  promptness  to  every  call  of  the  national  gov 
ernment,  whether  for  troops  or  for  moral  or  political  sup 
port,  he  was  most  zealous  in  making  provision  for  the 
defense  of  his  exposed  people  in  the  border  counties. 
He  had  an  ample  force  within  the  State  to  protect  the 
border  against  raids  by  the  enemy,  and  would  have  saved 
Chambersburg  from  destruction  by  the  vandal  torch,  had 
not  his  own  State  troops  been  ordered  away  from  him  to 
save  General  Hunter  after  his  disgraceful  and  disastrous 
raid  into  Virginia  in  1864.  Hunter's  vandalism  had 
justly  inflamed  the  South,  and  when  he  was  driven 


ZAV(  OLN  AND    CURTIN.  259 

across  the  Potomac  the  Pennsylvania  regiments  organ 
ized  for  the  special  defense  of  the  State,  being  subject 
to  orders  from  Washington  because  mustered  into  the 
United  States  service,  passed  through  Chambersburg, 
within  forty-eight  hours  of  the  period  of  its  destruction, 
to  join  Hunter  in  Maryland  and  save  him  from  the  retri 
bution  his  folly  had  invited.  Had  these  Pennsylvania 
troops  remained  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  State  author 
ities,  they  could  have  been  in  Chambersburg  before 
McCausland  reached  there,  and  would  have  outnum 
bered  him  nearly  three  to  one.  Chambersburg  was  thus 
destroyed  solely  because  of  the  grave  emergency  that 
called  the  State  troops  to  the  support  of  Hunter,  and 
they  were  almost  within  sound  of  McCausland' s  guns 
when  he  opened  on  the  defenseless  people  of  Chambers 
burg  at  daylight  on  the  3Oth  of  July,  1864,  before  he 
entered  the  town  to  destroy  it. 

Curtin's  relations  with  Stanton  were  never  entirely 
cordial  and  at  times  embarrassing;  but  Lincoln  always 
interposed  when  necessary,  and  almost  invariably  sus 
tained  Curtin  when  a  vital  issue  was  raised  between 
them.  The  fact  that  Lincoln  supported  Curtin  against 
Stanton  many  times  greatly  irritated  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  doubtless  intensified  his  bitterness  against  the 
Pennsylvania  War  Governor.  In  one  notable  instance 
only,  in  which  Curtin  and  Stanton  were  in  bitter  con 
flict,  did  Lincoln  hesitate  to  sustain  Curtin,  but  Lincoln 
was  overruled  by  his  military  commanders  and  bowed  to 
their  exactions  with  profound  reluctance.  In  the  winter 
or  early  spring  of  1864,  Curtin,  always  alive  to  the  inter 
ests  of  humanity,  and  feeling  keenly  the  sorrows  of  the 
Pennsylvania  soldiers  who  were  in  Southern  prison-pens 
suffering  from  disease  and  starvation,  went  to  Washing 
ton  on  three  different  occasions  and  appealed  to  both 
Stanton  and  Lincoln  for  the  exchange  of  prisoners  as 


260  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

the  Southern  commissioners  proposed.  We  then  held 
about  30,000  Southern  prisoners,  and  the  South  held  as 
many  or  more  of  Union  soldiers,  and  General  Grant, 
looking  solely  to  military  success,  peremptorily  refused 
to  permit  the  exchange  of  these  men,  because  L,ee  would 
gain  nearly  30,000  effective  soldiers,  while  most  of  the 
30,060  Union  prisoners  would  be  unfit  for  service  because 
of  illness.  On  Curtin's  third  visit  to  Washington  on  that 
subject  he  was  accompanied  by  Attorney-General  Wil 
liam  M.  Meredith,  and  they  both  earnestly  pressed  upon 
the  government  the  prompt  exchange  of  prisoners.  Stan- 
ton  grew  impatient  and  even  insolent,  retorting  to  the 
Governor's  appeal:  "  Do  you  come  here  in  support  of  the 
government  and  ask  me  to  exchange  30,000  skeletons  for 
30,000  well-fed  men?"  To  which  Curtin  replied  with 
all  the  earnestness  of  his  humane  impulses:  "Do  you 
dare  to  depart  from  the  laws  of  humane  warfare  in  this 
enlightened  age  of  Christian  civilization  ?' '  Curtin  and 
Meredith  carried  their  appeal  to  Lincoln,  who  shared  all 
of  Curtin's  sympathies  for  our  suffering  prisoners,  and 
who  exerted  himself  to  the  utmost,  only  to  effect  a  par 
tial  exchange.  In  1863,  when  Curtin  was  a  candidate 
for  re-election,  Stanton  gave  most  earnest  support  to  his 
cause,  notwithstanding  he  rarely  spoke  of  Curtin  person 
ally  except  with  bitterness.  Curtin  keenly  appreciated 
what  Stanton  had  done,  and  went  to  Washington  soon 
after  his  election  with  the  purpose  of  paying  his  respects 
to  Stanton  and  thanking  him  for  the  hearty  support  he 
had  given  him.  A  mutual  acquaintance,  who  knew  that 
Curtin  was  in  Washington  to  pay  his  respects  to  Stanton, 
happened  to  meet  Stanton  during  the  evening  and  spoke 
with  much  enthusiasm  of  Curtin's  victory,  and  of  his 
presence  there  to  visit  and  thank  the  Secretary  of  War. 
Stanton  replied  in  his  cynical  way :  ' (  Yes,  Pennsylvania 
must  be  a  damned  loyal  State  to  give  such  a  victory  to 


LINCOLN  AND    CUR  TIN.  261 

Curtin."  This  was  repeated  to  Curtin  the  same  even 
ing,  and  the  result  was  that  Curtin' s  visit  to  the  War 
Office  was  indefinitely  postponed,  and  Stanton  died 
without  having  received  the  thanks  that  Curtin  had  in 
tended  for  him.  Soon  after  the  war  was  over,  however, 
Stanton  seemed  to  have  justly  appreciated  Curtin,  as  he 
wrote  him  a  voluntary  and  most  affectionate  letter,  re 
viewing  the  great  work  he  had  done  as  Governor  of 
Pennsylvania,  thanking  him  for  his  patriotism  and  fidel 
ity,  and  offering  a  full  apology  for  anything  that  he 
might  have  done  to  give  him  unpleasant  recollections. 
Lincoln  played  a  most  conspicuous  part  in  Curtin' s 
second  nomination  and  re-election.  So  profoundly  was 
Curtin  impressed  with  the  necessity  of  uniting  all  par 
ties  in  the  support  of  the  war  for  the  suppression  of  the 
rebellion  that  he  was  the  first  man  to  suggest  his  own 
retirement  from  the  office  of  Governor  if  the  Democrats 
would  present  the  name  of  General  William  B.  Frank 
lin,  a  gallant  Pennsylvania  Democratic  soldier.  I  was 
present  when  Curtin  first  made  this  suggestion  to  a 
number  of  his  friends,  and  he  made  it  with  a  degree  of 
earnestness  that  impressed  every  one.  He  said  that  it 
was  vastly  more  important  to  thus  unite  the  whole 
Democratic  party  with  the  Republicans  on  an  honest 
war  platform  than  that  any  party  or  any  individual 
should  win  political  success.  So  earnestly  did  he  press 
the  matter  that  communication  was  opened  writh  a  num 
ber  of  leading  Democrats  of  the  State,  many  of  whom 
regarded  the  suggestion  with  favor  and  sought  to  accom 
plish  it.  Unfortunately  for  the  Democracy,  the  more 
Bourbon  element  controlled  its  councils  and  a  Supreme 
Judge  who  had  declared  the  national  conscription  act 
unconstitutional,  thereby  depriving  the  government  of 
the  power  to  fill  its  wasted  armies,  was  nominated  for 
Governor  when  the  thunders  of  Lee's  guns  were  heard 


262  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

in  the  Cumberland  Valley  and  almost  within  hearing  of 
the  capital  where  the  convention  sat.  Had  Franklin 
been  nominated  by  the  Democrats,  Curtin  would  have 
publicly  declared  for  him,  and  the  Republican  Conven 
tion  would  have  welcomed  him  as  their  candidate,  re 
gardless  of  his  political  faith.  Failing  in  that  move 
ment,  there  seemed  to  be  but  one  hopeful  loyal  candi 
date  for  Governor — Curtin  himself.  He  was  broken  in 
health  and  entirely  unequal  to  the  strain  of  a  desperate 
battle.  In  political  contests  he  was  expected  to  be 
leader  of  leaders  in  Pennsylvania.  In  addition  to  his 
shattered  health,  there  were  over  70,000  of  his  soldiers 
in  the  field  who  had  not  then  the  constitutional  right  to 
vote  in  their  camps,  while  the  bitter  factional  feud  be 
tween  the  Curtin  and  Cameron  wings  of  the  party  seri 
ously  threatened  his  defeat.  Curtin' s  greatest  desire, 
next  to  the  faithful  fulfillment  of  the  high  responsi 
bilities  cast  upon  him,  was  to  retire  from  public  office 
and  recover  his  physical  vigor.  It  was  believed  in  his 
own  household  that  he  could  not  survive  another  polit 
ical  campaign  in  which  he  was  compelled  to  take  the 
lead.  His  devoted  and  estimable  wife,  who  brightened 
every  public  honor  he  attained,  appealed  to  me  with 
tears  in  her  eyes  to  take  absolute  measures  to  retire  him 
from  the  field,  and  the  Governor  heartily  assented  if  he 
could  be  permitted  to  retire  in  any  way  honorable  to 
himself. 

Of  Curtin' s  renomination  there  was  no  doubt  what 
ever  if  he  permitted  his  name  to  be  used,  and  it  became 
merely  a  question  how  he  could  retire  gracefully.  En 
trusted  with  this  matter,  acting  entirely  upon  my  own 
judgment,  I  went  to  Washington,  called  upon  Colonel 
Forney  and  told  him  my  mission.  I  said:  "Senator 
Cameron  will  desire  the  retirement  of  Curtin  because  he 
is  his  enemy ;  I  desire  it  because  I  am  his  friend ;  may  we 


LINCOLN  AND   CURTIN.  263 

not  co-operate  in  bringing  it  about  ?"  Cameron  was  sent 
for;  the  matter  was  presented  to  him,  and  he  at  once  said, 
with  some  asperity,  that  ' '  Curtin  should  be  got  rid  of. ' ' 
I  suggested  that  if  Lincoln  would  tender  to  Curtin  a 
foreign  mission  in  view  of  his  broken  health,  it  would 
solve  the  difficulty  and  enable  Curtin  to  retire.  To  this 
Cameron  agreed,  and  within  half  an  hour  thereafter  we 
startled  Lincoln  by  appearing  before  him  together,  ac 
companied  by  Forney.  It  was  the  first  time  Cameron 
and  I  had  appeared  before  Lincoln  to  unite  in  asking 
him  to  perform  any  public  act.  I  stated  the  case  briefly 
but  frankly,  and  he  promptly  responded  that  Curtin  was 
entitled  to  the  honor  suggested,  and  that  it  would  be  a 
great  pleasure  to  him  to  tender  him  the  place.  '  *  But, ' ' 
said  he,  "I'm  in  the  position  of  young  Sheridan  when 
old  Sheridan  called  him  to  task  for  his  rakish  conduct, 
and  said  to  him  that  he  must  take  a  wife;  to  which  young 
Sheridan  replied:  '  Very  well,  father,  but  whose  wife  shall 
I  take?'  It's  all  very  well,"  he  added,  "to  say  that  I 
will  give  Curtin  a  mission,  but  whose  mission  am  I  to 
take  ?  I  would  not  offer  him  anything  but  a  first-class 
one."  To  this  Cameron  replied  that  a  second-class  mis 
sion  would  answer  the  purpose,  but  Forney  and  I  resented 
that,  and  said  that  if  a  second-class  mission  was  to  be  dis 
cussed  we  had  nothing  further  to  say.  Lincoln  closed 
the  conference  by  suggesting  that  as  it  seemed  to  be  my 
affair  I  should  call  to  see  him  in  the  morning.  I  did  so, 
when  Lincoln  handed  me  the  following  autograph  letter, 
tendering  Curtin  a  first-class  mission,  to  be  accepted  at 
the  close  of  his  gubernatorial  term: 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 
WASHINGTON,  April  13,  1863. 
HONORABLE  ANDREW  G.  CURTIN. 

MY  DEAR  SIR  :  If,  after  the  expiration  of  your  present  term  as 
Governor  of  Pennsylvania  I  shall  continue  in  office  here,  and  you 


LINCOLN  AND   CUR  TIN.  265 

shall  desire  to  go  abroad,  you  can  do  so  with  one  of  the  first-class 
missions.  Yours  truly, 

ABRAHAM  LINCOI/N. 


This  letter  I  delivered  to  Curtin.  The  announcement 
was  at  once  made  to  the  Associated  Press  that  a  foreign 
mission  had  been  tendered  to  Curtin,  that  he  had  signi 
fied  his  acceptance  of  it,  and  that  he  would  not  be  a  can 
didate  for  renomination  for  Governor.  The  popular  de 
mand  for  Curtin' s  renomination  came  with  such  emphasis 
from  every  section  of  the  State  that  within  a  few  weeks 
after  his  declination  he  was  compelled  to  accept  the  can 
didacy,  and  he  was  nominated  in  Pittsburg  by  an  over 
whelming  majority  on  the  first  ballot,  and  after  one  of 
the  most  desperate  contests  ever  known  in  the  State  was 
re-elected  by  over  15,000  majority,  even  with  his  soldiers 
disfranchised.  Lincoln  exhibited  unusual  interest  in  that 
struggle,  and  his  congratulations  to  Curtin  upon  his  re 
election  were  repeated  for  several  days,  and  were  often  as 
quaint  as  they  were  sincere. 

The  secret  of  Curtin' s  re-election  in  1863  was  the  de 
votion  of  the  Pennsylvania  soldiers  to  him  and  his  cause. 
He  was  the  earliest  of  all  the  Governors  in  the  States  to 
devise  and  put  into  practical  execution  every  measure 
that  could  lessen  the  sorrows  of  war  to  his  people.  After 
every  battle  in  which  Pennsylvania  troops  were  engaged 
Curtin  was  always  among  the  first  visitors  to  camp  and 
hospital,  and  his  sympathetic  hand  was  felt  and  his  voice 
heard  by  the  sick  and  wounded.  He  had  his  official 
commissioners  to  visit  every  part  of  the  country  in  search 
of  Pennsylvania  troops  needing  kind  ministrations,  and 
early  in  the  war  he  obtained  legislative  authority  to 
bring  the  body  of  every  soldier  who  was  killed  or  died 
in  the  service  home  for  burial  at  the  cost  of  the  State. 
Every  Pennsylvania  soldier  in  the  army  felt  that  he  had 


266  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

one  friend  upon  whom  he  could  always  rely  in  the  War 
Governor  of  his  State,  and  many  hundreds  of  letters 
poured  in  upon  Curtin  at  the  Capitol  every  day  appeal 
ing  to  him  for  redress  from  real  or  imaginary  grievances, 
every  one  of  which  was  promptly  answered.  If  injustice 
was  done  to  any  Pennsylvania  officer  or  any  hindrance 
of  gallant  men  in  the  ranks  from  just  promotion,  an  early 
appeal  to  Curtin  invariably  brought  him  to  the  front  to 
correct  it.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  when  he 
became  a  candidate  for  re-election  and  was  assailed  on 
every  side  with  bitterness,  nearly  every  soldier  in  the 
army,  whether  Democrat  or  Republican,  appealed  to  his 
people  at  home  to  support  and  vote  for  Curtin.  While 
the  soldiers  were  themselves  unable  to  testify  their  ap 
preciation  of  their  patriotic  Governor  at  the  polls,  every 
soldier  at  home  on  leave,  however  unskilled  in  rhetoric, 
was  a  most  eloquent  advocate  of  Curtin' s  re-election,  and 
there  was  hardly  a  home  in  the  State  that  had  a  soldier 
in  the  field  to  which  did  not  come  earnest  appeals  by 
letters  to  fathers  and  brothers  to  vote  for  the  Soldier's 
Friend.  Thus  was  Curtin  re-elected  by  a  large  majority, 
and  by  the  votes  of  Democrats  who  were  influenced  solely 
by  their  sympathy  with  their  sons  and  brothers  in  the 
field  whose  gratitude  to  Curtin  was  reflected  in  almost 
every  family  circle. 

It  was  on  Thanksgiving  Day  of  1863  that  Curtin  first 
conceived  the  idea  of  State  provision  for  the  care  and 
education  of  the  orphans  of  our  fallen  soldiers.  While 
on  his  way  in  Harrisburg  to  hear  Dr.  Robinson's  Thanks 
giving  sermon,  he  was  met  by  two  shivering  and  starving 
children,  who  piteously  appealed  to  him  to  relieve  them 
of  their  distress,  saying  that  their  father  had  been  killed 
on  the  Peninsula  and  that  their  mother  was  broken  in 
health  by  her  efforts  to  provide  for  them.  He  was  so 
deeply  impressed  and  his  sympathies  so  keenly  aroused 


LINCOLN  AND  CURTIN.  267 

by  the  children  that  he  heard  little  of  the  eloquent  ser 
mon.  He  remembered  that  all  over  Pennsylvania  there 
were  such  orphans  without  home  or  bread,  and  he  re 
solved  from  that  day  that  some  provision  should  be  made 
for  the  care  of  these  helpless  little  ones.  Soon  after  he 
presided  at  a  meeting  at  which  Henry  Ward  Beecher  was 
the  speaker.  Beecher  had  just  returned  from  England, 
where  he  had  been  most  eloquent  in  his  defense  of  the 
Union  cause,  and  he  was  welcomed  in  Pennsylvania  with 
enthusiasm  by  the  loyal  people.  In  Curtin's  introductory 
speech  he,  for  the  first  time,  made  public  allusion  to  the 
duty  of  the  State  to  provide  for  the  orphans  of  our  sol 
diers  who  had  fallen  in  battle,  and  the  suggestion  was 
greeted  with  round  after  round  of  applause.  Some  time 
before  that  period  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  had  placed 
at  the  disposal  of  the  State  $50,000  to  equip  troops.  The 
money  was  received  by  Curtin,  but  he  had  no  need  to 
use  it  for  the  equipment  of  troops,  and  if  he  had  covered 
it  into  the  treasury,  it  would  have  merged  into  the  gen 
eral  fund.  This  money  lay  idle  on  special  deposit  for 
some  months,  and  Curtin  conceived  the  plan  of  making 
it  the  basis  of  a  fund  for  the  care  of  our  soldiers'  orphans. 
To  this  President  Thomson  assented,  and  with  $50,000 
already  assured,  the  Governor  presented  the  subject  to 
the  Legislature  in  his  annual  message,  and  earnestly 
urged  early  action.  There  was  much  hesitation  to  sup 
port  such  a  bill,  and  no  progress  was  made  in  it  until 
near  the  close  of  the  session.  The  bill  was  finally  de 
feated,  and  when  the  next  Legislature  met  Curtin  ar 
ranged  with  President  Thomson  for  the  transportation 
of  a  large  number  of  our  soldiers'  orphans  to  visit  Har- 
risburg.  They  were  sent  free  of  cost  for  transportation, 
and  were  received  into  the  homes  of  generous  people,  ten 
of  them  being  guests  of  Curtin  in  the  Executive  Man 
sion.  They  came  bearing  the  flag  under  which  their 


268  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

fathers  had  fallen,  and  the  House  received  them  at  three 
o'clock,  when  patriotic  speeches  were  made,  the  little 
orphans  sang  patriotic  songs,  and  Curtin  made  a  most 
eloquent  appeal  to  the  Legislature  to  make  these  chil 
dren  the  wards  of  the  commonwealth.  The  Legislature 
speedily  retraced  its  steps,  passed  the  bill,  and  the  Gov 
ernor  had  the  gratification  of  signing  it  the  next  morn 
ing.  Such  was  the  beginning  of  the  Soldiers'  Orphans' 
Schools  which  have  lasted  now  for  nearly  thirty  years, 
which  have  educated  thousands  and  thousands  of  the 
war  orphans  of  the  State,  and  are  still  performing  that 
humane  mission  to  the  few  yet  in  our  midst.  In  this 
sublime  beneficence  to  the  helpless  children  of  our  heroes 
Pennsylvania  stands  single  and  alone  among  the  loyal 
States,  and  there  has  not  been  a  class  of  orphans  in  any 
school  in  Pennsylvania  that  has  not  lisped  the  name  of 
Curtin  with  affectionate  reverence. 

Some  of  the  most  momentous  official  acts  of  Curtin' s 
public  career  have  almost  passed  from  the  recollection 
of  the  men  of  the  present  who  lived  at  that  day,  yet  they 
rendered  the  greatest  service  to  the  national  government 
when  it  was  in  the  gravest  peril.  After  the  disastrous 
Peninsula  campaign  it  became  a  necessity  to  summon  a 
large  additional  force  to  the  field,  and  it  was  regarded  as 
a  dangerous  experiment  in  view  of  the  despairing  condi 
tion  of  public  sentiment  in  the  North.  Volunteering 
had  entirely  ceased;  there  was  at  that  time  no  national 
conscription  act;  the  appeal  had  to  be  made  directly  to 
the  States  to  raise  their  respective  quotas  of  troops.  As 
was  common  in  every  serious  emergency,  Curtin  was 
called  into  the  councils  of  Lincoln,  and  the  subject  dis 
cussed  with  a  full  appreciation  of  the  solemn  responsi 
bilities  that  devolved  upon  both  of  them.  It  was  Cur- 
tin's  suggestion  that  the  Governors  of  the  loyal  States 
should  be  conferred  with  and  got  to  unite  in  a  formal 


LINCOLN  AND   CURTIN,  269 

demand  upon  the  President  to  call  out  a  large  additional 
force.  Eighteen  loyal  Governors  responded,  and  on  the 
28th  of  June,  1862,  they  aroused  every  loyal  heart  in  the 
country  by  their  bold  demand  for  the  promptest  measures 
to  fill  up  our  armies  and  for  the  most  vigorous  prosecu 
tion  of  the  war.  The  address  concludes  with  this  patri 
otic  sentence:  "  All  believe  that  the  decisive  moment  is 
near  at  hand,  and  to  that  end  the  people  of  the  United 
States  are  desirous  to  aid  promptly  in  furnishing  all  rein 
forcements  that  you  may  deem  necessary  to  sustain  our 
government."  This  address  was  delivered  in  person  by 
a  number  of  the  Governors  themselves,  and  Lincoln  re 
plied:  "Gentlemen:  Fully  concurring  in  the  wisdom  of 
the  views  expressed  to  me  in  so  patriotic  a  manner  by 
you  in  the  communication  of  the  28th  of  June,  I  have 
decided  to  call  into  the  service  an  additional  force  of 
300,000  men."  The  Altoona  conference  of  the  loyal 
Governors  was  originally  proposed  by  Curtin  to  Lincoln 
and  cordially  approved  by  the  President  before  the  call 
was  issued.  It  was  a  supreme  necessity  to  crystallize  the 
loyal  sentiment  of  the  country  in  support  of  the  coming 
and  then  clearly  foreshadowed  Emancipation  policy. 
Curtin  telegraphed  Governor  Andrew  of  Massachusetts: 
' '  In  the  present  emergency  would  it  not  be  well  that  the 
loyal  Governors  should  meet  at  some  point  in  the  Border 
States  to  take  measures  for  the  more  active  support  of 
the  government?"  The  Governors  of  Massachusetts, 
Ohio,  and  West  Virginia  responded  promptly,  and  the 
call  was  issued  on  the  14! a  of  September,  and  the  Al 
toona  conference  met  on  the  24th,  the  day  after  the 
Emancipation  Proclamation  had  been  published  to  the 
world.  There  were  seventeen  Governors  in  attendance, 
and  after  a  full  interchange  of  views,  Curtin  and  Andrew 
were  charged  with  the  duty  of  preparing  an  address  to 
the  President  and  the  country.  That  address,  coming  ar 


2 yo  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

the  united  voice  of  the  loyal  States  through  their  Gov 
ernors,  was  regarded  by  Lincoln  as  of  inestimable  service 
to  the  cause  of  the  Union.  It  not  only  gave  the  keynote 
for  every  loyal  man  to  support  the  Emancipation  policy, 
but  it  suggested  to  the  President  to  call  out  additional 
troops  to  keep  a  reserve  of  100,000  men  for  any  emer 
gency  of  the  war.* 

*  In  1862,  after  the  disaster  on  the  Peninsula,  and  when  I  was 
in  New  York  under  medical  treatment  and  not  able  to  receive  my 
personal  friends,  I  sent  for  a  newspaper  and  read  of  the  defeat  of 
McClellan's  army.  Soon  after  a  messenger  came  to  see  me  from 
Mr.  Seward,  who  was  at  the  Astor  House,  inviting  me  to  meet 
Mr.  Seward,  saying  that  he  would  come  to  see  me  if  I  could  not 
go  to  see  him.  With  much  risk  and  suffering  I  went  at  once  to 
the  Astor  House,  where  I  found  Mr.  Seward  with  the  Mayor  of 
New  York  and  the  Mayor  of  Philadelphia,  who  were  then  con 
sidering  the  question  of  going  to  Boston.  Mr.  Seward  gave  me 
all  the  telegrams  from  the  front,  which  I  read  carefully,  and  found 
that  of  McClellan's  army  there  were  not  over  80,000  effectives  left. 
I  suggested  to  Mr.  Seward  that  it  might  be  better  to  ask  the  Gov 
ernors  of  the  loyal  States  than  the  Mayors  of  our  cities  to  unite 
in  an  address  to  the  President,  asking  for  a  more  vigorous  prose 
cution  of  the  war  and  an  immediate  call  for  additional  troops. 
He  asked  me  to  put  it  in  writing.  I  did  so,  and  he  immediately 
telegraphed  it  to  the  President,  who  prompt^  answered  that  it 
was  just  what  he  wanted  done.  I  at  once  prepared  a  telegram 
to  the  other  Governors,  and  Colonel  Scott,  who  happened  to  be 
there,  hurried  it  off  to  all  the  Governors  of  the  loyal  States.  Ap 
proving  answers  were  received  from  all  but  Governor  Andrew, 
who  made  the  objection  that  a  public  policy  should  be  declared, 
which  of  course  meant  Emancipation.  The  names  of  the  Gov 
ernors  were  appended  to  the  paper,  and  it  was  immediately  re 
turned  to  Lincoln.  Governor  Andrew  afterward  acquiesced,  and 
I  then  wrote  him  asking  his  views  as  to  the  propriety  of  calling 
the  loyal  Governors  to  meet  at  Altoona  for  the  purpose  of  declar 
ing  a  policy  and  demanding  a  more  vigorous  prosecution  of  the 
war.  He  agreed  to  it  at  once,  and  we  commenced  writing  and 
telegraphing  to  the  Governors,  and  I  had  favorable  answers  to 
all  excepting  Governor  Morgan  of  New  York,  whose  relations 
with  me  were  not  friendly.  Governor  Andrew,  Governor  Todd, 


(Photo  by  Brady,  Washington.) 

ANDREW  G.    CURTIN,    1892. 


272  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Thus,  from  the  day  that  Curtin  welcomed  Lincoln  in 
the  Hall  of  the  House  of  Representatives  at  Harrisburg 
when  on  his  way* to  be  inaugurated,  until  their  last  meet 
ing  in  the  same  hall  when  it  was  the  chamber  of  death, 
and  sorrowing  patriots  passed  silently  through  it  to  take 
their  last  look  upon  the  face  of  the  martyred  President, 
he  was  side  by  side  with  Lincoln  in  every  trial;  and, 
backed  by  his  great  State,  he  was  enabled  to  render  a 
service  to  the  President  and  to  the  country  unapproached 
by  any  other  Governor  of  the  Union.  How  gratefully 
his  public  record  was  appreciated  by  the  people  of  Penn 
sylvania  of  that  day  is  clearly  shown  by  reference  to  the 
journals  of  our  Legislature  of  April  12,  1866,  when  a 
resolution  was  passed,  by  unanimous  vote  in  both 
branches,  thanking  him,  in  the  name  of  Pennsylvania, 
u  for  the  fidelity  with  which,  during  the  four  years  of 
war  by  which  our  country  was  ravaged  and  its  free  in 
stitutions  threatened,  he  stood  by  the  national  govern 
ment  and  cast  into  the  scales  of  loyalty  and  the  Union 
the  honor,  the  wealth,  and  the  strength  of  the  State." 
These  resolutions  were  offered  in  the  House  by  Repre- 

and  myself  consulted  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  tie  highly  approved  of 
oiir  purpose.  In  that  interview  he  did  not  attempt  to  conceal 
the  fact  that  we  were  upon  the  eve  of  an  Emancipation  policy, 
and  he  had  from  us  the  assurance  that  the  Altoona  conference 
would  cordially  endorse  such  a  policy.  All  that  was  done  at  the 
Altoona  conference  had  the  positive  approval  of  President  Lin 
coln  in  advance,  and  he  well  understood  that  the  whole  purpose 
of  the  movement  was  to  strengthen  his  hands  and  support  the 
bolder  policy  that  all  then  knew  was  inevitable.  The  address 
presented  to  Mr.  Lincoln  from  the  Altoona  conference  was  pre 
pared  by  Governor  Andrew  and  myself.  I  did  not  then  doubt 
that  it  would  lose  us  the  coming  election  in  Pennsylvania,  and 
so  said  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  but  I  believed  that  the  country  then  knew 
what  the  war  was  about,  and  that  it  was  time  to  bring  slavery  to 
the  front  as  the  great  issue. — Ex-Governor  Curtin' s  Letter  to  the 
Author,  Feb.  16,  1892, 


LINCOLN  AND    CUR  TIN.  273 

sentative  Ruddimaii,  the  Republican  leader  of  that  body, 
and  were  passed  by  a  vote  of  97  ayes  and  no  nays,  being 
within  3  of  the  entire  membership  of  the  body.*  On 
the  same  day  the  resolutions  were  called  up  in  the  Sen 
ate  by  Senator  Wallace,  the  Democratic  leader  of  that 
body,  and  on  the  call  of  the  ayes  and  nays  received  the 
vote  of  every  Senator.  No  Governor  of  any  State  ever 
received  such  a  tribute  as  this  from  all  parties  when 
about  to  retire  from  his  high  office  after  six  years  of  ser 
vice  during  the  most  heated  partisan  and  factional  strife 

*  Whereas,  The  term  of  His  Excellency  Andrew  G.  Curtin  as 
Governor  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania  will  expire 
with  the  present  year,  and  the  Legislature  of  the  State  will  not 
stand  toward  him  in  the  relation  of  official  courtesy  and  personal 
regard  which  they  have  heretofore  sustained; 

And  whereas,  This  House  cannot  contemplate  his  course  dur 
ing  the  recent  struggle  of  our  country  without  admiration  of  the 
patriotism  which  made  him  one  of  the  earliest,  foremost,  and 
most  constant  of  the  supporters  of  the  government,  and  without 
commendation  of  the  spirit  which  has  prompted  him  with  un 
tiring  energy  and  at  the  sacrifice  of  personal  repose  and  health 
to  give  to  the  soldier  in  the  field  and  in  the  hospital,  and  to  the 
cause  for  which  the  soldier  fell  and  died,  fullest  sympathy  and 
aid;  be  it 

Resolved,  That  in  the  name  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Pennsyl 
vania  we  tender  to  Governor  Curtin  our  thanks  for  the  fidelity 
with  which,  during  the  four  years  of  war  by  which  our  country 
was  ravaged  and  its  free  institutions  threatened,  he  stood  by  the 
national  government  and  cast  into  the  scale  of  loyalty  and  the 
Union  the  honor,  the  wealth,  and  strength  of  the  State. 

Resolved,  That  by  his  devotion  to  his  country,  from  the  dark 
hour  in  which  he  pledged  to  the  late  lamented  President  of  the 
United  States  the  faith  and  steadfast  support  of  our  people,  he 
has  gained  for  his  name  an  historical  place  and  character,  and 
while  rendering  himself  deserving  of  the  nation's  gratitude  he 
has  added  lustre  to  the  fame  and  glory  to  the  name  of  the  Com 
monwealth  over  which  he  has  presided  during  two  terms  of  office 
with  so  much  ability,  and  in  which  he  has  tempered  dignity  with 
kindness  and  won  the  high  respect  and  confidence  of  the  people. 
18 


274  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF    WAR-TIMES, 

ever  known  in  our  political  history.  Again  on  the  6th 
of  April,  1869,  when  he  had  been  a  private  citizen  for 
several  years,  the  Legislature  passed  joint  resolutions  of 
thanks  to  President  Grant  for  his  appointment  of  Curtin 
as  Minister  to  Russia,  and  they  received  the  vote  of  every 
member  present  of  both  branches,  and  were  approved  by 
Governor  Geary  on  the  following  day.*  In  1868  the 
Republican  State  Convention  proclaimed  Curtin  with 
almost  entire  unanimity  for  the  Vice- Presidency  of  the 
United  States  on  the  ticket  with  Grant,  who  was  then 
the  accepted  candidate  of  the  party  for  President,  and  I 
went  to  Chicago  as  chairman  of  the  Pennsylvania  dele 
gation  to  present  his  name  and  cast  the  vote  of  the  State 
for  her  honored  War  Governor. 

Political  necessities  rather  than  individual  merit  con 
trolled  the  National  Convention,  and  Schuyler  Colfax 

*  Joint  Resolutions  relative  to  the  appointment  of  Andrew 
Gregg  Curtin  Minister  to  Russia: 

Whereas,  His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  United  States 
has  appointed  Andrew  Gregg  Curtin,  the  former  Chief  Magis 
trate  of  this  Commonwealth,  to  a  high  and  responsible  position 
in  the  representation  at  the  Court  of  the  ruler  of  the  European 
nation  whose  boast  is  that  he  has  always  been  a  friend  of  the 
United  States  of  America; 

Be  it  resolved,  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of 
the  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania  in  General  Assembly  met, 
That  the  best  wishes  of  the  members  of  this  Assembly  be  con 
veyed  to  His  Excellency  Andrew  G.  Curtin,  Minister  Plenipo 
tentiary  and  Envoy  Extraordinary  of  the  United  States  at  St. 
Petersburg,  Russia,  for  his  restoration  to  health,  so  much  impaired 
by  his  heroic  and  constant  labors  in  behalf  of  this  Commonwealth, 
and  that  he  has  and  always  will  receive  the  grateful  assurance  of 
the  high  regard  and  esteem  in  which  he  is  held  by  his  fellow-citi 
zens,  without  regard  to  partisan  -views,  on  account  of  the  noble 
and  self-sacrificing  spirit  displayed  by  him  alike  in  the  hours  of 
victory  and  defeat,  and  the  fidelity  with  which  he  executed  the 
solemn  and  responsible  trusts  committed  to  his  hands  by  his  fel 
low-citizens. 


LI.\COLN'  AFD    CUR  TIN.  275 

was  taken  to  turn  the  scale  in  doubtful  Indiana;  but 
Curtin  was,  as  ever,  in  the  front  of  the  battle,  as  Grant 
gratefully  acknowledged  by  nominating  him  as  Minister 
to  Russia  a  few  days  after  the  inauguration.  He  had 
been  offered  the  same  mission  by  President  Johnson  sev 
eral  years  earlier,  but  his  fidelity  to  the  cause  that  had 
enlisted  the  best  efforts  of  his  life  forbade  his  even  con 
sidering  it.  In  the  Republican  revolt  against  the  des 
potic  political  and  sectional  policy  of  Grant  in  1872, 
Curtin  sincerely  sympathized  with  the  Liberals,  and  he 
resigned  his  mission  to  obtain  freedom  in  political  action. 
When  on  his  way  home  he  was  met  in  both  Paris  and 
London  by  authorized  offers  of  either  of  those  missions 
if  he  would  remain  abroad,  but  he  declined.  On  his 
return  home  he  was  nominated  by  the  Liberal  Repub 
licans  for  delegate-at-large  to  the  Constitutional  Conven 
tion,  and  Ex-Governor  Bigler  voluntarily  retired  from 
the  Democratic  ticket  to  enable  that  party  to  tender  Cur 
tin  an  unanimous  nomination,  resulting  in  his  election. 
His  exceptional  experience  in  State  government  made 
him  one  of  the  most  practical  and  useful  members  of 
the  body,  and  many  of  the  most  beneficent  reforms  of 
the  new  fundamental  law  are  of  his  creation.  In  1880, 
and  again  in  1882  and  1884,  he  was  elected  to  Congress, 
and  during  his  six  years  of  service  in  the  House  he  was 
the  favorite  of  every  social  and  political  circle.  Since 
then  he  has  enjoyed  the  mellow  evening  of  his  life  in  his 
mountain-home,  where  every  face  brightens  at  his  com 
ing,  and  on  every  hillside  and  valley  of  the  State  there 
are  grizzled  veterans  and  their  children  and  their  chil 
dren's  children  whose  hearts  throb  with  grateful  emotion 
as  they  speak  of  the  Soldier's  Friend, 


(Photo  by  Brady,  Washington.) 

THADDEUS   STEVENS,    1 866. 


LINCOLN  AND  STEVENS. 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  and  Thaddeus  Stevens  were 
-£\  strangely  mated.  Lincoln  as  President  and  Stevens 
as  Commoner  of  the  nation  during  the  entire  period  of  our 
sectional  war  assumed  the  highest  civil  responsibilities  in 
the  administrative  and  legislative  departments  of  the  gov 
ernment.  While  Lincoln  was  President  of  the  whole  peo 
ple,  Stevens,  as  Commoner,  was  their  immediate  represen 
tative  and  oracle  in  the  popular  branch  of  Congress  when 
the  most  momentous  legislative  measures  of  our  history 
were  conceived  and  enacted.  No  two  men  were  so  much 
alike  in  all  the  sympathy  of  greatness  for  the  friendless 
and  the  lowly,  and  yet  no  two  men  could  have  been 
more  unlike  in  the  methods  by  which  they  sought  to 
obtain  the  same  great  end.  Lincoln's  humanity  was 
one  of  the  master  attributes  of  his  character,  and  it  was 
next  to  impossible  for  him  to  punish  even  those  most  de 
serving  of  it.  In  Stevens  humanity  and  justice  were 
singularly  blended,  and  while  his  heart  was  ever  ready 
to  respond  to  the  appeal  of  sorrow,  he  was  one  of  the 
sternest  of  men  in  the  administration  of  justice  upon 
those  who  had  oppressed  the  helpless.  No  man  pleaded 
so  eloquently  in  Congress  for  the  deliverance  of  the  bond 
men  of  the  South  as  did  Stevens,  and  he  made  ceaseless 
battle  for  every  measure  needed  by  ignorant  freedmen  for 
the  enjoyment  of  their  rights  obtained  through  the  mad 
ness  of  Southern  rebellion ;  and  there  was  no  man  of  all 

277 


£78  LINCOLN  AND   MEti  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

our  statesmen  whose  voice  was  so  eloquent  for  the  swift 
punishment  of  the  authors  of  the  war.  He  declared  on 
the  floor  of  Congress  that  if  he  had  the  power  he  would 
summon  a  military  commission  to  try,  convict,  and  exe 
cute  Jefferson  Davis  and  other  leaders  of  the  rebellion 
* '  for  the  murders  at  Andersonville,  the  murders  at  Salis 
bury,  and  the  shooting  down  of  prisoners-of-war  in  cold 
blood;"  and  when  the  whole  world  was  shocked  by  the 
relentless  vengeance  of  Juarez  in  the  summary  execution 
of  Maximilian,  he  was  the  one  man  of  Congress  who  rose 
and  boldly  defended  the  Mexican  President;  and  his 
ground  of  defence  was  that  Maximilian  had  sought  to 
usurp  power  from  the  weak.  Lincoln's  humanity  was 
always  predominant  in  his  nature  and  always  reflected 
itself  in  his  public  and  private  acts.  He  never  signed  a 
death-warrant  unless  it  was  absolutely  unavoidable,  and 
then  always  with  a  degree  of  sorrow  that  could  not  be  con 
cealed.  He  earnestly  desired  that  Davis  and  all  South 
ern  leaders  who  might  be  called  to  account  after  the  war 
for  precipitating  the  nation  into  fraternal  strife  should 
safely  escape  from  the  country;  and  Maximilian  could 
not  have  appealed  in  vain  to  Lincoln  for  his  life  had  it 
been  within  his  power  to  save  him.  Such  were  the  con 
flicting  attributes  of  the  two  great  civil  leaders  of  the 
country  during  the  war.  Each  filled  his  great  trust  with 
masterly  fidelity,  and  the  opposing  qualities  of  each  were 
potent  upon  the  other. 

The  country  has  almost  forgotten  the  exceptionally  re 
sponsible  position  of  Stevens  as  the  Great  Commoner  of 
our  civil  war.  It  is  the  one  high  trust  of  a  free  govern 
ment  that  must  be  won  solely  by  ability  and  merit.  The 
Commoner  of  a  republic  is  the  organ  of  the  people,  and 
he  can  hold  his  place  only  when  all  confess  his  pre-emi 
nent  qualities  for  the  discharge  of  his  duties.  Presi 
dents,  Cabinets,  Senators,  and  Representatives  may  be 


LINCOLN  AND  STEVENS.  273 

accidents.  Fortuitous  circumstances  or  sudden  muta 
tions  in  politics  may  create  any  of  these  civil  function 
aries  in  a  popular  government  to  serve  their  brief  terms 
and  pass  away  into  forgetfulness,  but  the  Commoner  of 
the  nation  must  be  the  confessed  " leader  of  leaders." 
Mere  popular  attributes  are  valueless  in  struggling  for 
such  a  place.  Only  he  who  can  come  to  the  front  when 
ever  occasion  calls,  lead  discordant  elements  to  a  common 
end,  and  maintain  his  position  in  all  the  sudden  changes 
of  a  mercurial  body  can  go  into  history  as  an  American 
Commoner;  and  Stevens  grandly,  undisputedly,  met  these 
high  requirements.  There  were  those  around  him  in 
Congress  much  riper  in  experience  in  national  legis 
lation,  for  he  had  served  but  six  years  in  the  House 
when  the  war  began,  and  four  of  those  were  nearly  a 
decade  before  the  rebellion ;  but  when  the  great  conflict 
came  before  which  all  but  the  bravest-hearted  quailed, 
Stevens'  supreme  ability  and  dauntless  courage  made 
him  speedily  accepted  by  all  as  the  leader  of  the  popular 
branch  of  Congress.  In  all  the  conflicts  of  opinion  and 
grave  doubts  among  even  the  sincerest  of  men  as  to  the 
true  policy  of  the  government  in  meeting  armed  rebel 
lion,  Stevens  was  the  one  man  who  never  faltered,  who 
never  hesitated,  who  never  temporized,  but  who  was  ready 
to  meet  aggressive  treason  with  the  most  aggressive  as 
saults.  He  and  Lincoln  worked  substantially  on  the 
same  lines,  earnestly  striving  to  attain  the  same  ends, 
but  Stevens  was  always  in  advance  of  public  sentiment, 
while  Lincoln  ever  halted  until  assured  that  the  con 
siderate  judgment  of  the  nation  would  sustain  him. 
Stevens  was  the  pioneer  who  was  ever  in  advance  of  the 
government  in  every  movement  for  the  suppression  of 
the  rebellion,  whether  by  military  or  civil  measures.  He 
always  wanted  great  armies,  heroic  chieftains,  and  relent 
less  blows,  and  he  was  ready  to  follow  the  overthrow  of 


280  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

rebellion  with  the  sternest  retributive  policy.  He  had 
faith  that  the  people  would  sustain  the  war — that  they 
would  patriotically  submit  to  any  sacrifice  of  blood  and 
treasure  necessary  to  preserve  the  Union  and  overthrow 
slavery  that  was  the  cause  of  fraternal  conflict,  and  he 
was  always  in  the  lead  in  pressing  every  measure  that 
promised  to  weaken  the  slave  power  in  any  part  of  the 
Union. 

Lincoln  was  inspired  by  the  same  patriotic  purpose 
and  sympathies  with  Stevens  in  everything  but  his  pol 
icy  of  vengeance.  Lincoln  possessed  the  sagacity  to 
await  the  fullness  of  time  for  all  things,  and  thus  he 
failed  in  nothing.  These  two  great  civil  leaders  were 
not  in  close  personal  relations.  Stevens  was  ever  im 
patient  of  Lincoln's  tardiness,  and  Lincoln  was  always 
patient  with  Stevens'  advanced  and  often  impracticable 
methods.  Stevens  was  a  born  dictator  in  politics;  Lin 
coln  a  born  follower  of  the  people,  but  always  wisely  aid 
ing  them  to  the  safest  judgment  that  was  to  be  his  guide. 
When  Stevens  proposed  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the 
District  of  Columbia,  and  followed  it  with  the  extension 
of  the  elective  franchise  to  the  liberated  slaves,  very 
many  of  his  party  followers  in  the  House  faltered  and 
threatened  revolt,  and  only  a  man  of  Stevens'  iron  will 
and  relentless  mastery  could  have  commanded  a  solid 
party  vote  for  the  measures  which  were  regarded  by 
many  as  political  suicide.  I  sat  by  him  one  morning 
in  the  House  before  the  session  had  opened  when  the 
question  of  negro  suffrage  in  the  District  of  Columbia 
was  about  to  be  considered,  and  I  heard  a  leading  Penn 
sylvania  Republican  approach  him  to  protest  against 
committing  the  party  to  that  policy.  Stevens'  grim  face 
And  cold  gray  eye  gave  answer  to  the  man  before  his  bit 
ter  words  were  uttered.  He  waved  his  hand  to  the  trem 
bling  suppliant  and  bade  him  go  to  his  seat  and  vote  for 


LINCOLN  AND   STEVENS.  281 

the  measure  or  confess  himself  a  coward  to  the  world. 
The  Commoner  was  obeyed,  for  had  disobedience  fol 
lowed  the  offender  would  have  been  proclaimed  to  his 
constituents,  over  the  name  of  Stevens,  as  a  coward,  and 
that  would  have  doomed  him  to  defeat. 

The  relations  between  Lincoln  and  Stevens  were 
always  friendly,  but  seldom  cordial.  Stevens  did  not 
favor  the  nomination  of  Lincoln  in  1860,  although  he 
voted  for  him  as  a  second  choice  in  preference  to  Seward. 
He  was  the  champion  of  John  McLean  for  President, 
and  presented  the  anomaly  of  the  most  radical  Repub 
lican  leader  of  the  country,  Giddings  excepted,  support 
ing  the  most  conservative  candidate  for  the  Presidency. 
He  was  politician  enough  to  understand  that  there  was 
a  large  conservative  element,  especially  in  Pennsylvania 
and  Indiana,  that  had  to  be  conciliated  to  elect  a  Repub 
lican  President,  and  he  loved  McLean  chiefly  because 
McLean  had  dared  to  disobey  the  commands  of  Jackson 
when  in  his  Cabinet.  He  was  again  a  delegate  when 
Lincoln  was  renominated  in  1864,  and  he  voted  for  Lin 
coln  simply  because  it  was  not  possible  to  nominate  any 
other  man  more  in  accord  with  his  convictions;  but  in 
neither  of  these  conventions,  in  both  of  which  he  voted 
for  Lincoln,  was  he  enthusiastic  in  Lincoln's  cause.  He 
had  faith  in  Lincoln's  patriotism  and  integrity,  but  he 
believed  him  weak  because  he  kept  far  behind  Stevens 
in  his  war  measures,  and  he  was  especially  bitter  against 
the  nomination  of  Johnson  for  Vice-President  instead 
of  Hamlin,  but  he  permitted  his  vote  to  be  recorded  for 
Johnson  in  obedience  to  the  9bvious  purpose  of  his  own 
delegation  and  of  the  convention  to  nominate  him.  I 
sat  close  by  him  in  the  first  informal  meeting  of  the 
Pennsylvania  delegation  in  Baltimore  in  1864,  and,  being 
a  delegate-at-large,  I  was  one  of  the  first  four  who  voted 
on  the  choice  for  Vice-President  When  I  voted  for 


282  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

Johnson,  Stevens  was  startled,  and  turning  to  me  he 
said  in  a  tone  of  evident  bitterness,  "Can't  you  find  a 
candidate  for  Vice- President  in  the  United  States,  with 
out  going  down  to  one  of  those  damned  rebel  provinces 
to  pick  one  up  ?"  I  gave  a  kind  answer  and  evaded  dis 
cussion  of  the  subject.  He  had  no  personal  love  for 
either  of  the  candidates  for  whom  his  own  vote  had  been 
finally  cast,  but  his  hatred  of  McClellan  called  out  his 
fiercest  invective  and  made  him  ready  to  do  tireless  battle 
for  his  defeat.  He  harshly  judged  all  men  who  pretended 
to  prosecute  the  war  while  protecting  slavery,  and  he  be 
lieved  that  McClellan  was  a  traitor  to  the  cause  for  which 
he  was  leading  his  armies,  and,  believing  it,  he  declared 
it. 

Stevens  never  saw  Lincoln  during  the  war  except  when 
necessity  required  it.  It  was  not  his  custom  to  fawn 
upon  power  or  flatter  authority,  and  his  free  and  incisive 
criticism  of  public  men  generally  prevented  him  from 
being  in  sympathetic  touch  with  most  of  the  officials 
connected  with  the  administration.  He  was  one  of  the 
earliest  of  the  party  leaders  to  demand  the  unconditional 
and  universal  freedom  of  the  slaves,  and  he  often  grieved 
Lincoln  sorely  by  his  mandatory  appeals  for  an  Emanci 
pation  Proclamation,  and  by  the  keen  satire  that  only  he 
could  employ  against  those  who  differed  from  him.  It 
was  known  to  but  few  that  he  suffered  a  serious  disap 
pointment  from  lyincoln  when  Cameron  was  appointed 
to  the  Cabinet.  Stevens  took  no  part  in  the  contest  for 
a  Pennsylvania  Cabinet  officer  until  after  it  became 
known  that  Lincoln  had  revoked  his  offer  of  a  Cabinet 
portfolio  to  Cameron  about  the  ist  of  January.  Stevens 
then  entered  the  field  with  great  earnestness  as  a  candi 
date  for  the  Cabinet  himself,  and  the  position  he  desired 
was  that  of  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  In  obedience  to 
his  invitation  I  met  him  at  Harrisburg,  and  found  him 


LINCOLN  AND  STEVENS.  283 

more  interested  in  reaching  the  Cabinet  than  I  had  ever 
known  him  in  any  of  his  political  aspirations.  Later, 
when  Cameron  became  again  prominent  as  a  Cabinet 
expectant,  Stevens  bitterly  protested,  and  when  Cam 
eron's  appointment  was  announced  he  felt  personally 
aggrieved,  although  few  even  of  his  most  intimate  ac 
quaintances  had  any  knowledge  of  it.  It  was  his  second 
disappointment  in  his  efforts  to  reach  Cabinet  honors. 
In  December,  1839,  when  the  Whig  National  Convention 
was  about  to  meet  at  Harrisburg  to  decide  whether  Clay, 
Harrison,  or  Scott  should  be  honored  with  the  candidacy, 
Harrison  sent  to  Stevens  by  Mr.  Purdy  an  autograph 
letter  voluntarily  proposing  that  if  Harrison  should  be 
nominated  and  elected  President,  Stevens  would  be  made 
a  member  of  his  Cabinet.  Stevens  was  one  of  the  most 
potent  of  the  political  leaders  in  that  convention,  and  he 
finally  controlled  the  nomination  for  Harrison.  He  never 
saw  or  heard  from  Harrison  from  that  time  until  he  was 
inaugurated  as  President,  and  he  was  astounded  when 
the  Cabinet  was  nominated  to  the  Senate  to  find  his 
name  omitted.  So  reticent  was  he  as  to  Harrison's  pre 
vious  proffer  of  the  position  that  Mr.  Burroughs,  who 
was  at  the  head  of  the  Pennsylvanians  in  Washington 
urging  Stevens'  appointment,  was  never  advised  of  the 
promise  he  held  from  Harrison  for  the  place.  Harrison 
died  too  early  to  feel  the  retribution  that  would  surely 
have  come  from  Stevens,  but  in  his  second  disappoint 
ment  Stevens  was  face  to  face  with  Lincoln  and  side  by 
side  with  him  until  death  divided  them.  Only  once 
during  Lincoln's  administration  can  I  recall  Stevens' 
positive  and  enthusiastic  commendation  of  Lincoln,  and 
that  was  when  he  issued  his  Emancipation  Proclamation 
in  1862.  He  then  believed  in  Lincoln,  and  expected  a 
rapid  advance  in  every  line  of  aggression  against  slavery 
and  rebellion,  but  soon  new  causes  of  dissent  arose  be- 


284  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF   WAR-TIMES. 

tween  them,  as  Stevens  called  for  the  speedy  confiscation 
of  property  of  those  in  rebellion  and  for  the  punishment 
of  all  who  were  responsible  for  the  civil  war.  Thus  they 
continued  during  the  whole  period  of  Lincoln's  adminis 
tration,  both  earnestly  working  to  solve  the  same  great 
problems  in  the  interest  of  free  government,  and  yet  sel 
dom  in  actual  harmony  in  their  methods  and  policies. 

I  am  quite  sure  that  Stevens  respected  Lincoln  much 
more  than  he  would  have  respected  any  other  man  in 
the  same  position  with  Lincoln's  convictions  of  duty. 
He  could  not  but  appreciate  Lincoln's  generous  forbear 
ance  even  with  all  of  Stevens'  irritating  conflicts,  and 
Lincoln  profoundly  appreciated  Stevens  as  one  of  his 
most  valued  and  useful  co-workers,  and  never  cherished 
resentment  even  when  Stevens  indulged  in  his  bitterest 
sallies  of  wit  or  sarcasm  at  Lincoln's  tardiness.  Strange 
as  it  may  seem,  these  two  great  characters,  ever  in  con 
flict  and  yet  ever  battling  for  the  same  great  cause,  ren 
dered  invaluable  service  to  each  other,  and  unitedly  ren 
dered  incalculable  service  in  saving  the  Republic.  Had 
Stevens  not  declared  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  as  soon 
as  the  war  began,  and  pressed  it  in  and  out  of  season, 
Lincoln  could  not  have  issued  his  Emancipation  Procla 
mation  as  early  as  September,  1862.  Stevens  was  ever 
clearing  the  underbrush  and  preparing  the  soil,  while 
Lincoln  followed  to  sow  the  seeds  that  were  to  ripen  in 
a  regenerated  Union ;  and  while  Stevens  was  ever  hast 
ening  the  opportunity  for  Lincoln  to  consummate  great 
achievements  in  the  steady  advance  made  for  the  over 
throw  of  slavery,  Lincoln  wisely  conserved  the  utter 
ances  and  efforts  of  Stevens  until  the  time  became  fully 
ripe  when  the  harvest  could  be  gathered.  I  doubt  not 
that  Stevens,  had  he  been  in  Lincoln's  position,  would 
have  been  greatly  sobered  by  the  responsibility  that  the 
President  must  accept  for  himself  alone,  and  I  doubt  not 


LINCOLN  AND  STEVENS.  285 

that  if  Lincoln  had  been  a  Senator  or  Representative  in 
Congress,  he  would  have  declared  in  favor  of  Emancipa 
tion  long  before  he  did  it  as  President.  Stevens  as  Com 
moner  could  afford  to  be  defeated,  to  have  his  aggressive 
measures  postponed,  and  to  take  up  the  battle  for  them 
afresh  as  often  as  he  was  repulsed;  but  the  President 
could  proclaim  no  policy  in  the  name  of  the  Republic 
without  absolute  assurance  of  its  success.  Each  in  his 
great  trust  attained  the  highest  possible  measure  of  suc 
cess,  and  the  two  men  who  more  than  all  others  blended 
the  varied  currents  of  their  efforts  and  crystallized  them 
in  the  unchangeable  policy  of  the  goverment  were  Abra 
ham  Lincoln  and  Thaddeus  Stevens. 

After  the  death  of  Lincoln,  Stevens  was  one  of  tie 
earliest  of  the  Republican  leaders  to  place  himself  in  an 
aggressively  hostile  attitude  to  Johnson,  and  he  persisted 
in  it  with  tireless  energy  until  he  performed  his  last  great 
task  in  his  plea  before  the  Senate  for  the  conviction  of 
the  President  under  articles  of  impeachment  preferred 
by  the  House.  He  was  then  greatly  enfeebled  by  broken 
health,  but  his  mental  powers  were  unabated.  I  remem 
ber  meeting  him  one  morning  in  acting  Vice-President 
Wade's  room  of  the  Capitol,  before  'the  meeting  of  the 
Senate,  when  the  impeachment  trial  was  in  progress. 
Chase  had  just  startled  some  of  the  Republican  leaders 
by  rulings  which  foreshadowed  the  probable  acquittal 
of  Johnson.  Stevens  came  limping  into  Wade's  room, 
dropped  into  an  easy-chair,  and  at  once  opened  his  in 
vective  upon  Chase.  He  ended  his  criticism  of  the  trial 
with  these  words:  "It  is  the  meanest  case,  before  the 
meanest  tribunal,  and  on  the  meanest  subject  of  human 
history. ' '  After  the  acquittal  of  Johnson  he  seemed  al 
most  entirely  hopeless  of  preserving  the  fruits  of  the  vic 
tory  won  by  our  armies  in  the  overthrow  of  the  rebellion. 
I  remember  meeting  him  at  his  house  some  three  weeks 


286  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

before  his  death.  He  spoke  of  the  perfidy  of  Johnson 
with  great  bitterness,  and  seemed  clouded  with  gloom  as 
to  the  achievements  of  his  own  life.  He  then  hoped  to 
go  to  Bedford  Springs  to  recover  sufficient  vigor  to  be 
able  to  resume  his  seat  at  the  next  session,  but  he  saw 
little  of  the  future  that  promised  restoration  of  the  Union 
with  justice  to  the  liberated  slaves.  Although  he  was  the 
acknowledged  Commoner  of  the  war,  and  the  acknow 
ledged  leader  of  the  House  as  long  as  he  was  able  to  re 
tain  his  seat  after  the  war  had  closed,  he  said,  ' '  My  life 
has  been  a  failure.  With  all  this  great  struggle  of  years 
in  Washington,  and  the  fearful  sacrifice  of  life  and  trea 
sure,  I  see  little  hope  for  the  Republic."  After  a  mo 
ment's  pause  his  face  suddenly  brightened,  and  he  said, 
' '  After  all,  I  may  say  that  my  life  has  not  been  entirely 
vain.  When  I  remember  that  I  gave  free  schools  to 
Pennsylvania,  my  adopted  State,  I  think  my  life  may 
have  been  worth  the  living. ' '  He  had  lately  reprinted 
his  speech  delivered  in  the  Pennsylvania  House  in  1835 
that  changed  the  body  from  its  purpose  to  repeal  the 
free-school  law,  and  he  handed  me  a  copy  of  it,  say 
ing,  "That  was  the  proudest  effort  of  my  life.  It  gave 
schools  to  the  poor  and  helpless  children  of  the  State. ' ' 
Thus  did  the  Great  Commoner  of  the  nation,  crowned 
with  the  greenest  laurels  of  our  statesmanship,  turn  back 
more  than  a  generation  from  his  greatest  achievements 
because  they  were  incomplete,  although  fully  assured, 
to  find  the  silver  lining  to  the  many  disappointments 
of  his  life. 

Stevens,  like  Lincoln,  had  few  intimate  acquaintances, 
and  no  one  in  whom  he  implicitly  confided.  That  he 
had  had  some  untold  sorrow  was  accepted  by  all  who 
knew  him  well,  but  none  could  venture  to  invade  the 
sacred  portals  of  his  inner  life.  He  seldom  spoke  of 
himself,  but  his  grim,  cynical  smile  and  his  pungent 


LINCOLN  AND   STEVENS.  2&7 

invective  against  the  social  customs  of  the  times  pro 
claimed  his  love  of  solitude,  except  when  his  lot  could 
be  cast  with  the  very  few  congenial  spirits  he  found 
around  him.  One  name  alone  ever  brightened  his  stern 
face  and  kindled  the  gray  eye  that  was  so  often  lustre 
less,  and  that  name  was  "mother."  He  loved  to  speak 
of  her,  and  when  he  did  so  all  the  harsh  lines  of  his 
countenance  disappeared  to  give  place  to  the  tenderness 
of  a  child.  That  one  devotion  was  like  an  oasis  in  the 
desert  of  his  affections,  and,  regardless  of  his  individual 
convictions,  he  reverenced  everything  taught  him  by  his 
mother.  In  his  will  he  provided  that  the  sexton  of  her 
little  churchyard  in  the  bleak  hills  of  Vermont  should 
ever  keep  her  grave  green,  * '  and  plant  roses  and  other 
cheerful  flowers  at  each  of  the  four  corners  of  said  grave 
every  spring."  He  also  made  a  devise  of  $1000  to  aid 
in  the  building  of  a  Baptist  church  in  Lancaster,  giving 
in  the  will  this  reason  for  it:  "I  do  this  out  of  respect  to 
the  memory  of  my  mother,  to  whom  I  owe  what  little 
prosperity  I  have  had  on  earth,  which,  small  as  it  is,  I 
desire  emphatically  to  acknowledge." 

I  need  hardly  say  that  a  man  of  Stevens'  positive  and 
aggressive  qualities  left  an  enduring  record  of  his  great 
ness  in  both  the  statutes  and  the  fundamental  law  of  the 
nation.  Unlike  his  distinguished  fellow-townsman,  Pres 
ident  Buchanan,  who  with  all  his  long  experience  in  both 
branches  of  Congress  never  formulated  a  great  measure 
to  stand  as  a  monument  of  his  statesmanship,  Stevens 
was  the  master-spirit  of  every  aggressive  movement  in 
Congress  to  overthrow  the  rebellion  and  slavery.  His 
views  of  the  civil  war  and  of  reconstruction  were  point 
edly  presented  in  the  Confiscation  Act  of  July  17,  1862. 
It  was  a  radical  measure,  and  clearly  foreshadowed  the 
employment  of  freedmen  in  the  military  service  of  the 
Union.  It  was  practically  the  abolition  of  slavery  by 


288  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Congress  under  the  war  powers  of  the  government.  Lin 
coln  saw  that  the  passage  of  the  bill  was  inevitable,  and 
he  took  occasion  to  make  known  the  fact  that  it  could 
not  meet  with  his  approval,  because  it  assumed  that  Con 
gress  had  the  power  to  abolish  slavery  within  a  State. 
He  went  so  far  as  to  prepare  a  veto,  but  Stevens  wisely 
obviated  the  necessity  of  a  veto  by  consenting  to  an  ex 
planatory  joint  resolution  of  Congress  relieving  the  bill  of 
its  acutely  offensive  features,  and  Lincoln  signed  the  bill 
and  the  explanatory  resolutions  together.  Stevens  was 
the  author  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  national 
Constitution,  although  it  was  not  accepted  as  he  would 
have  preferred  it.  This  new  article  of  the  fundamental 
law,  next  to  the  Thirteenth  Article  abolishing  slavery,  is 
the  most  important  of  all  the  actions  of  Congress  relating 
to  reconstruction.  It  conferred  unchangeably  upon  the 
liberated  slaves  the  high  right  of  American  citizenship, 
and  made  it  impossible  for  any  State  to  abridge  the  privi 
leges  of  any  race.  It  also  limited  representation  to  the 
enfranchised  voters  of  the  States;  it  made  the  validity 
of  the  public  debt  absolutely  sacred;  prohibited  the  as 
sumption  or  payment  of  Confederate  debt  by  any  State; 
and  it  disqualified  most  of  the  Southern  leaders  from  ever 
again  enjoying  citizenship  unless  their  disability  were 
relieved  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  Congress.  Stevens  was 
bitterly  opposed  to  the  provision  allowing  restoration  to 
citizenship  of  any  who  had  taken  the  oath  of  office,  mili 
tary  or  civil,  to  support  the  government  and  afterward 
engaged  in  the  rebellion,  but,  being  unable  to  obtain  the 
absolute  disqualification  of  those  men,  he  accepted  the 
gravest  obstacles  that  he  could  interpose  against  the  res 
toration  of  civil  rights.  His  policy  of  reconstruction, 
exclusive  of  his  fierce  confiscation  and  retributive  pur 
poses,  would  have  been  a  priceless  blessing  to  the  South, 
although  at  the  time  it  would  have  been  accepted  as  ex- 


LINCOLN  AND  STEVENS.  289 

tremely  vindictive.  He  would  have  held  the  rebellious 
States  as  provinces  and  governed  them  as  Territories,  to 
await  the  period  when  they  might  with  safety  be  restored 
to  the  Union.  Had  that  policy  been  adopted  the  desola 
tion  almost  worse  than  war  would  have  been  averted  in 
the  Southern  States.  Sadly  as  the  people  of  the  South 
were  impoverished  by  war,  the  greatest  humiliation  they 
ever  suffered  was  in  the  rule  of  the  carpet-bagger  and 
the  adventurer  who  despoiled  them  of  safety  and  credit 
and  ran  riot  in  every  channel  of  State  authority.  Had 
they  been  held  as  provinces  there  would  have  been  peace, 
their  industries  would  have  been  speedily  revived,  mu 
tual  confidence  between  the  North  and  South  would  have 
rapidly  strengthed,  and  in  a  very  few  years  at  the  most 
they  would  have  resumed  their  position  in  the  galaxy  of 
States ;  and  universal  negro  suffrage  would  not  have  been 
in  the  cup  of  bitterness  they  had  to  drain.  Stevens  was 
bitterly  denounced  by  many  for  his  vindictive  recon 
struction  policy;  but,  stripped  of  its  utterly  impracti 
cable  and  impossible  confiscation  and  retributive  fea 
tures,  it  would  have  been  the  wisest  policy  for  both 
North  and  South  that  could  have  been  adopted. 

It  is  a  common  belief  that  on  the  question  of  recon 
struction  and  on  many  other  questions  relating  to  the 
war  Stevens  planted  himself  entirely  above  the  Consti 
tution  and  acted  in  utter  contempt  of  the  supreme  law. 
I  have  heard  thoughtless  and  malicious  people  many 
times  quote  him  as  having  said  ' '  Damn  the  Constitu 
tion!"  but  Stevens  never  uttered  or  cherished  such  a 
sentiment.  He  defined  his  views  on  the  subject  so 
clearly  that  none  could  mistake  them  in  his  speech  giv 
ing  his  reasons  for  voting  for  the  admission  of  West 
Virginia  as  a  State.  He  quoted  the  requirements  of  the 
Constitution,  and  said  that  it  was  a  mockery  to  assume 

that  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  had  been  com- 
19 


2go  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

plied  with.  He  did  not  justify  or  excuse  his  vote  in 
favor  of  the  creation  of  a  new  State  because  of  his  dis 
regard  of,  or  contempt  for,  the  Constitution.  On  the 
contrary,  he  presented  the  unanswerable  argument  that 
Virginia  was  in  rebellion  against  the  government  and 
the  Constitution,  and  had  been  conceded  belligerent 
rights  by  our  government  and  by  the  governments  of 
Europe,  thus  making  her  subject  to  the  rules  of  war 
governing  a  public  enemy,  whereby  she  placed  herself 
beyond  the  pale  of  the  Constitution  and  had  no  claim 
upon  its  protecting  attributes.  He  said,  "We  may  ad 
mit  West  Virginia  as  a  new  State,  not  by  virtue  of  any 
provision  in  the  Constitution,  but  under  the  absolute 
power  which  the  laws  of  war  give  us  under  the  circum 
stances  in  which  we  are  placed.  I  shall  vote  for  this  bill 
upon  that  theory,  and  upon  that  alone,  for  I  will  not 
stultify  myself  by  supposing  that  we  have  any  warrant 
in  the  Constitution  for  this  proceeding. ' '  The  logic  that 
a  belligerent  power,  recognized  by  ourselves  and  by  the 
world,  was  entirely  beyond  the  protecting  power  of  our 
Constitution  was  indisputable,  and  in  that  case,  as  in  all 
cases,  he  always  maintained  the  sanctity  of  the  Consti 
tution  to  all  who  had  not  become  public  enemies  with 
conceded  belligerent  rights. 

Being  outside  the  pale  of  the  Constitution  in  war,  he 
held  that  the  insurgent  States  occupied  the  legal  status 
of  conquered  enemies  when  the  war  closed,  and  upon 
that  theory  was  based  his  whole  policy  of  reconstruction, 
including  the  confiscation  of  property  and  the  punish 
ment  of  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion.  That  he  was  ab 
stractly  right  in  his  interpretation  of  the  laws  of  war 
cannot  be  questioned,  however  widely  others  may  differ 
from  him  in  the  expediency  or  justice  of  the  measures 
he  proposed.  He  was  one  of  the  first  to  appreciate  the 
truth  that  President  Johnson  had  adopted  a  policy  of  re- 


£~—^ 


FAC-SIMII.E;  OF  BETTER  FROM  STEVENS. 


292  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF    WAR-TIMES. 

construction  that  the  Republican  party  could  not  sustain. 
In  this  I  heartily  agreed  with  him,  and  one  of  my  most 
valued  mementos  of  the  men  of  war-times  is  an  auto 
graph  letter  received  from  Mr.  Stevens  warmly  com 
mending  an  editorial  on  the  subject  published  in  the 
Chambersburg  Repository,  which  I  then  edited,  in  which 
he  expressed  the  hope,  since  proved  gratefully  prophetic, 
that  I  should  one  day  conduct  a  daily  newspaper  in  Phila 
delphia  with  a  hundred  thousand  readers.  *  I  had  voted 
for  Johnson's  nomination  for  Vice-President  in  disregard 
of  Stevens'  bitter  complaint,  but  when  Johnson  had  dis 
graced  himself  before  the  nation  and  the  world  by  his 
exhibition  of  inebriety  at  his  inauguration,  I  had  de 
nounced  him  and  demanded  his  resignation.  He  never 
was  permitted  to  return  to  the  Senate  as  Vice-President, 
but  a  little  more  than  a  month  thereafter  the  assassination 
of  Lincoln  made  him  President.  Assuming  that  my  free 
criticism  and  demand  for  his  resignation  would  preclude 
cordial  relations  between  us,  I  did  not  visit  him  in  the 
White  House  until  he  had  twice  requested  me  to  do  so 
through  Governor  Curtin,  and  my  first  and  only  inter 
view  with  him  convinced  me  that  his  policy  of  recon 
struction  could  not  be  sustained  by  the  North. 

My  relations  with  Stevens  for  a  dozen  years  before  his 
death  were  peculiarly  pleasant,  and  as  intimate  perhaps 
as  was  common  between  him  and  those  in  the  narrow 
circle  of  his  close  acquaintances.  He  spent  his  summers 


*  WASHINGTON,  Dec.  16,  1865. 

DEAR  SIR  :  I  thank  you  for  the  kindness  to  me  personally  in 
your  letter;  but  I  more  particularly  thank  you  for  the  grand  argu 
ment  in  favor  of  the  right  policy. 

You  ought  to  speak  from  Philadelphia  in  a  daily  of  100,000 
circulation.  Why  cannot  you  get  up  such  a  paper? 

THADDEUS  STEVENS. 
Coi,.  A.  K.  McCLURE. 


LINCOLN  AND    STEVENS.  293 

at  his  quiet  mountain-furnace  home  in  Franklin  county, 
where  I  resided,  and  during  the  few  years  that  I  was  in 
active  practice  at  the  bar  in  Chambersburg  he  attended 
our  courts  and  tried  one  side  of  nearly  every  important 
cause.  In  all  my  acquaintance  with  the  lawyers  of 
Pennsylvania  I  regard  Stevens  as  having  more  nearly 
completed  the  circle  of  a  great  lawyer  than  any  other 
member  of  the  Pennsylvania  bar.  He  was  perfect  in 
practice,  a  master  of  the  law,  exceptionally  skillful  in 
eliciting  testimony  from  witnesses,  a  most  sagacious,  elo 
quent,  and  persuasive  advocate,  and  one  of  the  strongest 
men  before  a  law  court  that  I  have  ever  heard.  He  was 
thoroughly  master  of  himself  in  his  profession,  and  his 
withering  invective  and  crushing  wit,  so  often  employed 
in  conversation  and  in  political  speeches,  were  never  dis 
played  in  the  trial  of  a  cause  unless  it  was  eminently  wise 
to  do  so;  and  he  was  one  of  the  most  courteous  of  men 
at  the  bar  whether  associate  or  opponent.  He  was  espe 
cially  generous  in  his  kindness  to  young  members  of  the 
bar  unless  they  undertook  to  unduly  flap  their  fledgling 
wings,  when  they  were  certain  to  suffer  speedy  and 
humiliating  discomfiture.  His  trial  of  the  Hanway  trea 
son  case  before  Judge  Greer  in  the  United  States  Court 
at  Philadelphia  exhibited  his  matchless  skill  in  the  best 
use  of  his  matchless  powers.  While  he  conceived  and 
directed  every  feature  of  the  defence,  he  was  the  silent 
man  of  the  trial.  He  knew  the  political  prejudices 
which  were  attached  to  his  then  odious  attitude  on  the 
slavery  question,  and  he  put  upon  the  late  Chief  Justice, 
John  M.  Read,  the  laboring  oars  of  the  trial,  as  Read 
was  a  Democrat  of  State  and  even  national  fame.  It  was 
a  trial  that  attracted  the  attention  not  only  of  the  nation, 
but  of  the  civilized  world,  and  was  the  first  case  adjudi 
cated  in  Pennsylvania  in  our  higher  courts  under  the 
Fugitive  Slave  lyaw  of  1850.  Mr.  Gorsuch,  a  Virginia 


294  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF    WAR-TIMES. 

minister,  pursuing  his  slave  into  Chester  county,  was 
killed  in  an  altercation  at  Christiana  by  the  friends  of 
the  hunted  bondman,  and  Hanway  and  others  were  in 
dicted  for  treason  in  inciting  to  rebellion  and  murder. 
Hanway  was  acquitted,  and  he  owed  his  deliverance  to 
the  legal  acumen  and  skill  of  Thaddeus  Stevens. 

The  highest  tribute  ever  paid  to  an  American  states 
man  since  the  foundation  of  the  Republic  was  paid  to 
Thaddeus  Stevens  by  his  bereaved  constituents  of  L/an- 
caster  county  when  his  dead  body  lay  in  state  at  his 
home.  He  died  on  Thursday,  the  nth  of  August,  1868, 
and  his  body  was  brought  from  Washington  to  his  home 
on  the  following  day,  and  on  Saturday  it  was  viewed  by 
thousands  of  sorrowing  friends.  The  Republican  prim 
ary  elections  had  been  called  for  that  day,  and,  although 
Stevens  had  died  three  days  before  and  a  nomination  was 
to  be  made  for  his  successor,  no  one  of  the  several  candi 
dates  in  the  county  dared  to  whisper  his  name  as  an  as 
pirant  while  Stevens'  body  was  untombed.  Acting  under 
a  common  inspiration,  the  people  of  the  county  who  were 
entitled  to  participate  in  the  primary  elections  cast  a 
unanimous  vote  for  Stevens'  renomination  as  their  can 
didate  for  Congress  when  they  knew  that  he  had  passed 
away  and  his  body  was  in  state  in  his  humble  house  in 
Lancaster.  There  is  nothing  in  Grecian  or  Roman  story 
of  such  a  tribute  to  a  dead  leader.  Monuments  were 
erected  in  those  days  to  greatness  which  have  crumbled 
away  under  the  gnawing  tooth  of  time,  but  the  dust  of 
Thaddeus  Stevens  reposes  under  an  humble  monument 
suggested  by  himself,  located  in  an  humble  u  City  of 
the  Silent,"  chosen  by  him  because  it  recognized  "  equal 
ity  of  man  before  his  Creator,"  and  admitted  any  of 
every  race  and  color  to  sleep  the  sleep  that  knows  no 
waking.  The  inscription  on  his  monument,  dictated  by 
himself,  is  in  these  words: 


LINCOLN  AND   STEVENS.  295 

THADDEUS  STEVENS, 
Born  at  Danville,  Caledonia  Co.,  Vermont, 

April  4,  1792. 

Died  at  Washington,  D.  C., 
August  n,  1868. 


I  repose  in  this  quiet  and  secluded  spot, 
Not  from  any  natural  preference  for  solitude, 
But,  finding  other  Cemeteries  limited  as  to  Race 

By  Charter  Rules, 
I  have  chosen  this  that  I  might  illustrate 

In  my  death 

The  Principles  which  I  advocated 
Through  a  long  life: 

EQUALITY  OF  MAN  BEFORE  HIS  CREATOR. 

Thus  passed  away  the  Great  Commoner  of  the  war;  the 
friend  of  the  lowly,  the  oppressed,  and  the  friendless;  the 
author  of  our  free-school  system  of  Pennsylvania  that  now 
gives  education  to  the  humblest  of  every  township ;  and  I 
can  fitly  quote  the  eloquent  tribute  of  Charles  Sumner: 
"I  see  him  now  as  I  have  so  often  seen  him  during  life; 
his  venerable  form  moves  slowly  with  uncertain  steps, 
but  the  gathered  strength  of  years  in  his  countenance 
and  the  light  of  victory  on  his  path.  Politician,  calcu 
lator,  time-server,  stand  aside;  a  Hero  Statesman  passes 
to  his  reward. ' ' 


(Photo  by  Say  lor,  Lancaster,  Pa.) 

JAMES  BUCHANAN,  1865. 


LINCOLN  AND  BUCHANAN. 


IT  is  now  more  than  thirty  years  since  James  Buchanan 
retired  from  the  office  of  President  of  the  United 
States,  but  I  doubt  whether  there  is  any  one  of  our  great 
national  characters  whose  relations  to  our  civil  war  are 
so  widely  and  so  flagrantly  misunderstood.  It  will  sur 
prise  many  at  this  day  when  I  say  that  Abraham  Lincoln 
took  up  the  reins  of  government  just  where  James  Bu 
chanan  left  them,  and  continued  precisely  the  same  pol 
icy  toward  the  South  that  Buchanan  had  inaugurated, 
until  the  Southern  leaders  committed  the  suicidal  act  of 
firing  upon  Fort  Sumter.  From  the  time  that  Buchan 
an's  original  Cabinet  was  disrupted  on  the  sectional 
issues  that  culminated  in  armed  rebellion,  the  adminis 
tration  of  Buchanan  was  not  only  thoroughly  loyal  to 
the  preservation  of  the  Union,  but  it  fixed  the  policy 
that  Lincoln  accepted,  and  from  which  he  took  no 
marked  departure  until  actual  war  came  upon  him. 
This  is  not  the  common  appreciation  of  Buchanan 
among  the  American  people,  but  it  is  the  truth  of  his 
tory.  He  retired  from  his  high  office  in  the  very  flood- 
tide  of  sectional  and  partisan  passion.  The  loyal  people 
were  frenzied  to  madness  by  what  was  regarded  as  the 
perfidy  of  Buchanan's  War  Minister,  Mr.  Floyd,  in  ship 
ping  valuable  arms  and  munitions  to  the  South  ;  by 
the  insolent  treason  of  his  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 

Mr.  Cobb;  by  the  boldly-asserted  and  generally-believed 

297 


29  LINCOLN  AND' MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

treachery  of  his  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Toucey,  in 
scattering  our  navy  throughout  the  world;  and  it  is  now 
accepted  by  many,  amongst  even  intelligent  people  of 
this  country,  that  Buchanan  was  faithless  to  his  duty  in 
failing  to  reinforce  Major  Anderson  at  Sumter.  In  addi 
tion  to  these  deeply-seated  unjust  convictions  in  regard 
to  Buchanan,  he  is  commonly  believed  to  have  been  in 
hostility  to  the  Lincoln  administration  and  to  the  war, 
and  his  sympathies  to  have  been  with  the  South  in  the 
bloody  struggle  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union.  It 
is  certainly  time  that  these  utterly  erroneous  and  most 
unjust  impressions  as  to  Buchanan  should  be  dissipated; 
and,  fortunately  for  his  own  good  name,  he  has  left  on 
record  the  most  positive  evidence  of  his  devotion  to  the 
Union  and  his  earnest  support  of  the  government  in  the 
most  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war  that  had  been,  as 
he  always  held,  wantonly  precipitated  upon  the  nation 
by  the  South.  I  never  was  in  political  sympathy  with 
Buchanan  while  he  was  in  public  life,  excepting  the  few 
closing  months  of  his  administration,  when,  as  I  then 
knew,  both  he  and  his  Cabinet  were  estranged  from  their 
ultra-Democratic  friends  North  and  South,  and  were  in 
daily  intercourse  with  the  leading  friends  of  Lincoln  as 
the  incoming  President.  My  personal  acquaintance  with 
him  was  of  the  most  casual  character,  and  I  have  there 
fore  neither  lingering  personal  nor  political  affection  to 
inspire  me  to  any  strained  attempt  to  vindicate  his 
memory. 

Buchanan  as  President  should  be  judged  by  the  cir 
cumstances  under  which  he  reached  that  position,  by  his 
long-cherished  and  conscientious  convictions,  and  by  his 
peculiar  political  environment,  that  led  him  into  the 
most  sympathetic  relations  with  the  South.  It  should 
be  remembered  that  he  was  elected  President  over  Gen 
eral  Fremont,  a  distinctly  sectional  candidate  who  was 


LINCOLN-  AND  BUCHANAN.  29$ 

not  thought  of  with  any  degree  of  favor  in  any  State 
south  of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line.  It  was  an  earnest 
battle  against  what  was  assailed  as  the  ultra-sectionalism 
of  the  North,  and  it  consolidated  the  South  in  support 
of  Buchanan.  It  naturally  intensified  the  sober  judg 
ment  of  his  life  against  political  Abolitionism,  and  he 
entered  the  Presidency  owing  his  election  to  the  solid 
vote  of  the  Slave  States.  To  these  facts,  which  could 
not  fail  to  profoundly  impress  Buchanan,  it  should  be 
added  that  he  was  naturally  a  most  conservative  and 
strict-constructionist  statesman.  Born  and  reared  in  the 
Federal  school,  acting  with  the  Federal  party  until  he 
had  become  noted  as  a  leader  in  Congress,  and  gravi 
tating  thence  into  the  Democratic  school  when  strict 
constructionists  had  settled  upon  State  rights  as  the 
jewel  of  their  faith,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Buchanan 
sympathized  with  the  South  in  all  the  preliminary  dis 
putes  which  finally  ended  in  sanguinary  war.  That  he 
was  radically  wrong  on  the  fundamental  issues  relating 
to  the  war  when  he  entered  the  Presidency  cannot  be 
doubted.  He  foreshadowed  the  Dred  Scott  decision  in 
his  inaugural  address,  and  evidently  believed  that  it  was 
to  come  as  a  final  solution  of  the  slavery  dispute,  as  it 
greatly  enlarged  the  constitutional  protection  of  slave 
holders;  and  his  support  of  the  lawless  and  revolutionary 
Lecompton  policy,  into  which  he  and  his  party  were 
dragooned  by  the  Southern  leaders,  engulfed  him  and 
his  administration  in  the  maelstrom  of  secession.  Thus 
was  he  drifting,  step  by  step,  insensibly  into  the  hands 
of  those  who,  however  fair  in  declaration  or  promise, 
were  treasonable  in  purpose,  and  sought  through  him  to 
wield  the  power  of  the  government  to  aid  rather  than 
hinder  the  disruption  of  the  Republic.  It  is  only  just  to 
Buchanan,  however,  to  say  that  whenever  he  was  brought 
face  to  face  with  the  true  purposes  of  the  Southern  lead- 


3oo  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  of 

ers  he  reversed  his  own  policy,  revised  his  Cabinet,  and 
made  his  administration  quite  as  aggressive  as  was  wise 
under  the  circumstances  in  asserting  the  paramount  au 
thority  of  the  Union. 

The  crisis  that  changed  Buchanan's  whole  policy  on 
the  question  of  Secession  was  initiated  on  the  i2th  of 
December,  1860,  when  General  Cass  resigned  his  posi 
tion  as  Secretary  of  State  because  he  could  not  har 
monize  with  Buchanan's  views  in  meeting  the  question. 
Cass  was  greatly  enfeebled  by  age,  and  Buchanan  left  a 
private  record  on  Cass'  resignation  in  which  he  stated 
that  until  that  time  the  only  difference  between  them 
that  he  had  knowledge  of  was  on  the  ground  that 
Buchanan  had  failed  to  assert  with  sufficient  clearness 
that  there  was  no  power  in  Congress  or  the  government 
to  make  war  upon  a  State  to  hinder  it  in  separating  from 
the  Union.  The  retirement  of  Cass  was  speedily  followed 
by  the  enforced  resignations  of  Floyd  from  the  War  De 
partment  and  Cobb  from  the  Treasury.  Philip  Thomas 
of  Maryland  succeeded  Cobb;  Joseph  Holt  of  Kentucky 
succeeded  Floyd;  Attorney-General  Black  was  promoted 
to  Secretary  of  State;  and  Edwin  M.  Stanton  made  his 
successor  as  Attorney-General.  Thomas  remained  in 
office  only  a  month,  when  he  was  succeeded  by  General 
Dix,  an  aggressive  loyalist.  Stanton,  Dix,  and  Holt 
were  aggressively  against  every  form  of  treasonable  re 
bellion,  and  they  gave  a  visibly  altered  tone  to  every 
thing  about  the  administration  in  the  preliminary  dis 
putes  with  the  leading  Secessionists.  One  of  the  first 
acts  of  South  Carolina  after  her  formal  withdrawal  from 
the  Union  was  to  appoint  Commissioners  to  proceed  to 
Washington  to  treat  with  the  government  of  the  United 
States  for  peaceable  separation  and  the  recognition  of 
the  independence  of  the  Palmetto  State.  These  Com 
missioners  proceeded  to  Washington,  and  were  cour- 


LINCOLN  AND  BUCHANAN.  301 

teously  received  by  Buchanan  as  citizens  of  South  Caro 
lina,  without  any  recognition  of  their  official  capacity, 
and  several  misunderstandings  arose  between  them  as  to 
what  was  accepted  or  agreed  upon  in  relation  to  the  mili 
tary  status  in  Charleston. 

It  finally  became  necessary  for  Buchanan  to  give  a 
formal  answer  to  the  South  Carolina  Commissioners  as 
to  the  attitude  of  the  government  and  his  purposes  as  its 
Executive.  He  prepared  an  answer  without  consulting 
any  of  the  members  of  his  Cabinet,  in  which  he  said: 
' '  I  have  declined  for  the  present  to  reinforce  these  forts 
(in  Charleston  harbor),  relying  upon  the  honor  of  South 
Carolinians  that  they  will  not  be  assaulted  while  they 
remain  in  their  present  condition,  but  that  Commis 
sioners  will  be  sent  by  the  convention  to  treat  with  Con 
gress  on  the  subject."  In  this  paper  Buchanan  assumed 
that  he  had  no  power  to  take  any  action  as  President — 
that  the  whole  dispute  was  one  to  be  submitted  to  Con 
gress.  He  added,  however,  that  "if  South  Carolina 
should  take  any  of  these  forts,  she  will  then  become  the 
assailant  in  a  war  against  the  United  States. ' '  In  the 
many  interesting  conversations  I  had  with  the  late  Judge 
Black  on  the  subject  of  the  difficulties  in  Buchanan's 
Cabinet,  I  received  from  his  own  lips  detailed  accounts 
of  almost  every  incident  of  importance  that  occurred, 
and  what  I  state  in  regard  to  the  answer  of  Buchanan  to 
the  South  Carolina  Commissioners  I  give  from  distinct 
recollection  on  his  authority.  On  the  2Qth  of  December, 
soon  after  Buchanan  had  written  the  original  draft  of  his 
answer  to  the  Commissioners,  he  submitted  it  to  his  Cab 
inet.  It  was  little  criticised  at  the  Cabinet  meeting  by 
any  of  the  President's  constitutional  advisers,  and  Black 
was  ominously  silent.  He  was  profoundly  grieved  at  the 
attitude  the  President  had  assumed,  and  his  strong  per 
sonal  devotion  to  Buchanan  made  his  position  one  of 


302  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

extreme  delicacy.  He  was  the  one  man  of  the  Cabinet 
whom  Buchanan  regarded  as  his  close  personal  and  po 
litical  friend.  He  did  not  express  his  views  to  any  of 
his  Cabinet  associates  until  he  had  spent  an  entire  night 
in  anxious  reflection  as  to  his  duty.  On  the  following 
day  he  called  upon  Buchanan  and  told  him  frankly  that 
if  he  sent  the  answer  to  the  South  Carolina  Commission 
ers  as  originally  prepared  he  (Black)  must  resign  from 
the  Cabinet,  because  he  could  not  assent  to  the  govern 
ment  being  placed  in  such  an  attitude.  It  was  seldom 
that  Buchanan  ever  betrayed  emotion,  but  when  Black 
informed  him  that  they  must  separate  Buchanan  was 
moved  even  to  tears.  Few  words  passed  between  them, 
and  Buchanan  handed  Black  the  original  paper  with  the 
request  to  modify  it  in  accordance  with  his  own  views, 
and  return  it  as  speedily  as  possible.  Black  then  wrote 
the  paper  that  went  into  history  as  the  answer  of 
Buchanan  to  the  Commissioners.  Before  he  presented  it 
to  the  President  it  was,  carefully  considered  and  revised 
by  Black,  Holt,  and  Stanton,  who  then  were,  and  there 
after  continued  to  be,  with  Dix,  the  aggressively  loyal 
members  of  the  Buchanan  Cabinet;  and  in  their  actions 
they  had  the  hearty  sympathy  and  support  of  the  Pres 
ident. 

One  of  the  common  accusations  against  Buchanan  is 
that  he  failed  to  reinforce  the  garrisons  in  the  Southern 
forts  and  protect  them  from  capture  by  the  Secessionists. 
A  careful  study  of  the  facts,  however,  shows  that  Bu 
chanan  was  utterly  without  an  army  to  protect  these 
forts.  He  and  General  Scott  had  a  somewhat  bitter  dis 
pute  on  this  point  after  Buchanan's  retirement  from 
office,  but  Scott's  own  statement  proves  that  he  had  no 
intelligent  knowledge  of  the  ability  of  the  government 
to  reinforce  the  forts,  or  that  he,  as  commander-in-chief 
of  the  army,  made  an  official  suggestion  to  the  President 


LINCOLN  AND  BUCHANAN.  303 

that  was  impossible  of  execution.  On  the  29th  of  Octo 
ber,  1860,  Scott  addressed  Buchanan  on  the  subject  of 
these  Southern  forts,  and  he  enumerated  nine  of  them 
that  would  be  exposed  to  easy  capture  unless  speedily 
reinforced.  On  the  day  after  thus  addressing  the  Presi 
dent,  Scott  pointedly  illustrated  the  absurdity  of  his 
recommendation  by  saying  to  the  President,  ' '  There  is 
one  regular  company  at  Boston,  one  here  at  the  Narrows, 
one  at  Portsmouth,  one  at  Augusta,  Georgia,  and  one  at 
Baton  Rouge."  According  to  Scott's  own  statement, 
there  were  but  five  companies  of  the  army  then  within 
the  reach  of  the  government  to  garrison  or  reinforce  the 
threatened  forts.  These  five  companies  did  not  aggre 
gate  four  hundred  men,  and  these  four  hundred  men, 
scattered  from  Boston  to  Baton  Rouge,  were  presented 
by  Scott  himself  as  the  resources  of  the  government  for 
the  protection  of  nine  forts  in  six  Southern  States. 

Our  little  army  of  that  day  was  all  needed  on  our  then 
remote  frontiers  to  protect  settlers  and  emigrants  from( 
the  savages  who  ruled  in  those  regions,  and  it  would 
have  required  weeks,  and  in  some  cases  months,  to  bring 
them  to  the  Bast  for  the  protection  of  the  endangered 
forts.  Even  when  war  came  and  the  frontiers  had  to  be 
stripped  of  their  military  protection  wherever  it  was  pos 
sible,  there  were  but  few  regular  troops  at  the  battle  of 
Bull  Run.  Scott  and  Buchanan  both  agreed  that  there 
was  danger  of  turbulence  at  the  inauguration  of  Lin 
coln,  and  they  cordially  co-operated  with  each  other  to 
take  the  most  effective  measures  to  preserve  peace  on 
that  occasion.  After  gathering  all  the  troops  that  could 
be  marshaled  from  every  part  of  the  country  to  serve  at 
the  inauguration,  they  finally  got  together  six  hundred 
and  thirty,  and  they  made  their  arrangements  for  the 
inauguration  with  that  small  military  display  because 
the  commander- in-chief  of  the  army  could  not  summon 


304  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

a  larger  force.  It  was  simply  impossible,  therefore,  for 
President  Buchanan  to  garrison  or  reinforce  the  South 
ern  forts,  for  the  reason  that  he  had  not  the  men  with 
which  to  do  it.  There  was  but  one  way  to  save  the 
Southern  forts,  and  that  was  to  garrison  them  so  strongly, 
with  ample  provisions  and  munitions  of  war,  that  they 
would  be  invulnerable  to  assault.  To  have  sent  inade 
quate  reinforcements  to  any  of  these  forts  in  the  then 
inflamed  condition  of  the  public  mind  in  the  South 
would  have  been  to  wantonly  provoke  attack  upon  forces 
that  could  not  protect  themselves.  Had  Lincoln  been 
President  he  could  not  have  done  more  without  doing 
wha'  would  have  been  accepted  as  an  open  declaration 
of  war  against  the  South,  and  Lincoln  would  no  more 
have  committed  that  folly  than  did  Buchanan.  It  would 
have  been  a  wise  thing  to  do  if  we  had  had  an  army  of 
thirty  or  forty  thousand  men.  Then  all  the  forts  could 
have  been  garrisoned  and  reinforced,  and  they  could 
have  had  the  support  necessary  in  case  of  threatened 
assault;  but  our  government  was  entirely  unprepared  for 
defence,  and  when  we  were  compelled  to  face  the  peril 
of  war  the  army  could  not  be  increased  without  making 
the  North  either  measurably  or  wholly  responsible  for 
precipitating  a  civil  conflict.  The  intelligent  and  dis 
passionate  American  citizen,  who  carefully  reads  the 
whole  story  of  the  action  of  Buchanan  and  his  Cabinet 
in  co-operation  with  Scott,  must  reach  the  conclusion 
that  Buchanan  was  not  in  any  degree  at  fault  for  the 
failure  to  garrison  or  reinforce  the  forts  in  the  South 
ern  States. 

On  the  important  question  of  Buchanan's  support  of 
the  government  after  war  had  been  commenced  by  the 
assault  on  Sumter,  he  has  fortunately  left  the  most  posi 
tive  and  multiplied  evidence  of  his  patriotic  loyalty  to 
the  Union,  He  was  singularly  reticent  during  the  war, 


LINCOLN  AND  BUCHANAN.  3°5 

and  his  silence  was  misconstrued  into  a  lack  of  sympa 
thy  with  the  government.  After  his  retirement  from 
the  Presidency  he  was  most  mercilessly  vilified,  brutally 
misrepresented  as  deliberately  disloyal,  and  he  seems  to 
have  abandoned  the  hope  of  correcting  public  sentiment 
and  doing  himself  justice  until  the  flood- tide  of  passion 
had  run  its  course.  He  was,  however,  in  constant  com 
munication  with  his  leading  friends  throughout  the 
country,  and  to  every  one  of  them,  from  the  beginning 
of  the  war  until  its  close,  he  expressed  the  most  patriotic 
convictions,  and  uniformly  urged  the  earnest  support  of 
the  war  and  its  most  vigorous  prosecution.  In  Septem 
ber,  1 86 1,  he  was  invited  by  an  intimate  friend  to  deliver 
a  public  address  on  the  condition  of  the  country  and  the 
attitude  of  the  government.  In  his  answer  he  said,  wri 
ting  in  the  frankness  of  sacred  friendship,  ' '  Every  per 
son  who  has  conference  with  me  knows  that  I  am  in 
favor  of  sustaining  the  government  in  the  vigorous  pros 
ecution  of  the  war  for  the  restoration  of  the  Union.  But 
occasion  may  offer  when  it  may  be  proper  for  me  author 
itatively  to  express  this  opinion  to  the  public.  Until  that 
time  shall  arrive  I  desire  to  avoid  any  public  exhibition. ' ' 
In  a  private  letter  to  James  Buchanan  Henry,  his  nephew, 
immediately  after  he  had  heard  of  the  firing  upon  Sum- 
ter,  he  said :  * ( The  Confederate  States  have  deliberately 
commenced  a  civil  war,  and  God  knows  where  it  may 
end.  They  were  repeatedly  warned  by  my  adminis 
tration  that  an  assault  on  Fort  Sumter  would  be  civil 
war  and  they  would  be  responsible  for  the  conse 
quences." 

On  the  i9th  of  April,  1861,  soon  after  the  bombard 
ment  of  Sumter,  he  wrote  to  General  Dix,  who  had  then 
been  announced  as  the  president  of  a  great  Union  meet 
ing  soon  to  be  held,  at  which  he  advised  him  to  repeat 

the  admonitions  the  administration  had  given  to  South 
20 


306  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

Carolina  against  precipitating  war.  He  referred  to  the 
fact  that  as  Dix  had  been  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  at 
the  time  he  could  speak  with  great  propriety  of  the  utter 
want  of  excuse  on  the  part  of  South  Carolina  for  firing 
upon  Sumter.  In  this  letter  he  said :  ' '  The  present  ad 
ministration  had  no  alternative  but  to  accept  the  war 
initiated  by  South  Carolina  or  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy.  The  North  will  sustain  the  administration  to  a 
man,  and  it  ought  to  be  sustained  at  all  hazards." 
Again,  on  the  26th  of  April,  writing  to  Mr.  Baker,  he 
said :  ' '  The  attack  on  Fort  Sumter  was  an  outrageous 
act.  The  authorities  at  Charleston  were  several  times 
warned  by  my  administration  that  such  an  attack  would 
be  civil  war,  and  would  be  treated  as  such.  If  it  had 
been  made  in  my  time  it  should  have  been  treated  as 
such."  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Stanton,  May  6,  when  Stan- 
ton  was  writing  to  Buchanan  fiercely  criticising  Lincoln 
and  every  act  of  the  administration,  Buchanan  said: 
' '  The  first  gun  fired  by  Beauregard  aroused  the  indig 
nant  spirit  of  the  North  as  nothing  else  could  have  done, 
and  made  us  an  unanimous  people.  I  repeatedly  warned 
them  that  this  would  be  the  result. "  In  a  letter  to  Mr. 
King,  July  13,  he  said:  "The  assault  upon  Fort  Sum 
ter  was  the  commencement  of  war  by  the  Confederate 
States,  and  no  alternative  was  left  but  to  prosecute  it 
with  vigor  on  our  part.  Up  until  all  social  and  political 
relations  ceased  between  the  Secession  leaders  and  my 
self  I  had  often  warned  them  that  the  North  would  rise 
to  a  man  against  them  if  such  an  assault  was  made.  .  .  . 
I  am  glad  that  General  Scott  does  not  underrate  the 
strength  of  his  enemy,  which  would  be  a  great  fault  in 
a  commander.  With  all  my  heart  and  soul  I  wish  him 
success."  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Leiper,  August  31,  he  said: 
4 '  I  agree  with  you  that  nothing  but  a  vigorous  prose 
cution  of  the  war  can  now  determine  the  question  be- 


LINCOLN  AND   BUCHANAN.  3°7 

tween  the  North  and  the  South.     It  is  vain  to  think  of 
peace  at  the  present  moment." 

In  a  letter  to  Dr.  Blake.  September  12,  he  said:  "We 
must  prosecute  the  war  with  the  utmost  vigor.  May 
God  grant  us  a  safe  deliverance  and  a  restoration  of  the 
Union!"  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  King,  September  18,  he 
said:  "  I  think  I  can  perceive  in  the  public  mind  a  more 
fixed,  resolute,  and  determined  purpose  than  ever  to  pros 
ecute  the  war  to  a  successful  termination  with  all  the 
men  and  means  in  our  power.  Enlistments  are  now  pro 
ceeding  much  more  rapidly  than  a  few  weeks  ago,  and  I 
am  truly  glad  of  it.  The  time  has  passed  for  offering 
compromises  and  terms  of  peace  to  the  seceded  States.  .  .  . 
There  is  a  time  for  all  things  under  the  sun,  but  surely 
this  is  not  the  moment  for  paralyzing  the  arm  of  the 
national  administration  by  a  suicidal  conflict  among  our 
selves,  but  for  bold,  energetic,  and  united  action. ' '  On 
the  28th  of  September,  Buchanan  addressed  a  letter  to 
a  committee  of  the  citizens  of  Chester  and  Lancaster 
counties  who  had  invited  him  to  address  a  Union  meet 
ing  at  Hagersville.  He  declined  because  "advancing 
years  in  the  present  state  of  my  health  render  it  impos 
sible."  He  said:  "Were  it  possible  for  me  to  address 
your  meeting,  waiving  all  other  topics,  I  should  confine 
myself  to  a  solemn  and  earnest  appeal  to  my  countrymen, 
and  especially  those  without  families,  to  volunteer  for  the 
war  and  join  the  many  thousands  of  brave  and  patriotic 
volunteers  who  are  already  in  the  field.  This  is  the 
moment  for  action — for  prompt,  energetic,  and  united 
action — and  not  for  discussion  of  peace  propositions." 
In  closing  the  letter  he  said  that  until  the  South  shall 
voluntarily  return  to  the  Union  "it  will  be  our  duty  to 
support  the  President  with  all  the  men  and  means  at  the 
command  of  the  country  in  a  vigorous  and  successful 
prosecution  of  the  war." 


3°8  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

In  a  letter  to  Mr.  King,  January  28,  1862,  he  said:  u  I 
do  most  earnestly  hope  that  our  army  may  be  able  to  do 
something  before  the  first  of  April.  If  not,  there  is 
great  danger  not  merely  of  British,  but  of  European, 
interference."  In  a  letter  to  Mrs.  Boyd,  February  16, 
he  said:  "The  Confederate  States  commenced  this  un 
happy  war  for  the  destruction  of  the  Union,  and  until 
they  shall  be  willing  to  consent  to  its  restoration  there 
can  be  no  hopes  of  peace."  On  the  4th  of  March  he 
wrote  Judge  Black:  "They  (the  South)  chose  to  com 
mence  civil  war,  and  Mr.  Lincoln  had  no  alternative  but 
to  defend  the  country  against  dismemberment.  I  cer 
tainly  should  have  done  the  same  thing  had  they  begun 
the  war  in  my  time,  and  this  they  well  knew."  In  a 
letter  to  Dr.  Blake,  July  12,  he  speaks  of  the  deep  anx 
iety  he  felt  about  the  safety  of  McClellan's  army,  with  a 
heavy  pressure  removed  from  his  heart  when  he  learned 
that  it  was  safe,  and  he  then  adds:  "Without  doubt  his 
change  of  position  in  the  face  of  a  superior  army  evinced 
great  skill  in  strategy;  but  why  was  the  wrong  position 
originallv  selected?  I  still  feel  great  confidence  in 
McClellan,  and  with  all  my  heart  wish  him  success. 
Still,  there  is  a  mystery  in  the  whole  affair  which  time 
alone  can  unravel."  On  February  14,  1863,  in  a  letter 
to  Mr.  Roosevelt,  he  expressed  his  great  disappointment 
that  a  country  so  great  as  ours  * '  has  not  yet  produced 
one  great  general."  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  L/eiper,  March 
19,  he  said:  "I  cannot  entertain  the  idea  of  a  division 
of  the  Union;  may  God  in  His  good  providence  restore 
it!"  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Schell,  July  25,  he  expresses  his 
profound  regret  at  Governor  Seymour's  hostility  to  the 
national  conscription  law,  and  said:  "  The  conscription 
law,  though  unwise  and  unjust  in  many  of  its  provisions, 
is  not  in  my  opinion  unconstitutional. ' '  So  earnest  was 
Buchanan  in  his  efforts  to  have  the  Democracy  of  Perm- 


LINCOLN  AND  BUCHANAX.  309 

Sylvania  give  the  most  cordial  support  to  Lincoln  and  to 
tiie  war  that  he  even  trangressed  the  lines  of  delicacy  in 
a  letter  addressed  to  Judge  Woodward,  then  a  Supreme 
Justice  and  candidate  for  Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  ear 
nestly  appealing  to  him  to  sustain  the  national  conscrip 
tion  law  by  a  judicial  decision.  This  he  did  as  early  as 
July,  1863,  when  the  question  was  first  raised  in  our 
courts.  In  a  letter  of  September  5,  also  addressed  to 
Judge  Woodward,  he  offered  an  apology  for  having  ad 
vised  him  as  to  his  judicial  duties,  and  his  apology  was, 
as  stated  by  himself,  "  I  perceived  that  in  New  York  the 
party  was  fast  making  the  unconstitutionality  of  the 
conscription  law  the  leading  prominent  point  in  the 
canvass. ' ' 

On  January  27,  1864,  he  wrote  Mr.  Capen,  expressing 
his  regret  that  "the  Democrats  have  made  no  issue  on 
which  to  fight  the  Presidential  battle,"  and  on  the  I4th 
of  March  he  wrote  to  the  same  friend,  expressing  the 
belief  that  it  would  be  best  if  the  Democrats  would  fail 
to  succeed  to  power  at  the  Presidential  election  of  that 
year.  On  the  25th  of  August  he  wrote  to  the  same 
friend,  assuming  that  McClellan  would  be  nominated,  in 
which  he  said:  "  A  general  proposition  for  peace  and  an 
armistice  without  reference  to  the  restoration  of  the 
Union  would  be,  in  fact,  a  recognition  of  their  inde 
pendence.  For  this  I  confess  I  am  far  from  being  pre 
pared."  On  the  22d  of  September,  writing  to  his 
nephew,  Mr.  Henry,  he  said:  u  Peace  would  be  a  very 
great  blessing,  but  it  would  be  purchased  at  too  high  a 
price  at  the  expense  of  the  Union."  In  a  letter  to  Mr. 
Capen  of  October  5  he  declares  his  purpose  to  support 
McClellan  for  President,  and  he  denounces  the  Chicago 
peace  platform,  and  specially  commends  McClellan  for 
having  patriotically  dissented  from  it.  In  the  same  let 
ter  he  expresses  some  hope  of  McClellan' s  election,  and 


310  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

frankly  says  that  * c  the  recent  victories  of  Grant,  Sher 
man,  and  Farragut  have  helped  the  Republicans,"  but 
he  rejoiced  at  the  victories  of  our  armies  and  the  pros 
pect  of  the  South  submitting  to  a  restoration  of  the 
Union.  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Capen,  December  28,  he  says: 
"I  agree  in  opinion  with  General  McClellan  that  it  is 
fortunate  both  for  himself  and  the  Democratic  party  that 
he  was  not  elected."  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Flinn,  April, 
1865,  he  speaks  most  feelingly  of  the  assassination  of 
Lincoln,  and  says:  "I  deeply  mourn  his  loss  from  pri 
vate  feelings,  and  still  more  deeply  for  the  sake  of  the 
country.  Heaven,  I  trust,  will  not  suffer  the  perpetra 
tors  of  the  deed  and  their  guilty  accomplices  to  escape 
just  punishment,  but  we  must  not  despair  of  the  Repub 
lic."  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Capen,  October  19,  1867,  he 
says:  "Negro  emancipation  is  a  fixed  fact,  and  so  let 
it  remain  for  ever;  but  the  high  privilege  of  voting  can 
only  be  constitutionally  granted  by  the  legislatures  of 
the  respective  States."  He  heartily  accepted  emanci 
pation,  but  he  felt  that  the  Democracy  had  an  issue  on 
which  it  could  stand  in  a  patriotic  attitude  opposing 
universal  negro  suffrage. 

Thus  from  the  day  that  civil  war  was  precipitated 
upon  the  country  by  the  madness  of  secession  until  the 
last  insurgent  gun  was  fired  there  was  not  an  utterance 
from  James  Buchanan  that  did  not  exhibit  the  most 
patriotic  devotion  to  the  cause  of  the  Union. 

In  the  flood  of  light  thrown  upon  the  actions  of 
Buchanan  and  Lincoln  as  nearly  a  generation  has  come 
and  passed  away,  the  intelligent  and  unbiased  reader  of 
the  truth  of  history  will  be  amazed  to  learn  how  closely 
the  policy  of  Lincoln  adhered  to  the  policy  inaugurated 
by  Buchanan  after  he  had  been  compelled  to  face  the 
issue  of  actual  secession  and  armed  rebellion.  From  the 
day  that  Judge  Black  revised  the  answer  of  Buchanan  to 


LINCOLN  AND  BUCHANAN.  311 

the  South  Carolina  Commissioners  the  aims  and  efforts 
of  Buchanan  were  uniformly  and  earnestly  in  the  line 
of  the  most  patriotic  devotion  to  his  responsible  duties; 
and  when  he  had  such  men  as  Black,  Dix,  Stanton,  and 
Holt  by  his  side,  the  majority,  and  the  absolutely  domi 
nant  element,  of  his  Cabinet  were  aggressively  loyal  to 
the  government,  and  made  heroic  effort  to  exercise  every 
power  they  possessed  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  the 
Union.  Whatever  may  have  been  Buchanan's  political 
errors  during  the  greater  part  of  his  administration,  and 
however  those  errors  may  have  strengthened  the  arms  of 
secession,  it  is  only  simple  justice  to  one  of  the  most  con 
scientious  and  patriotic  of  all  our  Presidents  to  say  that 
when  Buchanan  was  brought  face  to  face  with  the  fruits 
of  his  policy  he  severed  all  political  and  social  intercourse 
with  the  leaders  who  had  controlled  his  election,  and  cast 
his  lot  and  all  the  power  of  the  government  on  the  side 
of  unqualified  loyalty.  Not  only  did  the  call  of  Lincoln 
for  troops  to  prosecute  the  war  after  the  firing  upon 
Sumter  command  the  uniform  and  earnest  support  of 
Buchanan,  but  he  heartily  sustained  the  government  in 
every  war  measure,  even  to  the  extent  of  assenting  to 
emancipation.  Such  a  record  demands  the  commenda 
tion  rather  than  the  censure  of  our  only  Pennsylvania 
President;  and  I  have  performed  the  task  of  attempting 
to  present  him  justly  to  the  American  people  all  the  more 
gratefully  because  there  are  no  lingering  bonds  of  special 
personal  or  political  sympathy  between  us.  He  is  entitled 
to  justice  from  every  honest  American  citizen,  and  I  have 
sought  to  £fi  /e  him  justice — nothing  more,  nothing  less. 


LINCOLN  AND  GREELEY. 


HORACE  GREELEY  was  one  of  the  earliest  and 
most  fretting  of  the  many  thorns  in  the  political 
pathway  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  They  served  together  in 
Congress  in  the  winter  of  1848-49,  when  Greeley  was 
chosen  to  a  short  term  to  fill  a  vacancy.  Speaking  of 
Lincoln  some  years  after  his  death,  Greeley,  referring  to 
his  association  with  him  in  Congress,  said  that  Lincoln 
was  ' '  personally  a  favorite  on  our  side, ' '  and  adds :  * '  He 
seemed  a  quiet,  good-natured  man;  did  not  aspire  to 
leadership,  and  seldom  claimed  the  floor."  For  ten 
years  after  these  two  memorable  characters  separated  as 
members  of  Congress  Lincoln  was  little  known  or  heard 
of  outside  of  his  State  of  Illinois,  and  when  his  great 
contest  with  Douglas  for  the  Senate  attracted  the  atten 
tion  of  the  whole  country  in  1858,  Greeley,  with  his 
powerful  Republican  organ,  vastly  the  most  potent  polit 
ical  journal  in  the  country,  took  positive  grounds  in  favor 
of  the  return  of  Douglas  to  the  Senate  by  the  Republi 
cans  of  Illinois,  because  of  Douglas'  open  hostility  to 
the  Ivecompton  policy  of  the  Buchanan  administration. 
This  attitude  of  Greeley 's  Tribune  was  one  of  the  most 
serious  obstacles  that  confronted  Lincoln  in  his  great 
campaign  against  Douglas,  and  it  is  possible  that  the 
influence  of  the  Tribune  may  have  lost  Lincoln  the  leg 
islature.  He  carried  the  popular  vote  and  elected  the 

Republican  State  ticket,  but  Douglas  won  the  legislature 
312 


HORACE  GREEDY,    1872. 


314  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF    WAR-TIMES. 

and  was  re-elected  to  the  Senate.  Thus  did  Greeley 
antagonize  Lincoln  in  the  first  great  battle  he  made  for 
national  leadership  in  politics,  and  with  the  exception 
of  a  single  act  of  Greeley 's,  in  which  he  served  Lincoln 
to  an  extent  that  can  hardly  be  measured,  when  in  the 
early  part  of  1860  he  opened  the  broadsides  of  the 
Tribune  against  Seward's  nomination  for  President,  he 
was  a  perpetual  thorn  in  Lincoln's  side,  seldom  agreeing 
with  him  on  any  important  measure,  and  almost  con 
stantly  criticising  him  boldly  and  often  bitterly. 

The  first  assault  made  on  the  Seward  lines  that  at 
tracted  any  attention  from  the  country  was  the  unex 
pected  and  aggressive  revolt  of  Greeley 's  Tribune  against 
Seward  some  months  before  the  meeting  of  the  Chicago 
Convention  that  nominated  Lincoln.  It  attracted  special 
attention  from  considerate  Republicans  throughout  the 
country,  because  this  assault  came  from  the  ablest  Re 
publican  editor  of  the  nation,  from  Seward's  own  State, 
and  from  one  who  was  presumed  to  be  Seward's  personal 
and  political  friend.  It  was  not  then  known  to  the  pub 
lic  that  on  the  nth  of  November,  1854,  he  had  written 
a  pungent  letter  to  Seward  and  formally  severed  all  po 
litical  association  with  him,  to  take  effect  in  the  follow 
ing  February,  when  Seward  was  re-elected  to  the  United 
States  Senate.  The  letter  was  written  in  strict  confi 
dence,  but  in  1860,  when  the  friends  of  Seward  keenly 
felt  Greeley 's  criticisms  on  Seward's  availability  as  a 
Presidential  candidate,  and  especially  in  the  bitter  dis 
appointment  of  Seward's  friends  after  his  defeat  at  Chi 
cago,  such  free  allusions  were  made  to  the  contents  of 
this  letter  and  to  Greeley 's  personal  animosity  that  at 
Greeley 's  request  the  letter  was  made  public.  Until 
Greeley  had  thus  thrown  his  great  Tribune  into  the  con 
test  against  Seward's  nomination  Seward  was  the  gen 
erally-accepted  Republican  candidate  for  President  in 


LINCOLN  AND    G  REE  LEY.  .315 

1860,  and,  notwithstanding  the  ability  and  influence 
exerted  by  Greeley  and  his  newspaper,  the  Republicans 
of  the  country  elected  a  convention  overwhelmingly  in 
favor  of  Seward.  It  was  Greeley,  however,  who  drove 
the  entering  wedge  that  made  it  possible  to  break  the 
Seward  column,  and  I  shall  never  forget  the  smile  that 
played  upon  his  countenance  as  he  sat  at  the  head  of  the 
Oregon  delegation  in  the  Wigwam  at  Chicago  and  heard 
the  announcement  that  Abraham  Lincoln  had  been  nomi 
nated  as  the  candidate  of  the  convention  for  President. 
He  had  made  no  battle  for  Lincoln.  His  candidate  was 
Edward  Bates  of  Missouri,  whose  cause  he  championed 
with  all  his  fervency  and  power;  but  it  is  evident  that  in 
selecting  Bates  as  his  favorite  he  had  been  influenced 
solely  to  choose  the  most  available  candidate  to  contest 
the  honor  with  Seward.  After  Bates,  he  was  for  any  one 
to  beat  Seward,  and  when  Lincoln  became  the  chief 
competitor  of  Seward  he  was  more  than  willing  to  ac 
cept  him.  After  the  nomination  of  Lincoln,  Greeley 's 
Tribune  was  leader  of  leaders  among  the  Republican 
journals  of  the  land  in  the  great  struggle  that  elected 
Lincoln  President.  But  his  rejoicing  over  the  success 
of  Lincoln  was  speedily  chilled  by  the  announcement 
that  Seward  would  be  called  as  premier  of  the  new  ad 
ministration.  The  appointment  of  Seward  as  Secretary 
of  State  meant  the  mastery  of  Thurlow  Weed  in  wield 
ing  the  patronage  and  power  of  the  administration  in 
New  York,  and  it  meant  much  more  than  that  to  Gree 
ley.  It  meant  that  all  the  power  that  Seward  and  Weed 
could  exercise  would  be  wielded  relentlessly  to  punish 
Greeley  for  his  revolt  against  Seward.  On  the  very  day 
that  Lincoln  entered  the  Presidency,  therefore,  Greeley 
was  hopelessly  embittered  against  him,  and  while  no 
man  in  the  whole  land  was  more  conscientious  than 
Greeley  in  the  performance  of  every  patriotic  and  per- 


316  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

sonal  duty,  lie  was  also  human,  and  with  all  his  bound 
less  generosity  and  philanthropy  he  was  one  of  the  best 
haters  I  have  ever  known. 

Soon  after  Lincoln's  election  Greeley  put  himself  in 
an  attitude  that  he  must  have  known  at  the  time  was  an 
utterly  impossible  one  for  Lincoln  to  accept.  That  he 
was  influenced  in  any  degree  by  a  desire  to  embarrass 
Lincoln  I  do  not  for  a  moment  believe,  but  it  is  none 
the  less  the  truth  of  history  that,  after  having  done 
much  to  make  Lincoln's  nomination  possible,  he  did 
more  perhaps  than  any  one  man  in  the  country  to  assure 
his  election,  and  then  he  publicly  demanded  that  Lin 
coln  should  be  so  far  forgetful  of  his  oath  to  maintain  the 
Constitution  as  to  permit  the  Southern  States  to  secede 
in  peace.  Only  three  days  after  Lincoln's  election  Gree 
ley  published  an  editorial  in  the  Tribune  in  which  he 
said:  "If  the  Cotton  States  shall  become  satisfied  that 
they  can  do  better  out  of  the  Union  than  in  it,  we  insist 
on  letting  them  go  in  peace.  .  .  .  The  right  to  secede 
may  be  a  revolutionary  one,  but  it  exists  nevertheless. 
We  must  ever  resist  the  right  of  any  State  to  remain  in 
the  Union  and  nullify  or  defy  the  laws  thereof.  To 
withdraw  from  the  Union  is  quite  another  matter,  and 
whenever  a  considerable  section  of  our  Union  shall  de 
liberately  resolve  to  get  out  we  shall  resist  all  coercive 
measures  designed  to  keep  it  in.  We  hope  never  to  live 
in  a  republic  whereof  one  section  is  pinned  to  another 
by  bayonets."  Again,  on  the  i7th  of  December,  1860, 
just  after  the  secession  of  South  Carolina,  a  leading  edi 
torial  in  the  Tribune,  speaking  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,  said:  "If  it  justified  the  secession  from 
the  British  empire  of  three  million  of  colonists  in  1776, 
we  do  not  see  why  it  would  not  justify  the  secession  of 
five  million  of  Southerners  from  the  Federal  Union  in 
1 86 1.  .  .  .  If  seven  or  eight  contiguous  States  shall  pre- 


LINCOLN  AND    GREELEY.  317 

rent  themselves  at  Washington  saying,  '  We  hate  the 
Federal  Union;  we  have  withdrawn  from  it;  we  give 
you  the  choice  between  acquiescing  in  our  secession  and 
arranging  amicably  'all  incidental  questions  on  the  one 
hand,  and  attempting  to  subdue  us  on  the  other,'  we 
would  not  stand  up  for  coercion,  for  subjugation,  for  we 
do  not  think  it  would  be  just.  We  hold  to  the  right  of 
self-government  even  when  invoked  in  behalf  of  those 
who  deny  it  to  others.'1  Less  than  two  weeks  before 
the  inauguration  of  Lincoln,  on  the  23d  of  February, 
1 86 1,  and  the  same  day  on  which  his  paper  announced 
Lincoln's  midnight  journey  from  Harrisburg  to  Wash 
ington,  Greeley  said  in  a  leading  editorial:  uWe  have 
repeatedly  said,  and  we  once  more  insist,  that  the  great 
principle  embodied  by  Jefferson  in  the  Declaration  of 
American  Independence,  that  governments  derive  their 
just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed,  is  sound 
and  just,  and  that  if  the  Slave  States,  the  Cotton  States, 
or  the  Gulf  States  only  choose  to  form  an  independent 
nation,  they  have  a  clear  moral  right  to  do  so.  When 
ever  it  shall  be  clear  that  the  great  body  of  Southern 
people  have  become  conclusively  alienated  from  the 
Union  and  anxious  to  escape  from  it,  we  will  do  our  best 
to  forward  their  views. ' ' 

Such  were  the  pointed  and  earnest  utterances  of  Gree 
ley  between  the  period  of  Lincoln's  election  and  of  his 
inauguration,  and  it  is  needless  to  say  that  these  utter 
ances  not  only  grieved  but  embarrassed  Lincoln  to  an 
extent  that  can  hardly  be  appreciated  at  this  time.  Had 
Greeley  stood  alone  in  these  utterances,  even  then  his 
position  and  power  would  have  made  his  attitude  one  of 
peculiar  trouble  to  Lincoln,  but  he  did  not  stand  alone. 
Not  only  the  entire  Democratic  party,  with  few  excep 
tions,  but  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  Republican 
party,  including  some  of  its  ablest  and  most  trusted 


3l8  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

leaders,  believed  that  peaceable  secession,  that  might 
reasonably  result  in  early  reconstruction,  was  preferable 
to  civil  war.  The  constitutional  right  of  coercion  by 
the  government  upon  a  seceded  State  was  gravely  dis 
puted  by  most  Democratic  statesmen  and  by  many  Re 
publican  statesmen;  and  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  Lin 
coln,  like  Buchanan,  studiously  avoided  any  attempt  at 
coercion  until  the  South  wantonly  precipitated  war  by 
firing  upon  the  starving  garrison  in  Fort  Sumter.  The 
first  gun  fired  upon  Sumter  solved  the  problem  of  coer 
cion.  Coercion  at  once  ceased  to  be  an  issue.  The 
South  had  coerced  the  government  into  war  by  cause 
lessly  firing  upon  the  flag  of  the  nation  and  upon  a  gar 
rison  that  had  committed  no  overt  act  of  war;  and  from 
that  day  until  the  surrender  of  the  Southern  armies  to 
Grant  and  Sherman  the  overwhelming  sentiment  of  every 
Northern  State  demanded  the  prosecution  of  the  war  to 
conquer  Secession.  Had  Buchanan  or  Lincoln  fired  a 
single  gun  solely  to  coerce  the  Southern  States  to  re 
main  in  the  Union,  the  North  would  have  been  hope 
lessly  divided,  and  the  administration  would  surely  have 
been  overthrown  in  any  attempt  to  prosecute  the  war. 
Greeley  recognized  the  fact  that  the  firing  upon  Sumter 
ended  the  issue  of  coercion  as  understood  and  discussed 
until  that  time,  and  from  the  day  that  Lincoln  issued  his 
call  for  seventy-five  thousand  troops  to  engage  in  the  wrar 
that  had  been  so  insanely  precipitated  against  the  gov 
ernment  he  heartily  sustained  the  President  and  his 
policy ;  but  he  added  new  grief  and  fresh  embarrassments 
to  Lincoln  by  his  fretful  impatience  and  his  repeated 
and  emphatic  demands  that  the  army  should  be  hurled 
against  the  Confederates  as  soon  as  it  was  organized. 
uOn  to  Richmond!"  was  his  almost  daily  battle-rrv. 
and  Greeley  was  overwhelmed  with  sorrow  and  humil 
iation  when  at  last  his  impetuous  orders  were  obeyed 


LINCOLN  AND    G REE LEY.  319 

and  McDowell's  army  was  defeated  and  hurled  back  into 
the  intrenchments  of  Washington. 

When  war  was  accepted  as  a  necessity  no  man  in  the 
country  was  more  earnest  in  his  support  of  a  most  vig 
orous  and  comprehensive  war  policy  than  was  Greeley. 
After  the  lesson  of  the  first  Bull  Run  he  appreciated  the 
fact  that  a  great  war  was  upon  us,  and  every  measure 
looking  to  the  increase  of  our  armies  and  the  mainte 
nance  of  our  severely  strained  credit  was  supported  by 
the  Tribune  with  all  of  Greeley 's  matchless  ability  and 
vigor;  but  he  was  never  without  some  disturbing  issue 
with  Lincoln  and  the  policy  of  the  administration.  Sin 
cerely  patriotic  himself,  he  was  as  sincere  in  his  convic 
tions  on  all  questions  of  public  policy,  and  he  seldom 
took  pause  to  consider  the  claims  of  expediency  when 
he  saw  what  he  believed  to  be  the  way  dictated  by  the 
right.  He  believed  Lincoln  equally  patriotic  with  him 
self,  and  equally  sincere  in  every  conviction  and  public 
act,  but  no  two  men  were  more  unlike  in  their  mental 
organization.  Greeley  was  honest,  aggressive,  impul 
sive,  and  often  ill  advised  in  attempting  to  do  the  right 
thing  in  the  wrong  way.  Lincoln  was  honest,  patient, 
considerate  beyond  any  man  of  his  day,  and  calmly 
awaited  the  fullness  of  time  for  accomplishing  the  great 
achievements  he  hoped  for.  Writing  of  Lincoln  some 
time  after  his  death,  Greeley  said  that  after  the  war  be 
gan  "  Lincoln's  tenacity  of  purpose  paralleled  his  former 
immobility;  I  believe  he  would  have  been  nearly  the 
last,  if  not  the  very  last,  man  in  America  to  recognize 
the  Southern  Confederacy  had  its  armies  been  triumph 
ant.  He  would  have  preferred  death. ' '  That  two  such 
men  should  differ,  and  widely  differ,  and  that  Greeley 
should  often  differ  in  bitterness  from  Lincoln's  apparent 
tardiness,  was  most  natural;  and  with  a  great  war  con 
stantly  creating  new  issues  of  the  gravest  magnitude 


320  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR- TIMES. 

Greeley  was  kept  in  constant  conflict  with  Lincoln  on 
some  great  question  while  honestly  and  patriotically  sup 
porting  the  government  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

The  question  of  destroying  slavery  enlisted  Greeley 's 
most  earnest  efforts  when  it  became  evident  that  a  great 
civil  war  must  be  fought  for  the  preservation  of  the 
Union,  and  on  that  issue  he  fretted  Lincoln  more  than 
any  other  one  man  in  the  United  States,  because  he  had 
greater  ability  and  greater  power  than  any  whose  criti 
cisms  could  reach  either  Ivincoln  or  the  public.  While 
the  Cabinet  had  as  much  discord  as  there  was  between 
Lincoln  and  Greeley,  and  while  even  great  Senators  and 
Representatives  of  the  same  political  faith  with  the  Pres 
ident  had  serious  dispute  with  him  on  the  subject,  Gree 
ley  was  the  most  vexatious  of  all,  for  he  was  tireless  in 
effort  and  reached  the  very  heart  of  the  Republican  party 
in  every  State  in  the  Union  with  his  great  newspaper. 
Notwithstanding  the  loyal  support  given  to  Lincoln  by 
the  Republicans  throughout  the  country,  Greeley  was  in 
closer  touch  with  the  active  loyal  sentiment  of  the  peo 
ple  than  even  the  President  himself,  and  his  journal  con 
stantly  inspired  not  only  those  who  sincerely  believed  in 
early  Emancipation,  but  all  who  were  inclined  to  factious 
hostility  to  Lincoln,  to  most  aggressive  efforts  to  embar 
rass  the  administration  by  untimely  forcing  the  Emanci 
pation  policy.  Finally,  Greeley 's  patience  became  ex 
hausted  over  what  he  regarded  as  the  inexcusable  inac 
tion  of  Lincoln  on  the  subject  of  Emancipation,  and  on 
the  aoth  of  August,  1862,  he  published  in  his  own  news 
paper  an  open  letter  to  Lincoln  denouncing  him  for  his 
failure  to  execute  the  Confiscation  Act  in  ' ( mistaken 
deference  to  rebel  slavery,"  for  bowing  to  the  influence 
of  what  he  called  ' '  certain  fossil  politicians  hailing  from 
the  Border  States,"  and  because  our  army  officers 
u  evinced  far  more  solicitude  to  uphold  slavery  than  to 


LINCOLN  AND    G  REE  LEY.  321 

put  down  the  rebellion.''  Thus  plainly  accused  by  one 
whose  patriotism  Lincoln  did  not  question  and  whose 
honesty  of  purpose  he  could  not  doubt,  Lincoln  felt  that 
he  could  no  longer  be  silent,  and  on  the  22d  of  August 
he  addressed  a  letter  to  Greeley  that  did  more  to  steady 
the  loyal  sentiment  of  the  country  in  a  very  grave  emer 
gency  than  anything  that  ever  came  from  Lincoln's  pen. 
It  is  one  of  Lincoln's  clearest  and  most  incisive  presenta 
tions  of  any  question.  Greeley,  with  all  his  exceptional 
tact  and  ability  in  controversy,  was  unable  successfully  to 
answer  it.  It  was  in  that  letter  that  Lincoln  said:  "I 
would  save  the  Union;  I  would  save  it  the  shortest  way 
under  the  Constitution;"  and  he  followed  these  terse  ut 
terances  with  the  statement,  several  times  referred  to  in 
these  articles,  that  he  would  save  the  Union  either  by  the 
destruction  or  the  maintenance  of  slavery  as  might  best 
serve  the  great  end  he  had  in  view.  It  should  be  remem 
bered  that  at  the  time  this  letter  was  written  by  Lincoln 
to  Greeley  his  draft  of  the  Emancipation  Proclamation 
had  been  prepared  nearly  one  month,  and  precisely  one 
month  after  he  wrote  the  letter  he  issued  his  preliminary 
proclamation ;  but  the  letter  gives  no  indication  whatever 
as  to  his  action  on  the  issue  beyond  his  concluding  sen 
tence,  in  which  he  says:  "I  intend  no  modification  of 
my  often  expressed  personal  wish  that  all  men  for  ever 
could  be  free." 

This  constant  friction  between  Greeley  and  Lincoln 
logically  led  Greeley  into  the  ranks  of  the  opposition  to 
Lincoln's  renomination  in  1864,  and  he  labored  most 
diligently  to  accomplish  Lincoln's  overthrow.  His  ripe 
experience  in  politics  prevented  him  from  falling  in  with 
the  few  disappointed  Republican  leaders  who  nominated 
Fremont  at  Cleveland  before  the  Baltimore  Convention 
met.  He  would  gladly  have  joined  in  that  effort  had  he 
not  fully  appreciated  the  fact  that  the  occasion  was  too 

21 


322  LINCOLN  AND-  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

momentous  to  organize  a  faction  on  personal  or  political 
grievances;  but,  while  he  kept  aloof  from  the  Fremont 
movement,  he  aggressively  resisted  the  nomination  of 
Lincoln,  and  on  the  day  the  convention  met  he  published 
an  earnest  protest  and  indicated  very  clearly  that  Lin 
coln's  nomination  meant  Republican  defeat.  He  had 
long  been  in  intercourse  with  the  friends  of  Chase,  and 
he  would  gladly  have  accepted  Chase  or  Grant,  or,  in 
deed,  almost  any  other  Republican  in  the  country  whose 
name  had  been  mentioned  for  the  Presidency,  in  prefer 
ence  to  Lincoln.  When  Lincoln  was  renominated  by 
practically  an  unanimous  vote,  Greeley  avoided  direct 
antagonism  to  the  party,  but  earnestly  co-operated  with 
Senator  Wade  and  Representative  Davis  in  their  open 
rebellion  against  Lincoln.  Wade  and  Davis  issued  an 
address  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  that  appeared 
in  Greeley 's  journal  on  the  5th  of  August,  in  which  Lin 
coln  was  severely  arraigned  for  usurping  the  authority 
of  Congress  and  for  withholding  his  approval  to  a  bill 
presented  to  him  just  on  the  eve  of  adjournment,  for  the 
purpose,  as  they  assumed,  of  holding  * '  the  Electoral 
votes  of  the  rebel  States  at  the  dictation  of  his  personal 
ambition."  Such  an  appeal,  coining  from  two  of  the 
ablest  of  the  Republican  leaders,  cast  a  dark  gloom  over 
the  prospects  of  the  Republican  party,  and  to  the  sup 
port  of  this  revolt  Greeley  added  an  ostentatious  and  ill- 
advised  effort  to  negotiate  a  peace  through  a  plausible 
adventurer  commonly  known  as  '  *  Colorado ' '  Jewett. 
The  effusive  and  irrepressible  George  N.  Sanders  was 
Involved  in  it,  and  through  Greeley  they  communicated 
to  Lincoln  a  basis  of  peace  that  Greeley  was  led  to  be 
lieve  the  South  would  accept. 

The  terms  suggested  were  the  restoration  of  the  Union, 
the  abolition  of  slavery,  universal  amnesty,  payment  of 
$400,000,000  for  the  slaves,  full  representation  to  be  given 


LINCOLN  AND    GREELEY.  323 

to  the  Southern  States  in  Congress,  and  a  National  Con 
vention  to  be  called  at  once  to  engraft  the  new  policy  on 
the  Constitution.  Instead  of  maintaining  the  secresy 
necessary  to  the  success  of  an  adjustment  of  the  difficulty 
between  the  sections  then  at  war,  the  Greeley-Jewett  ne 
gotiations  soon  became  public,  and  Lincoln  was  earnestly 
importuned  by  Greeley  to  meet  the  emergency  by  open 
ing  the  doors  widely  to  the  consideration  of  any  proposi 
tion  of  peace.  Lincoln,  in  his  abundant  caution,  al 
though  entirely  without  hope  of  accomplishing  anything 
by  the  Greeley  negotiations,  transmitted  a  paper  to  be 
delivered  to  the  Confederates  who  were  assuming  to  act 
for  the  South — a  statement  over  his  signature — saying 
that  any  proposition  for  ' '  the  restoration  of  peace,  the 
integrity  of  the  whole  Union,  and  the  abandonment  of 
slavery,  and  which  comes  by  and  with  an  authority  that 
can  control  the  armies  now  at  war  against  the  United 
States,  will  be  received  and  considered  by  the  executive 
government  of  the  United  States,  and  will  be  met  by 
liberal  terms  on  other  substantial  and  collateral  points, 
and  the  bearer  or  bearers  thereof  shall  have  safe-conduct 
both  ways."  Greeley  had  become  enthusiastic  in  his 
efforts  to  accomplish  peace.  He  was  a  lover  of  peace,  an 
earnest  and  inherent  foe  of  the  arbitrament  of  the  sword 
under  all  circumstances,  and  when  he  found  that  the 
whole  effort  made  to  arrest  fraternal  war  brought  only 
a  contemptuous  rejection  of  Lincoln's  proposition  from 
those  who  assumed  to  represent  the  Confederate  govern 
ment,  he  was  profoundly  humiliated.  It  is  fortunate  for 
both  Greeley  and  the  country  that  Messrs.  Clay  and  Hoi- 
combe,  who  assumed  to  speak  for  the  Confederate  gov 
ernment,  refused  even  to  consider  the  question  of  peace 
on  the  basis  of  a  restored  Union  and  the  abandonment 
of  slavery.  Had  they  entertained  the  proposition,  or 
even  pretended  to  entertain  it,  they  would  have  misled 


324  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Greeley  into  a  violent  crusade  against  the  further  prose 
cution  of  the  war  and  into  as  violent  hostility  to  the 
re-election  of  Lincoln. 

The  pronounced  anti-war  platform  of  the  Democratic 
Convention  that  nominated  McClellan  against  Lincoln 
was  even  less  to  Greeley 's  liking  than  the  attitude  of  the 
Republicans,  and  finally,  as  the  Wade  and  Davis  mani 
festo  seemed  to  have  fallen  stillborn  upon  the  country, 
and  Greeley 's  negotiations  for  peace  had  ended  disas 
trously,  without  credit  to  any,  Greeley  had  no  choice  but 
to  fall  in  with  the  Lincoln  procession  and  advocate  the 
success  of  the  Republican  ticket.  Sherman's  capture 
of  Atlanta  and  Sheridan's  victories  in  the  Valley  started 
the  tidal  wave  in  favor  of  Lincoln,  and  Greeley  was  quite 
prepared,  through  his  sad  experiences  in  his  hostility  to 
the  administration,  to  fall  in  with  the  tide  and  share  the 
victory  his  party  was  then  certain  to  win.  After  Lin 
coln's  re-election  there  was  little  opportunity  for  Greeley 
to  take  issue  with  Lincoln.  During  the  winter  of  1865 
he  earnestly  favored  every  suggestion  looking  to  the  ter 
mination  of  the  war  upon  some  basis  that  would  bring 
the  South  back  into  cordial  relations  with  the  Union. 
The  failure  of  the  Hampton  Roads  conference  between 
Lincoln  and  the  Confederate  Commissioners  was  regretted 
by  Greeley,  but  he  no  longer  criticised  Lincoln  with  his 
old-time  severity;  and  when,  after  Lee's  surrender  and 
the  final  triumph  of  the  Union  cause,  Lincoln's  life  was 
taken  by  the  assassin's  bullet,  Greeley  and  Lincoln  were 
more  nearly  in  harmonious  relations  than  they  had  ever 
been  at  any  time  from  the  day  of  Lincoln's  inauguration. 
When  the  war  ended  Greeley  was  the  first  prominent 
man  of  the  country  to  demand  universal  amnesty  and 
impartial  suffrage.  A  leading  editorial  in  the  Tribune 
demanding  the  forgiveness  of  the  insurgents  as  the  price 
of  universal  suffrage  to  the  freedmen  startled  the  coun- 


LINCOLN  AND   GREELEY.  325 

try,  and   cost  Greeley  the   Senatorial  honors  he  much 
coveted. 

While  Greeley  was  one  of  the  founders  of  the  Repub 
lican  party,  and  certainly  did  more  to  make  it  successful 
than  any  other  one  man  of  the  nation,  he  gathered  few 
of  its  honors  and  was  seldom  in  harmony  with  Repub 
lican  authority  in  State  or  nation.  His  rebellion  against 
Seward  in  1860  cost  him  an  election  to  the  United  States 
Senate  in  1861.  His  universal  amnesty  and  suffrage  pol 
icy,  proclaimed  immediately  after  the  war,  again  defeated 
him  as  a  Senatorial  candidate  in  1865,  and  while  he  ac 
cepted  Grant  for  President  in  1868  and  supported  his 
election  with  apparent  cordiality,  he  very  soon  drifted 
into  a  hostile  attitude  toward  the  administration.  Grant 
had  none  of  Lincoln's  patience  and  knew  little  of  Lin 
coln's  conciliatory  methods;  and  when  Greeley  rebelled 
Grant  allowed  him  to  indulge  his  rebellious  ideas  to  his 
heart's  content.  Long  before  the  close  of  Grant's  first 
administration  Greeley  was  ripe  for  revolution,  and  was 
one  of  the  earliest  of  those  who  inaugurated  the  Liberal 
Republican  movement  of  1872  that  nominated  Greeley 
as  its  candidate  for  President.  I  cordially  sympathized 
with  the  revolt  against  Grant  in  1872,  and  was  chairman 
of  the  delegation  from  Pennsylvania  in  the  Cincinnati 
Convention.  My  relations  with  Greeley  had  been  of  the 
most  friendly  character  from  the  time  I  first  met  him 
when  a  boy-journalist  at  the  Whig  Convention  in  Phila 
delphia  in  1848,  and  I  not  only  profoundly  respected  his 
sincerity,  his  philanthropy,  and  his  masterly  ability,  but 
I  cherished  an  affection  for  him  that  I  felt  but  for  few, 
if  any,  of  our  public  men.  He  was  surprised  when  he 
learned  from  me,  after  the  delegation  to  the  Liberal  Con 
vention  had  been  selected  in  Pennsylvania,  that  I  was 
not  urging  his  nomination  for  President.  He  believed 
that  all  my  personal  inclinations  would  make  me  favor 


326  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

him  at  any  time  that  it  might  be  in  my  power  to  do  so, 
and  he  made  an  appointment  by  telegraph  to  meet  me  at 
the  Colonnade  Hotel  in  Philadelphia  to  discuss  the  ques 
tion  of  the  Presidency.  We  met  at  the  appointed  time, 
and  I  greatly  pained  Greeley  when  I  told  him  that  I  did 
not  believe  his  nomination  would  be  a  wise  one,  because 
I  saw  no  possible  chance  for  his  election.  He  believed 
me  when  I  assured  him  that  I  had  no  candidate  whom  I 
preferred  to  him,  and  that  I  was  influenced  solely  by  my 
desire  to  protect  him  from  a  great  personal  disaster  and 
the  country  from  a  failure  in  the  then  promising  effort  to 
overthrow  the  despotic  political  rule  that  had  obtained 
under  Grant.  I  told  him  that  I  did  not  believe  it  pos 
sible  for  the  Democrats  to  support  him,  and  without 
their  support  his  election  would  be  utterly  hopeless. 
After  hearing  me  very  fully,  and  evidently  in  great  sor 
row  because  of  the  attitude  I  assumed,  he  finally  made 
this  significant  remark:  "Well,  perhaps  the  Democrats 
wouldn't  take  me  head  foremost,  but  they  might  take 
me  boots  foremost."  I  well  understood  that  Greeley 
meant  that  while  he  might  not  be  an  available  candidate 
for  President,  he  might  be  an  acceptable  candidate  for 
the  second  place  on  the  ticket.  I  at  once  answered: 
"Yes,  Mr.  Greeley,  with  a  conservative  Republican  for 
President  you  can  easily  be  nominated  for  Vice- Pres 
ident  and  add  great  strength  to  the  ticket."  I  said: 
"There  are  two  names  which  seem  to  me  to  be  the 
strongest — David  Davis  and  Charles  Francis  Adams: 
which  would  you  prefer?"  Greeley  answered:  "The 
name  of  Adams  leaves  a  bad  taste  in  my  mouth ;  I  would 
prefer  Davis;"  and  we  finally  agreed  that  I  should  go  to 
the  Cincinnati  Convention  and  support  the  nomination 
of  Davis  for  President  and  Greeley  for  Vice-President. 
While  I  knew  that  Greeley  most  reluctantly  gave  up 
the  idea  of  being  nominated  for  President,  I  did  not 


LINCOLN  AND    GREELEY.  327 

doubt  that  his  candidacy  for  that  office  was  practically 
ended  by  our  conference.  When  I  went  to  Cincinnati, 
I  there  met  Leonard  Swett,  John  D.  Defrees,  Senator 
Fenton,  and  others,  and  we  started  out  to  accomplish 
the  nomination  of  Davis  and  Greeley.  Sorrie  fifteen  or 
twenty  of  us  met  at  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening  and  de 
cided  on  a  programme  by  which  we  confidently  expected 
to  nominate  Davis  and  Greeley  on  the  first  ballot.  But 
while  we  were  thus  conferring  General  Frank  P.  Blair 
had  gotten  together  a  conference  between  some  of  the 
more  radical  supporters  of  Greeley  and  the  supporters  of 
B.  Gratz  Brown,  and  their  conference  ended  by  deciding 
to  nominate  Greeley  for  President  and  Brown  for  Vice- 
President.  By  this  new  combination  we  were  deprived 
of  the  support  of  the  important  State  of  New  York,  and 
also  lost  a  large  support  in  the  West.  While  many  of 
the  New  York  delegates  would  have  preferred  the  nomi 
nation  of  Davis  and  Greeley,  when  Greeley  was  presented 
as  a  hopeful  candidate  for  President  the  delegation  natu 
rally  united  in  his  support,  and  Brown  brought  into  the 
combination  a  large  number  of  Western  delegates  who 
would  have  preferred  Davis  had  they  been  free  to  exer 
cise  their  own  judgment  in  selecting  a  candidate.  Davis 
was  thus  practically  out  of  the  race,  and  after  giving  a 
complimentary  vote  to  Curtin  a  large  majority  of  the 
Pennsylvania  delegation  united  with  me  in  supporting 
the  nomination  of  Adams.  I  did  not  regard  Adams  as 
possessing  the  qualities  of  availability  presented  in  Davis, 
but  Adams  seemed  to  be  the  only  man  who  had  a  reason 
able  prospect  of  winning  the  nomination  over  Greeley. 
I  was  placed  in  the  most  unpleasant  attitude  of  support 
ing  a  man  for  President  to  whom  I  was  almost  an  entire 
stranger,  and  for  whom  I  had  little  personal  sympathy, 
against  Greeley,  for  whom  I  cherished  the  profoundest 
respect  and  affection, 


328  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

On  the  first  ballot  Adams  led  Greeley  by  a  vote  of  203 
to  147,  with  a  large  scattering  vote  between  Trumbull, 
Brown,  Davis,  Curtin,  and  Chase.  On  the  second  ballot 
Adams  rose  to  243  and  Greeley  to  239,  with  Trumbull  to 
148,  On  the  third  ballot  Adams  had  264,  Greeley  258, 
and  Trumbull  156.  On  the  fourth  ballot  Adams  in 
creased  to  279,  and  Greeley  fell  off  to  251,  with  Trum 
bull  still  holding  141.  On  the  fifth  ballot  Adams  had 
309  and  Greeley  258;  and  on  the  sixth  and  final  ballot, 
as  first  reported,  Greeley  led  Adams  8  votes,  having  332 
to  Adams  324.  This  was  the  first  ballot  on  which  Gree 
ley  led  Adams,  and  it  clearly  indicated  that  the  conven 
tion  was  resistlessly  drifting  to  Greeley  as  its  candidate. 
There  was  at  once  a  rush  from  different  delegations  to 
change  votes  from  Adams  to  Greeley.  I  did  not  partici 
pate  in  it,  and  only  when  a  majority  of  votes  had  been 
cast  and  recorded  for  him  did  I  announce  the  change 
of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation  to  Greeley.  The  ballot 
as  finally  announced  was  482  for  Greeley  and  187  for 
Adams.  While  the  balloting  was  in  progress  Greeley 
was  sitting  in  his  editorial  room  in  the  Tribune  office 
along  with  one  of  his  editorial  assistants,  who  informed 
me  that  Greeley  became  intensely  agitated  as  the  sixth 
ballot  developed  his  growing  strength;  and  when  the 
telegrams  announced  that  he  led  Adams  on  that  vote,  he 
excitedly  exclaimed:  "Why  don't  McClure  change  the 
vote  of  Pennsylvania  ?' '  The  next  bulletin  he  received 
announced  his  nomination,  and  he  promptly  telegraphed 
to  Whitelaw  Reid,  then  his  chief  editorial  associate,  who 
was  in  attendance  at  the  convention:  u  Tender  my  grate 
ful  acknowledgments  to  the  members  of  the  convention 
for  the  generous  confidence  they  have  shown  me,  and 
assure  them  that  I  shall  endeavor  to  deserve  it.'* 

I  was  greatly  disappointed  at  the  result  of  the  conven 
tion,  and  was  deeply  grieved  at  what  I  regarded  as  a 


LINCOLN  AND    G  REE  LEY.  329 

cruel  sacrifice  of  one  of  the  men  I  most  loved  and  the 
surrender  of  a  great  opportunity  to  win  a  national  vic 
tory  in  the  interest  of  better  government  and  sectional 
tranquil ity.  The  nomination  of  Greeley  carried  with  it 
the  nomination  of  B.  Gratz  Brown  for  Vice- President, 
and  when  the  convention  adjourned  I  returned  to  my 
room  at  the  hotel  feeling  that  our  work  was  farcical, 
because  I  did  not  regard  it  as  possible  for  the  Democrats 
to  accept  Greeley.  Before  midnight,  however,  a  number 
of  leading  Democrats  from  different  parts  of  the  country 
who  were  in  constant  touch  with  the  convention  pulled 
themselves  together,  and  their  utterances  given  to  the 
world  the  next  morning  foreshadowed  the  possibility 
that  the  Democrats  would  accept  Greeley  and  Brown; 
but  even  when  the  Democratic  National  Convention 
with  substantial  unanimity  accepted  both  the  candidates 
and  the  platform  of  the  Liberal  Republicans,  I  saw  little 
hope  for  Greeley 's  election,  as  I  feared  that  the  Demo 
cratic  rank  and  file  could  not  be  brought  to  his  support. 
For  some  time  after  both  conventions  had  nominated 
Greeley  we  had  a  Greeley  tidal-wave  that  seemed  likely 
to  sweep  the  country.  In  Pennsylvania,  as  chairman 
of  the  Liberal  State  Committee,  I  had  voluntary  letters 
from  hundreds  of  leading  Republicans  in  every  section 
of  the  State  indicating  their  purpose  to  fall  in  with  the 
Greeley  current,  but  the  loss  of  North  Carolina  early  in 
August  not  only  halted  the  Greeley  tide,  but  made  its 
returning  ebb  swift  and  destructive.  With  this  obvious 
revulsion  in  the  political  current  the  great  business  in 
terests  of  the  country  were  speedily  consolidated  in  oppo 
sition  to  any  change  in  the  national  administration,  and 
there  never  was  a  day  after  the  North  Carolina  defeat 
when  Greeley 's  election  seemed  to  be  within  the  range 
of  possibility. 
The  September  elections  proved  that  Greeley 's  nomi- 


^  ^-^  (&£*'*&  p  o- 

*  ^^       4^U- 

^ 

^X/^-^^cp 


-•? 


GRBEI,EY'S  LAST 


LINCOLN  AND   GREELEY.  331 

nation  made  no  impression  upon  the  Republicans  in  New 
England,  including  his  native  State  of  Vermont,  where 
it  was  hoped  he  would  have  thousands  of  Republican 
followers,  and  the  October  elections  came  like  an  ava 
lanche  against  the  Liberal  movement.  Greeley  delivered 
campaign  speeches  in  New  England  and  in  the  Middle 
States  which  were  models  of  statesmanlike  ability,  but 
he  was  fighting  a  hopeless  battle;  and  when  the  October 
elections  cast  their  gloom  upon  his  political  hopes  he  was 
called  to  nurse  a  dying  wife,  where  for  nearly  a  month 
he  passed  sleepless  nights,  and  closed  her  eyes  in  death 
only  a  week  before  his  overwhelming  defeat  in  Novem 
ber.  Thus  at  once  broken  in  heart  and  hope,  the  most 
brilliant  and  forceful  editor  the  country  has  ever  pro 
duced,  and  one  of  the  sincerest  and  most  tireless  of 
American  philanthropists,  pined  away  in  the  starless 
midnight  of  an  unsettled  mind  until  the  29th  of  No 
vember,  1872,  when  he  passed  to  his  final  account.  Im 
mediately  after  the  election  I  had  written  him  a  personal 
letter  expressing  my  sincere  sympathy  with  him  in  his 
multiplied  misfortunes.  One  of  the  most  valued  of  my 
mementos  of  the  men  of  the  past  is  his  reply,  dated  No 
vember  loth,  the  last  day  on  which  he  ever  wrote  any 
thing,  as  follows: 

(Private.} 

NEW  YORK,  November  10,  1872. 
MY  DEAR  FRIEND  : 

I  am  a  man  of  many  sorrows,  and  doubtless  have  deserved 
them,  but  I  beg  to  say  that  I  do  not  forget  the  gallant  though 
luckless  struggle  you  made  in  my  behalf.  I  am  not  well. 

Yours  truly, 

HORACE  GREEDY. 
COL.  A.  K.  McCLURE, 

144  So.  Sixth  St.,  Philada. 

Thus  ended  one  of  the  most  useful  and  one  of  the  sad 
dest  lives  of  the  last  generation.  He  was  of  heroic 


332  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-  TIMES. 

mould  in  his  matchless  battles  for  the  lowly  and  help 
less,  and  was  always  invincible  in  political  controversy, 
because  his  integrity  was  ever  as  conspicuous  as  his  abil 
ity;  but  he  was  as  impatient  as  he  was  philanthropic, 
and  he  most  longed  for  what  was  so  pointedly  denied 
him — the  generous  approval  of  his  countrymen.  He 
was  made  heart-sore  when  he  saw  the  colored  voters, 
whose  cause  he  had  championed  when  no  political  party 
had  the  courage  to  espouse  it,  almost  unitedly  oppose  his 
election  to  the  Presidency;  and  finally,  smitten  in  his 
home,  in  his  ambition,  and  in  his  great  newspaper,  Hor 
ace  Greeley,  broken  in  heart  and  hopelessly  clouded  in 
intellect,  gave  up  the  battle  of  life,  and  slept  with  his 
loved  ones  who  had  gone  before. 


(Photo  by  Gutekunst,  Philadelphia.) 

JOHN  BROWN, 


AN  EPISODE  OF  JOHN  BROWN'S  RAID. 


FAR  down  in  the  beautiful  Cumberland  Valley,  the 
old-time  heartsome  village  of  Chambersburg  was 
one  of  the  chief  attractions  a  generation  ago.  It  was 
founded  by  the  sturdy  Scotch-Irish  pioneers,  who  carried 
their  severe  religion  and  not  less  severe  detestation  of 
despotism  with  them,  and  mingled  their  prayers  with 
their  warfare  against  the  savage  and  the  soldiers  of  King 
George.  The  memorable  pioneer  whose  name  the  village 
bears  chose  a  lovely  spot  as  his  home  and  the  heritage  of 
his  children,  where  the  soft  murmurs  of  the  crystal  waters 
of  Falling  Spring  are  lost  in  the  Conococheague,  and  the 
united  waters  course  through  the  centre  of  the  town  on 
their  journey  to  the  sea.  Here  more  than  a  century  had 
been  devoted  to  the  genial  civilization  that  made  Cham 
bersburg  first  in  the  affections  of  its  people;  and  its  homes, 
palatial  for  that  day;  its  grand  elms  and  lindens  which 
arched  the  walks  with  their  shades;  its  cultured  people, 
with  just  pride  of  ancestry  and  equal  pride  of  present 
character  and  usefulness, — made  it  one  of  the  most  de 
lightful  of  Pennsylvania  towns  for  citizen  or  visitor.  It 
had  none  of  the  paralysis  that  comes  when  "wealth  ac 
cumulates  and  men  decay;"  large  fortunes  were  unknown, 
but  plenty,  thrift,  and  comfort  stamped  their  impress 
upon  the  community. 

In  the  summer  of  1859  a  man  °f  ratner  ru(^e  aspect, 
but  of  grave  and  quiet  demeanor,   was  noticed  by  the 
334 


AN  EPISO  DE    OF  JOHN  BR  0  WN '  S  A'  A  ID.  3  }  5 

village  crowd  that  usually  gathered  in  social  converse 
about  the  post-office  while  the  evening  mail  was  being 
distributed.  He  attracted  little  attention,  as  he  seldom 
spoke  save  when  spoken  to,  and  then  only  in  the  briefest 
way.  He  was  known  as  ' (  Dr.  Smith, ' '  and  was  reputed 
to  be  engaged  in  the  development  of  iron-mines  on  the 
Potomac,  some  twenty-five  miles  distant.  He  lodged  at 
a  private  boarding-house  off  from  the  centre  of  the  town, 
and  there  was  nothing  in  his  sayings  or  doings  to  excite 
any  apprehension  that  his  mission  was  anything  else  than 
a  peaceful  one.  This  man  was  John  Brown,  then  of 
Kansas  fame,  and  later  immortalized  in  song  and  story 
throughout  every  civilized  land.  The  supposed  mining- 
implements  which  he  was  storing  in  Chambersburg  were 
the  rude  pikes  with  which  the  negroes  of  Virginia  were 
to  be  armed  in  their  expected  insurrection  against  their 
masters.  There  was  not  a  man,  woman,  or  child  in 
Chambersburg  who  then  dreamed  that  "  Dr.  Smith" 
was  John  Brown — not  one  who  knew  or  suspected  his 
real  purpose.  None  of  the  many  who  then  saw  him 
casually  from  day  to  day  could  have  dreamed  that  the 
harmless-looking  and  acting  "  Dr.  Smith"  was  engaged 
in  a  drama  the  sequel  of  which  would  be  enacted  when 
the  vandals'  torch  left  the  beautiful  old  village  in  ashes 
only  five  years  later.  The  South  ever  believed  that  John 
Brown  made  Chambersburg  the  base  for  his  mad  raid  on 
Harper's  Ferry  because  he  had  many  sympathizing  con 
fidants  and  abetters  there;  and  that  unjust  prejudice  re 
solved  all  doubts  as  to  dooming  the  town  when  McCaus- 
land  rioted  in  its  destruction  on  the  3Oth  of  July,  1864. 

In  the  early  part  of  October,  1859,  two  men,  unknown 
to  me,  entered  my  office  and  asked  to  submit  some  legal 
matters  in  private.  We  retired  to  the  private  office, 
when  the  younger  of  the  two,  an  intelligent  and  evi 
dently  positive  man,  gave  his  name  as  Francis  Jackson 


336  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR.  TIMES. 

Meriam  of  Boston,  and  his  companion  gave  his  name  as 
John  Henry.  Meriam  said  that  he  was  going  on  a  jour 
ney  South ;  that  he  had  some  property  at  home ;  that  acci 
dents  often  happened  to  travelers ;  and  that  he  desired  me 
to  draw  his  will.  I  did  so,  and  was  not  surprised  that  a 
young  Boston  traveler,  after  making  a  few  special  be 
quests,  gave  his  property  to  the  Abolition  Society  of  his 
native  State.  There  was  nothing  in  his  appearance, 
manner,  or  conversation  to  attract  any  special  attention 
to  his  proceeding,  and  his  will  was  duly  executed,  wit 
nessed,  and,  in  obedience  to  his  orders,  mailed  to  the 
executor  in  Boston.  When  I  asked  Meriam' s  companion 
to  witness  the  will,  he  declined,  saying  that  he  was  a 
traveler  also,  and  that  both  the  witnesses  had  better  be 
in  the  same  town.  His  real  reasons  for  declining  to  wit 
ness  the  will  of  his  friend  were — first,  that  "John  Henry  " 
was  none  other  than  John  Henry  Kagi,  and,  second,  be 
cause  he  presumed  his  life  to  be  as  much  in  peril  as  was 
that  of  his  friend.  The  sequel  proved  that  he  judged 
well,  for  Kagi  was  killed  in  the  attack  on  Harper's 
Ferry,  while  Meriam  escaped.  When  the  two  visitors 
left  they  were  no  more  thought  of  in  the  village  lawyer's 
office  until  the  startling  news  came  of  Brown's  attempt 
to  capture  Harper's  Ferry  and  to  arm  the  slaves  of  Vir 
ginia  in  general  insurrection.  Then,  to  my  surprise,  I 
read  the  name  of  the  testator  in  the  will  I  had  written  a 
short  time  before,  and  the  name  and  description  of  an 
other  assured  me  that  his  fellow-visitor  in  my  office  was 
the  then  fallen  John  Henry  Kagi. 

It  may  be  remembered  that  of  the  twenty-one  who 
composed  John  Brown's  army  of  invasion,  Watson 
Brown,  Oliver  Brown,  John  Henry  Kagi,  Adolphus 
Thompson,  and  Stewart  Taylor,  whites,  and  Sherrard 
Lewis  Leary,  Dangerfield  Newby,  and  Jeremiah  Ander 
son,  colored,  were  killed  in  the  battle,  and  that  William 


AN  EPISODE    OF  JOHN  BROWN'S  RAID.  337 

H.  Leeman  and  William  Thompson  were  killed  in  at 
tempting  to  retreat.  Owen  Brown,  Barclay  Coppoch, 
Charles  P.  Tidd,  and  Francis  Jackson  Meriam,  whites, 
and  Osborne  P.  Anderson,  colored,  escaped.  They  made 
their  way  through  the  forests  of  the  South  Mountain  to 
Chambersburg,  traveling  only  by  night;  were  concealed 
in  a  retired  grove  near  Chambersburg  for  several  days  to 
enable  the  wounded  men  of  the  party  to  recruit  their 
strength,  and  then  went  on  by  short  night-marches 
across  the  North  Mountain  to  the  Juniata  Valley,  near 
Bell's  Mills,  where  they  were  taken  in  charge  by  a 
prominent  citizen  of  Harrisburg,  whose  dust  has  long 
mouldered  with  that  of  John  Brown.  Meriam  left  the 
party  at  Chambersburg,  took  the  cars,  and  went  through 
to  Boston  without  detection.  Only  two  residents  of 
Chambersburg  knew  of  the  presence  of  the  fugitives, 
and  they  are  no  longer  numbered  among  the  citizens  of 
the  town  whose  history  forms  such  an  important  chapter 
in  the  annals  of  our  terrible  civil  war.  John  K.  Cook, 
Edwin  Coppoch,  Aaron  Dwight  Stevens,  and  Albert 
Hazlitt,  whites,  and  John  Copeland  and  Shields  Green, 
colored,  were  captured,  and,  with  John  Brown  their 
leader,  convicted  of  murder  at  Charlestown,  Virginia, 
and  executed  in  December,  1859.  Hazlitt  was  the  first 
of  the  fugitives  captured  in  Pennsylvania.  He  was 
arrested  while  walking  along  the  Cumberland  Valley 
Railroad  near  Shippensburg,  and  lodged  in  the  jail  at 
Carlisle.  His  captors  supposed  him  to  be  Captain  Cook, 
and  that  error  cost  Cook  his  life  on  the  gibbet.  A  requi 
sition  was  quietly  obtained  from  Richmond  for  the  ren 
dition  of  Cook.  When  it  arrived  the  identity  of  Hazlitt 
had  been  established,  but  the  requisition  remained  within 
thirty  miles  of  Chambersburg,  to  surprise  Cook  and  return 
him  to  Virginia  just  when  he  had  perfected  his  plans  for 
escape.  Cook  was  the  last  of  the  fugitives  to  be  cap- 

22 


LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

tured,  and  the  circumstances  and  manner  of  his  arrest, 
the  strange  miscarriage  of  his  apparently  certain  oppor 
tunities  of  escape,  and  his  heroism  in  the  lawless  cause 
that  so  blindly  misguided  him  make  a  truthful  story  be 
fore  which  the  fascinating  inventions  of  romance  pale. 

I  was  the  counsel  of  John  E.  Cook  in  Chambersburg, 
and  the  only  person  entirely  familiar  with  the  inner  his 
tory  of  his  capture  and  the  plans  of  escape.  The  com 
munity  of  which  Chambersburg  was  the  centre  of  busi 
ness  and  sentiment  was  nearly  equally  divided  on  the 
political  issues  of  that  day;  but  the  undertow  of  anti- 
slavery  conviction  was  stronger  than  the  partisan  dogmas 
which  made  one-half  the  people  declare  slavery  a  lawful 
and  therefore  a  defensible  institution.  Fervent  and  elo 
quent  speeches  would  be  made  on  the  stump  in  every 
campaign  against  interference  with  slavery  and  in  favor 
of  the  faithful  observance  of  the  mandates  of  the  Con 
stitution,  and  glittering  resolves  would  emanate  from 
party  conventions  in  favor  of  the  Union,  the  Constitu 
tion,  and  tiie  laws;  but  the  practical  division  of  the  com 
munity  on  the  issues  of  obedience  to  the  Constitution  and 
the  laws  which  commanded  the  rendition  of  fugitive  slaves 
left  here  and  there  a  despised  negro-catcher  on  the  one  side 
and  all  the  people  on  the  other  side.  There  was  no  Demo 
crat  in  Franklin  County  to  accept  a  commissionership  under 
the  Fugitive  Slave  L,aw.  I  have  seen  two  Democratic 
president  judges  administer  the  laws  with  a  singleness  of 
purpose  to  hold  the  scales  of  justice  in  even  balance;  and 
I  have  known  a  prominent  Democratic  candidate  for  the 
same  position,  once  a  member  of  Congress,  who  pub 
licly  demanded  justice  to  the  South  by  the  rendition  of 
slaves;  but  all  of  them  would  feed  the  trembling  sable 
fugitive,  hide  him  from  his  pursuers,  and  bid  him  God 
speed  on  his  journey  toward  the  North  Star.  The  Demo 
cratic  president  judge  who  personally  remanded  Captain 


AN  EPISODE    OF  JOHN  BROWN'S  RAID.  339 

Cook  to  the  custody  of  the  Virginia  authorities  for  exe 
cution  would  have  assented  to  and  aided  his  escape  had 
they  met  simply  as  man  and  man  outside  the  sacred  obli 
gations  of  the  law.  There  was  no  sentiment  in  Frank 
lin  County  or  elsewhere  in  the  North  to  give  any  practical 
enforcement  to  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law;  and  in  every 
contest  between  slave  and  master  and  in  every  issue  re 
lating  to  slavery  the  people  were  profoundly  anti-slavery, 
however  they  resolved  in  convention  or  spoke  in  the 
forum  or  voted  at  the  polls.  This  statement  of  the  pub 
lic  sentiment  that  prevailed  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago 
in  Southern  Pennsylvania,  hard  by  the  slave  border,  and 
which  was  but  a  reflex  of  the  sentiment  of  the  North 
that  gave  practical  effect  to  its  teachings,  will  make  the 
story  of  Captain  Cook's  apparently  certain  but  singular  ly- 
defeated  opportunities  of  escape  better  understood. 

It  had  been  known  for  some  days  after  the  Brown  raid 
on  Harper's  Ferry  that  Captain  Cook  was  at> large,  and, 
as  a  liberal  reward  for  his  capture  had  been  offered  by 
Governor  Wise  of  Virginia,  and  a  minute  description  of 
his  person  published  throughout  the  country,  the  whole 
skilled  and  amateur  detective  force  of  the  land  was 
watching  every  promising  point  to  effect  his  capture. 
The  Northern  cities,  East  and  West,  were  on  the  watch 
to  discover  his  hiding-place,  but  the  forest-schooled  and 
nature-taught  detective  of  the  South  Mountain  knew 
that  some  of  its  fastnesses  must  be  his  retreat.  The 
broken  ranges  of  the  mountain  on  the  southern  border 
of  Franklin  embraced  the  line  between  Pennsylvania 
and  Maryland,  between  the  free  and  the  slave  States. 
It  was  the  favorite  retreat  of  the  fugitive  slave,  and  its 
nearness  to  Harper's  Ferry,  and  its  sacred  temples  of 
solitude  where  only  the  hunter  or  the  chopper  wandered, 
made  it  the  most  inviting  refuge  for  the  fleeing  insurrec 
tionist.  Cook  was  known  as  a  man  of  desperate  courage, 


340  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

as  a  rare  expert  in  the  use  of  pistol  and  rifle,  as  a  reckless 
desperado  in  the  anti-slavery  crusade;  and  his  capture 
alive  was  not  expected.  He  had  braved  assassination  in 
Kansas,  and  all  believed  that  he  would  resist  to  the  death 
any  attempt  to  capture  him  for  Virginia  vengeance  on 
the  gallows.  He  had  been  concealed  in  the  mountain- 
recesses  for  some  days  with  his  companions,  who  subse 
quently  escaped  through  Chambersburg  to  the  North, 
when  he  decided  to  seek  out  some  woodman's  home  and 
obtain  provisions.  They  were  afraid  to  shoot  game,  lest 
the  reports  of  their  guns  might  indicate  their  retreat  and 
lead  to  their  capture.  Cook  was  of  a  nervous,  restless, 
reckless  disposition,  and  he  started  out  alone,  going  he 
knew  not  whither,  to  obtain  food.  He  reasoned  plausi 
bly  that  he  could  not  be  captured  by  any  one  or  two 
men,  as  he  was  well  armed  and  thoroughly  skilled  in  the 
use  of  his  weapons.  He  took  no  thought  of  arrest,  as, 
had  a  score  of  armed  men  confronted  him,  he  would 
have  sold  his  life  as  dearly  as  possible  and  died  in  the 
battle  for  his  liberty.  He  understood  that  he  might  die 
any  day  or  hour,  but  to  be  made  a  prisoner  and  be  ren 
dered  up  to  Virginia  justice  to  die  on  the  gibbet  was  the 
one  doom  that  he  meant  to  escape.  He  felt  safe,  there 
fore,  in  his  venture  out  in  the  pathless  mountains  to 
claim  the  hospitality  of  some  humble  home  in  the  wil 
derness.  And  his  judgment  would  have  been  justified 
had  he  not  walked  into  the  hands  of  the  only  man  in 
Franklin  County  who  combined  with  the  courage  and 
the  skill  the  purpose  to  capture  him. 

Among  the  sturdy  population  of  the  mountaineers 
on  the  southern  Pennsylvania  border  was  a  family  of 
Logans.  There  were  two  brothers,  both  shrewd,  quiet, 
resolute  men,  both  strongly  Southern  in  their  sympathies, 
both  natural  detectives,  and  both  trained  in  the  summary 
rendition  of  fugitive  slaves  without  process  of  law.  It 


AN  EPISODE    OF  JOHN  BROWN'S  RAID.  341 

was  common  for  slaves  to  escape  from  Maryland  and 
Virginia  into  the  South  Mountain,  whose  broken  spurs 
and  extended  wings  of  dense  forest  gave  them  reasonably 
safe  retreat.  Their  escape  would  be  followed  by  hand 
bills  describing  the  fugitives  and  offering  rewards  for 
their  capture  and  return.  These  offers  of  rewards  always 
found  their  way  into  the  hands  of  Daniel  and  Hugh 
Logan,  and  many  fleeing  sons  of  bondage  were  arrested 
by  them  and  quietly  returned  to  their  masters.  Hugh 
followed  his  natural  bent  and  went  South  as  soon  as  the 
war  began.  He  at  once  enlisted  in  the  Confederate  ser 
vice,  rose  to  the  rank  of  captain,  and  was  the  guide  in 
General  Stuart's  raid  to  Chambersburg  in  October,  1862. 
He  then  saved  me  from  identification  and  capture,  al 
though  my  arrest  was  specially  ordered,  with  that  of  a 
dozen  others,  in  retaliation  of  Pope's  arrest  of  Virginia 
citizens;  and  I  was  glad  at  a  later  period  of  the  war  to 
save  him  from  summary  execution  as  a  supposed  bush 
whacker  by  General  Kelley.  Whatever  may  be  said  or 
thought  of  his  convictions  and  actions,  he  sealed  them 
with  his  life,  as  he  fell  mortally  wounded  in  one  of  the 
last  skirmishes  of  the  war.  His  brother  Daniel  was  less 
impulsive,  and  he  did  not  believe  that  either  slavery  or 
freedom  was  worth  dying  for.  He  was  then  just  in  the 
early  vigor  of  manhood  and  a  man  of  rare  qualities. 
He  possessed  the  highest  measure  of  courage,  but  never 
sought  and  seldom  shared  in  a  quarrel.  He  was  a  com 
plete  picture  of  physical  strength,  compactly  and  sym 
metrically  formed,  and  with  a  face  whose  clear-cut  fea 
tures  unmistakably  indicated  his  positive  qualities.  He 
was  a  born  detective.  Silent,  cunning,  tireless,  and  reso 
lute,  he  ever  exhausted  strategy  in  his  many  campaigns 
against  fugitives,  and  he  seldom  failed.  Had  he  been 
city-born,  with  opportunities  for  culture  in  the  pro 
fession,  Logan  would  have  made  one  of  the  best  chiefs 


342  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

of  a  detective  bureau  to  be  found  in  the  country.  But, 
mountain-born,  unschooled  save  by  himself,  and  trained 
only  in  the  rude  contests  with  fugitive  slaves  and  an 
occasional  criminal  in  the  border  wilderness,  he  finally 
wearied  of  his  trade,  and  his  arrest  of  Captain  Cook  was 
his  last  exploit  in  the  detective  line.  He  subsequently 
removed  to  Lancaster,  where  a  very  quiet,  well-to-do, 
well  behaved,  and  respected  dealer  in  horses  answers  to 
the  name  of  Daniel  Logan. 

In  a  mountain-ravine  near  Mont  Alto  Furnace,  Cleg- 
gett  Fitzhugh,  manager  of  the  works,  and  a  man  of 
Southern  birth  and  strong  Southern  sympathies,  was 
overseeing  a  number  of  men  at  work,  and  Daniel  Logan 
had  happened  to  come  that  way  and  was  engaged  in 
casual  conversation  with  him.  The  ravine  is  so  hidden 
by  the  surrounding  forest  that  one  unacquainted  with 
the  locality  would  not  know  of  its  existence  until  he 
entered  it.  Captain  Cook,  in  his  wanderings  in  search 
of  food,  was  surprised  to  find  himself  suddenly  emerge 
from  the  mountain-thicket  into  an  open  space  and  within 
less  than  fifty  yards  of  a  number  of  workmen.  He  was 
clad  and  armed  as  a  hunter,  and  he  at  once  decided  to 
evade  suspicion  by  boldly  meeting  the  men  he  could  not 
hope  to  escape  by  flight.  The  moment  he  appeared  the 
keen  eye  of  Logan  scanned  him,  and,  without  betraying 
his  discovery  in  any  way,  he  quietly  said  to  Fitzlnigh, 
"That's  Captain  Cook;  we  must  arrest  him;  the  reward 
is  one  thousand  dollars."  Fitzhugh  heartily  sympathized 
with  Logan  alike  in  hatred  of  the  John  Brown  raiders 
and  in  desire  for  the  reward,  and  he  knew  enough  about 
Logan  to  say  nothing  and  obey.  Cook  advanced  in  a 
careless  manner  to  Logan  and  Fitzhugh,  and  told  them 
that  he  was  hunting  on  the  mountains  and  wanted  to  re 
plenish  his  stock  of  bread  and  bacon.  Logan  at  once 
disarmed  suspicion  on  the  part  of  Cook  by  his  well- 


AN  EPISODE    OF  JOHN  tiROWWS  RAW.  343 

affected  hospitality,  as  he  proposed  to  go  at  once  with 
Cook  to  Logan's  store — which  had  no  existence,  by  the 
way — and  supply  the  hunter's  wants.  Cook  was  so  com 
pletely  thrown  off  guard  by  the  kind  professions  of  Lo 
gan  and  Fitzhugh  that  he  fell  in  between  them  without 
noticing  how  he  was  being  flanked.  His  gun  rested 
carelessly  on  his  shoulder,  and  the  hand  that  could  grasp 
his  pistol  and  fire  with  unerring  aim  in  the  twinkling  of 
an  eye  was  loosely  swinging  by  his  side.  None  but  a 
Daniel  Logan  could  have  thus  deceived  John  K.  Cook, 
who  had  studied  men  of  every  grade  in  many  perils;  but 
there  was  not  the  trace  of  excitement  or  the  faintest  be 
trayal  of  his  desperate  purpose  on  the  face  of  Logan. 
Thus  completely  disarmed  by  strategy,  the  little  blue- 
eyed  blonde,  the  most  sympathetic  and  the  fiercest  of  all 
John  Brown's  lieutenants,  was  instantly  made  powerless, 
as  two  rugged  mountaineers,  at  a  signal  from  Logan, 
grasped  his  arms  and  held  him  as  in  a  vice.  Cook  was 
bewildered  for  a  moment,  and  when  the  truth  flashed 
upon  him  he  struggled  desperately;  but  it  was  one  small, 
starved  man  against  two  strong  mountaineers,  and  he 
soon  discovered  that  resistance  was  vain. 

u  Why  do  you  arrest  me?"  was  his  inquiry,  when  he 
perceived  that  violence  was  useless. 

"Because  you  are  Captain  Cook,"  was  the  cool  reply 
of  Logan. 

Cook  neither  affirmed  nor  denied  the  impeachment, 
and  the  speedy  search  of  his  person  settled  the  question, 
as  his  captain's  commission  in  John  Brown's  army  was 
found  in  an  inner  pocket.  Cook  was  taken  to  Fitz 
hugh' s  house  and  stripped  of  his  weapons,  consisting 
of  gun,  revolver,  and  knife.  He  was  allowed  to  eat  a 
hasty  meal,  and  was  then  placed,  unbound,  in  an  open 
buggy  with  Logan,  to  be  taken  to  Chambersburg.  He 
was  informed  that  if  he  attempted  to  escape  he  would  be 


344  LINCOLN  AND  MEN   OF  WAR-TIMES. 

shot;  and  it  did  not  need  an  extended  acquaintance  with 
his  captor  to  assure  him  that  what  he  threatened  he 
would  certainly  perform.  He  then  gave  up  all  hope  of 
escape  by  either  fight  or  flight.  As  they  were  journey 
ing  along  the  eighteen  miles  Cook  found  that  his  captor 
was  less  bloodthirsty  than  mercenary;  and  the  following 
conversation,  subsequently  repeated  to  me  by  both  par 
ties,  passed  substantially  between  them: 

' '  You  will  get  a  reward  of  one  thousand  dollars  for 
me,  you  say?"  queried  Cook. 

"Yes,  a  thousand  dollars,"  answered  the  sententious 
Logan. 

"They  will  hang  me  in  Virginia,  won't  they?"  was 
Cook's  next  inquiry. 

' '  Yes,  they  will  hang  you, ' '  was  the  chilling  answer. 

"Do  you  want  to  have  me  hung?"  was  Cook's  first 
venture  upon  the  humane  side  of  his  captor. 

' '  No, ' '  was  the  prompt  but  unimpassioned  answer  of 
Logan. 

"Then  you  want  only  the  reward?"  was  Cook's  half- 
hopeful  appeal  to  Logan. 

"  Yes;  that's  all,"  was  Logan's  reply. 

Cook's  naturally  bright  face  beamed  at  once  with  hope 
as  he  enthusiastically  entered  into  various  plans  for  the 
payment  of  the  sum  that  would  ransom  his  life.  He  told 
Logan  how  a  thousand  dollars,  or  five  times  that  sum, 
would  not  be  a  matter  of  a  moment's  consideration  to 
his  brother-in-law,  Governor  Willard  of  Indiana,  or  his 
other  brother-in-law,  a  man  of  large  fortune  residing  in 
Brooklyn ;  but  Logan  distrusted  this  story  of  high  digni 
taries  and  large  fortunes,  and  no  practical  way  seemed 
open  to  make  Cook's  credit  good  enough  to  assure  his 
discharge.  Finally,  he  inquired  of  Logan  whether  there 
was  no  one  in  Chambersburg  who  would  be  likely  to  take 
an  interest  in  him,  and  who  could  act  as  his  counsel  and 


AN  EPISODE    OF  JOHN  BROWN'S  RAID.  345 

assure  Logan  of  the  payment  of  the  reward.  Logan 
named  me  as  a  Republican  Senator  just  elected,  who 
might  agree  to  act  as  his  counsel.  He  proposed  to  take 
Cook  to  my  office  without  revealing  his  identity  to  any 
others,  and  if  I  assured  him  of  the  payment  of  the  re 
ward  he  would  walk  away  and  leave  Cook  with  me. 
With  this  truce  between  captor  and  captive  they  arrived 
in  Chambersburg  a  little  before  sunset,  put  up  at  a  hotel, 
and  Logan  sent  for  me.  I  had  walked  out  to  the  south 
ern  suburbs  of  the  town  that  evening  after  tea  to  look  at 
some  lots,  and  on  my  way  back  had  stopped  with  a  circle 
of  men  gathered  about  a  small  outskirt  store.  We  had 
just  closed  one  of  the  most  desperate  local  contests  of 
the  State,  and  only  those  who  know  the  sunny  side  of 
village  politics  can  appreciate  how  an  evening  hour  or 
more  could  thus  be  pleasantly  spent.  It  was  an  out-of- 
the-way  place,  and  among  the  last  that  would  be  thought 
of  in  deciding  to  look  for  me.  Meantime,  Logan  had 
me  searched  for  in  every  place  where  I  was  accustomed 
to  stroll  in  the  evening,  until,  as  it  grew  late,  his  evident 
concern  attracted  attention,  and  he  feared  the  discovery 
or  suspicion  of  the  identity  of  his  prisoner.  When  dark 
ness  began  to  gather  and  all  efforts  to  find  me  had  been 
unsuccessful,  he  sent  for  an  officer  and  started  with  his 
prisoner  for  the  office  of  Justice  Reisher,  to  deliver  Cook 
to  the  custody  of  the  law.  The  office  of  the  justice  was 
on  the  main  street,  about  midway  between  the  hotel  and 
the  suburban  store  where  I  had  tarried,  and  as  I  walked 
leisurely  homeward  I  noticed  a  crowd  about  the  door  of 
the  little  temple  of  justice.  As  I  came  up  to  the  door 
Logan  first  noticed  me  from  the  inside,  and  hurried  out 
to  meet  me,  exclaiming  in  a  whisper,  with  a  betrayal  of 
excitement  that  I  had  never  before  seen  in  him,  "My 
God,  Colonel  McClure!  where  have  you  been?  I  have 
been  hunting  you  for  more  than  an  hour.  That's  Cap- 


346  LINCOLN  AND  MEN   OF   WAR.  TIMES. 

tain  Cook,  and  I  had  agreed  to  bring  him  to  you.  Can't 
you  get  him  yet?" 

I  was  greatly  surprised,  of  course,  and  equally  per 
plexed  at  the  grave  results  likely  to  follow.  I  quietly 
pressed  my  way  into  the  office  until  the  justice  noticed 
me,  and  he  at  once  addressed  Cook,  saying,  "Here's 
your  counsel  now." 

Cook  beckoned  me  to  his  side  in  the  corner,  and  said, 
in  a  tone  of  visible  despair,  ' '  I  had  expected  to  meet  you 
at  your  office  and  escape  this  misfortune. ' '  He  added, 
"  I  am  Cook:  there's  no  use  in  denying  it.  What's  to  be 
done?" 

I  turned  to  the  justice,  and  said,  "There  is  no  dispute 
as  to  the  identity  of  the  prisoner:  a  hearing  is  needless. 
Let  him  be  committed  to  await  the  demand  for  his  ren 
dition." 

The  justice  would  have  been  quite  content  had  Cook 
been  able  to  bounce  through  a  window  and  escape,  but 
that  was  not  possible,  and  Cook  was  committed  to  prison. 
I/ogan  repented  of  his  work  when  he  saw  that  he  had  sur 
rendered  a  life  for  a  price,  and  his  last  direction  to  me  as 
we  passed  out  of  the  office  was,  "  Get  Cook  away,  reward 
or  no  reward. ' ' 

Cook  was  conducted  to  the  old  jail,  accompanied  by 
the  officer  and  myself;  and  I  shall  never  forget  the  trem 
ulous  voice  in  which  the  sheriff  inquired  of  me  what  pre 
cautions  he  should  take  to  secure  the  prisoner.  I  was 
in  the  doubly  unpleasant  position  of  being  counsel  for  a 
prisoner  whose  life  depended  upon  his  escape  from  prison, 
and  also  counsel  for  the  sheriff,  who  was  more  than  ready 
to  obey  any  instructions  I  might  give  him  to  facilitate 
Cook's  escape  without  legal  responsibility  for  the  act. 
The  sheriff  was  one  of  a  class  of  simple  countrymen  who 
are  as  rugged  in  their  political  convictions  and  prejudices 
as  in  their  physical  organization,  He  ill  concealed  his 


AN  EPISODE    OF  JOHN  BROWN'S  RA,D.  347 

willingness  to  let  Cook  get  away  if  it  could  be  done  with 
out  official  responsibility  for  the  escape;  and  this  he  was 
more  than  willing  to  leave  me  to  decide.  I  told  him  to 
take  Cook  and  myself  to  a  cell,  leave  us  together,  and 
admit  no  others.  When  the  lawless  little  captive  had 
got  comfortably  seated  in  his  cell,  I  had  my  first  oppor 
tunity  to  note  his  appearance  and  qualities.  His  long, 
silken,  blonde  hair  curled  carelessly  about  his  neck;  his 
deep-blue  eyes  were  gentle  in  expression  as  a  woman's; 
and  his  slightly  bronzed  complexion  did  not  conceal  the 
soft,  effeminate  skin  that  would  have  well  befitted  the 
gentler  sex.  He  was  small  in  stature,  barely  five  feet 
five,  and  his  active  life  on  the  Western  theatre  of  war 
had  left  him  without  superfluous  flesh.  He  was  nervous 
and  impatient;  he  spoke  in  quick,  impulsive  sentences, 
but  with  little  directness,  save  in  repeating  that  he  must 
escape  from  prison.  I  reminded  him  that  he  could  not 
walk  out  of  jail,  and  that  his  escape  that  night,  under 
any  circumstances,  would  be  specially  dangerous  to  him 
self  and  dangerous  to  the  sheriff.  My  presence  with  him 
in  the  jail  until  a  late  hour  and  my  professional  relations 
as  counsel  of  the  sheriff  forbade  any  needless  haste.  We 
carefully  considered  every  possible  method  of  getting  a 
requisition  for  him  from  Richmond;  and,  assuming  that 
Cook's  arrest  was  telegraphed  to  Richmond  that  evening, 
a  requisition  by  mail  or  special  messenger  could  not  pos 
sibly  reach  Chambersburg  the  next  day  or  night.  It  was 
decided,  therefore,  that  he  should  not  attempt  to  escape 
that  night,  but  that  the  next  night  he  should  have  the 
necessary  instructions  and  facilities  to  regain  his  liberty. 
How  or  by  whom  he  was  to  be  aided  need  not  be  told. 
The  two  men  who  took  upon  themselves  the  work  of 
ascertaining  just  where  and  by  what  means  Cook  could 
best  break  out  of  the  old  jail  were  never  known  or  sus- 


348  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   U'AR-TIMF.S. 

pected  as  actively  aiding  the  prisoner.  One  is  now  dead 
and  the  other  is  largely  interested  in  Southern  enter 
prises.  They  did  their  part  well,  and,  had  Cook  re 
mained  in  Chambersburg  over  the  next  day,  he  would 
have  been  following  the  North  Star  before  the  midnight 
hour. 

I  had  spent  half  an  hour  with  Cook  when  he  first  en 
tered  the  prison,  and  then  left  him  for  an  hour  to  confer 
with  my  law-partner  about  the  possibility  of  a  legal  con 
test  to  delay  or  defeat  the  requisition  in  case  it  should  be 
necessary.  I  returned  to  the  jail  about  ten  o'clock,  and 
had  my  last  interview  with  Cook.  As  he  never  dreamed 
of  a  requisition  reaching  him  before  the  second  day,  and 
as  he  was  entirely  confident  of  his  escape  the  following 
night,  he  threw  off  the  cloud  of  despair  that  shadowed 
him  in  the  early  part  of  the  evening,  and  startled  me 
with  the  eloquence  and  elegance  of  his  conversation. 
His  familiar  discussion  of  poetry,  painting,  and  every 
thing  pertaining  to  the  beautiful  would  have  made  any 
one  forget  that  he  was  in  a  chilly  prison-cell,  and  im- 
gine  that  he  was  in  the  library  of  some  romantic  lover 
of  literature  and  the  fine  arts.  I  became  strangely  in 
terested  in  the  culture  that  was  blended  with  the  mad 
desperation  of  the  Virginia  insurgent.  He  was  evidently 
a  man  of  much  more  than  common  intellectual  qualities 
and  thoroughly  poetic  in  taste  and  temperament,  with  a 
jarring  mixture  of  wild,  romantic  love  of  the  heroic. 
He  told  me  of  his  hairbreadth  escapes  in  Kansas,  of  the 
price  set  upon  his  head;  and  his  whole  soul  seemed  to  be 
absorbed  in  avenging  the  Kansas  slavery  crusades  by 
revolutionary  emancipation  in  the  Slave  States.  When 
I  asked  him  whether  he  would  not  abandon  his  lawless 
and  hopeless  scheme  when  he  escaped,  his  large,  soft  eyes 
flashed  with  the  fire  of  defiance  as  he  answered,  with  an 
emphasis  that  unstrung  every  nerve  in  his  body:  "  No! 


AN  EPISODE    OF  JOHN  BROWN'S  RAID.  349 

the  battle  must  be  fought  to  the  bitter  end;  and  we  must 
triumph,  or  God  is  not  just." 

It  was  vain  to  argue  with  him  the  utter  madness  of 
attempting  such  a  revolution,  and  its  absolute  lawless 
ness:  he  rejected  all  law  and  logic  and  believed  in  his 
cause.  And  more:  he  fully,  fanatically,  believed  in  its 
justice:  he  believed  in  it  as  a  duty — as  the  rule  of  patriot 
ism  that  had  the  sanction  of  a  higher  law  than  that  of 
man.  In  short,  John  B.  Cook  was  a  wild  fanatic  on  the 
slavery  question,  and  he  regarded  any  and  every  means 
to  precipitate  emancipation  as  justified  by  the  end.  He 
did  not  want  to  kill  or  to  desolate  homes  with  worse  than 
death  by  the  brutal  fury  of  slave  insurrection;  but  if  such 
appalling  evils  attended  the  struggle  for  the  sudden  and 
absolute  overthrow  of  slavery,  he  was  ready  to  accept  the 
responsibility  and  believe  that  he  was  simply  performing 
his  duty.  I  do  not  thus  present  Cook  in  apology  for  his 
crime;  I  present  him  as  he  was — a  sincere  fanatic,  with 
mingled  humanity  and  atrocity  strangely  unbalancing 
each  other,  and  his  mad  purposes  intensified  by  the  bar 
barities  which  crimsoned  the  early  history  of  Kansas. 

After  half  an  hour  thus  spent  almost  wholly  as  a  lis 
tener  to  the  always  brilliant  and  often  erratic  conversa 
tion  of  the  prisoner,  I  rose  to  leave  him.  He  bade  me 
good-night  with  hope  beaming  in  every  feature  of  his 
attractive  face.  I  engaged  to  call  again  the  next  after 
noon,  and  left  him  to  meet  nevermore.  He  could  have 
made  his  escape  in  thirty  minutes  that  night,  but  it 
would  have  compromised  both  the  sheriff  and  myself, 
and  the  second  opportunity  for  his  flight  was  lost.  I 
reached  my  home  before  eleven  o'clock,  and  was  sur 
prised  to  find  Mrs.  McClure  and  her  devoted  companion, 
Miss  Virginia  Reilly,  awaiting  me  in  the  library,  dressed 
to  face  the  storm  that  had  begun  to  rage  without.  They 
stated  that  they  were  about  to  proceed  to  the  jail,  ask  to 


350  LINCOLN  AND,  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

see  Cook — which  they  knew  would  not  be  refused  them 
by  the  sheriff — dress  him  in  the  extra  female  apparel 
they  had  in  a  bundle,  and  one  of  them  walk  out  with 
him  while  the  other  remained  in  the  cell.  It  was  en 
tirely  practicable,  and  it  required  more  than  mere  prot 
estation  on  my  part  to  prevent  it.  Even  when  assured 
that  Cook  would  certainly  escape  the  following  night 
without  embarrassment  to  the  sheriff  or  any  one  else,  the 
woman's  intuition  rejected  the  reason  it  could  not  answer, 
and  only  when  it  was  peremptorily  forbidden  as  foolish 
and  needless  did  they  reluctantly  consent  to  abandon  the 
last  chance  Cook  could  then  have  to  escape.  They  were 
both  strongly  anti-slavery  by  conviction,  and  their  lives 
were  lustrous  in  the  offices  of  kindness.  Miss  Reilly, 
better  known  in  Philadelphia  as  the  late  Accomplished 
wife  of  Rev.  Thomas  X.  Orr,  was  the  daughter  of  a 
Democratic  member  of  Congress,  and  wag  positive  in 
her  party  faith  in  all  save  slavery;  and  both  women  were 
of  heroic  mould.  They  many  times  reproached  them 
selves  for  not  acting  upon  their  woman's  intuition  with 
out  waiting  to  reason  with  man  on  the  subject.  Had 
they  done  so,  Cook  would  have  been  out  of  prison,  fleetly 
mounted,  and  the  morning  sun  would  have  greeted  him 
in  the  northern  mountains.  Their  mission  £  \led  because 
forbidden  when  the  escape  of  the  prisoner  by  other  means 
seemed  as  certain  as  anything  could  be  in  th$  future,  and 
the  ill-fated  Cook  lost  his  third  chance  for  lij/.erty.  Both 
his  fair  would-be  rescuers  sleep  the  dream]  ^cc  sleep  of 
the  dead,  and  the  winds  of  the  same  autun  ng  their 
requiem  and  strewed  their  fresh  graves  w  Nature's 
withered  emblems  of  death. 

About  noon  on  the  following  day  the  §"•  riff  rushed 
into  my  office,  wild  with  excitement  a"U.l  his  eyes 
dimmed  by  tears,  and  exclaimed,  "Cook's  t?  .en  away!" 
A  thunderbolt  from  a  cloudless  sky  couj  (  not  have 


AN  EPISODE    OF  JOHN  BROWN'S  RAID.  351 

startled  me  more,  but  the  painful  distress  of  the  sheriff 
left  no  doubt  in  my  mind  that  he  had  stated  the  truth. 
He  soon  calmed  down  sufficiently  to  tell  me  how  a  req 
uisition  for  Cook  had  been  lying  in  Carlisle,  only  thirty 
miles  distant  by  railroad,  where  it  had  been  brought 
some  days  before  when  Hazlitt  had  been  arrested  and 
was  believed  to  be  Cook.  The  error  had  been  corrected 
when  the  identity  of  Hazlitt  had  been  discovered,  and 
another  requisition  forwarded,  on  which  he  had  been 
returned  to  Virginia;  but  the  Cook  requisition  remained 
with  the  sheriff  of  Cumberland.  When  Cook's  arrest 
was  announced  the  requisition  was  brought  on  to  Cham- 
bersburg  in  the  morning  train,  and  the  officer,  fearing 
delay  by  the  sheriff  sending  for  his  counsel,  called  on  the 
president  udge,  who  happened  to  be  in  the  town,  and 
demanded  his  approval  of  the  regularity  of  his  papers 
and  his  cc  umand  for  the  prompt  rendition  of  the  pris 
oner.  T:  e  judge  repaired  to  the  prison  with  the  officer, 
and  perfc  med  his  plain  duty  under  the  law  by  declaring 
the  office  entitled  to  the  custody  of  Cook.  The  noon 
train  borj  the  strangely  ill-fated  prisoner  on  his  way 
to  Virginia  and  to  death.  No  man  in  like  peril  ever 
seemed  t  •  have  had  so  many  entirely  practicable  oppor 
tunities  ..  ,r  escape;  but  all  failed,  even  with  the  exercise 
of  what  would  be  judged  as  the  soundest  discretion  for 
his  safet;  . 

His  n  ,urn  to  the  Charlestown  jail,  his  memorable 
trial,  V  '  inevitable  conviction,  his  only  cowardly  act  of 
subn  j  to  recapture  when  he  had  broken  out  of  his 
cell  a  hours  before  his  execution,  and  his  final  exe 
cution  _h  his  captive  comrades, — are  familiar  to  all. 
His  tri?  attracted  more  attention  than  that  of  any  of 
the  otht  .,  because  of  the  prominent  men  enlisted  in  his 
cause  ai  '  of  the  special  interest  felt  in  him  by  the  com 
munity  i  and  about  Harper's  Ferry.  He  had  taught 


352  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

school  there  some  years  before,  had  married  there,  and 
his  return  as  one  of  John  Brown's  raiders  to  kindle  tne 
flame  of  slave  insurrection  intensified  the  bitterness  of 
the  people  against  him.  From  the  28th  day  of  October, 
1859,  when  he  was  lodged  in  the  Charlestown  jail,  until 
the  last  act  of  the  tragedy,  when  he  was  executed,  Cook 
attracted  the  larger  share  of  public  interest  in  Harper's 
Ferry,  much  as  Brown  outstripped  him  in  national  or 
worldwide  fame.  Governor  Willard,  the  Democratic 
executive  of  Indiana,  appeared  in  person  on  the  scene, 
and  made  exhaustive  efforts  to  save  his  wayward  but  be 
loved  brother-in-law.  Daniel  W.  Voorhees,  now  United 
States  Senator  from  Indiana,  was  then  United  States  Dis 
trict  Attorney  of  his  State,  and  his  devotion  to  his  party 
chief  made  him  excel  every  previous  or  later  effort  of  his 
life  in  pleading  the  utterly  hopeless  cause  of  the  brilliant 
little  Virginia  insurgent  It  was  a  grand  legal  and  for 
ensic  battle,  but  there  was  not  an  atom  of  law  to  aid  the 
defense,  and  public  sentiment  was  vehement  for  the 
atonement. 

Viewed  in  the  clearer  light  and  calmer  judgment  of 
the  experience  of  more  than  thirty  years,  it  would  have 
been  wiser  and  better  had  Virginia  treated  John  Brown 
and  his  corporal's  guard  of  madmen  as  hopeless  lunatics 
by  imprisonment  for  life,  as  was  strongly  advised  by  con 
fidential  counsels  from  some  prominent  men  of  the  land 
whose  judgment  was  entitled  to  respect;  but  Governor 
Wise,  always  a  lover  of  the  theatrical,  made  a  dress- 
parade  burlesque  of  justice,  and  on  the  i6th  day  of  De 
cember,  1859,  amidst  the  pomp  and  show  of  the  concen 
trated  power  of  the  Mother  of  Presidents,  John  E.  Cook 
paid  the  penalty  of  his  crime  on  the  gallows.  No  demand 
was  ever  made  for  the  rendition  of  Cook's  companions 
who  had  escaped  from  Harper's  Ferry  into  the  South 
Mountain  with  him.  Some  of  them  lived  in  Northern 


AN  EPISODE    OF  JOHN  BROWN'S  RAID.  353 

Pennsylvania  without  concealment,  but  no  one  thought 
of  arresting  them.  A  few  months  thereafter  the  long- 
threatening  clouds  of  fraternal  war  broke  in  fury  upon 
the  country;  the  song  of  John  Brown  inspired  great 
armies  as  they  swept  through  the  terrible  flame  of  battle 
from  the  Father  of  Waters  to  the  Southern  Sea,  and  the 
inspiration  that  made  lawless  madmen  of  Brown  and 
Cook  at  Harper's  Ferry  crowned  the  Republic  with  uni 
versal  freedom  at  Appomattox. 


OUR  UNREWARDED  HEROES. 


OUR  UNREWARDED  HEROES. 


A<Lf  great  wars  produce  great  victors,  and  they  are 
crowned  with  the  greenest  laurels  of  the  people  for 
whose  cause  they  have  achieved  success.  These  chief 
tains  live  in  history  and  their  memory  is  gratefully  cher 
ished  long  after  they  have  passed  away  ;  but  every  great 
war  has  also  its  unrewarded  heroes,  whose  merits  are 
often  equal  to,  sometimes  even  greater  than,  those  who 
attained  the  highest  measure  of  distinction.  In  war 
and  politics  nothing  is  successful  but  success,  and  the 
unsuccessful  military  commander  and  the  unsuccessful 
politician  are  forgotten,  whatever  may  be  their  personal 
merits,  while  those  who  win  victories  win  the  applause 
of  the  world.  Accident,  fortuitous  circumstance,  and 
personal  or  political  influence  aid  largely  in  winning 
promotion  in  both  peace  and  war,  and  a  lost  battle,  how 
ever  bravely  and  skillfully  fought,  often  deposes  a  com 
mander,  while  a  victory  won,  even  in  spite  of  the  absence 
of  the  elements  of  greatness,  may  make  a  name  immor 
tal.  The  rewarded  heroes  of  our  late  civil  war  are  well 
known  to  the  country  and  to  the  world,  but  that  great 
conflict  left  unrewarded  heroes  whose  names  and  merits 
should  be  crystallized  in  the  history  of  the  Republic. 
Prominent  among  these  are  General  George  G.  Meade, 
General  George  H.  Thomas,  General  Fitz  John  Porter, 
General  G.  K.  Warren,  and  General  D.  C.  Buell. 

The  country  has  never  done  justice  to  General  Meade 

355 


356  LINCOLN  AND  *MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

as  a  military  commander,  and  our  varied  histories,  as  a 
rule,  have  grudgingly  conceded  to  him  only  what  could 
not  be  withheld  from  him.  The  man  who  fought  and 
won  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  should  have  been  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  armies  of  the  Union  and  held 
that  position  during  life.  It  was  the  great  battle  of  the 
war;  it  was  the  Waterloo  of  the  Confederacy,  and  the 
victory  there  achieved  was  won  by  the  skill  of  the  com 
manding  general  and  the  heroism  of  his  army.  No  man 
ever  accepted  a  command  under  circumstances  as  embar 
rassing  and  in  every  way  discouraging  as  those  which 
confronted  General  Meade  when  he  succeeded  Hooker  as 
commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  That  superb 
army  had  never  up  to  that  time  won  a  decisive  victory 
in  a  great  battle.  It  had  been  defeated  in  1861  under 
McDowell,  in  the  spring  of  1862  under  McClellan  on  the 
Peninsula,  again  under  Pope  on  the  second  Bull  Run 
field,  next  under  Burnside  at  Fredericksburg  in  the  fall 
of  1862,  and  in  1863  under  Hooker  at  Chancellorsville; 
and  the  only  success  it  had  achieved  in  pitched  battle 
was  the  victory  of  Antietam.  That  was  a  victory  only 
because  Lee  left  the  field  unassailed  after  the  battle  had 
been  fought.  Meade  was  called  to  the  command  within 
three  days  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  and  was  compelled 
to  advance  to  meet  the  strongest  and  most  defiant  army 
that  ever  marched  under  the  Confederate  flag,  and  one 
that  fully  equaled  his  in  numbers  and  that  was  flushed 
with  repeated  triumphs.  His  army  was  fresh  from  the 
humiliating  discomfiture  of  Chancellorsville,  distrustful 
of  its  own  ability  because  of  distrust  in  its  commanders, 
and  it  had  to  be  concentrated  by  forced  marches  to  meet 
the  shock  of  battle  on  Cemetery  Hill. 

The  Gettysburg  campaign  was  in  all  material  respects 
defensive.  The  government  had  little  hope  of  anything 
more  than  repelling  L,ee's  advance  upon  the  national 


OUR   UNREWARDED  HEROES.  357 

capital  or  upon  Baltimore  or  Philadelphia.  The  destruc 
tion  of  I/ee's  army  was  not  to  be  thought  of,  for  it  was 
equal  in  numbers,  equipment,  and  prowess  to  the  ever- 
gallant  though  often-defeated  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It 
was  the  single  hope  of  the  nation,  for  had  it  been  de 
feated  in  a  great  battle  Washington  and  the  wealth  of  our 
Eastern  cities  would  have  been  at  the  mercy  of  the  in 
surgents.  It  was  an  occasion  for  the  most  skillful  and 
prudent  generalship,  united  with  the  great  courage  essen 
tial  to  command  successfully  in  such  an  emergency.  All 
these  high  requirements  General  Meade  fully  met,  and 
the  most  critical  examination  of  the  records  he  made  in 
the  Gettysburg  campaign  develops  nothing  but  what 
heightens  his  qualities  for  the'  peculiarly  grave  emer 
gency  that  confronted  him.  He  has  been  thoughtlessly 
or  maliciously  criticised  because  he  took  the  wise  pre 
caution  to  provide  for  his  retreat  from  Gettysburg  had 
the  chances  of  war  made  it  necessary,  and  also  because 
he  failed  to  pursue  Lee  more  vigorously  on  the  retreat, 
and  decided  not  to  assault  him  at  Williamsport. 

When  General  Meade  arrived  at  Gettysburg,  which  he 
did  at  the  earliest  hour  possible,  he  knew  how  desperate 
the  battle  must  be  and  how  the  advantage  was  with  the 
enemy,  as  I^ee  had  largely  superior  numbers  on  the  first 
day,  and  should  have  had  largely  superior  numbers  on 
the  second  day.  Not  until  the  morning  of  the  third  day 
was  Meade' s  army  all  upon  the  field,  and  then  one  corps 
had  made  a  forced  march  of  nearly  thirty  miles.  He 
had  expected  to  fight  a  defensive  battle  east  of  Gettys 
burg,  and  his  topographical  examinations  had  been  care 
fully  made  and  his  lines  fully  formulated.  He  thus  acted 
as  a  wise  and  skillful  general  in  making  the  earliest  prepa 
rations  for  the  retirement  of  his  army  to  another  position 
in  case  he  should  be  assaulted  or  flanked  from  his  lines 
on  Cemetery  Hill.  He  was  thus  prepared  to  retire  hi3 


358  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

army  at  any  moment  in  perfect  order,  with  every  corps 
advised  precisely  where  to  form  its  new  lines;  but  he 
proved  by  the  dauntless  courage  with  which  he  held  his 
position  at  Gettysburg  that  he  did  not  contemplate  retreat 
until  retreat  became  an  absolute  necessity.  So  far  from 
being  complained  of  for  having  looked  beyond  Gettys 
burg  for  a  position  in  which  to  fight  the  decisive  battle 
with  Lee,  he  is  entitled  to  the  highest  commendation  as 
a  most  skillful,  brave,  and  considerate  soldier. 

When  Lee  was  defeated  and  retired  from  the  field,  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  worn  by  forced  marches  and 
fighting  for  more  than  a  week,  and  more  than  twenty 
thousand  of  its  gallant  warriors  were  killed  or  wounded, 
and  when  the  two  armies  were  brought  face  to  face  again 
at  Williamsport,  they  were  yet  equal  in  numbers,  equal 
in  prowess,  and  presumably  equal  in  equipment,  and  Lee 
had  the  advantage  of  a  chosen  position  for  repelling  as 
saults,  upon  his  lines.  Meade  might  have  won  another 
victory,  but  it  would  have  been  at  such  fearful  sacrifice 
that  no  wise  soldier  would  have  attempted  it.  After 
Gettysburg,  General  Meade  had  but  a  single  opportunity 
of  displaying  his  generalship  in  handling  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  and  that  was  in  the  fruitless  movement 
upon  Mine  Run,  where  by  disobedience  of  his  orders, 
owing  to  a  mistake  of  one  of  his  corps  commanders,  Lee 
was  enabled  to  unite  his  forces  in  an  impregnable  posi 
tion  before  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  ready  for  as 
sault.  He  might  have  done  at  Mine  Run  as  Grant  did 
at  Vicksburg  and  Cold  Harbor,  and  as  Burnside  did  at 
Fredericksburg,  and  sacrificed  ten  thousand  men  with 
only  defeat  as  his  reward;  but  General  Meade  was  too 
great  a  soldier  to  sacrifice  an  army  to  conceal  failures  in 
generalship.  General  Grant,  the  victor  of  Vicksburg  on 
the  same  day  that  Meade  was  victor  at  Gettysburg,  added 
fresh  laurels  to  his  crown  at  Missionary  Ridge,  where  he 


OUR   UNREWARDED  HEROES.  359 

had  overwhelming  numbers  to  assure  success.  That 
achievement  made  him  Lieutenant-General,  as  Meade 
would  have  been  made  had  he  succeeded  at  Mine  Run 
and  Grant  failed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  and  thenceforth 
Grant  was  the  only  chieftain  the  nation  could  know  until 
his  final  victory  at  Appomattox. 

I  first  saw  General  Meade  on  the  day  that  he  reported 
for  duty  at  Tenleytown,  wearing  his  new  brigadier's  uni 
form,  to  take  command  of  a  brigade  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Reserves.  He  impressed  me  then,  as  he  ever  impressed 
those  who  came  in  close  contact  with  him,  as  a  thorough 
gentleman  and  soldier,  quiet,  unobtrusive,  intelligent,  and 
heroic,  and  in  every  battle  in  which  he  led  his  brigade 
or  his  division  or  his  corps  he  was  ever  first  in  the  fight 
and  last  to  leave  it.  He  would  have  won  Fredericksburg 
had  he  been  half  supported,  as  his  movement  in  the  early 
part  of  the  day  was  the  only  success  achieved  by  any 
effort  of  the  army  in  that  disastrous  battle;  and  when  he 
was  called  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
he  hesitated  long  before  accepting  it,  and  finally  accepted 
it  only  when  it  was  pressed  upon  him  as  an  imperious 
duty  that  he  could  not  evade. 

I  have  reason  to  believe  that  Meade  lost  the  Lieuten 
ant-Generalship  that  was  conferred  upon  Sheridan  in 
1869  because  of  the  disappointment  in  Washington  at 
his  failure  to  deliver  battle  to  Lee  at  Williamsport  I 
saw  Lincoln  within  a  week  after  Lee's  retreat  from  Penn 
sylvania,  and  he  inquired  most  anxiously  and  in  great 
detail  as  to  all  the  roads  and  mountain-passes  from  Get 
tysburg  to  the  Potomac.  I  was  entirely  familiar  with 
them,  and  gave  him  minute  information  on  the  subject. 
After  a  somewhat  protracted  inquiry  into  the  topography 
of  the  country,  I  asked  Lincoln  whether  he  was  not  sat 
isfied  with  what  Meade  had  accomplished.  He  answered 
with  the  caution  that  always  characterized  Lincoln  in 


360  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

speaking  of  those  who  were  struggling  for  the  preserva 
tion  of  the  government.  I  remember  his  exact  language 
as  well  to-day  as  if  it  had  been  spoken  but  yesterday. 
He  said:  "  Now,  don't  misunderstand  me  about  General 
Meade.  I  am  profoundly  grateful  down  to  the  bottom  of 
my  boots  for  what  he  did  at  Gettysburg,  but  I  think  that 
if  I  had  been  General  Meade  I  would  have  fought  an 
other  battle. ' '  The  atmosphere  about  Washington  was 
not  friendly  to  Meade.  He  was  all  soldier,  and  would 
have  died  unpromoted  had  he  been  compelled  to  seek 
or  conciliate  political  power  to  attain  it.  Stanton  raved 
against  him  because  he  did  not  do  the  impossible  thing 
of  capturing  Lee  and  his  army,  and  political  sentiment 
in  and  around  the  administration  and  in  Congress  settled 
down  in  the  conviction  that  Meade  had  lost  a  great  op 
portunity.  They  would  have  deified  Meade,  when  terror- 
stricken  as  Lee  was  marching  upon  Gettysburg,  had  he 
given  them  the  assurance  that  he  could  drive  Lee's  army 
back  defeated  and  broken  upon  its  desolated  Virginia 
homes;  but  when  their  fears  were  quieted  by  Meade' s 
hard- fought  battle  and  decisive  victory,  they  forgot  the 
grandeur  of  his  achievement  and  accused  him  of  incom- 
petency  for  failing  to  fight  at  Williamsport.  Had  he 
fought  there  and  been  repulsed,  as  he  had  every  reason 
to  believe  was  more  than  probable  had  he  attacked,  he 
would  have  been  denounced  as  rash  and  unfitted  for  com 
mand  ;  but  he  was  censured  for  his  wisdom ;  multiplied 
censure  fell  upon  him  for  his  wisdom  at  Mine  Run;  and 
thus  the  man  who  should  have  been  the  Great  Captain 
of  the  war  was  subordinated,  but  performed  his  duty  with 
matchless  fidelity  until  the  last  insurgent  flag  was  furled. 
That  Meade  was  sore  at  heart  because  he  felt  that  his 
best  efforts  as  a  soldier  were  not  fully  appreciated  is 
known  to  all  his  personal  associates.  One  month  before 
General  Grant  was  inaugurated  as  President,  I  met  hiin 


OUR    UNREWARDED  HEROES.  361 

on  a  railway-train  going  to  Washington.     He  and  his 
family  were  in  a  private  car  at  the  rear  of  the  train. 
When  I  learned  that  he  was  there,  along  with  others  I 
called  to  pay  my  respects.     After  a  very  brief  conversa 
tion  I  was  about  to  leave  him  when  he  asked  me  to 
remain  for  a  moment,  as  he  wished  to  speak  to  me  about 
the  proposed  abolishment  of  the  rank  of  General,  which 
he  was  soon  to  vacate  when  he  became  President,  and  to 
which  Sherman  was  fairly  entitled  by  regular  promotion. 
He  asked  me  to  take  some  interest  in  the  matter  at  Wash 
ington  and  urge  some  of  our  prominent  Pennsylvania 
Representatives  to  defeat  the  passage  of  the  bill.     I  fully 
agreed  with  him,  and  in  leaving  him  said,  "The  coun 
try  well  understands  who  should  succeed  you  as  General 
in  the  army,  but  there  is  dispute  as  to  who  should  suc 
ceed  Sherman  as  Lieutenant-General. ' '    I  did  not  expect 
any  intimation  from  Grant  as  to  his  choice  for  Lieuten 
ant-General,  but  to  my  surprise  he  answered,  ' '  Oh,  that 
is  not  a  matter  of  doubt;  Sheridan  is  fully  entitled  to  it." 
The  remark  was  not  made  in  confidence,  although  none 
heard  it  but  his  family  and  myself.     The  names  of  Meade 
and  Thomas  were  both  freely  discussed  at  that  time  as 
likely  to  reach  the  Lieutenant-Generalship,  while  few, 
if  any,    expected  Sheridan,    a  junior  major-general,    to 
attain  it.     On  my  return  from  Washington  I  happened 
to  meet  General  Meade  in  Col.  Scott's  room  of  the  Penn 
sylvania  Railroad  office,  and  without  intimating  that  I 
had  any  information  on  the  subject  I  inquired  of  him 
whether  the  Lieutenant-Generalship,  soon  to  be  vacant, 
would  not,  of  right,  go  to  the  senior  major-general  of  the 
army.     General  Meade  answered  very  promptly  and  with 
great  emphasis:   "  Of  course,  it  can  go  only  to  the  senior 
major-general;  I  could  not  with  self-respect  remain  in 
the  army  for  a  day  if  any  other  should  be  appointed  over 
me. ' '     I  need  hardly  say  that  I  did  not  venture  to  inform 


362  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF    WAR-TIMES. 

General  Meade  of  the  positive  views  expressed  by  Gen 
eral  Grant  on  the  subject,  as  it  would  have  wounded  him 
beyond  expression.  A  few  weeks  thereafter  Grant  was 
inaugurated  and  Sheridan  promptly  appointed  to  the  Lieu 
tenant-Generalship.  I  saw  Meade  many  times  thereafter, 
but  always  wearing-  the  deep  lines  of  sad  disappointment 
in  his  finely-chiseled  face.  The  Lieutenant-Generalship 
was  obviously  a  forbidden  topic  with  him,  and  he  went 
down  to  his  grave  one  of  the  sorrowing  and  unrewarded 
heroes  of  the  war. 


GEORGE  H.  THOMAS  was  another  of  the  unrewarded 
heroes  of  the  war.  He  was  the  same  type  of  soldier  as 
General  Meade,  cautious  in  movement  and  heroic  in 
action,  and  both  were  modest  and  gentle  as  a  woman  in 
their  private  lives.  No  two  men  in  the  army  more  per 
fectly  completed  the  circle  of  soldier  and  gentleman,  and 
either  was  equal  to  the  highest  requirements  of  even  the 
exceptional  duties  imposed  upon  a  great  commander  by 
our  civil  war.  Either  would  have  taken  Richmond  with 
Grant's  army,  and  saved  tens  of  thousands  of  gallant 
men  from  untimely  death.  Both  of  these  men  fought 
one  great  battle  when  in  supreme  command,  Meade  at 
Gettysburg  and  Thomas  at  Nashville,  and  they  stand 
out  single  and  alone  in  history  as  the  two  most  decisive 
battles  of  the  wrar.  Meade  dealt  the  deathblow  to  the 
Confederacy  from  Cemetery  Hill;  Thomas  annihilated 
the  army  of  Hood  from  the  heights  of  Nashville,  and 
thenceforth  Hood's  army  is  unknown  in  the  history  of 
the  conflict.  In  all  the  many  other  achievements  of 
these  men  they  fought  as  subordinate  commanders,  and 
their  records  are  unsurpassed  by  any  of  the  many  heroic 
records  made  by  our  military  commanders.  Both  were 
considered  as  hopeful  candidates  for  the  Lieutenant-Gen- 


OUR    UNREWARDED  HEROES.  363 

eralship  to  which  Grant  appointed  Sheridan.  I  remem 
ber  a  conversation  with  Senator  John  Sherman  soon 
after  the  election  of  Grant  to  the  Presidency  in  1868,  in 
which  he  expressed  the  opinion  that  either  Thomas  or 
Meade  would  certainly  be  promoted  when  Grant  became 
President;  and  at  that  time  he  certainly  reflected  the  be 
lief  of  his  brother,  then  Lieutenant-General,  who  was 
soon  to  be  promoted  to  the  highest  rank  of  the  army. 
General  Thomas's  military  record  is  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  to  be  found  in  the  history  of  our  civil  con 
flict.  He  is  one  of  the  very  few  commanders  who  never 
committed  a  serious  military  error,  who  never  sacrificed 
a  command,  and  who  never  lost  a  battle.  He  was  prob 
ably  more  cautious  than  Meade,  but  I  doubt  whether 
any  man  of  all  the  generals  of  the  war  was  better 
equipped  for  the  supreme  command  of  all  our  armies 
than  George  H.  Thomas.  He  lacked  Grant's  persistent 
aggression,  but  Grant  never  lost  a  battle  that  Thomas 
would  have  fought,  and  never  failed  in  an  assault  that 
Thomas  would  have  ordered.  His  battle  at  Mill  Spring, 
fought  on  the  i9th  of  January,  1862,  with  an  army  of 
entirely  raw  troops,  was  one  of  the  first  important  vic 
tories  of  the  war,  and  it  directed  the  attention  of  the 
country  to  the  great  skill  and  energy  of  Thomas  as  a 
military  commander.  Soon  after  he  was  called  to  the 
command  of  one  of  the  three  wings  of  the  army  of 
Rosecrans,  and  in  the  bloody  battle  of  Stone  River  his 
command  played  a  most  conspicuous  part  and  contrib 
uted  more  than  any  other  to  the  victory  that  was  finally 
wrested  from  Bragg  on  that  memorable  field.  Again  his 
name  called  out  the  homage  of  every  loyal  heart  as  he 
and  his  brave  warriors  stood  alone  to  resist  the  success 
ful  enemy  on  the  sanguinary  battle-field  of  Chickamauga. 
He,  and  he  alone,  saved  the  army  from  utter  rout  in  that 
disastrous  battle,  and  it  led  to  his  promotion  to  the  com- 


LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-  TIMES. 

mand  of  the  army  as  the  successor  of  Rosecrans.  In 
Sherman's  great  campaign  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta, 
Thomas  was  one  of  his  most  efficient  lieutenants.  So 
highly  was  he  appreciated  by  Sherman  that  he  was 
chosen  from  all  of  Sherman's  subordinates  to  protect 
Sherman's  rear  by  confronting  Hood  in  Tennessee  when 
Sherman  started  on  his  march  to  Savannah.  When 
Sherman  cut  loose  from  his  base  of  supplies  and  started 
on  his  romantic  march  through  the  heart  of  the  rebel 
lion,  he  left  Thomas  to  give  battle  to  Hood,  knowing 
that  Thomas  would  be  outnumbered  by  the  enemy,  but 
entirely  confident  in  Thomas's  ability  to  maintain  his 
position. 

The  duty  assigned  to  Thomas  was  one  that  required 
exceptional  discretion  and  courage,  and  he  was  doubt 
less  chosen  because  he  possessed  those  qualities  in  a  pre 
eminent  degree.  Had  he  given  battle  to  Hood  before 
he  was  entirely  prepared  to  fight,  even  under  the  most 
favorable  circumstances,  he  could  have  been  easily  over 
whelmed,  but  Sherman  confidently  trusted  Thomas, 
knowing  that  if  any  man  could  save  an  army  Thomas 
was  the  man.  Because  of  the  inadequacy  of  his  force  to 
make  an  aggressive  movement  against  Hood,  Thomas 
was  compelled  to  fall  back  upon  Nashville,  where  he 
could  best  concentrate  his  army  for  the  decisive  conflict. 
He  reached  Nashville  on  the  3d  of  October,  1864,  where 
he  summoned  scattered  commands  with  all  possible  speed 
until  he  had  gathered  25,000  infantry  and  8000  cavalry 
to  resist  Hood's  advance  with  40,000  infantry  and  over 
10,000  cavalry. 

Sherman  did  not  start  upon  his  march  to  the  sea  until 
a  month  or  more  after  Thomas  had  begun  the  concentra 
tion  of  his  army  at  Nashville,  and  until  Hood  had  moved 
far  enough  against  Thomas  to  make  it  impossible  for  him 
to  pursue  Sherman.  So  rapidly  did  Hood  march  north- 


OUR    UNREWARDED  HEROES,  365 

ward  that  General  Schofield  was  compelled  to  fight  a 
desperate  battle  at  Franklin  before  he  was  able  to  join 
Thomas  at  Nashville,  where  he  arrived  on  the  ist  of 
December.  On  the  next  day  after  Schofield' s  arrival 
the  authorities  at  Washington  became  most  importunate 
to  have  Thomas  deliver  battle  at  once.  Stanton  tele 
graphed  Grant  on  the  2d  of  December,  complaining  of 
the  ' '  disposition  of  Thomas  to  lay  in  fortifications  for  an 
indefinite  period.  .  .  .  This  looks  like  the  McClellan  and 
Rosecrans  strategy  of  do  nothing  and  let  the  enemy  raid 
the  country."  On  the  same  day  Grant  telegraphed 
Thomas  urging  him  to  make  an  early  attack  upon  Hood. 
On  the  same  day  he  telegraphed  him  again,  complaining 
that  lie  had  not  moved  out  from  Nashville  to  Franklin 
and  taken  the  offensive  against  the  enemy.  To  these 
complaints  General  Thomas  replied  on  the  same  day  that 
had  he  joined  Schofield  at  Franklin  he  could  have  had 
no  more  than  25,000  men  to  take  the  offensive  against 
nearly  50,000.  Again,  on  the  5th  of  December,  Grant 
telegraphed  Thomas  complaining  of  his  delay  in  attack 
ing  Hood,  and  again  Thomas  answered  that  he  could  not 
take  the  aggressive  for  want  of  sufficient  cavalry  force 
that  he  was  rapidly  increasing  and  equipping.  On  the 
6th  of  December,  Grant  telegraphed  Thomas  a  peremp 
tory  order  in  these  words:  "Attack  Hood  at  once,  and 
wait  no  longer  for  a  remount  for  your  cavalry. ' '  This 
dispatch  was  dated  4  p.  M.,  and  at  9  p.  M.  of  the  same 
evening  Thomas  replied :  "I  will  make  the  necessary 
disposition  and  attack  Hood  at  once,  agreeably  to  your 
orders,  though  I  believe  it  will  be  hazardous  with  the 
small  force  of  cavalry  now  at  my  service."  On  the  next 
day  Stanton  telegraphed  Grant:  "Thomas  seems  unwill 
ing  to  attack  because  it  is  hazardous,  as  if  all  war  was 
any  but  hazardous.  If  he  waits  for  Wilson  to  get  ready, 
Gabriel  will  be  blowing  his  last  horn."  On  the  8th  of 


LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

December,  Grant  telegraphed  Halleck:  "If  Thomas  has 
not  struck  yet,  he  ought  to  be  ordered  to  hand  over  his 
command  to  Schofield.  There  is  no  bet'ter  man  to  repel 
an  attack  than  Thomas,  but  I  fear  he  is  too  cautious  to 
take  the  initiative."  Halleck  replied:  u  If  you  wish 
General  Thomas  relieved,  give  the  order.  No  one  here 
will,  I  think,  interfere.  The  responsibility,  however, 
will  be  yours,  as  no  one  here,  so  far  as  I  am  informed, 
wishes  General  Thomas  removed."  On  the  same  day 
Grant  telegraphed  Thomas:  "  Why  not  attack  at  once? 
By  all  means  avoid  the  contingency  of  a  foot-race  to  see 
which,  you  or  Hood,  can  beat  to  the  Ohio."  On  the 
same  day,  in  answer  to  Halleck' s  inquiry  about  removing 
Thomas,  Grant  said:  "  I  would  not  say  relieve  him  until 
I  hear  further  from  him."  At  11.30  P.  M.  of  the  same 
day  Thomas  telegraphed  Grant:  "I  can  only  say,  in 
further  extenuation  why  I  have  not  attacked  Hood,  that 
I  could  not  concentrate  my  troops  and  get  their  trans 
portation  in  order  in  shorter  time  than  it  has  been  done, 
and  am  satisfied  I  have  made  every  effort  that  was  pos 
sible  to  complete  the  task."  On  the  9th  of  December, 
Halleck  telegraphed  Thomas:  u  lieutenant-General  Grant 
expresses  much  dissatisfaction  at  your  delay  in*  attacking 
the  enemy;"  and  on  the  same  day  Grant  telegraphed  to 
Halleck:  ' '  Please  telegraph  orders  relieving  him  (Thomas) 
and  placing  Schofield  in  command."  In  obedience  to 
this  request  of  Grant,  the  War  Department  issued  a  gen 
eral  order  reciting  Grant's  request  to  have  Thomas  re 
lieved  by  Schofield,  and  assigning  Schofield  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Department  and  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
On  the  afternoon  of  December  9th,  Thomas  telegraphed 
Halleck,  expressing  his  regret  at  Grant's  dissatisfaction 
at  his  delay  in  attacking  the  enemy,  and  saying  that  ' c  a 
terrible  storm  of  freezing  rain  has  come  on  since  day 
light,  which  will  render  an  attack  impossible  till  it 


OUR    UNREWARDED  HEROES.  367 

breaks."  On  the  same  day  he  telegraphs  Grant  that  if 
Grant  should  deem  it  necessary  to  relieve  him,  "I  will 
submit  without  a  murmur. "  At  5. 30  p.  M.  of  the  same 
day  Grant  thought  better  of  his  purpose  to  relieve 
Thomas,  and  telegraphed  to  Halleck:  UI  am  very  un 
willing  to  do  injustice  to  an  officer  who  has  done  so 
much  good  service  as  General  Thomas  has,  however, 
and  will  therefore  suspend  the  order  relieving  him  until 
it  is  seen  whether  he  will  do  anything."  Two  hours 
later  he  telegraphed  to  General  Thomas,  earnestly  press 
ing  him  to  give  early  battle.  The  severe  freeze  that  had 
covered  the  ground  with  ice,  so  that  troops  could  not  be 
manoeuvred  at  all,  contined  for  several  days,  and  on  the 
1 1 th  Grant  again  telegraphed  Thomas:  u  Delay  no  longer 
for  weather  or  reinforcements. ' '  To  this  dispatch  Thomas 
answered :  '  *  The  whole  country  is  now  covered  with  a 
sheet  of  ice  so  hard  and  slippery  it  is  utterly  impossible 
for  troops  to  ascend  the  slopes,  or  even  move  on  level 
ground  in  anything  like  order.  .  .  .  Under  these  circum 
stances  I  believe  that  an  attack  at  this  time  would  only 
result  in  a  useless  sacrifice  of  life. ' '  On  the  following 
day,  December  i3th,  Grant  issued  special  orders  No.  149, 
as  follows:  "  Major-General  John  A.  Logan,  United  States 
Volunteers,  will  proceed  immediately  to  Nashville,  Ten 
nessee,  report  by  telegraph  to  the  Lieutenant-General  his 
arrival  at  Louisville,  Kentucky,  and  also  his  arrival  at 
Nashville,  Tennessee. ' ' 

General  Logan  started  immediately  upon  his  mission 
with  an  order  in  his  pocket  requiring  General  Thomas 
to  transfer  to  him  the  command  of  the  army.  When 
he  reached  Louisville  he  learned  that  the  battle  was  in 
progress,  and  he  wisely  halted  and  returned  without  vis 
iting  Nashville.  On  the  evening  of  the  i4th,  Thomas 
telegraphed  Halleck:  "  The  ice  having  melted  away  to 
day,  the  enemy  will  be  attacked  to-morrow  morning." 


368  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

In  the  mean  time  Grant  had  become  alarmed  at  the  pos 
sible  consequences  of  his  own  order  in  transferring  the 
command  from  Thomas  to  L,ogan,  and  on  the  I4th  he 
started  for  Nashville  himself  to  take  personal  command. 
When  he  reached  Washington  he  received  the  first  infor 
mation  of  Thomas's  attack,  and  later  in  the  evening  a 
report  of  the  great  victory  achieved,  to  which  Grant  re 
sponded  by  the  following  dispatch  to  Thomas:  "Your 
dispatch  of  this  evening  just  received.  I  congratulate 
you  and  the  army  under  your  command  for  to-day's  ope 
rations,  and  feel  a  conviction  that  to-morrow  will  add 
more  fruits  to  your  victory. ' '  Stanton  also  telegraphed 
Thomas:  uWe  shall  give  you  a  hundred  guns  in  the 
morning."  Two  days  later,  when  Grant  learned  how 
complete  were  Thomas's  methods  and  his  victory,  he 
telegraphed  Thomas :  ' '  The  armies  operating  against 
Richmond  have  fired  two  hundred  guns  in  honor  of 
your  great  victory." 

I  give  the  substance  of  these  dispatches  because  it  is 
necessary  to  convey  to  the  public  the  peculiar  attitude  in 
which  Thomas  was  placed  before  he  fought  the  battle  at 
Nashville.  He  was  soldier  enough  to  disobey  the  per 
emptory  order  of  the  commander-in-chief  when  he  knew 
that  his  commander  could  not  know  or  appreciate  the 
peril  of  an  attempt  to  obey  his  orders,  and  he  exhibited 
the  most  sublime  qualities  of  a  great  soldier  when,  even 
in  the  face  of  his  threatened  removal  from  his  command, 
he  peremptorily  refused  to  fight  a  battle  that  he  was  con 
vinced  could  result  only  in  disaster  and  in  the  needless 
sacrifice  of  life.  The  result  so  fully  vindicated  General 
Thomas  that  none  have  since  questioned  the  wisdom  of 
the  position  he  assumed  and  maintained  so  heroically; 
but  the  fact  that  the  battle  of  Nashville  proved  that 
Thomas  was  entirely  right,  and  that  Grant,  Halleck, 
and  Stanton  were  entirely  wrong,  doomed  Thomas  to 


OUR    UNREWARDED  HEROES.  369 

disfavor  with  the  government;  and  while  he  never  could 
be  censured  by  those  who  so  severely  criticised  him,  I 
fear  that  even  Grant,  with  all  his  greatness,  never  fully 
forgave  Thomas  for  the  wrong  that  Grant  had  done  him 
in  regard  to  the  battle  of  Nashville.  It  was  the  one 
battle  of  the  war  that  was  planned  on  the  most  thorough 
principles  of  military  science  and  executed  in  its  entirety 
with  masterly  skill;  and  it  is  the  only  great  battle  of  our 
civil  war  that  is  studied  in  the  military  schools  of  the 
world  because  of  the  completeness  of  the  military  strat 
egy  exhibited  by  Thomas.  There  were  no  more  battles 
to  be  fought  in  the  South-west  after  the  battle  of  Nash 
ville,  as  Thomas  had  left  no  enemy  to  confront  him. 

I  first  met  George  H.  Thomas  in  May,  1861,  when  he 
dined  at  my  home  in  Chambersburg  along  with  Generals 
Patterson,  Cadwalader,  Doubleday,  and  Keim,  and  Col 
onels  Fitz  John  Porter  and  John  Sherman,  who  were 
serving  as  staff  officers.  Thomas  was  then  a  colonel, 
and  commanded  the  regulars  in  Patterson's  movement 
into  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  The  war  was  freely  dis 
cussed  by  this  circle  of  military  men,  and  I  well  remem 
ber  that  all  those  present,  with  the  exception  of  Double- 
day  and  Thomas,  freely  predicted  that  it  would  not  last 
over  three  months,  and  that  no  more  than  one  or  two 
battles  would  be  fought.  Doubleday  aggressively  dis 
puted  the  theory  generally  advanced  of  an  early  peace, 
and  Thomas,  with  that  modesty  that  always  character 
ized  him,  was  silent.  Doubleday  had  met  the  South 
erners  in  battle  at  Sumter,  and  he  knew  how  desperately 
earnest  they  were ;  and  Thomas  was  a  son  of  Virginia, 
and  knew  that  the  Southern  people  were  as  heroic  as 
any  in  the  North.  I  saw  him  several  times  during  that 
campaign,  and  much  enjoyed  visits  to  his  camp;  but 
even  in  the  privacy  of  personal  conversation  he  was 

most  reluctant  to  discuss  the  situation,  evidently  because 

24 


370  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES, 

he  knew  that  the  North  did  not  understand,  and  could 
not  be  made  to  understand,  the  determined  purpose  of 
the  Southern  people  to  win  independence.  Our  ac 
quaintance  that  began  at  Chambersburg  was  maintained 
until  his  death,  and  whenever  opportunity  presented  I 
always  sought  his  companionship.  He  was  one  of  the 
most  lovable  characters  I  have  ever  known,  but  it  re 
quired  exhaustive  ingenuity  to  induce  him  to  speak 
about  any  military  movements  in  which  he  was  a  prom 
inent  participant  Any  one  might  have  been  in  daily 
intercourse  with  him  for  years  and  never  learned  from 
him  that  he  had  won  great  victories  in  the  field. 

After  the  war  Thomas  suffered  in  silence  the  disfavor 
of  those  in  authority.  It  was  doubtless  the  more  dis 
tressing  to  one  of  his  sensitive  temperament  from  the 
fact  that  there  was  no  visible  evidence  of  the  injustice 
that  was  studiedly  done  him.  Politicians  tempted  him 
to  enter  the  field  as  a  candidate  for  President,  but  he 
wisely  declined,  and  on  no  occasion  did  he  so  grandly 
exhibit  the  higher  qualities  of  the  soldier  and  gentleman 
as  when  President  Johnson,  having  quarrelled  with  Grant, 
decided  to  supersede  Grant  as  commander-in-chief  of  the 
army  by  nominating  Thomas  to  the  same  brevet  rank 
held  by  Grant.  The  President  went  so  far  as  to  send  his 
name  to  the  Senate  for  confirmation  as  General  by  brevet, 
which  would  have  enabled  Johnson  to  assign  Thomas  to 
the  command  of  the  army.  The  President  acted  without 
conference  with  or  the  knowledge  of  Thomas,  and  as 
soon  PS  Thomas  learned  of  it  he  promptly  telegrapher1 
to  Senator  Chandler  and  others  peremptorily  refusing  to 
accept  the  proffered  promotion.  After  having  served  as 
commander  of  the  third  military  district  in  the  South 
and  of  his  old  Department  of  the  Cumberland,  he  was 
finally  assigned  to  the  Military  Division  of  the  Pacific, 
and  he  arrived  in  San  Francisco  to  assume  his  last  com- 


OUR    UNREWARDED  HEROES.  371 

mand  in  June,  1869.  My  last  meeting  with  him  was  some 
time  during  the  winter  of  1870,  when  he  made  his  last 
visit  to  Washington.  We  spent  the  evening  together  at  the 
opera,  and  afterward  sat  until  late  in  the  night  conversing 
on  topics  of  general  interest.  I  doubt  whether  any  one 
ever  heard  him  utter  a  single  complaint,  but  it  was  ob 
vious  to  those  who  knew  him  well  that  he  felt  humiliated 
and  heart-sore  at  the  treatment  he  had  received  from  the 
military  power  of  the  government.  Within  a  few  weeks 
thereafter  the  lightning  flashed  from  the  Western  coast 
the  sad  news  that  the  great  warrior's  head  had  fallen 
upon  his  breast  while  sitting  in  his  office,  and  on  the 
evening  of  the  same  day  one  of  the  noblest  but  unre 
warded  heroes  of  the  war  passed  away. 


GENERAL  FITZ  JOHN  PORTER  was  the  most  conspicu 
ous  victim  of  military  injustice  in  the  history  of  our  civil 
war.  I  doubt  whether  the  military  records  of  modern 
times  in  any  civilized  country  present  such  a  flagrant 
instance  of  the  overthrow  of  one  of  the  bravest  and  most 
skillful  of  officers  by  a  deliberate  conspiracy  of  military 
incompetents  and  maddened  political  partisans.  He  was 
the  only  one  of  McClellan's  lieutenants  who  had  proved 
his  ability  to  exercise  supreme  command  in  fighting  great 
battles,  and  I  doubt  whether  there  was  then  in  the  entire 
Army  of  the  Potomac  a  more  competent  man  for  the  su 
preme  command  than  Fitz  John  Porter;  and  certainly  no 
one  was  more  patriotic  in  his  devotion  to  the  cause  of  the 
Union.  I  first  met  him  in  the  dark  days  of  April,  1861, 
when  he  was  sent  to  Harrisburg  to  represent  General 
Scott  in  organizing  and  forwarding  troops  to  the  national 
capital.  When  communication  between  Washington  and 
the  North  had  been  severed  by  the  treasonable  revolution 
in  Baltimore,  it  became  a  grave  question  what  action 


37"  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

should  be  taken  in  Pennsylvania  in  the  absence  of  orders 
from  the  national  authorities.  I  shall  never  forget  the 
last  council  held  in  the  Executive  Chamber  at  Harris- 
burg  when  General  Patterson,  Governor  Curtin,  and 
their  advisers  were  compelled  to  act  upon  their  own  re 
sponsibility.  Each  in  turn  advised  caution,  as  revolu 
tion  was  in  the  air  and  it  was  impossible  to  devise  a  plan 
of  operations  with  any  assurance  of  safety.  After  all 
had  spoken  Fitz  John  Porter,  the  youngest  of  the  party, 
who  had  won  his  promotion  on  the  battle-fields  of  Mex 
ico,  spoke  with  an  earnestness  that  inspired  every  one 
present.  With  his  handsome  face  brightened  by  the 
enthusiasm  of  his  patriotism,  and  his  keen  eye  flashing 
the  fire  of  his  courage,  he  said  to  General  Patterson  and 
Governor  Curtin:  "I  would  march  the  troops  through 
Baltimore  or  over  its  ashes  to  the  defence  of  the  capital 
of  the  nation. ' '  He  was  a  thorough  soldier  and  an  ear 
nest  patriot,  and  had  his  counsels  prevailed  it  would  not 
have  been  left  for  General  Butler  to  command  obedience 
to  the  laws  in  Baltimore  by  his  shotted  guns  on  Federal 
Hill,  nor  would  the  government  have  been  compelled  to 
confess  its  weakness  by  shipping  troops  surreptitiously  by 
Annapolis  to  Washington. 

Colonel  Porter  had  been  among  the  first  of  our  soldiers 
called  to  active  duty  when  the  madness  of  Secession  took 
shape  by  the  capture  of  forts  in  the  Secession  States, 
lie  was  ordered  by  General  Scott  to  Texas,  where  he 
made  earnest  effort  to  save  Albert  Sydney  Johnson  from 
being  engulfed  in  the  maelstrom  of  rebellion.  By  his 
skill  and  energy  the  garrisons  at  Key  West  and  Tortugas 
were  reinforced  and  saved  from  capture,  and  when  at 
Harrisburg,  unable  to  reach  his  commander-in-chief  or 
the  War  Department  because  of  the  interruption  of  com 
munications,  he  took  the  responsibility  of  telegraphing 
to  General  Frank  P.  Blair  of  Missouri  authority  to  mus- 


OUR   UNREWARDED  HEROES.  373 

ter  in  troops  for  the  protection  of  that  State,  whereby,  as 
General  Blair  subsequently  stated,  Missouri  was  saved  to 
the  Union.  Before  the  close  of  the  first  year  of  the  war 
he  had  organized  a  division  that  attained  the  highest 
reputation  as  a  model  of  discipline,  and  early  in  1862  he 
went  to  the  Peninsula  with  McClellan  as  a  division  com 
mander.  Immediately  after  the  capture  of  Yorktown  he 
was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps, 
and  with  that  corps  he  fought  the  battles  of  Mechanics- 
ville  and  Games'  Mill,  and  won  the  highest  encomiums 
from  both  General  McClellan  and  the  government  for  the 
ability  he  exhibited.  After  the  failure  of  the  Peninsula 
campaign,  and  when  Pope  was  playing  the  braggart  and 
sacrificing  his  army  to  his  incompetency  in  the  second 
Bull  Run  campaign,  Porter  was  ordered  to  the  relief  of 
Pope,  and,  learning  that  Lee  was  rapidly  advancing  upon 
Pope's  defeated  army,  Porter  disobeyed  orders  to  stop  at 
Williamsburg,  and  assumed  the  responsibility  whereby 
he  was  enabled  to  join  Pope  several  days  earlier.  He 
participated  in  the  second  Bull  Run  battle,  and  was 
finally  compelled  with  the  rest  of  the  army  to  retreat 
into  the  defences  of  Washington. 

Pope  was  smarting  under  the  disgraceful  failure  he  had 
made  as  a  military  commander,  and  his  cause  was  taken 
up  by  the  embittered  partisans  who  then  sought  the  over 
throw  of  McClellan"  and  all  who  were  supposed  to  be  in 
friendly  relations  with  him.  General  Porter  was  singled 
out  for  sacrifice,  although  so  fully  did  General-in-chief 
Halleck  and  Secretary-of-War  Stan  ton  confide  in  Porter's 
ability  as  a  military  commander  that  when  the  movement 
was  made  against  Lee  in  the  Antietam  campaign,  Porter 
was  directed  to  select  a  division  of  12,000  from  among 
several  divisions  and  a  commander  among  twenty  gen 
eral  officers,  and  add  them  to  his  corps.  With  this  com 
mand  he  held  the  centre  of  the  line  of  battle  at  Antie- 


374  LINCOLN  AND  -MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

tarn,  and  was  one  of  the  first  to  pursue  Lee  in  his  retreat, 
and  with  his  single  corps  fought  the  battle  of  Shepherds- 
town.  Early  in  November,  General  McClellan  was  re 
moved  from  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  one  week  later  General  Porter  was  relieved  of  the 
command  of  his  corps.  Pope  preferred  charges  against 
him,  and  on  the  25th  of  November,  Porter  was  placed 
under  arrest.  The  substance  of  the  charges  against  him 
was  that  he  had  failed  to  obey  an  order  from  General 
Pope  requiring  him  to  start  with  his  division  to  General 
Pope  in  the  field.  The  court  was  chosen  by  Secretary 
Stanton,  who  had  become  so  intensely  inflamed  against 
McClellan  and  all  wTho  were  supposed  to  be  in  sympathy 
with  him  that  he  had  determined  to  eliminate  them  from 
the  army,  and  he  could  dispense  with  so  skillful  and  he 
roic  a  soldier  as  Porter,  after  Lee  had  been  driven  back 
to  Virginia,  only  by  disgracing  him.  The  court  was 
organized  to  convict.  By  the  verdict  of  the  court-mar 
tial  he  was  not  only  dismissed  from  the  army?  but  he  was 
made  a  stranger  to  the  country  for  which  he  had  so  gal 
lantly  fought,  by  depriving  him  of  his  citizenship  and 
making  him  ineligible  to  any  public  position  under  the 
government. 

For  fifteen  years  General  Porter  was  compelled  to  bear 
the  fearful  stigma  that  had  been  put  upon  him  by  a  court 
that  simply  obeyed  the  vindictive  orders  of  its  master. 
Many  applications  had  been  made  from  time  to  time  to 
have  his  case  reopened,  and  fully  ten  years  before  the 
effort  was  successful  men  like  Governor  Curtin,  Senator 
Wilson  of  Massachusetts,  and  others  had  made  earnest 
efforts  to  have  a  review  of  Porter's  case.  During  the 
eight  years  in  which  Grant  was  President  he  had  been 
earnestly  urged  to  open  the  door  for  justice  to  a  fellow- 
soldier,  but  he  stubbornly  refused;  and  it  was  not  until 
after  he  had  retired  from  the  Presidency,  and  had  care- 


UNREWARDED  HEROES.  375 

fully  studied  the  whole  question  from  the  accurate  his 
tory  of  both  sections,  that  he  became  fully  convinced  of 
his  error,  and  manfully  declared,  in  an  article  published 
in  the  North  American  Revieiv,  that  Porter  had  not  only 
not  failed  to  perform  his  duty  as  a  soldier,  but  that  he 
was  entitled  to  the  highest  measure  of  credit  for  having 
performed  his  duty  to  the  uttermost.  In  1878,  President 
Hayes  authorized  a  military  commission  to  review  the 
judgment  in  Porter's  case,  and  three  of  the  most  expe 
rienced  and  respected  generals  of  the  army,  Schofield, 
Terry,  and  Getty,  were  assigned  to  that  duty.  Two  of 
these  generals  entered  upon  that  duty  inclined  to  the  be 
lief  that  Porter  deserved  censure  if  not  dismissal,  and  it 
is  not  known  that  any  one  of  the  three  was  specially 
friendly  to  his  cause.  They  heard  all  the  evidence  in 
the  case,  and  they  not  only  reversed  the  judgment  of  the 
partisan  court  that  had  condemned  Porter  by  relieving 
him  of  all  accusations  of  failing  to  perform  his  duty,  but 
they  declared:  "  Porter's  faithful,  subordinate,  and  intel 
ligent  conduct  that  afternoon  (August  29th)  saved  the 
Union  army  from  the  defeat  which  would  otherwise  have 
resulted  that  day  in  the  enemy's  more  speedy  concentra 
tion.  .  .  .  Porter  had  understood  and  appreciated  the  mil 
itary  situation,  and  so  far  as  he  had  acted  upon  his  own 
judgment  his  action  had  been  wise  and  judicious. ' '  Such 
was  the  unanimous  judgment  of  three  of  the  ablest  and 
confessedly  among  the  most  fair-minded  generals  of  the 
army,  but  it  was  not  until  1885  that  a  bill  was  finally 
passed  authorizing  General  Porter's  restoration  to  the 
army  roll,  upon  which  he  had  shed  such  conspicuous 
lustre  in  the  early  part  of  the  war,  and  that  bill  was 
vetoed  by  President  Arthur.  General  Porter  was  re 
stored  to  the  army  on  the  yth  of  August,  1886,  by  a 
subsequent  act  of  Congress,  and  was  permitted  to  exer 
cise  his  own  discretion  as  to  active  service  or  retiring 


376  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES 

with  his  original  rank.  In  obedience  to  his  own  request 
he  was  placed  upon  the  retired  list. 

A  memorable  incident,  not  generally  known  in  history, 
occurred  about  this  time,  arising  from  the  retirement  of 
General  Pope  from  the  major-generalship  to  which  he 
had  been  so  unjustly  promoted.  General  Terry,  who  was 
one  of  the  members  of  the  military  commission  that  had 
heard  and  decided  the  Porter  case,  was  entitled  by  rank 
to  succeed  Pope  as  major-general,  but  he  was  as  chival 
rous  in  peace  as  he  was  in  war,  and  so  keenly  did  he  feel 
the  injustice  under  which  General  Porter  had  suffered 
that  he  not  only  proposed,  but  insisted,  that  General  Por 
ter  should  be  promoted  to  the  major-generalship  in  prefer 
ence  to  himself  as  the  only  possible  atonement  the  gov 
ernment  could  make  for  the  unspeakable  wrong  it  had 
perpetrated.  General  Porter  gratefully  appreciated  this 
manly  action  of  General  Terry,  and,  in  the  face  of  Gen 
eral  Terry's  appeal  to  him  to  accept  the  promotion,  he 
resolutely  declined  to  be  considered  for  the  place,  because 
it  would  have  hindered  the  promotion  of  the  equally  gal 
lant  soldier  who  had  vindicated  the  majesty  of  justice. 
General  Grant,  in  a  letter  written  December  30,  1881, 
speaking  of  Porter's  case,  said:  UI  have  done  him  an 
injustice,  and  have  so  written  to  the  President;"  and 
from  that  time  until  the  verdict  of  the  military  commis 
sion  was  rendered  Grant  left  no  opportunity  unemployed 
to  aid  in  the  restoration  of  Porter  to  the  position  and 
respect  to  which  he  was  justly  entitled. 

In  1869,  General  Porter  was  tendered  by  the  Khedive 
of  Egypt  the  position  of  commander-in-chief  of  his 
army,  but  he  declined  it,  and  recommended  General 
Stone,  who  accepted  it.  Since  then  he  has  made  his 
home  in  New  York,  where  he  has  filled  most  important 
public  and  private  positions,  having  served  as  Commis 
sioner  of  Public  Works,  Assistant  Receiver  of  the  Cen- 


OUR    UNREWARDED  HEROES.  377 

tral  Railroad  of  New  Jersey,  as  Police  Commissioner, 
and  later  as  Fire  Commissioner  of  that  city.  He  retired 
in  1889,  since  when  he  has  been  engaged  in  private  busi 
ness  pursuits.  Despite  the  fearful  flood-tide  of  injustice 
that  was  flung  upon  him,  General  Porter  has  survived 
nearly  all  his  assailants,  and  the  few  who  survive  with 
him  are  now  ashamed  to  whisper  even  an  accusation 
against  his  heroism  or  his  honor  as  a  soldier.  He  is  yet 
in  the  full  vigor  of  life,  and  while  his  accusers  have  been 
forgotten  where  the  names  of  men  are  cherished  with 
respect,  he  lives  beloved  by  all  who  know  him  and  hon 
ored  by  every  soldier  of  the  land.  Many  of  the  heroes 
of  the  war  failed  to  meet  just  reward  for  the  devotion 
they  gave  to  the  country,  but  Fitz  John  Porter  stands  out 
single  from  all  as  the  one  man  who  suffered  a  judgment 
of  infamy,  formally  declared  by  a  military  court,  for  the 
single  offence  of  having  been  one  of  the  wisest,  noblest, 
and  bravest  of  our  army's  commanders. 


THE  record  of  GENERAL  G.  K.  WARREN  is  the  story 
of  a  brilliant  military  career  touched  with  every  hue  of 
promise  cut  short  by  the  unjust  exercise  of  that  power 
that  resides  in  military  rank,  used  upon  impulse  and  in 
ignorance  of  actual  existing  conditions,  without  hesita 
tion  and  without  reference  to  inquiry  or  investigation. 
It  was  the  ist  of  April,  1865;  the  war  was  yet  in  progress, 
and  the  two  armies  still  faced  each  other  at  Petersburg. 
Our  lines  had  been  extended  to  the  left,  which  brought 
them  in  immediate  contact  with  the  enemy.  On  the 
3ist  of  March,  Sheridan  with  his  cavalry  had  struck  the 
enemy's  combined  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry  at  Din- 
widdie  Courthouse  under  Pickett,  and  had  been  roughly 
handled.  Warren  with  the  Fifth  Corps  had  come  to  his 
support;  upon  the  next  day  a  battle  was  fought  at  Five 


378  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Forks,  wholly  decisive,  far-reaching  in  its  results,  and 
ending  in  the  rout  of  the  enemy's  forces.  The  whole 
nation  was  exulting,  when  suddenly  the  news  was  flashed 
over  the  land  that  Major-General  Warren,  the  commander 
of  the  Fifth  Corps,  had  been  relieved  of  his  command 
by  order  of  General  Sheridan,  on  the  field  of  battle. 

It  is  with  a  recognition  of  what  Warren,  in  long  and 
faithful  service,  in  character  and  achievement,  brought 
to  the  discharge  of  his  duties  as  a  corps  commander  in 
this  battle  that  I  am  to  deal  with  him.  Just  before  the 
Wilderness  campaign,  when  Sykes  had  been  relieved  as 
commander  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  Warren  was  at  once 
named  as  its  commandant.  He  brought  to  the  command 
of  the  Fifth  Corps  a  reputation  for  ability  and  energy 
and  brilliant  service  that  had  won  for  him  steady  and 
well-deserved  promotion.  With  a  courage  that  never 
quailed  he  had  fought  his  way  from  the  command  of  a 
regiment  to  that  of  an  army  corps.  There  was  no  mili 
tary  reputation  more  promising  than  his  when  at  the 
head  of  one  of  the  army's  best  corps  of  veteran  soldiers 
he  crossed  the  Rapidan  and  became  at  once  involved  in 
the  battles  of  the  Wilderness.  Initiating  almost  every 
flank  movement  after  the  investment  of  Petersburg,  his 
corps  participated  prominently  in  all  the  battles  of  the 
army,  his  restless  spirit  knowing  no  repose.  He  was  be 
loved  by  his  men,  who  trusted  him,  and  who  testified  to 
their  affection  when,  on  the  return  march  of  the  corps 
through  Petersburg,  recognizing  him  as  he  stood  among 
the  crowd,  they  rent  the  air  with  shouts  of  recognition. 

On  the  ist  of  April,  1865,  after  some  preliminary  fight 
ing  in  front  of  Dinwiddie  Courthouse  on  the  3ist,  in 
which  he  had  been  unsuccessful,  Sheridan  applied  to 
Grant  for  infantry  support.  He  wanted  the  Sixth  Corps, 
which  had  been  with  him  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah.  He  objected  to  Wcirren,  and  only  took  him  aivJ. 


OUR   UNREWARDED  HEROES.  379 

his  corps  when  Grant  had  authorized  him  to  relieve  War 
ren  upon  any  occasion  justifying  that  action.  Warren 
moved  his  corps  to  Gravelly  Run  Church.  Pickett  had 
fallen  back  to  the  White  Oak  road  and  intrenched. 
Warren  with  his  corps  was  to  move  upon  the  left  in 
trenched  flank  of  Pickett' s  works.  A  faulty  reconnais 
sance  had  been  made,  and  when  the  Fifth  Corps  moved 
at  noon  of  the  ist  the  intrenchments  of  the  enemy  were 
found  to  be  three-quarters  of  a  mile  to  the  left  of  the 
position  supposed  by  Sheridan.  To  meet  this  unexpected 
fire  upon  his  flank  Ayres  broke  away  from  Crawford  and 
Griffin.  Warren  went  at  once  to  these  flanking  divisions, 
where  he  remained  in  person,  directing  their  movements, 
changing  their  direction  to  meet  the  force  on  Ayres' s 
flank  as  well  as  their  own  front,  getting  into  the  enemy's 
rear  with  Crawford's  division,  capturing  guns  and  thir 
teen  hundred  prisoners,  and  compelling  the  retreat  of  the 
enemy. 

The  battle  as  it  was  fought  was  a  series  of  flank  move 
ments,  and  was,  as  such,  wholly  unanticipated  by  Sheri 
dan.  Warren  had  just  reached  a  point  directly  in  rear 
of  the  enemy  at  the  Forks,  and  was  pursuing  his  success 
when  he  sent  his  adjutant-general  to  Sheridan  to  report 
that  he  was  in  the  enemy's  rear,  had  taken  a  large  num 
ber  of  prisoners,  and  was  pursuing  his  advantages,  when 
the  stroke  fell,  in  the  midst  of  the  victory  he  had  done 
so  much  to  secure.  "  Tell  General  Warren,"  said  Sheri 
dan,  u  that,  by  God!  he  was  not  at  the  front:  this  is  all 
I've  got  to  say  to  him."  He  had  already  replaced  him 
without  any  attempt  to  communicate  with  him,  and 
this  with  the  victory  won,  the  enemy  in  retreat,  and  the 
evacuation  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg  made  inevit 
able.  Conscious  of  his  innocence  and  knowing  what  he 
had  accomplished,  Warren  went  in  person  to  Sheridan 
and  asked  him  to  reconsider  his  action.  "Hell!"  said 


380  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Sheridan;  "  I  don't  reconsider  my  determinations."    Nor 
did  he. 

Warren  at  once  sought  an  investigation,  which  was 
then  refused  him,  and  fifteen  years  of  incessant  applica 
tion  and  pleading  were  to  pass  before  it  was  secured;  but 
at  last  the  long-hoped-for  investigation  came,  an  inquiry 
where  the  keenest  legal  acumen  was  instrumental  in 
bringing  facts  to  light,  wholly  regardless  of  that  pedantry 
that  belongs  to  military  life — a  search  for  truth,  unawed 
by  the  glitter  of  the  uniform  or  the  prestige  of  rank,  no 
matter  how  high,  and  with  a  result  so  wholly  different 
from  that  which  had  been  assumed  and  acted  upon  as  to 
seem  almost  romance.  And  what  was  gained  by  this 
investigation,  to  which  were  summoned  witnesses  from 
every  quarter,  and  where  the  Confederate  testimony  es 
tablished  the  facts  of  the  battle  beyond  controversy? 
This,  that  but  for  the  movement  of  Crawford's  division 
under  Warren's  immediate  orders  the  enemy's  lines 
would  have  been  held,  and  were  held  until  the  move 
ment  of  Crawford,  and  that  the  results  of  Ayres's  attack 
were  rendered  possible  by  that  movement.  What,  then, 
could  excuse  the  action  of  General  Sheridan  in  view  of 
the  victory  secured  to  him?  Nothing  but  that  he  was 
ignorant  of  what  was  done,  as  he  himself  testifies,  and 
that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  Confederate  Mumford's  en 
gagement  with  Crawford's  division,  nor  of  the  fighting 
of  that  division,  nor  of  the  cavalry.  He  knew  that  in 
relieving  Warren  he  was  pleasing  General  Grant,  and  he 
ignored  then  and  subsequently  anything  presented  to 
him  that  might  in  any  way  question  his  action.  War 
ren  made  every  effort  to  carry  out  the  order  and  execute 
the  plan  of  this  battle ;  and  when  asked  by  his  own  coun 
sel  if  he  had  or  had  not  done  this,  his  reply  was  nobie. 
Asking  that  the  question  be  withdrawn,  he  said,  "  I  do 
it  on  the  ground  that  I  am  willing  to  be  judged  by  nry 


OUR    UNREWARDED  HEROES.  381 

deeds."  Sheridan,  with  a  magnetism  second  to  none,  a 
fighter  beyond  all  other  qualities,  was  deficient  in  strong 
mental  or  moral  sense. 

When  the  battle  of  Five  Forks  had  been  fought  and 
won  he  did  not  know  what  had  been  accomplished  nor 
by  whom.  His  testimony  distinctly  shows  this:  he  made 
his  official  report  without  that  knowledge,  and,  although 
the  commanding  general  upon  the  field,  he  saw  but  one 
of  the  many  movements  which  contributed  to  the  vic 
tory,  and  ignored  the  rest;  nor  would  he  give  any  ac 
count  of  his  own  personal  movements  after  Ayres's  as 
sault;  and  yet  he  committed  an  act  of  despotic  power  so 
uncalled  for,  unjust,  and  cruel  as  to  wellnigh  constitute  a 
crime.  The  record  of  Warren's  court  of  inquiry  will 
remain  for  ever  an  enduring  stain  upon  an  otherwise 
great  reputation.  Warren,  after  long  and  patient  wait 
ing,  at  last  began  to  despond  and  to  doubt  as  to  the  final 
result.  His  health  was  breaking.  He  lost  the  fiery  spirit 
that  had  animated  him.  Grant  and  Sheridan  were  om 
nipotent,  the  heroes  of  the  hour,  and  unassailable.  And 
so  the  end  came  at  last  before  the  decision  of  his  court 
was  known,  and  they  buried  him  in  that  sunny  city  by 
the  sea  where  he  was  known  and  loved  and  where  he 
worked  in  peace.  His  last  request  was  that  there  should 
be  no  military  display,  no  emblems  of  his  profession  upon 
his  coffin,  and  no  uniform  upon  his  person.  Devoted 
friends  followed  him  to  his  last  resting-place,  and  as  they 
turned  homeward  the  conviction  came  to  each  of  them 
that  the  earth  with  which  they  had  filled  his  grave  gave 
rest  to  a  generous  and  broken  heart. 


GENERAL  DON  CARLOS  BUELL  very  clearly  demon 
strated  in  the  early  part  of  the  war  that  he  was  one  of 
the  most  accomplished  soldiers  of  our  army.  While  he 


382  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

was  not  dishonored,  as  were  General  Porter  and  General 
Warren,  he  was  displaced  from  command  in  obedience  to 
partisan  clamor.  He  was  a  thorough  soldier,  brave,  in 
telligent,  skillful,  and  equal  to  every  emergency  in  which 
he  was  placed;  but  he  was  not  a  politician.  He  believed 
that  war  was  war;  he  believed  that  armies  were  organized 
to  fight  battles,  and  to  fight  them,  according  to  the  estab 
lished  rules  of  military  science,  to  accomplish  the  speedi 
est  and  most  substantial  results.  During  the  period  that 
he  was  in  command  in  Kentucky  he  accomplished  more 
in  the  same  length  of  time  than  any  other  general  in  the 
Western  army.  When  he  assumed  command  at  Louis 
ville  on  the  1 5th  of  November,  1861,  his  entire  effective 
Union  force  was  less  than  30,000  men,  and  they  largely 
without  organization,  arms,  equipment,  or  transportation. 
During  the  seven  months  he  remained  there  he  organized 
one  of  the  best  disciplined  armies  that  ever  marched  on 
the  continent.  He  defeated  the  enemy  at  Middle  Creek 
and  Mills  Springs  in  January,  aided  in  the  capture  of 
Fort  Donelson,  occupied  Middle  Tennessee  and  the  north 
ern  part  of  Alabama,  and  moved  with  the  main  body  of 
his  army  by  a  forced  march  to  the  rescue  of  Grant  at 
Shiloh.  All  this  was  accomplished  between  the  i5th  of 
November,  1861,  and  the  loth  of  January,  1862.  He 
committed  no  military  mistakes,  met  with  no  military 
disasters,  and  he  strengthened  the  Union  cause  unspeak 
ably  in  Kentucky  by  the  strict  discipline  he  enforced  in 
his  command. 

The  temptation  was  great  to  Union  troops  in  Kentucky 
to  demoralize  themselves  by  pillage  and  plunder,  as  one- 
half  the  people  of  the  State  were  earnestly  disloyal  and 
very  many  of  them  in  the  Confederate  service;  but  Buell 
was  placed  in  command  in  Kentucky  to  save  it  to  the 
Union,  and  he  performed  that  duty  most  conscientiously 
and  patriotically.  But  the  most  effective  means  he  em- 


OUR   UNREWARDED  HEROES.  383 

ployed  to  save  Kentucky  were  seized  upon  by  the  poli 
ticians  of  the  times,  and  he  was  denounced  from  one  end 
of  the  country  to  the  other  as  a  semi-rebel  because  he 
strictly  restrained  his  troops  from  the  plundering  of  pri 
vate  property  of  either  friend  or  foe.  He  was  not  only  a 
soldier  himself,  but  he  made  a  soldier  of  every  man  in 
his  command  as  far  as  he  could  be  obeyed.  But  for  his 
timely  arrival  at  Pittsburgh  Banding  on  the  evening  of 
the  first  day's  battle,  when  Grant's  army  had  been  liter 
ally  routed  and  driven  to  the  river,  the  army  of  Grant 
would  have  ceased  to  exist  in  history  at  the  close  of  the 
following  day.  It  was  Buell  whose  energy  and  skill  as 
a  soldier  brought  relief  to  Grant,  and  it  was  his  courage 
and  skill  on  the  battle-field,  co-operating  with  Grant  on 
the  second  day,  that  gave  the  victory  to  the  Union  armies 
at  Shiloh.  Both  were  as  generous  as  they  were  brave, 
and  Buell  never  claimed  the  victory  as  his,  and  Grant 
proved  his  appreciation  of  Buell  by  asking  his  assign 
ment  to  an  important  command  when  he  was  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  army.  Stanton  was  implacable 
in  his  hatred  of  Buell,  as  he  was  in  his  hatred  against 
all  who  incurred  his  displeasure,  and  Buell  was  left  with 
out  a  command,  although  his  services  were  called  for  by 
the  one  who  certainly  best  understood  his  value  as  a 
soldier. 

On  the  loth  of  June,  Buell  was  assigned  to  make  a 
campaign  for  the  capture  of  Chattanooga.  It  was  ordered 
by  General  Halleck,  who  was  then  in  personal  command 
at  Corinth.  This  movement  was  regarded  by  the  author 
ities  at  Washington  as  the  most  important  of  all  our 
army  operations,  with  the  single  exception  of  the  cam 
paign  against  Richmond.  Stanton,  in  a  dispatch  to 
Halleck,  declared  that  the  capture  of  Chattanooga 
' '  would  be  equal  to  the  capture  of  Richmond, ' '  but 
soon  after  Buell  was  assigned  to  this  task  the  disasters 


384  LINCOLN  AND*  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

on  the  Peninsula  and  the  second  Bull  Run  campaign 
brought  importunate  calls  from  Washington  for  troops 
from  Halleck's  army  to  strengthen  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  On  the  4th  of  July,  Lincoln  telegraphed  Hal- 
leek:  u  You  do  not  know  how  much  you  would  oblige 
us  if,  without  abandoning  any  of  your  positions  or  plans, 
you  could  promptly  send  us  10,000  infantry.  Can  you 
not?"  On  receipt  of  this  dispatch  Halleck  called  a 
council  of  war,  and  sent  a  dispatch  saying  that  no  troops 
could  be  sent  to  the  East  without  abandoning  the  Chat 
tanooga  expedition,  and  Halleck  himself  became  alarmed 
at  his  position  at  Corinth,  as,  after  having  detached  Buell 
to  the  Chattanooga  campaign,  he  had  sent  reinforcements 
to  General  Curtis  in  Arkansas.  After  having  started 
Buell  on  his  Chattanooga  campaign,  in  which  he  was 
to  confront  Bragg  with  his  75,000  men  and  maintain  a 
long  line  of  communication,  Buell  was  notified  by  Hal 
leck  that  Thomas's  division  must  be  withdrawn  from 
him,  and  perhaps  other  portions  of  his  -command  would 
be  called  away.  Thus,  after  starting  Buell  with  an  in 
ferior  force  to  fight  his  way  to  Chattanooga  and  maintain 
hundreds  of  miles  of  communication  in  an  enemy's  coun 
try,  his  force  was  depleted,  his  plan  of  campaign  was 
overruled,  and  because  he  failed  to  march  with  a  rapidity 
that  Halleck  had  never  approached  he  was  censured  from 
day  to  day  by  both  Halleck  and  the  War  Department  for 
his  failure  to  accomplish  the  impossible.  Halleck  had 
required  two  months  to  remove  his  army  from  Shiloh  to 
Corinth,  a  distance  of  twenty  miles,  and  soon  thereafter 
he  telegraphed  Buell  complaining  of  his  slow  movement, 
when  he  had  marched  with  four  times  the  rapidity  that 
Halleck  had  himself. 

When  it  is  remembered  that  Buell  was  compelled  to 
fortify  every  bridge  for  more  than  three  hundred  miles 
of  road  in  his  rear,  the  depletion  of  his  forces  and  the 


OUR    UNREWARDED  HEROES.  385 

necessity  for  caution  may  be  intelligently  understood. 
Especially  did  Halleck  become  mandatory  about  rapid 
movements  on  the  part  of  Buell  after  he  became  coni- 
mander-in-cliief  and  had  been  transferred  to  Washing 
ton.  On  the  1 3th  of  August  he  telegraphed  Buell  that 
he  had  been  notified  to  have  him  removed,  but  inti 
mating  that  he  interposed  to  save  him.  To  this  Buell 
replied  on  the  same  day :  "I  beg  that  you  will  not  inter 
pose  in  my  behalf.  On  the  contrary,  if  the  dissatis 
faction  cannot  cease  on  grounds  which  I  think  may  be 
supposed  if  not  apparent,  I  respectfully  request  that  I 
may  be  relieved.  My  position  is  far  too  important  to  be 
occupied  by  any  officer  on  sufferance.  I  have  no  desire 
to  stand  in  the  way  of  what  may  be  deemed  for  the  pub 
lic  good."  Buell  was  not  then  relieved  from  command, 
but  the  clamor  for  his  removal  grew  more  imperious, 
and  all  the  partisan  rancor  of  that  time  was  thrown  into 
the  scale  against  Buell  as  a  military  commander.  His 
command  was  composed  largely  of  Illinois  and  Indiana 
troops,  and  Governors  Morton  and  Yates  pursued  him 
with  intense  ferocity  because  he  enforced  discipline  in 
his  army  and  would  not  permit  his  soldiers  to  plunder 
private  homes.  It  was  political  clamor  and  not  military 
necessity,  nor  even  military  expediency,  that  made  the 
War  Department  issue  an  order  on  the  27th  of  Septem 
ber  relieving  Buell  of  his  position  and  ordering  him  to 
Louisville,  limiting  his  authority  to  the  command  of  the 
troops  in  that  city,  and  directing  him  to  transfer  the 
army  to  the  direction  of  General  Thomas.  Buell 
promptly  called  General  Thomas  to  this  place,  but 
Thomas  was  one  of  the  bravest  and  noblest  of  our  sol 
diers,  and  he  at  once  telegraphed  to  Secretary  Stan  ton: 
"General  Buell' s  preparations  have  been  complete  to 
move  against  the  enemy,  and  I  therefore  respectfully  ask 
that  he  may  be  retained  in  command."  In  obedience  to 
25 


LINCOLN  AND* MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Thomas's  request  the  order  relieving  Buell  was  revoked, 
only  to  be  met  by  a  fiercer  clamor  from  the  political  pas 
sions  of  the  day  for  his  sacrifice.  On  the  8th  of  October 
he  fought  and  won  the  battle  of  Perrysville,  after  a  san 
guinary  conflict  in  which  he  lost  over  four  thousand 
men.  Even  when  Buell  had  won  a  decisive  victory, 
instead  of  being  complimented  by  the  authorities  at 
Washington,  he  was  daily  criticised  for  his  failure  to 
pursue  and  destroy  Bragg' s  army  that  largely  outnum 
bered  him.  On  the  I9th  of  October  he  was  notified  by 
Halleck  that  the  capture  of  East  Tennessee  should  be 
the  main  object  of  his  campaign,  and  saying,  "Buell 
and  his  army  must  enter  East  Tennessee  this  fall." 
Four  days  later,  on  the  23d  of  October,  Buell  was  re 
moved  from  his  command  and  General  Rosecrans  as 
signed  to  it.  General  Buell  in  his  modest  but  soldier 
like  farewell  to  his  army,  after  referring  to  its  heroic 
achievements,  broadly  took  upon  himself  all  responsi 
bility  for  any  failures  it  might  be  charged  with.  He 
said:  "If  anything  has  not  been  accomplished  which 
was  practicable  within  the  sphere  of  its  duty,  the  gen 
eral  cheerfully  holds  himself  responsible  for  the  failure." 
Strange  as  it  may  seem,  while  the  Secretary  of  War 
notified  Halleck  in  the  early  part  of  the  Tennessee  cam 
paign  that  the  capture  of  Chattanooga  was  second  only 
in  importance  to  that  of  Richmond,  and  while  only  ten 
days  before  Buell  was  relieved  of  command  General  Hal 
leck  notified  him  that  he  "must  enter  East  Tennessee 
this  fall,"  Rosecrans  immediately  abandoned  the  East 
Tennessee  movement  and  pushed  his  army  as  directly  as 
possible  to  Nashville.  To  show  how  promptly  Buell  had 
moved  in  comparison  with  others,  it  may  be  stated  that 
General  Rosecrans,  although  only  thirty-two  miles  away 
from  Bragg,  permitted  two  months  to  elapse  before  he 
delivered  battle  at  Stone  River;  and  he  did  not  march 


OUR    UNREWARDED   HEROES.  387 

his  army  a  mile  for  six  months  thereafter.  The  same 
army  under  Buell  in  about  the  same  period  of  eight 
months  marched  across  the  State  of  Kentucky,  185 
miles;  thence  across  Tennessee,  217  miles;  thence  across 
the  State  of  Alabama  to  East  Tennessee,  217  miles; 
thence  across  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  to  Louisville, 
336  miles;  thence  through  Central  and  Eastern  Ken 
tucky  in  pursuit  of  Bragg  and  back  to  Nashville,  485 
miles — making  nearly  fifteen  hundred  miles  of  march 
and  several  hard-fought  battles. 

Thus  ended  the  military  career  of  one  who  could  and 
should  have  been  one  of  the  great  military  leaders  of  our 
civil  war.  He  was  retired  from  command  solely  because 
of  the  intense  partisan  hatred  that  had  pursued  him  for 
no  other  reason  than  being  a  true,  faithful,  and  skillful 
soldier.  When  Grant  asked  for  his  restoration  to  com 
mand  on  the  iQth  of  April,  1864,  Halleck  replied:  UI 
would  like  very  much  to  see  Buell  restored  to  command, 
and  have  several  times  pressed  him  at  the  War  Depart 
ment,  but  there  has  been  such  a  pressure  against  him 
from  the  West  that  I  do  not  think  the  Secretary  will  give 
him  any  at  present."  In  obedience  to  Buell' s  request  for 
an  official  investigation  of  the  operations  of  the  armies 
under  his  command,  a  military  commission  was  appoint 
ed  for  the  purpose  on  the  2oth  of  November,  1862,  and 
its  labors  continued  until  May  10,  1863.  The  record  and 
opinion  of  the  commission  were  received  at  the  War  De 
partment,  but  were  never  published,  and  after  they  had 
been  suppressed  for  nearly  ten  years  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  by  resolution  passed  March  i,  1872,  called  for 
a  copy  of  the  proceedings,  which  brought  the  astounding 
answer  from  the  Secretary  of  War  that  ' '  a  careful  and 
exhaustive  search  among  all  the  records  and  files  of  the 
Department  fails  to  discover  what  disposition  was  made 
of  the  proceedings  of  the  commission  and  the  papers  en- 


388  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

closed. "  It  is  obvious  that  the  evidence  and  the  finding 
of  the  commission  were  not  in  accord  with  the  violent 
passions  which  had  forced  the  removal  of  one  of  the  most 
gallant  soldiers  of  our  army,  and  the  proceedings  were 
deliberately  suppressed  and  justice  withheld  from  General 
Buell.  The  Governors  of  the  Western  States  who  had 
so  boldly  assailed  Buell  were  called  upon  to  confront  him 
and  testify  before  the  commission,  but  all  refused.  His 
accusers  dared  not  meet  him,  and  when  a  packed  com 
mission,  chosen  and  manipulated  by  the  filling  of  va 
cancies  to  hinder  justice,  had  failed  to  convict  him,  the 
proceedings  were  deliberately  suppressed  for  ten  years, 
and  General  Buell  permitted  to  live  under  the  false  and 
malicious  charges  made  against  him  by  reckless  poli 
ticians  who  did  not  even  venture  to  testify  against  him. 
That  Stanton  himself  felt  that  his  injustice  to  Buell 
was  so  flagrant  as  to  call  for  some  atonement  is  evident 
by  the  fact  that  in  the  spring  of  1864  he  invited  Buell  to 
a  personal  interview,  received  him  most  cordially,  and 
asked  him  which  one  of  several  important  commands  he 
would  prefer  to  receive.  Buell' s  only  answer  was  that  it 
was  first  a  necessity  to  dispose  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
military  commission  that  inquired  into  his  case.  Buell' s 
self-respect  as  a  soldier  forbade  his  acceptance  of  a  com 
mand  when  his  fidelity  and  ability  as  a  commander  had 
been  inquired  into  by  a  military  commission  ^  Those  judg 
ment  was  withheld  not  only  from  the  accused,  but  from 
the  public.  This  was  a  degree  of  manliness  that  Stanton 
was  unprepared  for,  and  they  parted  for  the  last  time,  as 
Stanton  never  again  conferred  with  Buell.  Subsequently, 
Stanton  twice  voluntarily  offered  Buell  important  com 
mands,  but  he  very  properly  declined  both,  as  the  verdict 
of  the  commission  was  denied  publicity,  and  in  both  cases 
he  would  have  been  compelled  to  serve  under  officers 
whom  he  outranked. 


OUR    UNREWARDED  HEROES.  389 

Thus  the  war  closed  with  one  of  its  ablest  and  most 
patriotic  chieftains  not  only  refused  the  right  to  give  the 
gallant  service  he  offered,  but  he  was  assailed  by  partisan 
passion  for  having  faithfully  performed  his  duty  as  a  sol 
dier,  and  he  was  finally  tried  by  a  military  commission 
whose  testimony  and  judgment  were  stolen  from  the 
archives  of  the  Department  to  give  license  to  his  ma 
licious  slanderers.  His  chief  accusers  have  all  passed 
away,  but  General  Buell  yet  lives,  honored  and  respected 
by  the  country  as  one  of  the  noble  but  unrewarded 
Heroes  of  the  War. 


BORDER-LIFE   IN  WAR-TIMES. 


WHILE  all  sections  of  the  country  keenly  felt  the 
sad  bereavements  and  sacrifices  of  the  civil  var, 
only  those  who  lived  on  the  border  between  the  two  con 
tending  sections  involved  in  bloody  fraternal  strife,  with 
all  the  fierce  passions  it  inspires,  can  have  any  just  con 
ception  of  the  severe  trials  and  constant  strain  which  fell 
upon  the  border  people.  My  home  was  tlion  m  Cliam- 
bersburg,  in  one  of  the  most  beautiful  valleys  of  the 
country,  and  among  a  people  exceptionally  comfortable 
and  forming  one  of  the  most  delightful  communities  of 
the  State.  The  first  distant  murmurs  of  the  coming  war 
were  heard  in  Chambersburg  in  October,  1859,  when 
John  Brown  and  his  few  insane  followers  attempted  the 
conquest  of  Virginia  by  assaulting  Harper's  Ferry.  Al 
though  Brown  had  made  Chniubersburg  his  base  of  ope 
rations  for  some  weeks  before  he  moved  upon  Harper's 
Ferry,  freely  mingling  with  the  citizens  of  the  town  and 
known  only  as  u  Dr.  Smith,"  who  was  ostensibly  en 
gaged  in  mining  pursuits  in  Maryland,  there  was  not  a 
single  resident  of  Chambersburg  who  had  any  concep 
tion  or  suspicion  of  his  purpose;  but  when  the  startling 
news  came  that  actual  conflict  had  been  precipitated  at 
Harper's  Ferry  by  the  stubborn  fanatic  fresh  from  the 
Kansas  battles,  it  appalled  the  community,  as  it  seemed 
to  be  the  precursor  of  civil  war.  In  little  more  than  a 
year  thereafter  the  people  of  the  town  were  again  startled 
390 


(Photo  by  Brady,  Washington.) 


ROBERT  E,    I,EE,    1865. 


392  LINCOLN  AND  'MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

by  Lieutenant  Jones  and  straggling  members  of  his  com 
mand  reaching  there,  exhausted  and  footsore,  to  announce 
that  he  had  been  compelled  to  abandon  Harper's  Ferry, 
where  he  was  in  command,  and  had  blown  up  the  works 
as  far  as  he  was  able  to  accomplish  it.  This  was  one  of 
the  first  of  the  many  thrilling  events  of  the  great  war 
that  was  soon  to  burst  upon  us.  From  that  time,  through 
four  long  years  of  bloody  battle  until  the  end  came  at 
Appomattox,  there  was  not  a  day  nor  an  hour  of  absolute 
peace  in  the  border  counties. 

Chambersburg  was  within  a  night's  ride  of  the  Con 
federate  lines  during  the  whole  war,  and  not  only  the 
repeated  raids  made  into  that  community  by  the  Con 
federate  commanders,  but  the  constant  sense  of  insecurity 
and  the  multiplied  reports  of  incursions  from  the  enemy, 
made  tranquility  impossible.  Not  only  did  these  people 
suffer  their  full  share  of  the  exactions  of  war  which  fell 
upon  every  community,  but  they  were  subject  to  constant 
convulsions  by  actual  or  threatened  raids  of  the  enemy, 
and  often  by  destructive  incursions  of  militia  defenders; 
and  they  suffered  unspeakable  loss  of  property  from  both 
armies.  Finally,  upon  Chambersburg  fell  the  avenging 
blow  for  Hunter's  vandalism  in  Virginia,  and  the  beau 
tiful  old  town  was  left  in  its  ashes  and  its  people  largely 
impoverished.  On  the  I2th  of  April,  1861,  the  brief  tel 
egraphic  bulletins  which  were  then  obtainable  in  coun 
try  districts  announced  the  bombardment  of  Sumter. 
Business  was  practically  suspended,  public  meetings  were 
held  in  support  of  the  government  at  which  the  leading 
men  of  every  political  faith  were  orators,  the  Stars  and 
Stripes  were  displayed  from  every  house,  and  patriotic 
badges  and  shields  graced  almost  every  person.  Volun 
teering  was  so  rapid  that  companies  could  not  even  be 
organized  to  keep  pace  with  them.  The  first  call  for 
troops  was  responded  to  more  generously  in  that  sectiprj 


BORDER-LIFE   IN    WAR-TIMES.  393 

than  from  any  other  in  the  State.  Its  very  nearness  to 
the  seat  of  war  and  the  exceptional  dangers  which  fell 
upon  it  seemed  to  call  out  the  highest  measure  of 
patriotic  purpose  and  action.  Party  differences  were 
obliterated  in  the  common  effort  to  maintain  the  cause 
of  the  Union.  It  is  only  in  times  of  great  danger  that 
the  greatest  qualities  of  both  men  and  women  are  devel 
oped,  and  the  border  people,  of  whom  Chambersburg  was 
the  central  altar,  grandly  illustrated  the  truth  of  the 
adage. 

On  the  28th  of  May  the  advance  of  General  Patterson's 
army  reached  Chambersburg,  and  from  that  day  until  the 
war  closed  Chambersburg  was  the  military  headquarters 
for  all  movements  on  the  border.  Even  with  a  great 
army  in  our  midst,  it  was  impossible  for  the  people  to 
appreciate  what  war  really  meant.  I  well  remember  that 
when  two  officers  of  General  Patterson's  command  had 
crossed  the  Potomac  as  scouts,  and  had  been  captured  by 
the  Confederates,  it  was  spoken  of  by  all  in  bated  breath 
as  if  some  unspeakable  calamity  had  befallen  them. 
Both  the  North  and  the  South  seemed  to  believe  that 
they  were  about  to  engage  in  war  with  a  barbarous 
enemy,  and  all  expectations  of  humane  and  civilized 
warfare  appeared  to  have  perished  in  the  minds  of  the 
people.  For  two  months  General  Patterson's  army  kept 
the  border  people  in  a  state  of  restless  suspense.  He 
crossed  the  Potomac  to  Falling  Waters,  then  fell  back 
upon  Maryland,  and  then  renewed  his  march  into  the 
enemy's  country.  The  wildest  excitement  prevailed  in 
every  circle:  a  great  battle  was  expected  every  day,  as 
Patterson  was  threatening  Johnson  at  Winchester  and 
McDowell  marched  against  Beauregard  at  Manassas. 
Finally,  on  Monday,  July  22d,  the  news  of  a  great  tri 
umph  won  by  McDowell  was  posted  on  the  bulletin- 
boards,  and  all  business  was  forgotten  as  the  people  re- 


394  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF   WAK-T/MF.S. 

joiced  over  the  victory,  but  before  the  sun  had  set  on  the 
same  day  the  reports  from  Manassas  told  the  sad  story 
that  McDowell  was  not  only  defeated,  but  that  his  army 
was  routed  and  retreating  into  the  defences  of  Washing 
ton,  with  little  hope  that  the  capital  would  be  saved  from 
the  enemy. 

The  call  for  additional  troops  was  responded  to  by  a 
regiment  of  volunteers  made  up  almost  entirely  of  the 
sturdy  young  men  of  Franklin  and  Fulton  counties. 
When  the  regiment  started  for  Harrisburg  the  people 
turned  out  almost  en  masse  to  inspire  them  in  their  patri 
otic  work.  Speeches  were  made,  flags  were  waved,  tears 
shed,  sorrowing  hearts  were  left  behind  as  the  brave  men 
went  to  their  great  task,  and  many  to  death.  In  May, 
1862,  the  border  people  were  thrown  into  convulsion  by 
the  retreat  of  Banks  from  Strasburg  to  Winchester, 
thence  to  Martinsburg,  and  finally  to  the  north  side  of 
the  Potomac.  This  was  assumed  to  mean  the  invasion 
of  Pennsylvania.  Stock  and  valuables,  including  the 
goods  of  merchants  and  money  of  banks,  were  all  hur 
ried  away  to  places  of  safety.  This  was  only  the  first 
of  many  like  disturbances  that  came  during  every  year 
of  the  war.  General  Kwell,  who  had  driven  Banks  to 
the  north  side  of  the  Potomac,  did  not  pursue  his  victory 
upon  Northern  soil,  but  in  August  of  the  same  year,  when 
Pope  was  defeated  in  the  second  Bull  Run  campaign  and 
Lee  crossed  the  Potomac  into  Maryland,  war  was  brought 
to  the  very  doors  of  the  people  of  the  border.  As  Lee's 
army  moved  westward  from  Frederick,  a  portion  of  it 
extended  northward  as  far  as  Hagerstown,  while  Jackson 
hastened  to  Williamsport,  thence  to  Martinsburg  and 
Harper's  Ferry,  where  he  captured  10,000  men  and  60 
guns,  and  was  back  on  the  Antietam  battle-ground  in 
time  to  fight  McClellan. 

An  interesting  story  may  here  be  told  of  the  methods 


BORDER-LIFE   IN    WAR  TIMES.  395 

by  which  information  was  obtained  to  guide  the  actions 
of  great  armies.  I  was  then  Assistant  Adjutant-General 
of  the  United  States,  assigned  to  duty  at  Harrisburg  to 
make  a  draft  under  the  State  laws  of  Pennsylvania. 
There  was  no  military  force  on  the  border,  and  not  even 
an  officer  of  the  army  who  had  exercised  any  command 
of  troops.  I  was  compelled,  therefore,  to  exercise  what 
little  military  authority  could  be  enforced  under  the  cir 
cumstances,  and  Governor  Curtin  ordered  a  half-organ 
ized  company  of  cavalry,  that  Captain  W.  J.  Palmer  was 
recruiting  at  Carlisle,  to  report  to  me  at  Chambersburg 
for  duty  as  scouts.  I  thus  became  commander  of  an 
army  of  nearly  one  hundred  men,  or  about  one  man  to 
each  mile  of  border  I  had  to  guard,  but  Captain  Palmer 
proved  to  be  a  host  within  himself,  as  he  entered  the 
Confederate  lines  every  night  for  nearly  a  week  under 
various  disguises,  obtained  all  information  possible  as  to 
the  movements  of  Lee's  command,  and  with  the  aid  of 
William  B.  Wilson,  an  expert  telegrapher,  who  was  co 
operating  with  him,  attached  his  instrument  to  the  first 
telegraph-wire  he  struck  and  communicated  to  me  all 
movements  of  the  enemy,  present  and  prospective,  as  far 
as  he  had  been  able  to  ascertain  them.  As  rapidly  as 
these  telegrams  reached  me  they  were  sent  to  Governor 
Curtin,  who  promptly  forwarded  them  to  the  War  De 
partment,  whence  they  were  hastened  to  General  McClel- 
lan's  headquarters,  who  was  then  moving  through  Mary 
land  against  Lee;  and  all  the  important  information  that 
McClellan  received  from  the  front  of  Lee's  army  until 
their  lines  faced  each  other  at  Antietam  came  from  Cap 
tain  Palmer's  nightly  visits  within  the  enemy's  lines  and 
his  prompt  reports  to  me  in  the  morning.  Ho  well  Cobb's 
division  finally  reached  as  far  north  as  Hagerstown,  and 
Captain  Palmer  spent  most  of  the  night  within  Cobb's 
camp,  and  learned  from  leading  subordinate  officers  that 


396  LINCOLN  AND   MEN   OF  WAR-TIMES. 

the  destination  of  Lee's  army  was  Pennsylvania,  and  that 
Cobb's  command  would  lead  the  movement  probably  the 
next  day. 

I  need  hardly  say  that  I  hastened  the  information  to 
Curtin,  who  hurried  it  through  to  Washington,  whence 
McClellan  received  it  within  a  few  hours.  McClellan 
was  then  ignorant  of  the  exact  movements  of  General 
Reynolds,  whom  he  had  sent  to  Pennsylvania  to  organize 
a  force  of  u  emergency-men  "  and  bring  them  to  the  aid 
of  McClellan  in  Western  Maryland.  He  did  not  know, 
therefore,  who  was  in  command  at  Chambersburg  or 
what  force  was  there,  but  doubtless  supposed  that  either 
Reynolds  or  some  part  of  his  command  was  already  there 
on  its  way  to  join  him.  General  McClellan,  on  receipt 
of  the  news  that  Lee  was  likely  to  advance  into  Pennsyl 
vania,  sent  substantially  this  telegram  to  the  commander 
at  Chambersburg,  without  naming  him:  "  I  am  advised 
that  Lee's  probable  destination  is  Pennsylvania,  and  if 
he  shall  advance  in  that  direction,  concentrate  all  your 
forces  and  obstruct  his  march  until  I  can  overtake  him 
and  give  battle.  The  occasion  calls  for  prompt  action. ' ' 
As  I  was  the  commander  and  had  less  than  one  hundred 
men,  all  told,  and  not  twenty  of  them  within  fifteen 
miles  of  me,  the  prospect  of  concentrating  my  forces 
and  marching  out  to  meet  one  of  Lee's  army  corps  was 
not  specially  enticing.  I  promptly  advised  Curtin  of  the 
situation  and  of  the  orders  I  had  received  from  McClel 
lan.  Thaddeus  Stevens  happened  to  be  in  the  Executive 
Chamber  when  the  message  was  received,  and  McClel 
lan' s  order  to  me  to  confront  one  of  Lee's  army  corps 
with  my  force,  which  did  not  amount  to  a  corporal's 
guard  within  reach,  caused  considerable  merriment. 
Stevens,  who  at  that  time  never  lost  an  opportunity  to 
slur  McClellan,  said:  "Well,  McClure  will  do  something. 
If  he  can't  do  better,  he'll  instruct  the  tollgate  keeper 


BORDER-LIFE  IN   WAR-TIMES.  397 

not  to  permit  Lee's  army  to  pass  through;   but  as  to 
McClellan,  God  only  knows  what  he'll  do." 

Thus  one  bold,  heroic,  and  adventurous  young  captain, 
aided  by  an  equally  heroic  young  telegrapher,  furnished 
McClellan  all  the  reliable  information  he  received  about 
Lee's  movements  from  the  time  McClellan  left  Rockville 
in  the  Antietam  campaign  until  the  shock  of  battle  came 
ten  days  later.  I  met  Captain  Palmer  at  Antietam  when 
the  battle  was  in  progress,  and,  after  complimenting  him 
as  he  so  well  deserved  for  the  great  work  he  had  done,  I 
earnestly  cautioned  him  against  attempting  to  repeat  his 
experiments  if  Lee  should  be  driven  into  Virginia.  He 
was  a  young  man  of  very  few  words,  arid  made  no  re 
sponse  to  my  admonition  beyond  thanking  me  for  my 
kind  expressions  of  confidence.  When  Lee  retreated 
across  the  Potomac,  Captain  Palmer  followed  him  the 
next  night,  entered  his  lines  again,  and  brought  import 
ant  reports  which,  as  I  believe,  led  to  the  battle  of  Shep- 
herdstown  that  was  successfully  fought  by  General  Fitz 
John  Porter.  He  then  passed  beyond  my  jurisdiction, 
and  became  known  to  some  of  the  'leading  officers  of 
McClellan' s  army  as  the  scout  or  spy  who  had  given 
McClellan  most  reliable  and  important  information.  For 
several  nights  he  entered  Lee's  lines  and  reported  in  the 
morning.  Finally,  he  was  missed  at  the  usual  time  his 
report  was  expected.  When  the  second  day  passed  with 
out  any  word  from  him,  great  anxiety  was  felt  for  his 
safety,  and  every  effort  was  made  that  could  be  made 
without  exposing  him  to  the  discovery  of  his  identity  to 
learn  of  his  whereabouts,  but  without  success.  When  he 
had  been  missing  a  week  it  was  evident  that  he  had  been 
captured,  and,  upon  being  advised  of  it  from  the  head 
quarters  of  McClell an's  army,  I  hastened  to  Philadelphia 
to  confer  with  President  J.  Edgar  Thompson  of  the  Penn- 


398  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

sylvania  Railroad  Company,  whose  secretary  Captain  Pal 
mer  had  been  until  he  entered  the  service,  and  who  was 
greatly  interested  in  him  personally. 

A  conference  with  President  Thompson  and  Vice-Pres- 
ident  Scott  resulted  in  the  purpose  to  endeavor  to  save 
Palmer  from  being  identified  by  his  captors,  and  it  was 
finally  decided  that  I  should  go  to  the  offices  of  the  North 
American,  the  Press,  and  the  Inquirer,  the  leading  morn 
ing  journals  of  the  city,  and  write  up  for  publication  the 
next  morning  displayed  dispatches  announcing  the  arrival 
in  Washington  of  Captain  W.  J.  Palmer,  who  had  been 
scouting  in  Virginia  for  some  days,  and  who  had  brought 
most  important  .information  of  the  movements  and  pur 
poses  of  the  enemy.  Some  details  of  his  reported  facts 
were  given  to  make  the  story  plausible,  to  which  was 
added  the  statement  that  he  had  brought  momentous  in 
formation  that  could  not  be  given  to  the  public,  but  that 
would  doubtless  lead  to  early  military  movements  against 
the  enemy.  The  dispatches  were  all  accepted  by  the  pub 
lishers,  as  all  felt  a  special  interest  in  Captain  Palmer's 
fate,  and  that  publication  doubtless  saved  him  from  being 
gibbeted  as  a  spy.  He  had  been  arrested  by  the  enemy, 
tried,  and  convicted  as  a  spy,  but  he  had  managed  to 
maintain  doubt  as  to  his  identity.  His  execution  was 
delayed  from  time  to  time  to  ascertain  who  he  was.  The 
dispatches  published  in  the  Philadelphia  papers,  all  of 
which  reached  the  enemy's  lines  within  forty-eight  hours, 
if  not  sooner,  entirely  misled  the  Confederates  as  to  Cap 
tain  Palmer,  and  the  failure  to  identify  him  saved  him, 
until  he  finally  effected  his  own  exchange  by  quietly  tak 
ing  the  place  of  a  dead  prisoner  in  the  ranks  and  re 
sponding  to  his  name  when  the  roll  was  called  for  the 
men  who  were  to  be  sent  to  the  North.  He  is  better 
known  to  the  world  of  to-day  as  President  Palmer  of 
New  York,  lately  of  the  Denver  and  Rio  Grande  Rail- 


BORDER-LIFE  IN  WAR-TIMES  399 

way,   and  one  of  the  fortunate  and   potential   railroad 
magnates  of  the  land. 

After  the  battle  of  Antietam  and  the  retreat  of  Lee 
beyond  the  Potomac  the  border  people  began  to  breathe 
freely  again,  and  felt  that  they  were  reasonably  safe  at 
least  for  a  season,  but  twenty  days  after  the  retreat  of 
Lee  they  were  thrown  into  panic  again,  as  General  Stuart 
made  the  first  great  raid  of  the  war  clear  around  McClel- 
lan's  army,  crossing  the  Potomac  near  Hancock,  swing 
ing  through  Mercersburg  and  Chambersburg,  and  getting 
safely  back  to  Lee  again.  It  was  on  Friday  evening, 
October  10,  1862,  and  I  had  gone  home  from  Harrisburg 
after  weeks  of  almost  ceaseless  labor  night  and  day,  ex 
pecting  a  quiet  rest  until  Monday  morning.  When  I 
landed  on  the  depot  platform  at  Chambersburg,  Mr.  Gil- 
more,  the  telegraph-operator,  called  me  into  his  private 
office  and  exhibited  to  me  several  dispatches  he  had  just 
received  from  Mercersburg,  stating  that  a  strong  Confed 
erate  force  of  cavalry  was  just  entering  that  town,  and 
other  dispatches  stating  that  they  were  moving  from 
Mercersburg  toward  St.  Thomas,  which  was  on  the 
direct  line  toward  Chambersburg.  I  could  not  believe 
it  possible  that  Stuart  would  venture  to  Chambersburg, 
when  he  must  have  known  that  part  of  McClellan's  force 
was  at  Hagerstown,  within  one  hour  of  us  by  railway, 
and  that  troops  could  be  brought  there  to  overwhelm  him 
by  the  exercise  of  any  reasonable  military  skill.  I  at 
once  telegraphed  to  the  commander  at  Hagerstown,  who 
turned  out  to  be  General  Wood,  telling  him  that  Stuart 
was  approaching  Chambersburg,  to  which  I  received  an 
impertinent  reply;  saying  in  substance  that  Stuart  was 
no  such  fool,  and  not  to  bother  myself  about  it.  I  re 
mained  at  the  telegraph -office  for  two  hours  without  com 
municating  the  information  to  any  one,  as  I  hoped  that 
Stuart  would  not  get  so  far  from  his  base  as  Chambers- 


(Photo  by  Brady,  Washington.) 

GENERAL,  J.  E.  B.  STUART,  1862. 


BORDER-LIFE  IN  WAR-TIMES.  401 

burg,  and  that  our  people  could  be  spared  the  panic  that 
must  follow  the  announcement  of  his  coming.  I  soon 
learned  that  Stuart's  force  had  reached  the  turnpike  six 
or  eight  miles  west  of  Chambersburg,  and  was  moving 
toward  us,  and  I  urgently  appealed  to  General  Wood  to 
throw  a  force  into  Chambersburg  to  protect  the  town. 
Even  then  he  had  ample  time  to  do  so,  as  the  railway 
facilities  were  at  his  command,  but  the  only  answer  I 
received  was  a  repetition  of  the  assumption  that  Stuart 
would  not  dare  to  venture  into  Chambersburg,  and 
broadly  intimating  to  me  not  to  annoy  him  any  further. 
Finding  that  nothing  could  be  done  to  protect  Cham 
bersburg,  I  quietly  went  to  my  home,  took  tea,  and  re 
turned  to  my  office  to  await  events.  A  cold,  drizzling 
rain  had  been  falling  during  the  day,  and  between  the 
clouds  and  fog  darkness  came  unusually  early.  Some 
of  the  prominent  citizens  of  the  town  had  been  advised 
of  the  approach  of  Stuart,  but  all  agreed  that  it  could  do 
no  good  to  make  an  alarm  or  to  attempt  defence.  About 
seven  o'clock  in  the  evening  there  was  a  knock  at  my 
office-door,  which  I  promptly  opened,  and  in  came  three 
Confederate  soldiers  with  a  dirty  rag  tied  to  a  stick  which 
they  called  a  flag  of  truce.  Judge  Kimmell  and  Colonel 
Thomas  B.  Kennedy  were  present.  The  Confederate 
officer  said  he  had  been  sent  in  advance  to  demand  the 
surrender  of  Chambersburg.  We  told  him  that  there 
were  no  troops  in  the  town  and  nobody  to  oppose  the 
entrance  of  the  insurgents.  I  asked  who  was  in  com 
mand  of  the  Confederate  forces,  but  they  refused  to  an 
swer.  I  then  asked  where  the  forces  were,  which  they 
also  refused  to  answer.  I  then  asked  them  whether  they 
would  take  us  to  the  commanding  general  and  give  us 
safe-conduct  back.  They  assured  us  that  they  would  do 
so,  and  we  three  mounted  horses  and  rode  out  on  the  west 
ern  turnpike  for  nearly  a  mile,  and  were  there  brought 
26 


402  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

up  before  a  solid  column  of  soldiers.  General  Wade 
Hampton  came  to  the  front  and  announced  his  name. 
He  said  he  desired  to  take  peaceful  possession  of  the 
town,  and  in  answer  to  our  inquiries  assured  us  that  pri 
vate  citizens  and  private  property  would  be  respected, 
excepting  such  property  as  might  be  needed  for  the  pur 
poses  of  the  army.  Remembering  that  I  was  a  commis 
sioned  officer,  I  said  to  General  Hampton :  * '  There  are 
several  military  officers  in  the  town  in  charge  of  hos 
pitals,  recruiting  service,  etc. ;  what  will  be  done  with 
them  ?"  He  promptly  answered:  u  They  will  be  paroled, 
unless  there  are  special  reasons  for  not  doing  so,  but  you 
must  not  give  information  to  any  of  them,  so  that  they 
may  escape."  As  we  were  not  in  a  position  to  quibble 
about  the  terms  of  surrender,  and  as  General  Hampton's 
proposition  seemed  reasonably  fair,  we  decided  to  give 
him  a  town  that  he  could  take  without  opposition,  and 
rode  back  into  Chambersburg,  with  Hampton's  command 
immediately  following. 

In  a  short  time  the  large  square  in  the  centre  of  the 
town  was  filled  with  soldiers  in  gray,  the  first  our  people 
had  ever  seen  in  fighting  force.  In  crossing  the  square 
to  my  office  through  a  crowd  of  the  enemy,  I  was  tapped 
on  the  shoulder,  and,  turning  round,  I  recognized  Hugh 
Logan,  who  was  a  Franklin  county  man,  and  to  whom  I 
had  rendered  some  professional  service  when  he  was  a 
resident  of  the  county.  His  exclamation  was:  "Why, 
colonel,  what  are  you  doing  here  ?  Don't  you  know  that 
Stuart  has  orders  to  arrest  a  number  of  civilians,  and  you 
among  them,  and  that  we  have  half  a  dozen  with  us  now, 
including  Mr.  Rice  of  Mercersburg  ?' '  I  answered  that 
I  had  not  been  informed  of  that  interesting  fact.  He 
advised  me  quietly  to  get  out  of  the  way,  and  I  reminded 
him  that  I  was  a  commissioned  officer,  and  that  under 
my  agreement  with  General  Hampton  I  assumed  that  I 


BORDER-LIFE  IN   WAR-TIMES.  403 

would  be  entitled  to  parole  if  arrested.  His  answer  was 
unpleasantly  significant.  He  said:  "If  you  are  arrested 
and  can  reach  Hampton  he  will  parole  you,  for  he's  a 
gentleman ;  but  Jeb  Stuart  wants  you,  and  I  am  not  cer 
tain  that  he  would  release  you  on  parole. "  As  I  lived  a 
mile  out  of  the  centre  of  the  town,  I  decided  that  I  would 
return  home  and  await  events,  rather  than  leave  my  fam 
ily  alone.  When  I  reached  there,  I  found  that  a  detach 
ment  of  Stuart's  troops  had  been  in  advance  of  me  and 
relieved  me  of  the  possession  of  ten  fine  horses.  My 
house  stood  back  from  the  highway  some  fifty  yards  and 
was  largely  hidden  by  shade  trees,  and  I  closed  up  the 
house,  so  as  to  leave  no  lights  visible,  and  sat  on  the 
porch  awaiting  visitors,  whom  I  sincerely  hoped  would 
not  come.  Shortly  after  midnight  I  heard  the  clatter 
of  hoofs  and  the  jingle  of  sabres  coming  down  the  road 
toward  the  town.  Soon  they  arrived  in  front  of  my 
house.  They  saw  corn-shocks  on  one  side  of  the  road, 
a  large  barn  and  water  on  the  other  side,  and  a  paling 
fence  that  promised  a  quick  fire.  They  halted,  appa 
rently  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  in  number,  and  im 
mediately  proceeded  to  tumble  the  corn-shocks  over  to 
the  horses  and  tear  down  the  palings  to  start  the  fire. 
Seeing  that  their  acquaintance  was  inevitable,  I  walked 
down  to  the  gate  and  kindly  said  to  them  that  if  they 
wanted  to  make  a  fire  they  would  find  wood  just  a  few 
feet  from  them,  and  showed  them  a  short  way  to  water. 
The  commander  of  the  detachment  stepped  up  to  me  and 
very  courteously  inquired  whether  I  resided  there,  with 
out  asking  my  name,  and  said  he  would  be  greatly 
obliged  if  he  and  some  of  his  officers  could  get  a  cup 
of  coffee.  I  told  them  that  I  had  plenty  of  coffee,  but 
that  my  servants  were  colored  and  had  hidden.  He  as 
sured  me  that  they  were  not  after  negroes,  whether  slave 
or  free,  and  that  if  I  could  find  the  servants  and  get  them 


404  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES, 

some  coffee  I  could  promise  them  absolute  safety.  My 
servants  were  hidden  in  the  thicket  but  a  little  distance 
from  the  house,  and  I  soon  found  some  twenty  negroes, 
who  swarmed  back  and  speedily  had  hot  coffee  and  tea 
for  the  officers  of  the  command.  It  was  evident  they 
had  no  idea  at  whose  place  they  were  stopping,  but  they 
were  thinly  clad,  without  their  overcoats  and  blankets, 
in  order  to  be  in  the  lightest  trim  for  rapid  marching, 
and  they  were  suffering  from  the  cold  rain  of  the  entire 
day.  They  gladly  accepted  my  invitation  to  come  into 
the  house  and  warm  themselves,  and  they  were  not  five 
minutes  in  the  library,  where  the  New  York  and  Phila 
delphia  papers  lay  on  my  table  with  my  name  on  them, 
before  they  all  intuitively  comprehended  the  fact  that 
they  had  asked  hospitality  and  were  about  to  receive  it 
in  the  house  of  a  man  whom  they  were  ordered  to  take 
as  a  prisoner  to  the  South.  They  were  all  Virginians 
and  gentlemen  of  unusual  intelligence  and  culture,  as 
the  young  bloods  of  that  State  with  fine  horses  filled  up 
the  ranks  of  the  cavalry  in  the  early  part  of  the  war.  I 
watched  with  unusual  interest  to  see  what  the  effect 
would  be  when  they  discovered  in  whose  house  they 
were  as  guests,  but  they  did  not  long  leave  me  in  doubt 
as  to  their  appreciation  of  the  peculiar  condition  in  which 
they  were  placed.  They  at  once  took  in  the  situation 
without  opportunity  to  confer  on  the  subject.  It  was 
soon  evident  that  they  had  decided  that,  having  asked 
and  accepted  hospitality,  they  would  not  permit  them 
selves  to  know  that  they  were  in  the  house  of  a  host 
whom  it  was  their  duty  to  arrest  as  a  prisoner.  We  sat 
at  tea  and  over  our  pipes  and  cigars  until  at  daylight  the 
bugle  called  them  to  the  march.  Every  phase  of  the 
war  was  discussed  with  the  utmost  freedom,  but  no  one 
of  them  spoke  the  name  of  himself  or  any  of  his  fellows, 
and  not  one  assumed  to  know  my  identity.  It  was  to 


BORDER-LIFE  IN  WAR-TIMES.  405 

me  one  of  the  most  interesting  events  of  the  war,  and  I 
doubt  whether  the  war  itself  was  ever  discussed  with 
equal  candor  on  both  sides  without  a  single  exhibition 
of  prejudice  or  passion.  When  the  bugle  sounded  they 
arose  and  bade  me  good-bye,  thanking  me  for  my  hospi 
tality  and  earnestly  expressing  the  hope  that  we  should 
some  time  meet  again  under  more  pleasant  auspices. 
Soon  after  I  followed  them  into  the  town,  and  stood  in 
the  crowd  close  beside  Jeb  Stuart  for  some  time  before 
he  started  on  his  homeward  march.  He  did  not  doubt 
that  I  was  one  of  his  prisoners,  and  it  was  not  until  he 
had  crossed  the  Potomac  that  he  learned  that  I  was  not 
among  his  captives,  when,  as  I  have  since  been  told  by 
officers  who  were  present,  he  made  the  atmosphere  blue 
with  his  profane  lamentations. 

I  much  regretted  that  I  had  no  clue  whatever  to  the 
identity  of  any  of  the  Virginia  officers  who  had  spent  the 
night  with  me,  and  after  the  war  had  closed,  and  Presi 
dent  Johnson  was  breathing  the  fiercest  vengeance  against 
the  South,  I  felt  that  I  might  be  of  some  service  to  these 
men  if  I  could  discover  who  they  were.  I  wrote  to  a 
newspaper  in  Winchester  and  also  to  the  Richmond 
Whig,  stating  the  facts  and  asking  for  information  as  to 
these  officers,  but  there  was  then  universal  distrust  in  the 
South,  and,  as  my  property  had  been  burned  with  Cham- 
bersburg  but  a  year  before,  I  infer  that  my  suggestions 
were  regarded  as  insincere,  and  no  answers  were  received 
to  either  of  my  letters.  It  was  not  until  ten  years  after 
the  war  that  I  accidentally  learned  the  names  of  some  of 
the  officers  who  were  with  me.  On  a  visit  to  Washing- 
ton  I  was  in  conversation  with  the  late  Heister  Clymer 
on  the  floor  of  the  House  just  before  the  meeting  of  the 
body,  when  he  remarked  to  me  that  a  Virginia  member 
desired  to  renew  his  acquaintance  with  me,  and  asked 
permission  to  bring  him  and  introduce  him.  I  of  course 


406  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

assented,  and  he  brought  up  Colonel  Whitehead,  then  a 
Congressman  from  the  Lynchburg  district,  who  informed 
me  that  he  had  spent  a  night  with  me  at  my  house  during 
Stuart's  raid,  and  that  he  desired  to  renew  his  acquaint 
ance  of  that  evening  under  the  more  pleasant  circum 
stances  which  then  surrounded  us,  and  to  thank  me  for 
the  kindness  they  had  all  received.  From  him  I  learned 
that  Lieutenant- Colonel  James  W.  Watts  commanded  the 
detachment,  and  that  Captain  W.  W.  Tebbs,  Captain 
Thomas  W.  Whitehead  (himself),  Lieu  tenant  Kelso,  and 
two  others,  whose  names  he  did  not  then  recall,  consti 
tuted  the  unique  tea-party  at  Norland  on  the  night  of 
October  10,  1862.  John  Paxton  of  Adams  County,  who 
was  on  the  list  with  myself  from  that  town,  was  taken 
by  Stuart's  command,  but  released  soon  after  he  had 
reached  Richmond.  Perry  A.  Rice  of  Mercersburg,  a 
prominent  member  of  the  bar,  was  held  in  Libbey  Prison 
for  some  months,  and  died  there.  It  was  thus  that  I  es 
caped  being  Jeb  Stuart's  captive  in  the  first  and  one  of 
the  most  brilliant  cavalry  raids  of  the  war.  It  is  but  just 
to  Captain  Hugh  Logan,  however,  to  state  that  he  ad 
vised  me,  when  telling  me  of  my  danger,  that  if  cap 
tured  and  refused  parole  I  should  quietly  submit  and  join 
the  procession,  and  he  would  put  me  out  of  the  ranks  the 
first  night.  That  he  would  have  done  so,  even  at  the 
peril  of  his  life,  I  do  not  doubt,  and  I  am  as  grateful  to 
him  as  if  he  had  had  occasion  to  perform  that  act  of 
kindness  to  me. 

The  Stuart  raid  of  October,  1862,  was  the  first  actual 
experience  of  the  border  people  of  Pennsylvania  with  a 
Confederate  force  in  their  midst,  but  beyond  the  general 
panic  and  disturbance  it  produced,  the  loss  of  some  twelve 
hundred  horses  by  our  farmers  and  the  destruction  of  rail 
road  property,  we  felt  none  of  the  serious  results  of  war. 
The  Pennsylvania  "emergency-men"  followed  to  give 


BORDER-LIFE   IA     WAR-TIMES.  4°7 

protection  when  it  was  no  longer  needed,  as  they  did 
again  in  1863,  after  Lee  had  retreated,  and  again  in  1864, 
after  McCausland  had  burned  Chambersburg.  These 
suddenly-organized  and  undisciplined  commands  were 
inspired  by  patriotic  purpose,  but  they  really  never  ren 
dered  any  service  in  protecting  the  people  of  the  border, 
and  at  times  were  very  destructive  because  of  their  want 
of  discipline  and  properly-organized  supplies. 

After  the  militia  had  been  quietly  disposed  of,  there 
was  comparative  peace  along  the  border  until  after  the 
defeat  of  Hooker  at  Chancellorsville  and  Lee  commenced 
his  movement  northward.  The  first  sullen  murmurs  of 
invasion  came,  as  usual,  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  as 
General  Milroy  was  routed  at  Winchester  and  his  stam 
peded  army  scattered  in  fragments  over  the  border  region. 
With  them  came  fleeing  loyal  fugitives  from  Virginia 
and  swarms  of  negroes,  creating  panic  in  every  direction, 
and  on  the  evening  of  the  i5th  of  June  positive  informa 
tion  was  received  that  General  Jenkins,  commanding  the 
cavalry  advance  of  Lee's  army,  was  approaching.  They 
took  possession  of  Chambersburg  the  same  night,  and 
General  Jenkins  exhibited  the  good  taste  of  all  com 
manders  of  both  armies  by  camping  on  my  farm,  and 
he  further  honored  me  by  taking  possession  of  my  house 
as  his  headquarters. 

A  short  time  before  this  advance  of  Lee  a  prominent 
citizen  who  lived  just  south  of  the  Pennsylvania  line  in 
Maryland,  who  was  a  client  and  friend  of  mine,  and 
whose  release  I  had  obtained  after  he  had  been  con 
demned  by  General  Schenck  and  banished  into  the 
Southern  lines,  rode  nearly  all  night  from  his  home  to 
Chambersburg  to  advise  me  that  an  invasion  was  inevit 
able,  and  that  I  must  not  permit  myself  to  be  captured. 
He  had  spent  some  weeks  within  the  Confederate  lines 
after  he  had  been  banished  by  court-martial,  and  he  feU 


LINCOLN  AND.   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

it  to  be  his  duty  to  inform  me  of  the  excessive  estimate 
the  Southern  leaders  put  upon  me  as  a  prisoner,  as  they 
supposed  that  with  me  as  captive  they  could  make  un 
usually  good  terms  with  Governor  Curtin  and  President 
Lincoln.  I  heeded  his  advice,  and  thereafter  did  not 
remain  in  Chambersburg  to  extend  hospitality  to  the 
sons  of  the  South.  General  Jenkins  was  hospitably 
treated  by  my  family,  and  his  sick  soldiers,  for  whom 
my  barn  had  been  improvised  as  hospital,  were  kindly 
ministered  to  by  Mrs.  McClure.  It  was  this  same  com 
mand  that  one  year  later,  under  General  McCausland, 
burned  Chambersburg  and  went  a  mile  out  of  its  way  to 
burn  my  house  and  barn.  Of  course  all  stock  and  valu 
ables  that  could  be  shipped  away  had  been  sent  to  Har- 
risburg  or  points  beyond,  and  our  people  were  living 
under  many  discomforts.  Jenkins  remained  only  a  few 
days  in  Chambersburg,  when  he  suddenly  fell  back  toward 
the  Potomac  between  Greencastle  and  Hagerstown,  and 
from  there  sent  out  marauding  parties  to  capture  horses 
and  supplies.  The  whole  southern  portion  of  Franklin 
county  was  mercilessly  plundered  while  Jenkins  was 
waiting  the  arrival  of  Lee's  infantry.  General  Rhodes' 
division  was  the  first  to  reach  Pennsylvania,  and  with 
that  command  Jenkins  again  advanced  and  took  posses 
sion  of  Chambersburg. 

The  history  of  the  great  Gettysburg  campaign  and 
battle  is  so  familiar  to  all  that  I  need  not  dwell  on  de^ 
tails.  Lee  then  commanded  the  largest  and  the  most 
defiant  army  the  Confederates  ever  had  during  the  war. 
General  Bwell's  corps,  over  twenty  thousand  strong,  en 
camped  on  my  farm,  and  thence  Generals  Rhodes  and 
Early  made  their  movements  against  York  and  Harris- 
burg.  On  the  26th  of  June,  General  Lee  entered  Cham 
bersburg  with  his  staff,  and  it  is  needless  to  say  that  his 
movements  were  watched  with  intense  interest  by  all  in- 


BORDER-LIFE  IN   WAR-TIMES.  4°9 

telligent  citizens.  Early  and  Rhodes  were  already  ope 
rating  on  the  lines  of  the  Susquehanna,  and  Lee's  army 
was  so  disposed  that  it  could  be  rapidly  concentrated  for 
operations  in  the  Cumberland  Valley  and  against  Phila 
delphia  or  thrown  south  of  the  South  Mountain  to  ope 
rate  against  Washington.  Lee  held  a  brief  council  in 
the  centre  square  of  Chambersburg  with  General  A.  P. 
Hill  and  several  other  officers,  and  when  he  left  them 
intense  anxiety  was  exhibited  by  every  one  who  observed 
them  to  ascertain  whether  his  movements  would  indicate 
the  concentration  of  his  army  in  the  Cumberland  Valley 
or  for  operations  against  Washington.  When  he  came 
to  the  street  where  the  Gettysburg  turnpike  enters  the 
square,  he  turned  to  the  right,  went  out  a  mile  along 
that  road,  and  fixed  his  headquarters  in  a  little  grove 
close  by  the  roadside  then  known  as  Shetters'  Woods. 
When  Lee  turned  in  that  direction,  Benjamin  S.  Huber, 
a  country  lad,  happened  to  be  present,  and,  as  he  had 
already  exhibited  some  fitness  for  such  work,  he  was 
started  immediately  overland  for  Harrisburg  to  commu 
nicate  to  Governor  Curtin  the  fact  that  Lee's  movement 
indicated  Gettysburg  as  his  objective  point.  Lee  was 
fated  to  lose  three  days  of  invaluable  time  at  his  head 
quarters  in  the  quiet  grove  near  Chambersburg,  as  his 
cavalry  had  been  cut  off  from  him  by  encountering  our 
cavalry  forces  in  Eastern  Maryland,  and  he  could  get  no 
information  whatever  of  the  movements  of  the  Union 
army. 

It  was  not  until  the  29th  of  June  that  he  received  in 
formation  from  one  of  Longstreet's  scouts  of  the  position 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  he  immediately  de 
cided  to  cross  South  Mountain  and  accept  battle  on  the 
line  to  Baltimore  and  Washington.  On  the  night  of 
Monday,  June  29th,  General  Ewell's  wagon-trains  passed 
through  Chambersburg  and  turned  eastward  on  the  Get- 


410  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

tysburg  turnpike.  This  movement  was  carefully  watched, 
and  it  soon  became  evident  to  intelligent  observers  that 
Lee's  army  was  moving  rapidly  to  concentrate  south  of 
the  South  Mountain.  I  was  then  at  Harrisburg  with 
Governor  Curtin,  and  the  only  news  we  received  of  Lee's 
movement,  and  the  only  reliable  news  received  at  Meade's 
headquarters  for  some  days,  came  from  the  several  ener 
getic  young  men  who  performed  scout-duty  between 
Chambersburg  and  Harrisburg  by  traversing  the  moun 
tains  north  of  the  Cumberland  Valley.  It  was  known 
to  us  that  Lee  was  in  the  Cumberland  Valley  with  the 
largest  Southern  army  ever  organized,  and  the  gravest 
apprehensions  were  felt  by  all  as  to  the  ability  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  meet  it  in  battle.  There  was 
no  sleep  for  the  weary  men  at  Harrisburg  who  were  com 
pelled  to  watch  and  to  await  events. 

The  first  intimation  received  of  Lee's  movement  toward 
Gettysburg  came  from  John  A.  Seiders  of  Chambersburg, 
who  had  entered  the  enemy's  lines  in  Confederate  uni 
form  and  saw  General  Rhodes  begin  the  movement  from 
Carlisle  in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg;  but  as  Rhodes 
and  Early  were  both  moving  from  point  to  point,  the 
fact  that  Rhodes  was  apparently  retiring  from  Carlisle 
was  no  indication  of  Lee's  movements  in  Chambers 
burg. 

I  shall  never  forget  the  first  dispatch  received  at  the 
Executive  Mansion  at  Harrisburg  giving  the  information 
that  Lee  had  moved  toward  Gettysburg.  It  was  some 
time  between  midnight  and  morning  on  the  ist  of  July, 
while  a  dozen  or  more  were  waiting  with  the  intensest 
interest  for  news,  that  an  unsigned  dispatch  was  received 
by  Governor  Curtin  from  Port  Royal  in  Juniata  county, 
stating  that  the  writer  had  left  Chambersburg  the  day 
before  at  the  request  of  Judge  Kimmell  to  convey  the 
information  to  the  Governor  that  Lee  was  marching 


OF  I,E;TTKR  FROM  GENERA^ 


412  LINCOLN  AND*  MEN  OF  WAR- TIMES. 

toward  Gettysburg.  The  fact  that  the  dispatch  was  un 
signed  threw  doubt  upon  the  value  of  the  information, 
but  as  it  described  minutely  the  route  the  scout  had  trav 
eled  through  Franklin  and  Juniata  counties,  with  which 
I  was  personally  quite  familiar,  I  was  able  to  give  reason 
able  assurance  that  the  dispatch  was  genuine.  The  tele 
graph-office  at  Port  Royal  had  been  opened  to  send  the 
dispatch,  and  was  closed  immediately  after,  so  that  no 
details  could  be  obtained.  General  Couch,  then  in  com 
mand  of  the  Union  force  at  Harrisburg,  was  present  in 
the  Governor's  room,  and  he  immediately  communicated 
with  General  "  Baldy "  Smith,  giving  the  information 
received  and  asking  him  to  see  whether  the  enemy  had 
retired  from  his  front.  Before  noon  the  next  day  the 
correctness  of  the  statement  given  by  the  unknown  scout 
was  fully  verified;  and  it  is  a  most  remarkable  fact  that 
the  identity  of  this  man  was  never  discovered  by  Gov 
ernor  Curtin  until  twenty  years  thereafter. 

This  scout  was  Stephen  W.  Pomeroy,  whose  father  had 
sat  on  the  bench  as  associate  with  Judge  Kimmell,  and 
Kimmell,  knowing  the  trustworthiness  of  the  young 
man,  wrote  the  dispatch  for  Governor  Curtin,  cut  a  hole 
in  the  buckle-strap  of  Pomeroy 's  pantaloons,  and  hid  the 
telegram  therein.  Information  came  from  so  many  quar 
ters  during  the  next  day  that  the  message  of  the  young 
scout  was  almost  forgotten,  and  the  thrilling  events  that 
followed  and  the  many  conspicuous  feats  performed  by 
the  young  men  of  the  Cumberland  Valley  in  scouting 
service  prevented  minute  inquiry  into  the  source  of  the 
important  dispatch  of  the  early  morning.  Twenty  years 
later  the  Presbyterian  Synod  of  that  section  met  in  Belle- 
fonte,  and  several  ministers  in  attendance  were  guests  of 
Governor  Curtin.  In  the  course  of  his  reminiscent  con 
versations  about  the  war  he  happened  to  mention  the 
receipt  of  this  important  dispatch,  and  the  fact  that  he 


BORDER-LIFE  IN   WAR-TIMES.  413 

had  never  been  advised  as  to  the  author  of  it.  To  his 
surprise,  Rev.  S.  W.  Pomeroy,  then  his  own  guest,  told 
him  that  he  was  the  man,  and  at  Curtin's  request  he 
wrote  a  letter  that  was  given  to  the  public  stating  the 
full  particulars  of  his  marvelous  journey.  *  It  was  upon 

*  MOUNT  UNION,  PA.,  Nov.  13,  1883. 

HON.  A.  G.  CURTIN — DEAR  SIR  :  In  compliance  with  your 
request,  I  send  you  the  account  of  how  I  came  to  send  you  the 
telegram  of  the  concentration  of  the  Confederate  army  at  Gettys 
burg  during  the  war.  After  being  discharged  from  the  nine 
months'  service  of  the  Pennsylvania  volunteers,  I  happened  to 
be  home,  at  my  father's — Judge  Pomeroy  of  Roxbury,  Franklin 
county — when  the  enemy  were  marching  down  the  Cumberland 
Valley.  There  was,  of  course,  great  excitement,  for  the  enemy 
were  at  our  doors  and  taking  what  they  would.  Farmers  hid 
their  horses  and  other  stock  in  the  mountains  as  far  as  possible. 
One  day  three  hundred  cavalry  marched  into  Roxbury.  When 
we  learned  of  their  coming,  ten  of  the  men  who  had  been  out  in 
the  nine  months'  service  armed  ourselves  as  best  we  could  and 
went  out  to  intercept  them ;  but  the  odds  were  too  great,  so  we 
retired.  Anxious  to  hear  the  news  and  render  what  service  we 
might  to  our  country,  a  number  of  us  walked  to  Chambersburg, 
a  distance  of  fourteen  miles,  reaching  there  in  the  afternoon. 
That  night  the  rebels  were  concentrated  at  Gettysburg.  Next 
morning  Judge  F.  M.  Kimmell,  with  whom  my  father  sat  as 
associate  judge,  learned  that  a  son  of  Thomas  Pomeroy  was  in 
town.  He  sent  for  me  to  come  to  him  at  once.  I  found  the  judge 
on  the  street  that  leads  to  McConnellsburg,  a  short  distance  from 
the  Franklin  Hotel,  where  the  Central  Presbyterian  Church  now 
stands.  As  the  town  was  full  of  rebels  and  a  rebel  had  his  beat 
near  us,  the  judge  asked  m$  in  a  low  tone  if  I  was  a  son  of  Judge 
Pomeroy.  I  replied  in  the  affirmative.  With  apparent  unconcern 
he  asked  me  to  follow  him.  I  did  so,  and  he  led  me  into  a  little 
dark  back  room  and  told  me  that  the  rebels  were  concentrating 
at  Gettysburg  and  Governor  Curtin  did  not  know  it.  He  said  it 
was  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the  Governor  should  know  at 
the  earliest  possible  moment,  and  asked  me  if  I  would  take  a  tel 
egram  to  the  nearest  point  on  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  and 
send  it  to  him.  He  added:  "  It  is  of  infinite  importance  to  him 
and  to  our  country."  I  replied  that  I  would  try  it,  The  telegram 


414  LINCOLN  AND' MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

this  information  that  General  Meade,  then  just  placed  in 
the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  hastened  to 

was  already  written,  so  he  cut  a  hole  in  the  buckle-strap  of  my 
pantaloons  and  deposited  there  the  telegram  to  be  sent,  and 
said:  "Get  this  safely  and  in  the  shortest  time  possible  to  the 
Governor."  Assuming  indifference,  I  came  to  the  street  and  met 
the  rebel  guard,  who  did  not  disturb  me.  Some  of  those  who 
came  with  me  wishing  to  return  to  Roxbury,  we  set  out  together. 
We  met  many  at  the  edge  of  the  town  returning  who  could  not 
get  through  the  guards,  who  were  stationed  around  the  town. 

Coming  to  the  forks  of  the  Strasburg  and  Roxbury  roads,  we 
found  both  cavalry  and  infantry.  On  the  left  there  was  a  slight 
hollow,  also  several  wheat-fields,  and  beyond  these  there  were 
woods .  This  was  the  only  way  to  hope  for  escape.  At  my  pro 
posal  we  crept  along  this  hollow,  at  the  end  of  which  there  were 
some  wheat-fields;  we  kept  these  between  us  and  the  guard  till 
we  reached  the  woods.  When  getting  over  the  fence  into  the 
woods  we  were  seen  by  the  enemy.  They  called,  rode  after  us, 
and  leveled  their  muskets  at  us,  but  we  ran  on,  and,  as  they  did 
not  fire  or  follow  far,  we  escaped.  Still  fearing  capture,  we  kept 
to  the  fields.  Before  we  reached  Strasburg  all  had  fallen  behind 
but  one.  We  must  have  walked  about  seventeen  miles  before  we 
got  to  Roxbury.  As  the  horses  were  hid  in  the  mountains,  I  was 
in  dread  lest  I  should  not  get  a  horse;  but  I  met  Mr.  L.  S.  Sent- 
man  riding  into  town  to  get  feed  for  his  horses  in  the  mountains. 
Telling  him  of  the  message  I  was  carrying,  he  gave  me  his  horse. 
Informing  my  father  of  my  errand,  I  set  out  on  my  trip  at  once. 
It  was  about  noon.  The  mountain-road  to  Amberson  Valley 
was,  I  knew,  blockaded  with  trees  to  prevent  the  marauders  from 
entering  the  valley  to  steal  horses.  The  Barrens  below  Concord 
were  blockaded  by  citizens  of  Tuscarora  Valley,  many  of  whom 
knew  me.  The  report  having  reached  them  that  I  was  killed 
while  trying  to  hinder  the  rebels  from  entering  Roxbury,  the  ob 
stacles  and  excitement  of  my  friends  at  finding  me  alive  hindered 
me  about  ten  minutes.  Free  from  them,  I  hastened  down  the 
Tuscarora  Valley  as  fast  as  my  horse  could  carry  me.  At  Beal- 
town,  Mr.  Beal  (now  the  Rev.  D.  J.  Beal)  speedily  got  me  a  fresh 
horse.  When  I  reached  Silas  E.  Smith's  I  did  these  two  things: 
got  lunch  and  proved  to  the  future  Mrs.  Pomeroy  that  I  was  not 
dead,  as  she  supposed,  but  good  for  many  years  to  come.  From 
thence  I  rode  to  my  uncle's,  Joseph  Pomeroy,  at  Academia,  found 


RORDER-LIt'E   IN    \VAR-TlMbS.  415 

concentrate  his  army,  and  he  ordered  General  Reynolds 
to  make  a  recognizance  in  force  at  Gettysburg  to  ascer 
tain  the  position  of  the  enemy.  The  young  men  who 
performed  the  most  important  duty  of  maintaining  com 
munications  between  Harrisburg  and  Chambersburg  by 
circuitous  journeys  through  the  mountains  were  Stephen 
W.  Pomeroy,  Thomas  J.  Grimison,  Sellers  Montgomery, 
J.  Porter  Brown,  Anthony  Holler,  Shearer  Houser,  Ben 
jamin  S.  Huber,  and  probably  others  whose  names  I  can 
not  recall. 

When  Lee  had  passed  the  South  Mountain  and  the 
battle  at  Gettysburg  had  begun  it  was  impossible  to  ob 
tain  any  news  from  Lee's  rear  as  to  important  movements 
between  the  two  armies,  and  thenceforth  until  Lee's  re 
treat  the  only  information  received  at  Harrisburg  and 
Chambersburg  came  from  General  Meade  through  Wash 
ington.  On  the  evening  of  the  first  day's  battle  we 
learned  the  sad  news  that  Reynolds  had  fallen  and  that 

them  likewise  mourning  my  supposed  death,  and  he  supplied  an 
other  horse,  the  fastest  he  had.  That  carried  me  to  within  a  mile 
of  my  destination,  when  a  soldier  on  guard  called,  "Halt!"  I 
told  the  sergeant  on  guard  my  mission,  and  requested  one  of  the 
guard  to  go  with  me,  that  I  might  get  the  telegram  off  to  Harris 
burg  in  the  shortest  time  possible. 

Getting  on  the  horse  behind  me,  we  rode  in  a  few  minutes  to 
the  office.  Finding  the  operator,  he  cut  the  telegram  out  of  the 
strap  of  my  pantaloons  and  sent  it  at  once  to  you.  The  excite 
ment  and  journey  being  over  and  the  telegram  being  off  to  you, 
I  began  to  look  at  the  time  and  found  it  about  midnight.  I  had 
walked  that  day  about  seventeen  miles  and  ridden  about  forty- 
one  miles.  Anxious  as  I  was  about  the  critical  state  of  the  coun 
try,  I  was  so  tired  I  had  to  seek  the  house  of  my  kinsman,  Major 
J.  M.  Pomeroy,  in  Perryville  (now  Port  Royal),  for  rest. 

The  above  is  the  history  of  that  telegram  that,  I  believe,  first 
gave  you  notice  of  the  concentration  of  the  rebel  troops  at  Gettys 
burg  just  before  the  famous  battle  in  that  place. 

Respectfully  yours, 

STEPHEN  W.  POMEROY. 


416  LINCOLN  AND   MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

the  Union  troops  had  been  badly  defeated.  On  the  sec 
ond  day  no  material  news  came,  and  for  two  days  the 
government  at  Harrisburg  and  the  people  in  the  Valley 
were  agonized  by  fearful  suspense  as  to  the  issue  of  the 
conflict.  Late  in  the  evening  of  July  3d,  Wayne  Mac- 
Veagh,  who  had  been  with  the  Governor  during  the 
whole  period  of  trial,  and  whose  anxiety  kept  him  close 
beside  the  telegraph-operator,  rushed  into  the  Executive 
Chamber  with  Meade's  report  of  the  repulse  of  Pickett 
on  Cemetery  Hill.  It  was  the  first  silver  lining  of  the 
dark  cloud  flung  upon  us  by  the  Gettysburg  invasion, 
and  when  the  next  morning  it  was  known  that  Lee  had 
retreated,  while  every  loyal  heart  of  the  land  was  glad 
dened,  the  border  people  felt  a  relief  that  was  unknown 
in  any  other  part  of  the  country. 

One  of  the  incidents  of  Lee's  retreat  I  do  not  recall 
with  pleasure,  but  it  is  due  to  the  truth  of  history  to  tell 
the  story  of  the  fierce  passions  which  ran  riot  in  our  civil 
war.  Lee  left  thousands  of  his  wounded  scattered  along 
the  line  of  his  retreat,  and  a  number  of  them  were  gath 
ered  into  a  hospital  in  Chambersburg.  Little  attention 
was  paid  to  the  fact  that  there  was  a  Confederate  hospital 
in  our  midst,  as  "uncommon  things  make  common 
things  forgot."  Some  ten  days  after  Lee's  retreat,  Dr. 
A.  H.  Senseny,  my  own  family  physician,  came  to  me 
and  informed  me  that  he  was  attending  the  Confederate 
wounded  in  the  hospital,  and  that  they  were  .in  great 
need  of  some  things  which  were  not  supplied  by  army 
regulations.  He  appealed  to  me  to  go  in  person  and  see 
them  and  take  the  lead  to  have  them  properly  supplied, 
as  he  believed  I  could  do  it  without  suspicion  of  disloy 
alty.  I  visited  the  hospital  with  him  and  found  a  num 
ber  of  severely- wounded  men  who  had  great  need  of  some 
delicacies  necessary  to  their  recovery  or  comfort.  Mrs. 
McClure  immediately  took  charge  of  the  effort,  and  was 


BORDER-LIFE   I  ft   WAR-'TIMES.  417 

heartily  seconded  by  a  number  of  estimable  ladies.  I 
became  specially  interested  in  a  young  Confederate, 
Colonel  Carter,  who  resided  in  Texas,  but  who  was  a 
native  of  Tennessee.  It  was  evident  that  his  wound  was 
mortal,  and  he  fully  understood  it.  When  he  was  in 
formed  by  the  doctor  that  I  had  come  to  perform  some 
kind  offices  for  the  wounded  in  that  hospital,  he  thanked 
me  effusively,  and  made  a  piteous  appeal  to  me  to  assure 
him  decent  Christian  burial  after  his  death.  I  gave  him 
the  promise,  little  dreaming  of  the  angry  passions  it 
would  arouse  in  a  Christian  community.  He  died  a  few 
days  thereafter,  and  I  applied  to  the  trustees  of  the  Pres 
byterian  church  I  attended  for  permission  to  bury  him  in 
the  graveyard  attached  to  it.  To  my  surprise  it  was 
refused.  I  made  like  application  to  the  several  other 
churches  in  the  town  which  had  cemeteries,  and  was 
refused  in  every  instance.  I  then  applied  to  a  company 
that  had  recently  started  a  new  cemetery  near  the  town, 
and  proposed  to  purchase  a  lot  for  the  burial  of  the  dead 
Confederate  colonel,  but  that  was  refused,  and  indigna 
tion  was  expressed  on  almost  every  side  because  of  my 
effort  to  give  a  Confederate  soldier  decent  burial.  I  then 
announced  that  I  would  set  apart  a  small  lot  in  the  corner 
of  the  field  in  front  of  my  house  to  bury  him  there  and 
dedicate  it  as  his  resting-place.  Finally  Mr.  Burnett,  an 
estimable  Christian  character,  gave  Colonel  Carter's  re 
mains  a  resting-place  in  his  own  lot  in  the  Methodist 
burial-ground.  Such  were  the  fierce  passions  of  civil 
war  in  one  of  the  most  intelligent,  generous,  and  Chris 
tian  communities  of  the  North,  and  I  recall  it  often  as 
one  of  the  saddest  memories  of  our  fraternal  conflict. 

After  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  the  border  people  had 
seen  war  in  its  most  horrible  aspect.  The  constant  peril 
from  incursions  of  the  enemy,  and  the  possibility  of  other 

great  battles  being  fought  upon  the  border  or  north  of 
27 


41  &  LINCOLN  AND,  MEN   OF   WAR-TIMES. 

the  Potomac,  destroyed  all  hope  of  tranquility  in  that 
region  until  the  war  closed.  There  was  comparative 
peace  and  quiet  during  the  winter  of  1863-64,  but  when 
the  spring  of  1864  opened  the  border  counties  were  almost 
constantly  threatened  by  cavalry  raids  or  hostile  armies. 
Governor  Curtin  had  taken  the  precaution  to  organize  an 
ample  force  to  protect  the  border  from  raids,  but  as  these 
troops  were  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  national 
government,  and  thereby  subject  to  the  call  of  the  War 
Department,  they  were  ordered  from  the  State  to  rein 
force  Hunter  on  the  north  side  of  the  Potomac  after  his 
disastrous  advance  into  Virginia.  While  Hunter  was 
thus  endeavoring  to  reorganize  his  demoralized  forces 
and  the  border  was  threatened  in  the  direction  of  Hagers- 
town,  the  startling  news  came  to  General  Couch's  head 
quarters  on  the  evening  of  July  29,  1864,  that  a  Confed 
erate  force  had  entered  Mercersburg  and  was  marching 
toward  Chambersburg.  General  Couch,  although  com 
manding  a  department  with  headquarters  at  Chambers- 
burg,  had  but  one  hundred  and  fourteen  men  under  his 
command,  and  they  were  scattered  over  half  as  many 
miles  as  scouts  on  the  border.  The  troops  that  he  could 
have  summoned  to  repel  invasion  under  ordinary  circum 
stances  had  passed  through  Chambersburg  within  twenty- 
four  hours  to  join  Hunter,  in  command  of  another  de 
partment,  and  were  beyond  his  control. 

I  remained  with  Couch  the  night  of  the  29th  until 
three  o'clock  the  next  morning.  He  received  frequent 
reports  from  the  heroic  Lieutenant  McLean,  who  had  just 
thirteen  men  with  him,  but  who  in  the  darkness  of  the 
night  confronted  McCausland  at  every  cross-roads  in  his 
advance  upon  Chambersburg,  and  so  hindered  him  that 
he  did  not  arrive  in  front  of  the  town  until  daylight. 
McCausland  in  his  official  report  states  that  he  was  con 
fronted  by  a  regiment  that  fought  him  most  gallantly  and 


BORDER-LIFE   IN    WAR-TIMES,  419 

greatly  delayed  his  advance,  but  I  happened  to  know  that 
the  entire  force  opposed  to  him  was  the  lieutenant  and  his 
thirteen  men.  It  was  evident  at  three  o'clock  in  the 
morning  that  the  Confederate  force  would  reach  the  town 
before  daylight,  and,  as  General  Couch  had  no  means 
whatever  for  defending  the  place,  he  ordered  a  special 
train  to  be  in  readiness  to  take  himself,  staff,  and  official 
records  away  when  it  became  necessary.  He  urged  me 
to  go  with  him,  believing  that  it  was  unsafe  for  me  to 
remain  at  home,  but  I  decided  that  I  would  not  leave  my 
family,  perilous  though  it  seemed  to  be,  and  left  him  to 
go  to  my  own  house.  When  I  reached  there  and  gave 
the  condition  of  affairs,  Mrs.  McClure  most  earnestly 
urged  me  to  go  with  General  Couch,  and  while  I  was 
hesitating  he  sent  a  staff-officer  to  my  house,  saying  that 
he  felt  it  his  duty  to  command  me  to  accompany  him  out 
of  the  town,  and  to  come  at  once  and  leave  with  him  on 
the  train.  I  still  hesitated  and  sent  his  staff-officer  away, 
but  soon  after  Mr.  Taylor,  an  old  friend,  drove  up  in  his 
buggy  and  proposed  to  take  me  with  him,  and  I  accom 
panied  him  to  Shippensburg. 

Telegraphic  communication  was  of  course  cut  off,  but 
the  next  morning  I  took  the  cars  for  Harrisburg,  where 
I  was  greeted  with  the  information  that  McCausland  had 
burned  the  town  and  had  sent  a  special  detachment,  com 
manded  by  a  son  of  Ex-Governor  Smith  of  Virginia,  to 
burn  my  house  and  barn,  after  having  burned  my  print 
ing-office  and  law-office  in  the  town.  Rev.  Samuel  J. 
Niccolls,  now  of  St.  L,ouis,  was  my  immediate  neighbor, 
and  he  came  to  my  house  when  he  found  that  a  detach 
ment  of  the  enemy  had  entered  it.  Mrs.  McClure  was 
ill,  confined  to  her  room,  but  Captain  Smith  entered  it 
and  notified  her  to  leave  immediately,  as  he  was  going  to 
burn  the  house  in  retaliation  for  the  destruction  of  pri 
vate  property  by  Hunter  in  Virginia,  and  forbade  her  to 


420  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

take  anything  with  her.  Mr.  Niccolls  attempted  to  take 
some  of  my  clothing  on  his  arms,  but  it  was  grasped 
from  him  and  cast  into  the  flames.  The  only  thing 
saved  from  the  house  was  a  portrait  that  Miss  Virginia 
Riley  seized,  and  with  it  ran  out  of  the  house  through  a 
back  door,  and  the  family  Bible  was  taken  charge  of  by 
Mrs.  Gray,  the  mother  of  my  wife.  When  Captain  Smith 
was  about  to  fire  the  room  in  which  Mrs.  McClure  was 
an  invalid,  she  opened  a  drawer  in  her  bureau  and  handed 
him  a  letter  she  had  received  but  a  few  days  before  and 
requested  him  to  read  it.  It  was  from  one  of  the  same 
command  who  had  been  there  under  Jenkins  the  year 
before,  and  who  had  been  ill  and  received  generous  min 
istrations  from  her.  It  was  a  letter  of  thanks  from  one  of 
Captain  Smith's  own  associates  for  the  kind  offices  she 
had  given  to  an  enemy  when  in  distress,  but  it  did  not 
stop  the  vandal's  work,  and  everything  perished  by  the 
vandal's  torch. 

I  need  not  describe  the  brutality  that  is  inevitable 
when  a  military  command  is  ordered  to  play  the  barba 
rian.  Many  of  the  men  became  intoxicated,  and  there 
were  numerous  records  of  barbarity  which  all  would  be 
glad  to  forget.  A  large  brick  house  on  another  part  of 
my  farm  was  fortunately  occupied  by  the  family  of  Col 
onel  Boyd,  one  of  our  most  gallant  troopers  and  success 
ful  scouts.  Learning  that  that  property  belonged  to  me, 
Colonel  Harry  Gilmore  led  a  detachment  to  burn  it. 
Colonel  Boyd  was  absent  on  duty,  but  his  wife  was  an 
heroic  woman,  and,  when  Colonel  Gilmore  entered  the 
house  and  informed  her  of  their  purpose,  she  amazed 
them  by  her  coolness  of  manner  and  much  more  by  her 
defiance.  She  said:  "Do  you  know  whose  home  this 
is  ?' '  The  answer  was:  ' '  Yes,  we  know  that  this  belongs 
to  Colonel  McClure,  and  we  are  ordered  to  burn  it" 
Her  answer  was:  "This  is  the  home  of  Colonel  Boyd, 


BORDER-LIFE   IN   WAR-TIMES.  421 

of  whom  you  have  some  knowledge.  I  am  now  ready 
to  walk  out  of  it,  and  you  can  burn  it  if  you  choose,  but 
don't  forget  that  it  is  the  home  of  Colonel  Boyd."  They 
knew  of  Colonel  Boyd,  and  they  knew  also  that  if  his 
home  was  burned  it  would  make  a  hundred  Virginians 
homeless  before  another  month,  as  he  would  have  given 
fearful  retribution.  Colonel  Gilmore  bowed  to  Mrs.  Boyd, 
saying:  "We  will  not  burn  the  home  of  so  gallant  a  sol 
dier;"  and  thus  the  property  was  saved.  He  gives  a  dif 
ferent  account  of  the  incident  in  his  book,  but  all  who 
remember  Mrs.  Boyd  well  know  that  she  was  not  the 
whimpering  dame  he  represents  her. 

I  need  not  describe  the  burning  of  Chambersburg.  It 
was  ordered  by  General  Early  upon  the  failure  of  the 
people  to  pay  a  tribute  of  $500,000,  which  was  an  impos 
sible  demand,  and  the  order  was  executed  in  unexampled 
barbarity.  It  accomplished  nothing  in  the  war  beyond 
making  hundreds  of  homeless  families  in  the  South,  and 
especially  in  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  when  Sherman 
was  marching  north,  where  the  people  learned  to  asso 
ciate  the  cry  of  Chambersburg  with  sweeping  destruc 
tion.  Every  drunken  Union  soldier  in  Southern  cities 
applied  the  torch  as  did  the  drunken  soldiers  of  McCaus- 
land  in  Chambersburg,  always  preceding  it  with  the  cry 
of  "Remember  Chambersburg!"  The  fact  remains  that 
one  of  the  most  beautiful  towns  of  the  State  had  been 
ruthlessly  destroyed  by  war;  that  the  people  of  Cham 
bersburg  and  of  the  border  regions  had  suffered  spoliation 
to  the  extent  of  not  less  than  $4,000,000;  and  that  the 
burning  of  Chambersburg  was  the  direct  result  of  the 
general  government  calling  away  the  troops  organized 
for  State  service  that  would  have  been  ample  to  defend 
the  town.  It  was  not  the  accident  of  a  lost  battle;  it 
was  the  result  of  the  extreme  necessities  of  the  national 
government  that  deprived  Pennsylvania  of  her  own  right- 


422  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

ful  defenders,  and  it  is  a  blistering  stain  upon  the  gov 
ernment  that  it  has  not  made  reasonable  restitution  for 
the  loss  which  resulted  from  the  action  of  the  govern 
ment  itself.  The  people  of  Chambersburg  heroically 
struggled  to  rebuild  their  homes  and  revive  their  busi 
ness,  but  soon  after  the  war  closed  there  was  a  general 
paralysis  and  depression  of  values,  and  many  were  hope 
lessly  bankrupted,  while  others  struggled  on  for  years  in 
the  vain  effort  to  retrieve  their  fortunes. 

This  fearful  strain  upon  the  people  of  the  border  con 
tinued  for  four  long  years.  Finally,  on  the  night  of 
April  9,  1865,  when  the  long-suffering  residents  of  Cham 
bersburg  were  at  rest  in  the  homes  they  had  improvised 
in  their  ashes,  they  were  suddenly  startled  by  the  ringing 
of  the  courthouse  bell,  in  which  the  chimes  of  several 
church  bells  were  soon  mingled.  There  had  been  no 
rumors  of  a  raid,  but  the  people  hurried  from  their  beds 
to  inquire  what  new  peril  confronted  them  or  what  great 
victory  had  been  achieved.  In  a  very  short  time  the 
streets  resounded  with  the  shouts:  "  L,ee  has  surren 
dered!"  Soon  the  people  of  the  town,  young  and  old, 
were  upon  the  streets,  many  of  them  weeping  with  joy, 
and  all  mingling  in  congratulations;  and  thus  the  fearful 
strain  upon  them  was  ended.  To  them  it  meant  more 
than  peace  between  the  North  and  the  South ;  it  meant 
much  more  than  a  restored  nation:  it  meant  the  ending 
of  the  strife  that  entered  their  own  homes  and  desolated 
the  places  where  their  affections  centered,  and  it  meant 
that  at  last,  after  the  bloodiest  war  of  modern  history, 
they  had — rest. 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  RESERVE  CORPS. 


WHIL,E  none  will  claim  that  the  soldiers  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps  were  more  heroic 
than  other  scores  of  thousands  of  Pennsylvania  soldiers 
who  volunteered  for  the  defence  of  the  Union,  it  is  none 
the  less  true  that  this  organization,  alike  by  reason  of  the 
peculiar  circumstances  under  which  it  was  created  and 
because  of  its  opportunities  for  the  most  heroic  service 
in  nearly  every  battle  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  oc 
cupies  a  distinctive  place  in  the  history  of  Pennsylva 
nia  heroism.  How  it  was  organized  has  already  been 
stated  in  these  articles.  How  it  was  summoned  by  the 
patriotism  and  sagacity  of  Governor  Curtin  when  the 
national  government  had  not  only  not  called  for  it,  but 
refused  to  accept  it;  how  the  legislature  was  appealed  to 
by  the  Governor,  and  a  State  organization  effected  alike 
for  the  protection  of  the  State  and  the  general  govern 
ment;  how  it  was  frantically  called  for  by  the  same  au 
thorities  who  had  rejected  it  when  disaster  fell  upon  the 
Union  forces  at  Bull  Run;  how  it  promptly  marched  to 
Washington  and  ended  panic  by  assuring  the  safety  of 
the  capital, — are  matters  of  history  known  to  all;  and 
when  it  is  remembered  that  it  had  such  commanders  as 
McCall,  Meade,  Reynolds,  Ord,  and  Crawford,  and  bri 
gade  commanders  who  have  shed  lustre  upon  the  skill 
and  heroism  of  Pennsylvania  soldiers,  and  that  more 
than  one-half  of  its  entire  force  fell  wounded  or  dead 

423 


(Photo  by  Gutekunst,  Philadelphia.) 

MAJOR-GENERAL  S.  W,  CRAWFORD,  1865, 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA   RESERVE   CORPS.  425 

in  battle,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Pennsylvania  Re 
serve  Corps  occupies  a  unique  position  in  the  annals 
of  Pennsylvania  achievement  and  sacrifice  in  our  civil 
war. 

The  command  of  the  Reserves  was  first  offered  to  Gen 
eral  McClellan,  and  he  had  accepted,  but  on  his  way  to 
Harrisburg  he  was  stopped  at  Columbus,  Ohio,  where  he 
was  prevailed  upon  to  accept  the  command  of  the  Ohio 
State  troops.  It  was  then  offered  to  General  Franklin, 
but  he  declined,  as  he  had  been  promoted  to  a  colonelcy 
in  the  regular  army.  It  was  then  tendered  to  General 
McCall  of  Chester  county,  Pennsylvania,  a  retired  army 
officer,  who  proved  to  be  an  excellent  disciplinarian  and 
a  most  gallant  soldier.  General  McCall  earnestly  devoted 
himself,  and  at  once,  to  the  organization  for  service  of 
the  division,  to  its  drill  and  discipline,  and  gave  to  the 
Bucktails,  or  First  Rifles,  his  especial  care — a  regiment 
to  become  famous  as  skirmishers  wholly  unique,  and 
whose  value  in  thick  woods,  tangled  overgrowth,  streams, 
and  mountain-passes  was  unequaled  anywhere.  Three 
brigades  were  formed,  under  Reynolds,  Meade,  and  Ord 
— names  soon  to  become  famous  for  ability  and  conspicu 
ous  service;  and  it  cannot  be  questioned  that  the  impres 
sion  left  by  these  able  soldiers  of  the  highest  class  in 
their  discipline  and  instruction  was  long  effective  and 
contributed  greatly  to  the  reputation  of  the  division. 

Before  the  advance  of  our  lines  in  front  of  Washington 
to  a  stronger  position  the  Reserves  were  ordered  to  I^ang- 
ley,  at  Camp  Pierpoint,  beyond  the  Chain  Bridge,  where 
McCall's  division  constituted  the  right  of  the  army, 
which  it  held  until  after  the  seven  days'  retreat  on  the 
Peninsula.  Constantly  in  contact  with  the  enemy,  and 
always  with  credit  to  itself,  it  was  preparing  for  the 
larger  operations  of  war  so  soon  to  devolve  upon  it.  A 
reconnaissance  in  force  showed  the  presence  of  the  enemy 


426  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

in  uncertain  numbers  near  Dranesville,  and  an  attack 
from  the  direction  of  Centreville  was  anticipated,  in  re 
gard  to  which  McCall's  division  was  warned.  Had  the 
reconnaissance  to  Dranesville  resulted  in  holding  that 
place,  the  disaster  to  Baker  and  his  command  at  Ball's 
Bluff,  and  his  subsequent  rout,  might  have  been  avoided. 

From  intelligence  received  by  a  scout  it  was  learned 
that  the  enemy  was  in  force  at  Dranesville,  and  that 
his  object  was  to  forage  in  the  unoccupied  country  in 
his  immediate  front.  He  had  advanced  his  pickets  in 
front  of  his  line,  and  was  molesting  Union  men  about 
him,  when  it  was  determined  to  drive  his  line  back 
and  take  possession  of  the  supplies  of  grain  and  forage 
available. 

On  the  aoth,  Ord's  brigade,  with  Easton's  battery 
and  a  detachment  of  cavalry,  and  with  the  Bucktails 
as  skirmishers,  was  ordered  to  move  up  the  Dranesville 
road.  Reynolds  with  his  brigade,  in  support,  was  to 
move  in  the  same  direction  later,  while  Meade  was  held 
in  reserve  in  camp.  Ord  reached  Dranesville,  and  soon 
developed  the  enemy,  who  opened  fire  with  his  artillery. 
The  brigade  soon  became  closely  engaged,  Easton's  bat 
tery  coming  rapidly  into  position  and  rendering  most 
effective  service  through  the  battle.  Ord's  dispositions 
were  admirable,  and  he  directed  in  person  the  operations 
of  his  regiments,  with  Easton's  guns  and  the  Bucktails. 
In  an  attempt  to  turn  the  left  of  our  position  the  enemy 
was  repulsed  by  Easton's  guns  and  the  Sixth  regiment. 
There  was  close  firing  along  the  line,  when  an  advance 
was  ordered  and  the  enemy  rapidly  retreated  toward 
Centreville.  Meantime,  Reynolds'  brigade,  followed 
by  that  of  Meade,  had  come  up,  but  the  battle  was 
over — a  most  successful  affair,  hardly  to  be  dignified 
with  the  name  of  a  battle,  and,  in  view  of  the  immense 
issues  of  the  future,  insignificant,  but  in  its  moral  as- 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA   RESERVE   CORPS. 

pects  immense.  Young  men  gathered  from  all  parts 
of  Pennsylvania  had  assumed  the  panoply  of  war,  and 
had  gone  into  action  and  moved  and  fought  with  the 
confidence  of  veteran  soldiers;  and  it  was  the  first  vic 
tory  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Pennsylvania  was 
thrilled  at  the  achievement  of  her  sons,  and  not  only 
through  her  Governor,  but  through  the  Secretary  of 
War,  himself  a  Pennsylvanian,  congratulations  and  com 
mendations,  official  and  private,  upon  the  conduct  of 
the  division  came  in  profusion. 

The  division  now  returned  to  its  camp  (Pierpoint)  and 
made  preparations  to  go  into  winter  quarters.  McClellan 
had  been  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  army,  which 
for  seven  long  months  remained  inactive  confronting 
the  enemy's  lines.  The  Reserves  under  their  competent 
officers  were  daily  attaining  efficiency  in  drill  and  in  dis 
cipline  and  in  preparation  for  battle — an  efficiency  that 
was  never  to  leave  them  during  their  service.  The 
whole  heart  of  their  State  had  gone  out  to  them,  and  the 
patriotic  Governor,  who  ever  considered  them  his  own 
special  creation,  never  wearied  in  the  exercise  of  his 
paternal  care. 

McClellan  now  moved  from  Alexandria  to  Fortress 
Monroe,  and  the  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
began.  To  reach  Yorktown  and  the  Peninsula  the  army 
embarked  by  divisions.  McDowell's  corps,  with  the 
Pennsylvania  Reserves,  was  in  the  rear.  But  while  all 
was  in  motion,  the  President,  learning  that  Washington 
had  not  been  protected  by  a  sufficient  force  in  accordance 
with  his  orders,  detached  McDowell's  corps  and  ordered 
him  to  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  This  conse 
quently  kept  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves  from  the  Penin 
sula,  and  they  accompanied  their  corps  to  Alexandria. 
Soon  after  another  advance  was  made  into  Virginia  to 
Falmouth  and  Fredericksburg.  But  when  McDowell 


LINCOLN  AND 'MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

arrived  and  was  about  to  take  up  the  line  of  march,  he 
received  an  order,  directly  from  the  President,  forbidding 
him  to  cross  the  river.  Here  the  Reserves  remained  for 
over  a  month,  going  through  all  the  phases  and  vicissi 
tudes  of  military  life,  and  becoming  hardened  and  thor 
oughly  fitted  for  the  future  service  in  store  for  them. 
They  were  directly  on  the  road  to  Richmond.  The  gal 
lant  Bayard  was  made  a  brigadier-general  on  the  28th  of 
April,  and  the  flying  brigade  was  organized  under  his 
command. 

Again  a  forward  movement  toward  Richmond  was 
ordered,  and  McDowell's  corps  had  begun  its  movement 
by  the  advance  of  Bayard's  brigade,  and  everything 
looked  favorable  to  the  speedy  junction  of  McDowell  and 
his  corps  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  when  the  Presi 
dent  and  his  Cabinet  arrived  at  Fredericksburg  to  confer 
with  McDowell  as  to  the  movement.  All  was  in  readi 
ness,  the  transportation  secured,  the  men  eager,  and  only 
awaited  the  final  order.  It  was  Saturday,  the  24th  of 
May.  The  next  day  being  Sunday,  the  President  ob 
jected  to  beginning  a  campaign  on  that  day,  when  Mon 
day  morning  was  fixed  upon.  Meantime  a  despatch  was 
received  by  McDowell  revoking  the  order  and  changing 
the  whole  plan  of  campaign.  Jackson  had  again  burst 
into  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  and  was  in  full  march 
northward.  The  President  personally  interfered,  Bayard 
was  quickly  recalled,  and  the  three  divisions  of  Shields, 
King,  and  Ord  were  hurried  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
to  meet  him.  McCall  with  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves 
was  to  hold  Fredericksburg  temporarily,  some  troops  of 
the  cavalry  only  accompanying  the  expedition  on  their 
march.  Bayard  with  his  brigade  encountered  the  enemy 
in  Jackson's  rearguard,  other  troops,  from  Fremont's 
command,  joined  him,  and  there  was  a  brisk  fight  with 
the  enemy.  Bayard's  brigade  remained  with  Fremont. 


THE   PENNSYLVANIA   RESERVE   CORPS.  429 

Meantime  the  Reserves  remained  at  Fredericksburg  under 
McCall,  when,  on  the  4th  of  June,  McClellan  called  ear 
nestly  for  reinforcements,  and  the  Reserves  were  prom 
ised  him  to  go  to  the  White  House.  McClellan  had 
assured  the  President  that  upon  McCall' s  arrival  with 
his  division,  if  the  state  of  the  ground  permitted,  he 
would  advance.  McDowell  moved  promptly  with  the 
division  of  the  Reserves  alone.  By  the  I4th  of  June 
the  division  was  united  at  Tunstall's  Station.  Stuart's 
Confederate  cavalry  had  threatened  an  attack  upon  the 
depot  and  had  opened  fire  upon  a  train  at  the  station. 
Upon  the  appearance  of  Reynolds  with  his  brigade  the 
cavalry  retreated. 

The  Reserves,  now  united,  mustered  nearly  ten  thou 
sand  strong,  of  effective  material.  Fully  organized,  well 
drilled  and  equipped,  under  favorite  and  skilled  com 
manders,  they  marched  on  the  iyth  with  enthusiasm  to 
take  their  place  on  the  right  of  the  army.  It  was  the 
place  of  honor;  they  occupied  it  upon  the  iQth,  and 
almost  at  once  came  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  It 
was  a  position  which  should  have  never  been  chosen, 
but  which  McCall  with  admirable  sagacity  and  judg 
ment  at  once  made  strong  and  formidable,  taking  ad 
vantage  of  the  natural  features  of  the  ground  and  dis 
posing  his  force  with  reference  to  the  efficiency  of  its 
fire,  putting  two  of  his  brigades  in  line  and  holding 
Meade's  brigade  in  reserve. 

The  enemy  was  in  plain  view.  At  three  o'clock  he 
threw  forward  his  skirmishers,  which  were  at  once 
driven  back.  Advancing  his  main  body  under  cover 
of  his  artillery  fire,  he  attacked  the  Reserves  along  their 
whole  front.  The  fighting  was  long  continued,  and 
from  the  right  centre  to  the  left  was  hotly  maintained. 
Various  attempts  were  made  by  the  enemy  to  find  weak 
places  in  our  line,  but  without  success.  The  Reserves 


430  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

maintained  their  position,  inflicting  great  losses  upon 
the  enemy,  who  finally  retired  at  nine  o'clock  p.  M. 
McCall  at  once  prepared  for  a  renewal  of  the  attack  in 
the  morning,  when  he  received  McClellan's  order  to  fall 
back  to  Games'  Mills.  Jackson  was  marching  from  the 
direction  of  Gordonsville  upon  the  right  flank  and  rear 
of  our  army.  This  compelled  an  immediate  change  to 
one  definite  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  the  right  bank. 
The  movement  was  executed  with  skill  and  success. 
The  Reserves  moved  speedily,  and  the  spectacle  of  an 
army  with  an  impassable  boggy  stream  flowing  through 
its  centre  was  no  longer  seen. 

The  command  fell  back  with  regret,  in  perfect  order, 
behind  the  lines  of  Games'  Mills  at  ten  A.  M. ,  June 
27th — a  movement  which  the  corps  commander  doubted 
his  ability  to  accomplish.  Here  it  was  held  in  reserve. 
No  veteran  troops  could  have  behaved  with  any  greater 
distinction  than  did  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves  in  this 
battle  of  Mechanicsville,  and  the  glowing  approbation 
of  their  commander,  McCall,  was  wholly  deserved. 
They  had  met  most  honorably  every  requirement  of 
their  position  with  a  devotion  and  courage  worthy  of 
any  troops  in  any  army;  and  Mechanicsville  will  ever 
remain  one  of  their  proudest  achievements. 

The  withdrawal  had  been  successfully  accomplished, 
and  Porter's  corps  was  in  strong  position  at  Games'  Mill 
by  noon  on  the  27th  of  June,  its  flanks  resting  on  the 
creeks.  The  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  in  justice  to  them 
after  their  continued  and  gallant  fighting,  were  held  at 
first  in  reserve  and  rear.  But  the  enemy  in  strong 
columns  commenced  his  attack  at  four  o'clock,  and  It 
was  so  determined  and  persistent  that  the  second  line 
had  been  moved  up  by  the  corps  commander's  order; 
and  the  Second  and  Third  brigades  were  ordered  at  once 
to  the  support  of  the  left  centre,  now  severely  engaged. 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  RESERVE  CORPS.  43 1 

The  conflict  became  desperate,  and  the  men  fought  with 
out  regard  to  anything  but  the  enemy  in  their  front  and 
the  officers  who  commanded  them.  Other  troops  were 
moved  up  and  much  confusion  prevailed.  Again  and 
again  the  enemy  was  repulsed,  only  to  re-form,  and, 
being  reinforced,  to  again  attack. 

On  our  side  the  troops  held  their  position  bravely 
until  every  cartridge  had  been  fired.  One  regiment  on 
the  left  was  repulsed  and  driven  across  the  Chickahominy. 
Regiments  of  different  corps  were  gotten  together,  led 
on  a  charge  into  the  woods,  and  advanced  against  the 
enemy,  when  their  flanks  were  assailed  and  broken,  and 
in  disorder  they  fell  back  to  their  old  position.  The 
Bucktails,  by  their  unerring  fire,  forced  a  Confederate 
battery  to  change  its  position,  and  finally  drove  it  from 
the  field.  One  regiment  that  had  gone 'to  the  relief  of 
another  then  in  line  remained  fighting  until,  its  ammu 
nition  exhausted,  with  half  its  number  captured,  and 
with  the  enemy  all  around  it,  it  was  forced  to  surrender. 
Easton,  after  most  heroic  fighting,  his  support  gone,  his 
gunners  killed  at  their  pieces,  his  retreat  cut  off,  lost 
four  of  his  guns  and  two  caissons. 

The  action  had  now  become  general,  and  for  four  hours 
raged  furiously.  The  left,  unable  to  withstand  the  re 
peated  and  desperate  attacks  upon  it,  had  broken  and 
was  falling  back  in  confusion,  when  McCall  by  his  per 
sonal  efforts  partially  restored  order.  It  was  now  after 
sunset.  The  enemy,  after  forcing  our  left,  had  cut  off 
the  retreat  of  the  Eleventh  regiment  and  the  Fourth  New 
Jersey,  to  whose  relief  Reynolds  had  gone.  While  at 
tempting  to  regain  our  lines  the  next  morning  he  was 
captured  with  his  adjutant-general.  The  enemy,  believ 
ing  that  reinforcements  had  reached  us,  made  no  further 
attack.  He  had  before  displayed  no  such  strength  or  de 
termination.  The  Reserves  fought  against  superior  num- 


43 2  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

bers  and  bravely,  wholly  ' '  supporting  the  character  they 
had  previously  gained,"  as  was  justly  said  by  their  com 
mander.  Reynolds  had  been  everywhere,  and  in  the  ex 
ercise  of  that  personal  magnetism  so  characteristic  of  him 
was  of  the  greatest  influence  in  restoring  order.  We  lost 
twenty-two  guns  in  the  battle,  and  the  Pennsylvania  Re 
serves  alone  had  lost,  including  the  affair  at  Beaver  Dam 
Creek,  fourteen  hundred  men.  The  enemy  had  been 
held  in  check,  and  this,  the  commanding  general  said, 
was  all  that  he  proposed,  to  secure  his  changed  base  on 
the  James  River. 

But  there  was  to  be  no  rest  yet  for  the  division.  On 
the  2yth  of  June,  after  the  affair  at  Gainesville,  the  Penn 
sylvania  Reserves  crossed  the  Chickahominy.  It  was 
late  before  their  orders  reached  them  to  move  to  White 
Oak  Creek  as  an  escort  and  protection  to  Hunt's  reserve 
artillery.  It  was  an  important  and  hazardous  service, 
and  it  seemed  to  fall  to  the  lot  of  the  Reserves,  as  other 
details  had  done,  without  much  reference  to  justice  or 
routine.  The  transfer  of  so  important  an  element  of  his 
fighting  material  might  well  occasion  anxiety  to  the  com 
manding  general,  and  he  had  especially  entrusted  its  care 
to  McCall's  division  of  Pennsylvanians.  He  had  been 
satisfied  with  its  brilliant  service,  and  his  unjust  criti 
cisms  upon  its  action  at  New  Market  road  had  not  yet 
been  made. 

The  demoralization  at  Savage  Station  was  great ;  every 
thing  was  in  confusion;  nearly  three  thousand  sick  and 
wounded  men  were  in  tents  and  under  any  shelter  that 
could  be  found,  and  all  sorts  of  rumors  of  the  approach 
of  the  enemy  tended  to  demoralize  the  men.  Upon  their 
arrival  the  Reserves  at  once  sought  out  and  ministered  to 
the  wants  of  their  comrades  as  far  as  they  were  able  to  do. 
The  wounded  and  sick  were  to  be  left  behind,  and  when 
this  became  known  it  occasioned  a  feeling  that  moved 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA   RESERVE   CORPS.  433 

the  stoutest  heart.  McCall  had  crossed  the  swamp  with 
the  artillery  train,  and  had  formed  his  division  in  line 
of  battle,  when  he  was  relieved  from  his  escort  duty  and 
ordered  forward  on  the  Quaker  road  toward  the  James 
River.  The  division  moved  with  its  corps.  When  on 
the  march  some  confusion  and  delay  took  place  in  regard 
to  the  exact  location  of  the  Quaker  road.  The  whole 
command  was  countermarched,  except  the  Reserve  divis 
ion,  to  whom  Porter,  in  command  of  the  corps,  sent  no 
instructions,  leaving  the  division  in  front  and  in  sight 
of  the  enemy.  His  explanation  was  that  he  did  not  con 
sider  the  division  then  under  his  command.  The  enemy 
had  now  discovered  McClellan' s  intention  to  change  his 
base,  and  resolved  to  go  in  pursuit.  The  army  was 
formed  in  line  of  battle,  and  Sumner  with  the  rearguard 
held  Savage  Station,  the  point  of  honor,  and  nobly  re 
pulsed  a  determined  attack  of  the  enemy. 

Porter  with  his  corps,  including  the  Reserves,  was  in 
line  of  battle,  with  the  remainder  of  the  army  across  the 
roads  and  facing  Richmond.  The  position  originally 
taken  by  McCall  was  at  the  crossing  of  the  Quaker  road 
and  the  New  Market  road.  Ordered  back  from  this  posi 
tion,  McCall  received  orders  from  McClellan  himself  to 
form  his  division  on  the  New  Market  road,  and  to  hold 
that  position  until  our  trains  had  passed  on  toward  the 
James  River.  There  was  no  continuous  line  of  battle. 
The  divisions  were  disjointed  and  McCall  held  the  centre. 
He  had  formed  his  division  with  his  usual  ability.  Meade 
with  the  Second  brigade  was  on  his  right;  Seymour  on 
the  left;  Simmons  with  the  First  brigade  in  reserve,  and 
his  batteries  were  strongly  posted.  The  Confederates 
had  determined  to  seize  the  point  where  the  Charles  City 
and  New  Market  roads  crossed  each  other,  and  thus  place 
themselves  on  our  line  of  retreat.  This  movement,  if 

successful,  would  have  divided  McClellan' s  army.     Hill's 
ft 


434  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

Confederate  division,  that  had  been  repulsed  by  the 
Reserves  at  Mechanicsville,  was  again  to  attack,  and 
McCall's  division  of  Pennsylvania  Reserves  was  again 
to  meet  it. 

At  half-past  two  o'clock  the  battle  began  by  the  driv 
ing  in  of  our  skirmishers.  The  enemy  threw  forward 
two  regiments  to  feel  McCall's  line.  Colonel  Sickel  with 
the  Third  and  Colonel  Harvey  with  the  Seventh  drove 
them  back,  when  the  enemy  moved  a  large  column  upon 
our  left  flank  and  made  a  determined  assault  with  his 
artillery  and  infantry.  For  two  long  hours  the  battle 
raged  fiercely.  The  brave  Simmons  fell  and  the  enemy 
was  driven  back.  Our  batteries,  under  Kern  and  Cooper, 
were  well  served,  and  a  reckless  and  desperate  charge 
made  upon  Randall's  guns  was  bravely  repulsed,  the 
enemy  coming  up  to  the  muzzles  of  the  guns.  Our  men 
crossed  bayonets  with  the  Alabama  troops,  and  a  hand- 
to-hand  fight  occurred,  a  rare  thing  at  any  time  in  war. 
But  there  were  no  supports;  every  man  had  been  put  in; 
our  lines  were  broken  and  could  not  re-form,  and  fell 
back  in  disorder.  At  once  McCall  began  to  re-form  his 
line,  to  get  his  scattered  men  together,  and  to  present 
again  his  front  to  the  enemy.  But  all  was  changed:  his 
brigade  commanders  had  gone;  his  staff  had  all  been  dis 
abled  or  killed,  and  even  his  personal  escort  wounded  or 
dispersed,  and  he  himself  exhausted.  While  riding  for 
ward,  unaccompanied  by  any  of  his  staff,  to  look  for  one 
of  his  officers,  he  was  captured. 

At  no  previous  battle  had  there  been  so  many  instances 
of  hand-to-hand  fighting,  no  such  display  of  personal 
courage.  Well  might  the  enemy  regard  this  battle  as 
one  of  the  most  stubborn  and  long-contested  that  had 
yet  occurred,  and  say,  as  Longstreet  did,  that  if  McCall's 
division  had  not  fought  as  it  did  they  would  have  cap 
tured  our  army.  The  Reserves  had  met  the  divisions  of 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA   RESERVE   CORPS.  435 

Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill,  among  the  best  of  the  Con 
federate  troops,  and  from  eighteen  to  twenty  thousand 
strong.  The  conduct  of  the  Reserve  division,  as  its 
commander  said,  was  worthy  of  all  praise.  It  had 
added  to  its  laurels  by  as  devoted  and  valiant  a  service 
as  had  ever  been  rendered  by  any  troops.  Meade  had 
been  wounded,  but  remained  for  a  while,  when  he  finally 
left  the  field.  Seymour  became  separated  from  his  com 
mand,  and  retired.  In  his  official  report  the  division 
commander  thanks  Colonels  Roberts,  Sickel,  Hays,  Jack 
son,  and  others.  Three  stands  of  colors,  with  two  hun 
dred  prisoners,  were  captured,  while  the  loss  of  the  di 
vision  in  the  three  battles  of  the  26th,  2 7th,  and  3oth  of 
June  amounted  to  3180;  the  killed  and  wounded  amounted 
to  650  out  of  the  7000  who  went  into  battle  at  Mechanics- 
ville  on  the  26th  of  June. 

The  Reserve  commander  and  Reynolds  being  now  pris 
oners  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  Meade  wounded, 
the  command  of  the  division  devolved  upon  Seymour 
temporarily  as  the  senior.  Porter  with  the  Fifth  corps 
reached  Malvern  Hill  only  on  the  3<Dth  of  June,  and  took 
position  to  cover  the  passage  of  our  trains  and  reserve 
artillery  to  the  river  behind  Malvern  Hill. 

Lee,  failing  to  break  our  centre  on  the  New  Market 
road,  now  determined  to  turn  our  left  flank  at  Malvern 
Hill.  A  strong  line  was  formed  by  our  troops,  and  in 
front  of  it  the  enemy  appeared  on  the  morning  of  the  ist 
of  July.  Porter's  corps  held  the  left  of  the  line.  The 
Pennsylvania  Reserve  division  was  held  in  reserve  be 
hind  Porter  and  Couch.  In  the  attacks  upon  these  com 
mands  the  Reserves  were  not  engaged.  At  the  conclusion 
of  the  fight  McClellan  withdrew  his  army  to  Harrison's 
Landing,  which  had  been  previously  determined  upon, 
but  which  was  received  with  regret  by  both  officers  and 
men, 


43  6  LINCOLN  AND'  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

The  condition  of  the  Reserves  was  not  an  encouraging 
one.  Reduced  in  numbers,  many  sick,  their  officers 
gone,  the  severe  service  imposed  upon  them  had  affected 
their  well-being  and  touched  their  morale.  They  were 
broken  down,  and  their  losses  in  men  and  officers  had 
affected  them;  many  were  sent  to  hospitals  only  to  die; 
many  never  again  returned  to  their  commands.  But 
there  was  no  giving  up.  Early  in  August,  McCall,  Rey 
nolds,  and  the  prisoners  captured  in  the  previous  fights 
were  exchanged  and  returned  to  the  army.  McCall' s  re 
turn  was  warmly  welcomed  by  the  division,  but  he  too, 
broken  down  in  health,  was  obliged  to  seek  relief  at  his 
home.  Failing  to  regain  his  strength,  he  resigned  his 
commission,  when  Reynolds  assumed  command  of  the 
division,  and  was  welcomed  by  the  men  with  every  ex 
pression  of  gratification  and  joy. 

The  government  had  now  determined  upon  a  new  plan 
of  operations.  The  Peninsula  campaign  had  failed;  a 
junction  of  the  corps  of  Banks,  Fremont,  and  McDowell 
had  taken  place,  and  Major-General  Pope  placed  in  com 
mand.  While  Pope  protected  Washington  and  made 
demonstrations  toward  Gordonsville,  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  to  be  withdrawn  from  Harrison's  Landing 
and  to  join  him.  The  Confederates  soon  learned  what 
was  contemplated,  and  by  the  i8th  their  united  forces 
were  in  Pope's  front.  An  order  to  McClellan  required 
him  to  withdraw  his  army  to  the  Potomac.  There 
was  unaccountable  delay.  The  Pennsylvania  Reserves 
took  the  advance  on  the  nth  of  August,  and  by  the 
1 5th  were  en  route  to  join  Burnside.  They  were  pushed 
forward  with  the  greatest  promptness,  and  on  the  25th 
joined  Pope's  forces  at  Warrenton  Junction,  to  resume 
their  old  position  as  a  division  of  McDowell's  corps. 
With  Kearney's  division  they  were  the  only  organized 
troops  that  joined  Pope  until  the  26th  of  August, 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA   RESERVE   CORPS.  437 

Pope  was  now  on  the  Rapidan,  but  the  concentration 
and  force  of  the  enemy  on  the  south  bank,  the  failure  to 
receive  reinforcements  again  and  again  demanded,  both 
flanks  exposed,  and  his  communications  with  Fredericks- 
burg  threatened  by  which  his  relief  was  to  arrive,  com 
pelled  him  to  fall  back  to  the  Rappahannock.  Lee  fol 
lowed  with  his  army,  and  extended  his  line  far  beyond 
Pope's  right.  There  was  now  constant  fighting  and  skir 
mishing,  and  Pope's  position  again  became  untenable. 
The  enemy  was  crossing  to  his  left,  when  the  river  rose 
in  floods  and  became  an  impassable  barrier.  Reynolds 
had  now  joined  Pope,  who  fell  back  to  Warrenton  Junc 
tion  and  Manassas.  Pope  believed  that  he  had  thrown 
his  force  between  Jackson  and  Longstreet,  and  he  deter 
mined  at  once  to  force  the  fighting  on  the  28th  and  to 
attack  Jackson.  Reynolds,  without  waiting  for  formal 
orders  from  his  chief,  formed  on  Sigel's  left,  and  on  the 
inarch  to  Manassas  came  under  the  enemy's  fire,  which 
he  repulsed  with  his  artillery. 

The  Reserves,  in  connection  with  McDowell's  other 
divisions  and  with  Sigel,  had  succeeded  in  getting  be 
tween  Jackson  and  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  on  the  2Qth 
Reynolds  with  his  division  was  at  once  engaged  with  the 
enemy  all  day.  On  the  morning  of  the  3oth,  Reynolds 
posted  his  division  with  all  of  his  artillery  on  the  left. 
Pushing  forward  his  skirmishers  and  their  support,  he 
found  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  ready  for  attack.  He 
was  ordered  to  resist  this  attack,  and  other  troops  were 
to  support  him.  Porter's  corps  had  been  repulsed,  and 
the  Reserves  were  to  form  a  line  behind  which  it  could 
rally.  Heintzelman's  corps  was  in  retreat  amid  much 
confusion,  leaving  but  one  brigade  of  the  Reserves  under 
Anderson,  with  its  batteries,  to  resist  the  attack.  Here 
the  command  suffered  great  loss.  Kern  lost  four  of  his 
guns;  he  himself  was  wounded  and  left  on  the  field. 


LINCOLN  AND,  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

Colonel  Hardin  of  the  Twelfth  was  severely  wounded. 
The  command  now  fell  back  by  order  to  the  right  of  the 
Henry  House,  where  Meade's  and  Seymour's  brigades, 
with  Ransom's  batteries,  ''gallantly  maintained  their 
position."  It  was  in  this  battle,  when  our  left  was  forced 
back  and  the  troops  on  the  right  of  the  Reserves  had 
given  way,  that  the  brave  Reynolds,  seizing  the  flagstaff 
of  the  Second  regiment,  dashed  along  his  line,  cheering 
on  his  men  with  magnetic  effect.  The  bridge  over  Bull 
Run  was  saved  to  the  army. 

Thus  ended  another  battle  most  creditable  to  the 
Reserves,  wholly  sustaining  their  reputation.  Well 
might  the  army  commander  say  in  his  official  report: 
' '  The  Pennsylvania  Reserves  under  Reynolds  .  .  . 
rendered  most  gallant  and  efficient  service."  In  this 
campaign  they  lost  4  officers  and  64  privates  killed, 
31  officers  and  364  privates  wounded,  which  makes  an 
aggregate  loss  of  463  men. 

The  army  had  hardly  become  reunited  in  the  defences 
of  Washington  when  the  Confederates  crossed  the  Poto 
mac  in  force  and  marched  toward  Maryland.  The  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  once  took  the  field.  The  Pennsylvania 
Reserves  were  now  a  division  in  the  First  army  corps, 
commanded  by  Hooker.  Meantime  the  Governor  of 
Pennsylvania  had  called  out  75,000  of  the  militia,  and 
Reynolds  had  been  relieved  of  his  command  of  the  Re 
serves  and  ordered  to  Harrisburg  to  assist  the  Governor. 
General  Meade  now  took  command  of  the  division,  and 
on  the  1 3th  of  September  they  crossed  the  Monocacy. 
The  enemy,  pushing  northward,  had  taken  position  on 
South  Mountain.  McClellan  at  once  made  his  disposi 
tions  to  attack  him,  and  if  possible  to  throw  Franklin 
with  the  Sixth  corps  and  Couch's  division  between 
the  main  body  of  the  enemy  and  Jackson  at  Harper's 
Ferry.  Franklin  forced  the  enemy  to  take  position  on 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  RESERVE   CORPS.  439 

the  top  of  South.  Mountain,  where  he  strongly  posted 
himself  at  Turner's  Gap.  Burnside  reported  the  fact 
to  McClellan,  when  the  whole  army  was  ordered  to 
move  to  the  attack. 

At  one  o'clock  the  Reserves  were  in  position  on  our 
right,  with  orders  to  create  a  diversion  in  favor  of  Reno, 
who  was  pressed  on  our  left  by  the  enemy.  They  were 
to  advance  and  turn  the  enemy's  flank.  Seymour's  bri 
gade,  under  Meade's  order,  took  the  crest  of  the  first 
ridge,  and,  forming  line  of  battle  with  the  other  bri 
gades,  advanced  upon  the  enemy,  the  Bucktails  leading. 
The  enemy  was  engaged,  and  after  determined  fighting 
was  driven  from  the  walls  and  rocks  and  thick  under 
growth.  Reinforcements  came  up,  but  too  late  to  open 
fire,  when  the  enemy,  who  was  not  in  large  force,  retired 
amid  the  loud  shouts  of  our  men. 

The  Reserves  lost  in  this  battle  an  aggregate  of  392 
officers  and  men.  In  his  official  report  Meade  states  his 
indebtedness  to  the  Bucktails,  which  he  says  "have  al 
ways  been  in  the  advance,"  for  ascertaining  the  exact 
position  of  the  enemy.  The  battle  was  not  renewed  in 
the  morning.  During  the  night  the  enemy  had  fallen 
back  across  the  Antietam  Creek  to  Sharpsburg.  Push 
ing  through  Boonesboro'  and  Keedysville,  the  enemy 
was  found  in  force  on  the  Antietam  in  front  of  Sharps- 
burg,  and  an  attack  in  the  morning  was  determined 
upon.  The  enemy  had  meantime  changed  his  position 
to  one  of  more  strength,  and  had  strongly  posted  his 
artillery. 

Hooker  with  his  corps,  including  the  Pennsylvania  Re 
serves,  was  to  cross  the  Antietam  and  was  to  attack  the 
enemy's  left;  Meade  with  the  Reserves  led  the  advance 
and  opened  the  battle.  The  Bucktails  soon  found  the 
enemy,  and  Meade  at  once  ordered  in  Seymour  with  his 
brigade  and  posted  his  batteries.  The  engagement  be- 


440  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

came  general,  when  the  remaining  brigades  were  ordered 
up,  and  the  fight  continued  until  dark,  with  active  artil 
lery  firing  from  Cooper's  and  Simpson's  batteries.  The 
opposing  forces  were  almost  hand  to  hand. 

At  daylight  on  the  ijth  the  battle  was  renewed.  Fresh 
troops  had  come  up  and  the  line  was  strengthened.  The 
Reserves  were  at  once  engaged  on  the  left.  Cooper  and 
Simpson,  on  the  enemy's  left  flank,  served  their  batteries 
actively.  Warner  with  the  Tenth  Reserves  was  ordered 
to  join  Crawford's  division  of  Mansfield's  corps  in  his 
attack  upon  the  enemy  in  the  morning.  The  now  noted 
cornfield  was  carried,  then  lost,  again  reoccupied  with 
cheers,  when  their  ammunition  became  exhausted,  and 
the  enemy,  reinforced,  pressed  them  again  back  and 
came  on  in  heavy  force;  again  the  enemy  was  driven 
back,  and  not  an  inch  of  ground  was  lost. 

The  struggle  was  for  the  possession  of  the  cornfield. 
Hooker  with  part  of  Mansfield's  corps  determined  to  take 
it.  While  in  the  act  of  initiating  the  movement  he  was 
wounded  in  the  foot,  and  Meade  took  command  of  the 
corps,  while  Seymour  assumed  command  of  the  Reserves. 
The  Reserves  were  relieved  at  noon,  after  having  been 
engaged  for  five  hours  and  having  exhausted  their  am 
munition.  Mansfield  had  now  come  up  with  all  of  his 
corps. 

In  his  official  report  Meade  gives  to  Ransom's  battery 
the  credit  of  repulsing  the  enemy  in  the  cornfield  at  one 
of  the  most  critical  periods.  He  highly  commends  Sey 
mour  for  his  admirable  service.  In  this  battle  the  Re 
serves  lost  573  men — 9  officers  and  96  men  killed;  22 
officers  and  444  men  wounded;  and  2  missing. 

Constant  fighting  and  marching  had  now  reduced  the 
strength  of  the  division  to  little  more  than  a  third  of 
its  effective  strength.  It  was  desired  by  Governor  Curtin 
that  it  should  be  sent  back  to  the  State  to  be  reorgan- 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  RESERVE   CORPS.  44 l 

ized  and  recruited.  This  was  not  acceded  to,  and  the 
work  went  on  in  the  field;, other  regiments  were  added 
to  the  Second  brigade.  Colonel  Biddle  Roberts,  who 
had  done  excellent  service  in  every  capacity,  now  re 
signed  to  assist  Governor  Curtin,  and  was  placed  on  his 
staff.  Reynolds  upon  his  return  was  given  the  First 
army  corps,  while  Meade  went  back  to  his  division. 

The  army  now  rested  at  Sharpsburg  and  Harper's 
Ferry.  But  the  President  and  authorities  became  anx 
ious,  and  after  repeated  orders  to  move,  the  President,  on 
the  6th  of  October,  directed  that  McClellan  should  "  cross 
the  Potomac  and  give  battle  to  the  enemy  or  drive  him 
southward  " — a  very  positive  military  order,  but  in  which 
the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  General-in-Chief  concurred. 
At  last,  on  the  26th  of  October,  the  army  moved.  The 
Reserves  under  Meade  inarched  with  their  corps  to  War- 
renton,  arriving  on  the  6th  of  November.  Meantime, 
McClellan  was  relieved  from  his  command  by  Burnside 
unwillingly,  and  later  resigned  his  position  in  the  army. 
Seymour  had  been  relieved  and  sent  South.  The  army 
was  now  formed  into  three  grand  divisions,  and  the  Re 
serves  were  attached  to  the  left  grand  division,  under 
Franklin. 

In  accordance  with  a  plan  of  campaign  of  the  new 
general,  the  army  was  to  march  to  Fredericksburg  by  a 
forced  movement,  having  made  a  feint  toward  Gordons- 
ville.  This  was  ordered,  and  on  the  i6th  of  November 
the  movement  commenced.  By  another  blunder  the 
pontoon  bridges  were  not  forwarded,  and  valuable  time 
was  lost  while  others  were  constructing,  and  the  enemy 
had  strongly  occupied  Fredericksburg.  Finally,  the 
river  was  crossed  and  the  Reserves  were  placed  on  the 
extreme  left  of  the  army,  and  Meade  was  designated  to 
lead  the  charge  that  was  to  break  through  the  enemy's 
line.  No  description  of  their  heroic  service  can  be  better 


442  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

than  the  testimony  of  General  Meade  himself:  "The 
attack  was  for  a  time  perfectly  successful.  The  enemy 
was  driven  from  the  railroad,  his  rifle-pits,  and  breast 
works  for  over  half  a  mile.  Over  three  hundred  pris 
oners  were  taken  and  several  standards,  when  the  ad 
vancing  line  encountered  the  heavy  reinforcements  of 
the  enemy,  who,  recovering  from  the  effects  of  our  as 
sault,  and  perceiving  both  our  flanks  unprotected,  poured 
in  such  a  destructive  fire  from  all  three  directions  as  to 
compel  the  line  to  fall  back,  which  was  executed  without 
confusion;"  and  he  subsequently  says  that  "the  best 
troops  would  be  justified  in  withdrawing  without  loss  of 
honor."  The  list  of  his  losses,  which  he  subsequently 
corrected,  was  not  less  than  14  officers  and  161  men 
killed;  59  officers  and  1182  men  wounded;  12  officers 
and  425  men  captured  or  missing. 

It  was  the  old  story  again  of  hesitancy  and  slowness 
of  movement  upon  the  part  of  the  supporting  forces  at  a 
critical  time.  No  support,  all  in  confusion  from  their 
attack,  the  enemy  all  around  them,  their  work  accom 
plished,  their  ammunition  gone,  broken,  destroyed  al 
most,  they  were  driven  from  the  hills  to  the  low  grounds, 
where  they  re-formed,  and  had  left  176  killed,  1197 
wounded,  and  400  missing.  Jackson  of  the  Third  bri 
gade  was  killed  while  in  command  of  his  men :  a  most 
excellent  and  gallant  officer  was  thus  lost  to  the  division. 

No  proper  account  of  the  battle  can  fail  to  mention  the 
service  of  Captain  O'Rourke  of  the  First  regiment,  who 
had  command  of  the  ambulance  corps,  and  a  voluntary 
testimonial  to  his  coolness,  energy,  and  efficiency  was 
tendered  to  him  by  the  division  and  brigade  surgeons. 
On  Monday  the  army  recrossed  the  river,  having  lost  ten 
thousand  men.  Hooker  relieved  Burnside.  The  Reserves 
were  now  encamped  at  Belle  Plaine.  Meade  had  mean 
time  been  promoted  to  a  major-gen  eralcy,  and  was  as- 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA   RESERVE   CORPS.  443 

signed  to  the  command  of  the  Fifth  corps,  while  Colonel 
Sickel,  and  subsequently  General  Doubleday,  took  tem 
porary  command  of  the  division. 

The  effort  to  withdraw  the  Reserves  from  the  army  to 
recruit  them  was  again  made,  and  was  again  unsuccessful. 
Hooker  reorganized  the  army  and  prepared  for  a  forward 
movement.  But  before  this,  on  the  8th  of  February,  the 
Reserves  under  the  command  of  Sickel  were  ordered  to 
Washington  and  assigned  to  stations  in  the  defenses 
under  the  command  of  Heintzelman,  and  were  thus 
absent  from  Chancellorsville.  They  were  placed  on  duty 
to  guard  the  railroads,  and  the  troops  they  relieved  took 
their  place  as  the  Third  division  of  the  First  corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  Finally,  they  were  withdrawn 
from  the  railroad  and  assigned  to  duty  at  Upton  Hill, 
Fairfax  Courthouse,  and  Alexandria.  Strong  recom 
mendations  for  their  withdrawal  to  rest  and  recruit  were 
again  made  to  the  authorities.  Meade,  just  before  his 
relief  from  their  command,  had  made  a  strong  represen 
tation  to  Franklin,  and  Colonel  Sickel  had  made  a  sim 
ilar  statement  to  Governor  Curtin;  but  the  Secretary  of 
War  did  not  see  his  way  to  consent,  as  similar  applica 
tions  had  been  made  by  other  States,  and  all  could  not 
be  granted.  Everything  was  now  done  to  recall  the  ab 
sentees,  those  who  had  recovered  from  wounds  and  sick 
ness,  and  to  recruit  and  refit  the  command.  Brigadier- 
General  S.  W.  Crawford,  an  officer  of  the  regular  army 
and  a  Pennsylvanian  by  birth,  who  had  served  at  Fort 
Sumter,  who  had  commanded  a  brigade  and  division 
after  Cedar  Mountain,  and  who  had  been  severely 
wounded  at  Antietam,  although  not  yet  wholly  recov 
ered  from  his  wounds,  was  in  Washington,  and  upon  the 
request  of  Governor  Curtin,  Senator  Cameron,  and  my 
self  was  placed  in  command  of  the  division  on  the  3d  of 
June,  and  made  his  headquarters  at  Upton  Hill,  with  the 


444  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

First  brigade  under  McCandless.  Here  the  division 
rested  through  the  month  of  June,  preparing  for  further 
service. 

Meantime,  elated  with  his  success  at  Chancellorsville, 
the  enemy  under  his  ablest  general  had  crossed  the 
Rapidan  and  was  moving  northward.  As  soon  as  the 
movement  was  known  Hooker  promptly  crossed  the  Po 
tomac  at  Edwards'  Ferry  and  the  Point  of  Rocks  on  the 
24th  of  June,  and  moved  upon  Frederick  City,  where  he 
got  his  army  together.  As  soon  as  it  was  known  among 
the  Reserves  that  the  enemy  was  moving  in  the  direction 
of  their  State  some  of  the  regiments  at  once  asked  for 
orders  to  accompany  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  into 
Maryland.  Crawford  earnestly  and  repeatedly  urged, 
both  by  letter  and  in  person,  upon  the  government  and 
upon  the  Governor  of  the  State  the  necessity  that  the 
Reserves  should  be  ordered  to  join  the  army.  On  the 
2oth  of  June  he  went  at  night  to  Hooker's  headquarters, 
a  considerable  distance  off,  and  in  person  induced  him  to 
ask  for  the  division.  This  was  successful,  and  at  once, 
upon  the  receipt  of  the  order,  Crawford  moved  his  com 
mand  on  the  25th  of  June  toward  L,eesburg,  crossing  the 
Potomac  at  Kdwards'  Ferry  to  the  Monocacy,  leaving  his 
camp  and  garrison  equipment  and  his  trains  to  follow 
him. 

Karly  on  the  28th  the  division  reached  Fredericksburg. 
Meantime,  Hooker  had  been  relieved  and  Meade  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  army.  This  caused  the  greatest 
joy  and  satisfaction  to  the  Reserves,  who  loved  the  gen 
eral  who  had  shared  all  of  their  dangers  and  successes 
with  them.  At  Fredericksburg,  Crawford  reported  at 
first  to  General  Meade,  who  expressed  his  gratification 
at  the  return  of  his  old  division,  which  again  became  the 
Third  division  of  the  Fifth  corps,  under  General  Sykes. 
The  division  joined  the  corps  on  Rock  Creek  in  the  rear 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA   RESERVE   CORPS.  445 

of  our  right,  after  a  severe  night-march  to  Hanover  and 
Bonnoughtowu,  and  prepared  at  once  for  the  coming 
struggle.  As  it  crossed  the  boundary-line  of  Maryland 
at  Silver  Springs  its  commander  addressed  it  in  a  few 
stirring  words  of  congratulation  and  encouragement. 
At  three  o'clock  the  corps  moved  to  take  its  positions 
on  our  left.  The  Reserves  arrived  upon  the  field  so 
promptly  as  to  elicit  the  commendation  of  the  corps 
commander. 

After  some  contradictory  orders,  made  necessary  by  the 
enemy's  movements,  the  Reserves  were  drawn  up  in  line 
of  battle  on  the  slopes  and  near  the  crest  of  the  Little 
Round  Top,  on  the  edge  of  the  woods  and  undergrowth. 
Fisher's  brigade  had  been  sent  to  Big  Round  Top  to  sup 
port  Vincent,  when  Crawford  retained  the  Eleventh  regi 
ment  under  Jackson,  attached  it  to  McCandless's  brigade, 
and  took  personal  command.  Seeing  the  advance  of  the 
enemy  over  the  wheatfield  and  his  approach  to  the  Round 
Top,  the  retreat  and  confusion  of  our  troops,  and  the  fall 
ing  back  of  the  Second  division  of  Ayres's  regulars, 
Crawford,  who  had  been  left  to  act  in  accordance  with 
his  own  judgment,  rode  forward  and  ordered  the  com 
mand  to  advance.  The  line  moved  at  once,  after  open 
ing  fire;  the  Bucktails  and  the  Sixth  regiment,  being  in 
the  rear  of  each  flank,  were  subsequently  deployed,  and 
the  line  moved  forward.  Seizing  the  colors  of  the  First 
regiment,  near  which  he  was,  Crawford  took  them  upon 
his  horse  and  led  on  his  men.  The  enemy  was  ad 
vancing  irregularly,  and  had  crossed  the  stone  wall  on 
the  side  of  the  wheatfield,  when  he  was  met  by  the 
Reserves  and  driven  back  to  the  stone  wall,  for  the  pos 
session  of  which  there  was  a  short  and  active  struggle, 
when  he  was  driven  across  the  wheatfield  and  made 
no  further  attempt  at  any  advance. 

On  the  left,  Colonel  Taylor  of  the  Bucktails  was  killed 


44-6  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

while  leading  his  regiment.  The  line  of  the  stone  wall 
was  firmly  held  by  the  Reserves  until  the  afternoon  of 
the  next  day,  after  Pickett's  charge,  when  Crawford,  in 
carrying  out  the  direct  orders  of  General  Meade,  who 
with  other  general  officers  was  present,  directed  an  ad 
vance.  During  the  night  the  enemy  had  established 
himself  in  the  woods  opposite  the  Round  Tops.  Ander 
son's  brigade  of  Hood's  division  lay  in  line,  his  left  flank 
resting  on  the  wheatfield,  while  Benning's  brigade  was 
in  the  rear  in  support.  The  presence  of  these  troops  was 
unknown  to  Meade  or  to  Sykes.  Crawford  in  person  di 
rected  McCandless's  movements.  The  command  moved 
steadily,  but  in  a  wrong  direction,  when  orders  were  sent 
to  McCandless  to  halt,  change  front,  and  move  toward 
the  Round  Top.  When  he  entered  the  woods,  striking 
the  flanks  of  Anderson's  brigade,  which  was  behind  tem 
porary  breastworks,  that  brigade  gave  way,  involving 
Benning's  brigade  in  its  flight,  and  retiring  to  a  dis 
tance  of  a  mile,  where  it  strongly  entrenched  itself 
along  the  general  line  of  the  army. 

It  was  the  last  of  the  fighting  upon  the  field  of  Gettys 
burg,  and  done  by  Pennsylvania  troops,  as  the  battle  had 
been  opened  by  the  Fifty-sixth  Pennsylvania  regiment 
on  the  right.  Had  the  force  of  the  enemy  been  known, 
it  were  foolhardy  to  send  such  a  force  unsupported  under 
such  circumstances.  Meade  himself  declared  that  there 
was  no  force  in  the  woods  but  sharpshooters  and  stragglers 
only.  The  result  was  the  capture  of  over  two  hundred 
prisoners,  the  battle-flag  of  the  Fifteenth  Georgia  regi 
ment,  and  the  retaking  of  a  great  portion  of  the  ground 
lost  the  previous  day  by  our  troops,  and  the  recovery  of 
one  gun,  two  caissons,  and  over  seven  thousand  stand  of 
arms.  Our  picket-line  was  largely  advanced. 

And  thus  ended  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  the  Pennsyl 
vania  Reserves  adding  largely  to  their  well-earned  repu- 


THE   PENNSYLVANIA   RESERVE   CORPS.  447 

tation  upon  the  soil  of  their  own  State.  Their  losses 
were  between  two  hundred  and  three  hundred  men.  The 
enemy  maintained  his  front  until  Sunday  night,  when  he 
fell  back  to  the  Potomac  and  strongly  entrenched  at  Fall 
ing  Waters  in  Virginia.  The  army  followed,  and  on 
the  i4th  a  reconnaissance  was  made  by  three  selected 
divisions  of  the  Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  corps,  under 
Caldwell,  Crawford  with  his  Reserves,  and  Wright.  The 
enemy  had  retreated.  The  Reserves  alone  followed  to 
the  river  with  the  cavalry.  The  army  soon  after  re- 
crossed  the  Potomac  and  advanced  into  Virginia,  ma 
noeuvring  and  skirmishing  for  position,  while  detach 
ments  were  sent  to  various  points  of  importance. 

While  on  the  Rappahannock,  on  the  28th  of  August, 
advantage  was  taken  of  a  moment  of  inaction  to  present 
to  General  Meade,  upon  the  part  of  the  officers  and  men 
of  the  division,  a  costly  sword  of  the  finest  workmanship, 
with  sash  and  belt  and  a  pair  of  golden  spurs.  A  large 
number  of  distinguished  people  had  been  assembled. 
General  Crawford  in  a  few  appropriate  and  stirring 
words  made  the  presentation.  General  Meade  replied, 
referring  touchingly  to  his  association  with  the  division, 
justifying  its  action  at  New  Market  road,  and  regard 
ing  its  service  generally  said  ' '  that  no  division  in  this 
glorious  army  is  entitled  to  claim  more  credit  for  its  uni 
form  gallant  conduct  and  for  the  amount  of  hard  fighting 
it  has  gone  through  than  the  division  of  the  Pennsylva 
nia  Reserve  Corps." 

Finally,  the  enemy  determined  upon  a  forward  move 
ment,  apparently  to  seize  the  line  of  the  Rapidan.  He 
occupied  Culpepper  and  its  vicinity  in  great  force.  It 
was  the  middle  of  October  when  Meade  concluded  that 
the  enemy's  intention  was  to  seize  the  heights  of  Centre- 
ville.  By  a  rapid  movement  Meade  succeeded  in  seizing 
the  strong  position  at  Bull  Run,  where  on  the  I4th  the 


44-3  LINCOLN  AND  '  MEN  OF  WAR-  TIMES. 

Fifth  corps  under  Warren  came  up  with  the  Confederates 
under  Heth  at  Bristoe  Station  and  engaged  the  enemy, 
when  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves  fell  upon  the  left  flank 
of  the  enemy  and  completely  routed  him,  capturing 
some  pieces  of  artillery  and  a  large  number  of  prisoners. 
Lee  then  fell  back  to  the  Rapidan,  extending  to  Harr 
iett's  Mills  on  Mine  Run.  Meade  then  commenced  his 
movement  to  attack  Lee's  scattered  forces.  This  Lee 
anticipated,  and  concentrated  on  Mine  Run,  which  he 
strongly  fortified.  Meade  determined  to  attack,  and  sent 
Warren  with  a  strong  force  to  feel  the  enemy's  line  and 
flanks.  Warren  had  24,000  men  under  his  command. 
All  was  in  readiness,  and  on  the  3Oth  the  batteries  opened 
upon  the  whole  line.  But  Warren,  finding  the  enemy 
more  strongly  posted  than  he  had  anticipated,  took  the 
responsibility  of  suspending  his  movements  until  further 
orders.  The  attack  was  not  made,  and  Meade  again  fell 
back  across  the  Rapidan. 

In  these  operations  the  Reserves  had  been  sent  in  sup 
port  of  Gregg's  cavalry,  and  were  ordered  to  attack  the 
position  which  had  proved  too  strong  for  our  cavalry. 
The  Sixth  regiment,  under  Knt,  rapidly  advanced,  driv 
ing  in  the  skirmishers,  when  the  enemy  retired — a  work 
that  elicited  the  approval  of  Sykes,  not  at  all  partial  to 
the  division.  On  the  3d  they  had  moved  to  the  right 
into  the  woods  with  the  large  body  of  infantry  under 
Sedgwick,  anticipating  the  storming  of  the  enemy's 
works.  It  was  intensely  cold,  and  many  perished  then 
and  from  the  subsequent  effects.  Finally,  they  fell  back 
with  the  army  to  Bristoe  Station  and  Manassas,  where 
they  guarded  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad  until 
the  end  of  April,  1864. 

Grant,  who  had  on  the  2  ad  of  March  been  appointed 
General-in-Chief  of  all  the  armies,  made  his  headquar 
ters  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  army  was 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  RESERVE   CORPS.  449 

again  to  move,  and  the  Reserves  now  entered  upon  their 
last  campaign.  Sykes  had  been  relieved  and  Warren 
placed  in  permanent  command  of  the  Fifth  corps.  On 
the  3d  of  May  the  army  crossed  the  Rapidan,  the  Re 
serves  crossing  at  Germania  Ford,  and  they  moved  out 
to  the  old  Wilderness  Tavern  on  the  4th.  On  this  day 
the  Ninth  regiment  was  relieved,  as  it  had  completed  its 
term  of  service,  and  it  was  ordered  home.  Warren  moved 
out  toward  Parker's  Store,  with  Hancock  on  his  left  and 
Sedgwick  on  his  right.  The  enemy  moved  promptly, 
and  lyongstreet  was  ordered  to  attack  at  the  Wilderness 
Tavern,  and  fell  heavily  on  Warren's  corps.  Griffith 
successfully  resisted  the  attack,  and  was  supported  by 
some  of  Crawford's  division  of  the  Reserves,  and  also  by 
the  divisions  of  Wadsworth  and  Robinson. 

The  Reserve  division  had  been  ordered  to  Parker's 
Store  on  the  plank  road.  Upon  advancing  the  enemy 
was  found  in  force.  It  was  when  the  regiments  under 
McCandless  were  supporting  Wadsworth  that  a  gap  had 
been  opened  between  the  Reserves  and  the  other  divis 
ions:  the  enemy  pushed  into  this  gap  and  nearly  sur 
rounded  the  Reserves,  which  were  extricated  with  dif 
ficulty,  McCandless  coming  in  with  only  two  of  his 
regiments  and  losing  many  of  his  men.  Colonel  Bol- 
linger  with  the  Seventh  regiment,  pressing  too  far  to  the 
front,  was  surrounded  by  the  enemy;  he  was  wounded 
and  captured  with  a  large  portion  of  his  regiment.  The 
battle  raged  with  varying  success.  Warren  advanced  his 
division  in  the  centre,  with  the  Reserves  on  his  right, 
with  some  losses.  The  attack  upon  the  right  of  the 
Sixth  corps  had  driven  Shaler's  and  Seymour's  brigades, 
and,  the  enemy  getting  into  the  rear,  Sedgwick  was  cut 
off.  At  this  juncture  the  Reserves  were  ordered  to  the 
support  of  Sedgwick.  The  country  was  most  difficult 

of  passage,  but  the  men  pushed  on  and  found  Sedgwick, 
29 


45°  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-  TIMES. 

who  had  meantime  restored  his  line,  when  the  Reserves 
returned  to  their  former  position  at  Lacy  Farm.  The 
army  again  was  in  motion  to  the  left,  the  fight  of  Gregg 
and  Curtis  at  Todd's  Tavern  having  opened  the  way 
to  Spottsylvania.  Warren's  corps,  with  the  Reserves  in 
front,  marched  all  night.  The  great  effort  now  making 
was  to  secure  the  heights  of  Spottsylvania,  which  were 
gained  by  the  enemy. 

Meantime  all  of  the  divisions  of  the  Fifth  corps  had 
come  up,  and  the  enemy  had  concentrated  his  forces  to 
attack  them.  The  Reserves  and  Coulter  with  Wads- 
worth's  division  were  ordered  to  attack,  which  resulted 
in  driving  the  enemy  upon  his  second  line  of  entrench 
ments.  McCandless,  commanding  the  First  brigade,  was 
wounded  and  left  the  field.  After  a  short  respite  the 
Reserves  were  again  ordered  to  form  in  two  lines  under 
Tally,  and  a  determined  assault  on  the  enemy's  lines  was 
again  made  three  times,  but  without  success.  Again  and 
again  the  assault  was  renewed  at  different  portions  of  the 
line  and  with  varied  success  day  after  day.  The  enemy 
had  been  driven  from  the  Wilderness,  his  right  flank 
turned,  and  Spottsylvania  relinquished.  Meade  on  the 
1 3th  issued  a  complimentary  order  to  his  army,  and  an 
nounced  the  enemy's  loss  to  be  18  guns,  22  stands  of 
colors,  and  8000  prisoners. 

Again  a  movement  to  the  left  was  made,  and  again  the 
enemy  was  encountered,  and  assaults,  again  and  again 
repeated,  were  made,  fighting  along  the  whole  line  often 
for  days  at  a  time.  The  enemy,  losing  a  position,  would 
make  desperate  efforts  to  retake  it ;  and  ' '  so  terrific, ' '  says 
a  writer,  "was  the  death-grapple  that  at  different  times 
of  the  day  the  rebel  colors  were  planted  on  one  side  of  the 
works  and  ours  on  the  other."  On  the  I4th  the  Fifth 
corps  changed  its  position,  and  the  Reserves  became 
again  the  extreme  right  of  the  army.  Again  marched 


THE   PENNSYLVANIA   RESERVE   CORPS.  45 r 

to  the  left,  they  were  constantly  engaged,  until  the  rains 
and  impassable  roads  gave  the  army  a  temporary  respite. 

On  Thursday,  May  igth,  an  attempt  was  made  to  turn 
our  left.  Tyler's  heavy  artillery  regiments  were  the  only 
troops  at  the  point  threatened.  They  were  new  and  had 
just  arrived  from  Washington,  but  they  behaved  gal 
lantly  and  repulsed  the  enemy,  when  Crawford  with  his 
Reserves  was  sent  to  their  support  and  to  take  com 
mand.  They  moved  at  once,  but  the  enemy  had  rapidly 
retreated.  Spottsylvania  was  now  to  be  abandoned,  and 
once  more  a  flank  movement  to  the  left  decided  upon. 
On  the  22d  the  Fifth  corps  marched  toward  Bowling 
Green,  Crawford's  division  in  advance.  On  Monday,  the 
23d,  the  Fifth  corps  removed  to  the  North  Anna.  The 
enemy  had  fortified  his  position  on  both  flanks.  Griffin's 
division  had  crossed,  and  the  Reserves  were  formed  on 
his  left.  The  enemy  assaulted  the  lines,  but  were  re 
pulsed.  Warren  had  taken  a  strong  position.  On  Tues 
day  the  Reserves  were  ordered  to  advance  to  support 
Hancock.  Early  on  Tuesday,  General  Warren  had  or 
dered  Crawford  to  send  a  small  detachment  along  the 
river-bank  to  open  communication  with  Hancock's 
troops.  This  detachment  was  finally  supported  by  an 
other  regiment  under  Colonel  Stewart.  It  was  a  hazard 
ous  movement.  Crawford  had  asked  to  move  with  his 
division.  The  enemy  was  in  force,  and  had  wellnigh 
cut  off  the  regiment  sent  in  advance,  when  Warren,  see 
ing  that  his  orders  had  isolated  the  regiment,  directed 
Crawford  to  move  to  its  position.  Crittenden's  division 
of  Hancock's  corps  had  not  crossed,  and  seemed  to  have 
gone  astray,  when  Crawford  and  his  Reserves  opened 
communications,  and  Crittenden  crossed,  followed  shortly 
by  the  rest  of  his  corps,  to  a  firm  position  on  the  south 
bank. 

Finding  the  enemy's  position  too  strong  for  attack, 


45 2  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR- TIMES. 

Grant  on  Thursday  recrossed  the  North  Anna.  The 
Reserves  moved  with  their  corps  in  advance,  crossed  the 
Pamunkey  at  Hanover,  advanced  on  the  Mechanicsville 
road,  and  entrenched.  By  night  the  whole  army  had 
concentrated,  when  the  enemy  took  up  a  new  line  to 
oppose  the  advance.  On  the  3oth  of  May  the  Fifth 
corps  crossed  the  Tolopotamy.  The  Reserves  moved 
forward  on  the  Mechanicsville  road  to  connect  with 
Griffin,  who,  finding  himself  a  mile  north  of  the  ene 
my's  outposts,  determined  to  seize  the  road  by  a  vigorous 
movement,  and  advanced  upon  Mechanicsville.  The 
Bucktails  in  their  advance  drove  back  the  enemy's  cav 
alry  to  Bethesda  Church.  Hardin's  brigade  was  ad 
vanced,  but  exposed  his  flank,  when  Crawford  ordered 
Kitchen's  brigade  of  heavy  artillery  to  support  him. 
Together  these  brigades  drove  back  the  enemy's  right 
wing  and  centre.  Fisher  with  the  Third  brigade  was 
now  ordered  up  to  defend  the  right,  and  the  whole  divis 
ion  was  posted  on  strong  and  irregular  ground  and  light 
defenses  were  thrown  up  hastily.  Two  pieces  of  Rich 
ardson's  batteries  were  placed  in  position  on  Hardin's 
left  and  two  .on  his  right. 

Crawford  had  hardly  made  his  dispositions  when  the 
enemy  opened  with  his  artillery,  and  soon  after  his  in 
fantry  advanced,  and  the  whole  line  engaged.  In  this 
attack  on  the  Fifth  corps  Crawford  with  the  Reserves 
was  on  the  left.  On  came  the  enemy  with  his  assaulting 
column,  opening  with  artillery  and  infantry  fire.  Three 
times  the  attack  was  renewed,  and  as  often  repulsed. 
The  men,  now  veterans,  reserved  their  fire  until  the 
enemy's  lines  were  close  to  them,  and  thus  secured  the 
result.  The  enemy  was  driven  back  with  loss.  The 
Reserves  then  advanced,  captured  seventy  prisoners,  and 
compelled  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  in  confusion;  a  col 
onel,  five  commissioned  officers,  and  three  hundred  pri- 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA   RESERVE   CORPS.  453 

vates  were  left  upon  the  field.  The  Richmond  papers, 
in  commenting  upon  this  affair,  pronounced  it  "sad  and 
distressing. " 

This  brilliant  success  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves 
marked  the  close  of  their  service.  They  had  fought  a 
successful  battle  when  within  a  few  hours  they  were  to 
be  free.  All  around  them  were  souvenirs  of  their  early 
and  devoted  service,  Beaver  Dam  Creek  and  Mechanics- 
ville,  and  now  the  whole  was  crowned  by  a  brilliant  suc 
cess  due  alone  to  them  and  to  their  officers.  On  the 
3ist  of  May  the  Reserves  were  relieved  from  all  further 
service  with  the  army.  Taking  farewell  of  Warren,  they 
crossed  the  Tolopotamy,  and  soon  after,  on  June  ist,  de 
parted  with  the  remnant  of  that  brave  and  devoted  body 
of  men  who  had  been  the  first  to  offer  themselves  to  the 
government.  But  even  now  they  were  not  all  to  return. 
Nearly  two  thousand  men  re-enlisted  to  follow  the  for 
tunes  of  the  army.  About  twelve  hundred  officers  and 
men  were  all  that  returned  to  the  State.  The  two  thou 
sand  that  were  veteranized  were  organized  into  two  regi 
ments,  the  One-Hundred-and-Ninetieth  and  One-Hun- 
dred-and-Ninety-first,  by  General  Crawford  at  Peebles 
Farm,  and  remained  in  service  till  the  end  of  the  war. 
Before  their  march  their  general  issued  the  following 
farewell  to  the  faithful  men  who  had  so  nobly  borne 
themselves  under  his  command: 

Soldiers  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves:  To-day  the  connection 
which  has  so  long  existed  between  us  is  to  be  severed  for  ever. 

I  have  no  power  to  express  to  you  the  feelings  of  gratitude  and 
affection  that  I  bear  to  you,  nor  the  deep  regret  with  which  I  now 
part  from  you. 

As  a  division  you  have  ever  been  faithful  and  devoted  soldiers, 
and  you  have  nobly  sustained  me  in  the  many  trying  scenes 
through  which  we  have  passed  with  an  unwavering  fidelity. 
The  record  of  your  service  terminates  gloriously,  and  "the  Wil 
derness,"  "  Spottsylvania  Courthouse,"  and  "  Bethesda  Church" 


454  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

have  been  added  to  the  long  list  of  battles  and  of  triumphs  that 
have  marked  your  career. 

Go  home  to  the  great  State  that  sent  you  forth  three  years  ago 
to  battle  for  her  honor  and  to  strike  for  her  in  the  great  cause  of 
the  country;  take  back  your  soiled  and  war-worn  banners,  your 
thin  and  shattered  ranks,  and  let  them  tell  how  you  have  per 
formed  your  trust.  Take  back  those  banners,  sacred  from  the 
glorious  associations  that  surround  them,  sacred  with  the  mem 
ories  of  our  fallen  comrades  who  gave  their  lives  to  defend  them, 
and  give  them  again  into  the  keeping  of  the  State  for  ever. 

The  duties  of  the  hour  prevent  me  from  accompanying  you, 
but  my  heart  will  follow  you  long  after  you  return,  and  it  shall 
ever  be  my  pride  that  I  was  once  your  commander,  and  that  side 
by  side  we  fought  and  suffered  through  campaigns  which  will 
stand  unexampled  in  history.  Farewell! 

Upon  their  return  to  the  capital  of  their  State  they 
were  received  by  the  civil  and  military  authorities  and 
the  people  with  a  welcome  and  a  demonstration  wholly 
unprecedented.  Nothing  was  omitted  to  show  them  the 
loving  appreciation  in  which  they  were  held,  how  warmly 
their  services  had  been  appreciated,  and  of  the  affection 
in  which  they  must  ever  be  cherished,  and  the  State 
pride  that  was  to  continue  to  follow  them ;  and  all  this 
was  renewed  at  their  homes.  After  a  short  rest  many 
of  the  officers  and  men  returned  to  the  army  in  various 
regiments  and  batteries,  and  remained  until  the  end  of 
the  war. 

The  Second  brigade  had  been  divided  at  Alexandria, 
and  two  of  the  regiments  had  been  ordered  to  West  Vir 
ginia,  where  they  served  creditably  in  all  the  relations 
they  were  called  upon  to  fulfill  under  General  Crook. 
Their  term  of  service  having  expired  in  June,  they  were 
in  turn  transferred  to  their  State  to  be  mustered  out  of 
service.  An  effort  was  made  to  preserve  the  organiza 
tion,  but  failed,  as  the  authorities  at  Washington  could 
only  act  for  all  regiments  and  organizations.  Before 
separating  at  Harrisburg  the  Reserves  sent  for  their  old 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  RESERVE   CORPS.  455 

commander,  McCall,  and  abundantly  testified  to  him 
their  enduring  confidence  and  affection. 

And  thus  passed  into  history  the  record  of  one  of  the 
most  extraordinary  bodies  of  men  that  had  ever  assem 
bled  for  any  single  purpose.  I  have  from  time  to  time 
alluded  to  the  peculiar  conditions,  the  peculiar  associa 
tions  and  characteristics,  and  their  constant  and  heroic 
source.  It  is  not  now  intended  to  enlarge  upon  this.  To 
no  other  body  of  troops  was'it  given  to  secure  so  entirely 
distinct  a  reputation  that  will  go  into  history.  Whatever 
credit  may  arise  to  them  as  a  simple  division,  they  will 
be  known  as  the  Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps,  as  under 
that  appellation  they  achieved  their  fame.  To  this  title 
they  ever  adhered  with  a  tenacity  that  assured  it.  Give 
them  that,  and  you  might  add  the  name  of  any  body  to 
the  division,  and,  although  in  accordance  with  orders, 
they  were  called  by  the  name  of  the  general  command 
ing  them,  they  ever  retained  among  themselves  their 
favorite  title  of  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 

And  what  a  peculiar  soldiery  they  became!  For  all 
purposes  of  drills  and  discipline  and  in  preparation  for 
battle  they  ever  gave  the  readiest  acquiescence  and  obe 
dience;  but  to  all  the  special  detail  that  went  to  make 
up  the  technical  soldier  they  never  would  and  never  did 
yield  until  the  last.  They  believed  that  they  were  ever 
citizens  in  arms  for  the  nation's  life,  and  they  never  lost 
sight  of  their  coming  return  to  their  homes  and  the  pur 
suits  of  peace.  As  to  their  service,  it  makes  but  little 
difference  as  to  the  necessity  of  their  employment:  the 
fact  remains  that  they  were  constantly  called  upon  for 
every  variety  of  service,  thrown  into  critical  positions 
without  hesitancy,  and  their  services  but  poorly  acknow 
ledged.  There  was  no  murmur  or  complaint;  they  ac 
cepted  every  detail  of  the  service  required  of  them  from 
Dranesville  to  Bethesda  Church,  and  how  they  performed 


456  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

it  let  the  official  reports  of  their  commanders  and  the  sad 
lists  of  their  losses  attest. 

It  is  not  pretended  that  in  this  imperfect  sketch  any 
thing  like  justice  has  been  done  to  the  living  or  the  dead. 
Most  is  merely  reference;  honored  names  that  will  be  re 
membered  in  history  have  not  been  mentioned,  and  many 
instances  of  personal  valor  unrecorded.  If,  however,  the 
memory  of  their  deeds  has  been  recalled  at  all,  and  has 
again  awakened  a  feeling  of*  appreciation  and  gratitude 
upon  the  part  of  their  fellows, 'with  praise  for  those  who 
yet  survive  and  an  affectionate  memory  for  the  self-sacri 
ficing  dead,  then  my  object  will  not  have  been  wholly 
lost  in  recalling  the  memory7  of  their  conspicuous  service 
to  the  minds  of  a  new  generation. 


APPENDIX. 


THE  NICOLAY-McCLURE  CONTROVERSY. 


LINCOLN  AND   HAMLIN. 
[From  The  Philadelphia  Times,  July  6,  1891.] 

THE  death  of  Hannibal  Hamlin,  one  of  the  few  lingering  pict 
uresque  characters  of  the  political  revolution  that  conquered 
armed  rebellion  and  effaced  slavery,  has  inspired  very  free  dis 
cussion  of  the  early  conflicts  of  Republicanism  and  of  the  rela 
tions  which  existed  between  Lincoln  and  Hamlin.  Hamlin  was 
one  of  the  central  figures  of  the  first  national  Republican  battle 
in  1856;  he  was  the  first  elected  Republican  Vice-President;  his 
personal  relations  with  President  Lincoln  were  admittedly  of  the 
most  agreeable  nature;  his  public  record  while  Vice-President 
had  given  no  offense  to  any  element  of  his  party;  and  his  then 
unexpected  and  now  apparently  unexplainable  defeat  for  renomi- 
nation  with  Lincoln  in  1864  has  elicited  much  conflicting  dis 
cussion. 

Looking  back  over  the  dark  days  of  civil  war,  with  their  often 
sudden  and  imperious  necessities  in  field  and  forum,  and  in  po 
litical  directions  as  well,  it  is  often  difficult  to  explain  results  in 
accord  with  the  sunnier  light  of  the  present;  and  as  yet  we  have 
seen  no  explanation  of  the  rejection  of  Vice-President  Hamlin 
in  1864  that  presents  the  truth.  Most  of  our  contemporaries 
which  have  discussed  the  question  have  assumed  that  the  defeat 
of  Hamlin  was  accomplished  against  the  wishes  of  Lincoln.  This 
point  is  taken  up  in  the  elaborate  Life  of  Lincoln  by  Nicolay  and 
Hay,  and  they  assume  to  settle  it  by  stating  that  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  accused  by  members  of  the  Baltimore  Convention  of  prefer 
ring  a  Southern  or  a  new  man  for  Vice-President,  and  Mr.  Nicolay 
communicated  with  Lincoln  on  the  subject  and  reported  a  denial 
of  Lincoln's  purpose  to  interfere  in  the  contest. 

457 


458  LINCOLN  AND  MEN   OF   WAR-TIMES. 

The  Evening  Telegraph  of  this  city,  usually  accurate  in  the 
presentation  of  political  history,  states  that  "it  was  not  the 
President's  (Lincoln's)  doings  that  his  trusted  and  cherished 
coadjutor  was  deposed;  it  was  a  piece  of  politics,  pure  and  sim 
ple;  a  mistaken  attempt  to  placate  Southern  feeling  before  the 
time  was  ripe  for  it."  In  the  same  article  it  is  assumed  that  "  if 
Mr.  Hamlin  had  been  renominated  President  Lincoln  would 
have  lived  through  his  second  term,"  and  the  motive  for  Lin 
coln's  assassination  is  ascribed  to  "  the  fact  that  a  Southern  man 
was  to  succeed  as  a  result  of  his  (Booth's)  murderous  deed."  The 
theory  that  Lincoln  was  murdered  to  bring  a  Southern  man  to 
the  Presidency  is  clearly  refuted  by  the  well-known  historical 
fact  that  of  all  men  North  or  South  no  one  was  at  that  time  more 
execrated  in  the  South  than  Andrew  Johnson. 

It  is  true  that  Hamlin,  an  entirely  unobjectionable  Vice-Presi- 
dent  and  a  leader  with  peculiar  claims  upon  the  Republican 
party,  was  rejected  as  Vice-President  by  the  Republican  Conven 
tion  of  1864  to  place  a  Southern  man  in  that  office,  and  it  is 
equally  true  that  it  would  not  and  could  not  have  been  done  had 
President  Lincoln  opposed  it.  So  far  from  opposing  it,  Lincoln 
discreetly  favored  it;  indeed,  earnestly  desired  it.  The  writer 
hereof  was  a  delegate  at  large  from  Pennsylvania  in  the  Balti 
more  Convention  of  1864,  and  in  response  to  an  invitation  from 
the  President  to  visit  Washington  on  the  eve  of  the  meeting  of 
the  body,  a  conference  was  had  in  which  Lincoln  gravely  urged 
the  nomination  of  Johnson  for  Vice-President.  It  was  solely  in 
deference  to  Lincoln's  earnest  convictions  as  to  the  national  and 
international  necessities  which  demanded  Johnson's  nomination 
for  the  Vice-Presidency  that  the  writer's  vote  was  cast  against 
Hamlin,  and  other  Pennsylvania  delegates  were  influenced  to  the 
same  action  by  the  confidential  assurance  of  Lincoln's  wishes. 

It  should  not  be  assumed  that  Lincoln  was  ambitious  to  play 
the  role  of  political  master  or  that  he  was  perfidious  to  any.  His 
position  was  not  only  one  of  the  greatest  delicacy  in  politics,  but 
he  was  loaded  with  responsibilities  to  which  all  former  Presidents 
had  been  strangers.  His  one  supreme  desire  was  the  restoration 
of  the  Union,  and  he  would  gladly  have  surrendered  his  owrn 
high  honors,  and  even  his  life,  could  he  thereby  have  restored 
the  dissevered  States.  The  one  great  shadow  that  hung  over 
him  and  his  power  was  the  sectional  character  of  the  ruling 
party  and  the  government.  It  weakened  his  arm  to  make  peace  ; 
it  strengthened  European  hostility  to  the  cause  of  the  Union; 


APPENDIX.  459 

and  it  left  the  South  without  even  a  silver  lining  to  the  dark 
cloud  of  subjugation.  Lincoln  firmly  believed  that  the  nomi 
nation  of  Johnson,  an  old  Democratic  Southern  Senator  who  had 
been  aggressively  loyal  to  the  Union,  and  who  was  then  the  Mili 
tary  Governor  of  his  rebellious  but  restored  State,  would  not  only 
desectionalize  the  party  and  the  government,  but  that  it  would 
chill  and  curb  the  anti-Union  sentiment  of  Kngland  and  France, 
and  inspire  the  friends  of  the  Union  in  those  countries  to  see  a 
leading  Southern  statesman  coming  from  a  conquered  insurgent 
State  to  the  second  office  of  the  Republic. 

Such  were  Lincoln's  sincere  convictions,  and  such  his  earnest 
arguments  in  favor  of  the  nomination  of  Johnson  in  1864,  and 
but  for  Lincoln's  convictions  on  the  subject  Hamlin  would  have 
been  renominated  and  succeeded  to  the  Presidency  instead  of 
Johnson.  It  is  easy,  in  the  clear  light  of  the  present,  to  say  that 
the  nomination  of  Johnson  was  a  grave  misfortune,  and  to  specu 
late  on  the  countless  evils  which  could  have  been  averted;  but 
the  one  man  who  was  most  devoted  to  the  endangered  nation, 
and  who  could  best  judge  of  the  sober  necessities  of  the  time, 
believed  that  it  was  not  only  wise,  but  an  imperious  need,  to 
take  a  Vice-President  from  the  South,  and  that  is  why  Hannibal 
Hamlin  was  not  renominated  in  1864. 


MR.  NICOLAY'S   DENIAL. 
[Telegram  given  to  Associated  Press.] 

WASHINGTON,  July  7,  1891. 
MRS.  HANNIBAL  HAMLIN,  Bangor,  Me. : 

The  editorial  statement  from  The  Philadelphia  Times,  printed 
in  this  morning's  news  dispatches,  to  the  effect  that  President 
Lincoln  opposed  Mr.  Hamlin's  renomination  as  Vice-President, 
is  entirely  erroneous.  Mr.  Lincoln's  personal  feelings,  on  the 
contrary,  were  for  Mr.  Hamlin's  renomination,  as  he  confiden 
tially  expressed  to  me,  but  he  persistently  withheld  any  opinion 
calculated  to  influence  the  convention  for  or  against  any  candi 
date,  and  I  have  his  written  words  to  that  effect,  as  fully  set  forth 
on  pages  72  and  73,  chapter  3,  volume  ix.  of  Abraham  Lincoln: 
A  History,  by  Nicolay  and  Hay. 

Permit  me,  in  addition,  to  express  my  deepest  sympathy  in 
yours  and  the  nation's  loss  through  Mr.  Hamlin's  death. 

JOHN  G.  NICOLAY. 


4^o          LINCOLN-  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

THE   EXTRACT  NICOLAY   REFERRED   TO. 
[From  Nicolay  and  Hay's  Life  of  Lincoln,  vol.  ix.,  pages  72,  73.] 

The  principal  names  mentioned  for  the  Vice-Presidency  were, 
besides  Hannibal  Hamlin,  the  actual  incumbent,  Andrew  John 
son  of  Tennessee  and  Daniel  S.  Dickinson  of  New  York.  Be 
sides  these  General  L,.  H.  Rousseau  had  the  vote  of  his  own 
State,  Kentucky.  The  Radicals  of  Missouri  favored  General  B. 
F.  Butler,  who  had  a  few  scattered  votes  also  from  New  England. 
But  among  the  three  principal  candidates  the  voters  were  equally 
enough  divided  to  make  the  contest  exceedingly  spirited  and 
interesting. 

For  several  days  before  the  convention  the  President  had  been 
besieged  by  inquiries  as  to  his  personal  wishes  in  regard  to  his 
associate  on  the  ticket.  He  had  persistently  refused  to  give  the 
slightest  intimation  of  such  wish.  His  private  secretary,  Mr. 
Nicolay,  was  at  Baltimore  in  attendance  at  the  convention,  and 
although  he  was  acquainted  with  this  attitude  of  the  President, 
at  last,  overborne  by  the  solicitations  of  the  chairman  of  the  Illi 
nois  delegation,  who  had  been  perplexed  at  the  advocacy  of 
Joseph  Holt  by  Leonard  Swett,  one  of  the  President's  most  in 
timate  friends,  Mr.  Nicolay  wrote  a  letter  to  Mr.  Hay,  who  had 
been  left  in  charge  of  the  executive  office  in  his  absence,  contain 
ing,  among  other  matters,  this  passage:  "  Cook  wants  to  know 
confidentially  whether  Swett  is  all  right;  whether  in  urging  Holt 
for  Vice-President  he  reflects  the  President's  wishes;  whether  the 
President  has  any  preference,  either  personal  or  on  the  score  of 
policy;  or  whether  he  wishes  not  even  to  interfere  by  a  confiden 
tial  intimation.  .  .  .  Please  get  this  information  for  me  if  pos 
sible."  The  letter  was  shown  to  the  President,  who  indorsed 
upon  it  this  memorandum:  "Swett  is  unquestionably  all  right. 
Mr.  Holt  is  a  good  man,  but  I  had  not  heard  or  thought  of  him 
for  V.-P.  Wish  not  to  interfere  about  V.-P.  Cannot  interfere 
about  platform.  Convention  must  judge  for  itself." 

This  positive  and  final  instruction  was  sent  at  once  to  Mr. 
Nicolay,  and  by  him  communicated  to  the  President's  most  inti 
mate  friends  in  the  convention.  It  was,  therefore,  with  minds 
absolutely  untrammeled  by  even  any  knowledge  of  the  Presi 
dent's  wishes  that  the  convention  went  about  its  work  of  select 
ing  his  associate  on  the  ticket. 


APPENDIX.  46l 

McCLURE  ANSWERS   NICOLAY. 
[From  The  Philadelphia  Times,  July  9,  1891.] 

The  ignorance  exhibited  by  John  G.  Nicolay  in  his  public  tele 
gram  to  the  widow  of  ex-Vice-President  Hamlin  is  equaled  only 
by  his  arrogance  in  assuming  to  speak  for  Abraham  Lincoln  in 
matters  about  which  Nicolay  was  never  consulted,  and  of  which 
he  had  no  more  knowledge  than  any  other  routine  clerk  about 
the  White  House.  I  do  not  regret  that  Mr.  Nicolay  has  rushed 
into  a  dispute  that  must  lead  to  the  clear  establishment  of  the 
exact  truth  as  to  the  defeat  of  Hamlin  in  1864.  It  will  surely 
greatly  impair,  if  not  destroy,  Nicolay 's  hitherto  generally  ac 
cepted  claim  to  accuracy  as  the  biographer  of  Lincoln,  but  he 
can  complain  of  none  but  himself. 

I  saw  Abraham  Lincoln  at  all  hours  of  the  day  and  night 
during  his  Presidential  service,  and  he  has  himself  abundantly 
testified  to  the  trust  that  existed  between  us.  Having  had  the 
direction  of  his  battle  in  the  pivotal  State  of  the  Union,  he 
doubtless  accorded  me  more  credit  than  I  merited,  as  the  only 
success  in  politics  and  war  is  success;  and  the  fact  that  I  never 
sought  or  desired  honors  or  profits  from  his  administration,  and 
never  embarrassed  him  with  exactions  of  any  kind,  made  our 
relations  the  most  grateful  memories  of  my  life. 

In  all  of  the  many  grave  political  emergencies  arising  from  the 
new  and  often  appalling  duties  imposed  by  internecine  war,  I 
was  one  of  those  called  to  the  inner  councils  of  Abraham  Lin 
coln.  He  distrusted  his  own  judgment  in  politics,  and  was  ever 
careful  to  gather  the  best  counsels  from  all  the  varied  shades  of 
opinion  and  interest  to  guide  him  in  his  conclusions;  and  there 
were  not  only  scores  of  confidential  conferences  in  the  White 
House  of  which  John  G.  Nicolay  never  heard,  but  no  man  ever 
met  or  heard  of  John  G.  Nicolay  in  such  councils.  He  was  a 
good  mechanical,  routine  clerk;  he  was  utterly  inefficient  as  the 
secretary  of  the  President;  his  removal  was  earnestly  pressed 
upon  Lincoln  on  more  than  one  occasion  because  of  his  want  of 
tact  and  fitness  for  his  trust,  and  only  the  proverbial  kindness  of 
Lincoln  saved  him  from  dismissal.  He  saw  and  knew  President 
Lincoln;  the  man  Abraham  Lincoln  he  never  saw  and  never 
knew;  and  his  assumption  that  he  was  the  trusted  repository  of 
Lincoln's  confidential  convictions  and  efforts  would  have  been 
regarded  as  grotesque  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago,  when  Lincoln 
and  his  close  surroundings  were  well  understood,  His  biography 


462  LINCOLN  ANT)  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

of  Lincoln  is  invaluable  as  an  accurate  history  of  the  public  acts 
of  the  Lincoln  administration,  but  there  is  not  a  chapter  or  page 
on  the  inner  personal  attributes  of  the  man  that  is  not  burdened 
with  unpardonable  errors.  Nicolay  was  a  plodding,  precise,  me 
chanical  clerk,  well  fitted  to  preserve  historical  data  and  present 
them  intelligently  and  correctly;  but  there  his  fitness  as  a  biog 
rapher  ended. 

I  now  repeat  that,  in  obedience  to  a  telegraphic  request  from 
President  Lincoln,  I  visited  him  at  the  White  House  the  day 
before  the  meeting  of  the  Baltimore  Convention  of  1864.  At  that 
interview  Mr.  Lincoln  earnestly  explained  why  the  nomination 
of  a  well-known  Southern  man  like  Andrew  Johnson — who  had 
been  Congressman,  Governor,  and  Senator  by  the  favor  of  his 
State — would  not  only  nationalize  the  Republican  party  and  the 
government,  but  would  greatly  lessen  the  grave  peril  of  the  recog 
nition  of  the  Confederacy  by  England  and  France.  He  believed 
that  the  election  to  the  Vice-Presidency  of  a  representative  states 
man  from  an  insurgent  State  that  had  been  restored  to  the  Union 
would  disarm  the  enemies  of  the  Republic  abroad  and  remove  the 
load  of  sectionalism  from  the  government  that  seemed  to  greatly 
hinder  peace.  No  intimation,  no  trace,  of  prejudice  against  Mr. 
Hamlin  was  exhibited,  and  I  well  knew  that  no  such  consider 
ation  could  have  influenced  Mr.  Lincoln  in  such  an  emergency. 
Had  he  believed  Mr.  Hamlin  to  be  the  man  who  could  best  pro 
mote  the  great  work  whose  direction  fell  solely  upon  himself,  he 
would  have  favored  Hamlin's  nomination  regardless  of  his  per 
sonal  wishes ;  but  he  believed  that  a  great  public  achievement 
would  be  attained  by  the  election  of  Johnson;  and  I  returned  to 
Baltimore  to  work  and  vote  for  Johnson,  although  against  all  my 
personal  predilections  in  the  matter. 

Mr.  Nicolay's  public  telegram  to  Mrs.  Hamlin,  saying  that  the 
foregoing  statement  "is  entirely  erroneous,"  is  as  insolent  as  it 
is  false,  and  the  correctness  of  my  statement  is  not  even  inferen- 
tially  contradicted  by  Nicolay's  quotation  from  Lincoln.  On  the 
contrary,  Nicolay's  statement  given  in  his  history  (vol.  ix.  pages 
72,  73)  proves  simply  that  Nicolay  was  dress-parading  at  Balti 
more  and  knew  nothing  of  the  President's  purposes.  True,  he 
seems  to  assume  that  he  had  responsible  charge  of  the  Executive 
duties,  as  he  says  that  "  Mr.  Nicolay  wrote  a  letter  to  Mr.  Hay, 
who  had  been  left  in  charge  of  the  Executive  office,"  asking 
whether  Leonard  Swett,  "one  of  the  President's  most  intimate 
friends,"  was  "all  right"  in  urging  the  nomination  of  Judge- 


APPENDIX.  463 

Advocate-General  Holt  for  Vice  President.  Had  Nicolay  ever 
learned  anything  in  the  White  House,  he  would  have  known 
that  of  all  living  men  Leonard  Swett  was  the  one  most  trusted 
by  Abraham  Lincoln,  and  he  should  have  known  that  when 
Swett  was  opposing  Hamlin,  Lincoln  was  not  yearning  for  Ham- 
lin's  renomination.  Then  comes  Lincoln's  answer  to  Nicolay's 
bombastic  query,  saying:  "Swett  is  unquestionably  all  right;" 
and  because  Lincoln  did  not  proclaim  himself  a  fool  by  giving 
Nicolay  an  opportunity  to  herald  Lincoln's  sacredly  private  con 
victions  as  to  the  Vice-Presidency,  he  assumes  that  he  has  Lin 
coln's  "written  words"  to  justify  his  contradiction  of  a  circum 
stantial  statement  and  an  executed  purpose  of  which  he  could 
have  had  no  knowledge.  When  Leonard  Swett  was  against 
Hamlin,  none  could  escape  the  conclusion  that  opposition  to 
Hamlin  was  no  offense  to  Lincoln.  I  saw  and  conferred  with 
Swett  almost  every  hour  of  the  period  of  the  convention.  We 
both  labored  to  nominate  Johnson,  and  Swett  made  Holt,  who 
was  an  impossible  candidate,  a  mere  foil  to  divide  and  conquer 
the  supporters  of  Hamlin.  Had  Lincoln  desired  Hamlin's  nomi 
nation,  Swett  would  have  desired  and  labored  for  it,  and  Hamlin 
would  have  been  renominated  on  the  first  ballot.  The  conven 
tion  was  a  Lincoln  body  pure  and  simple,  and  no  man  could  have 
been  put  on  the  ticket  with  Lincoln  who  was  not  known  to  be 
his  choice.  It  was  not  publicly  proclaimed,  but  it  was  in  the 
air,  and  pretty  much  everybody  but  John  G.  Nicolay  perceived 
and  bowed  to  it. 

Of  the  few  men  who  enjoyed  Lincoln's  complete  confidence, 
Charles  A.  Dana  was  conspicuous,  and  his  statement  is  as  cred 
ible  testimony  as  could  now  be  given  on  the  subject.  He  was 
trusted  by  Lincoln  in  most  delicate  matters  political  and  mili 
tary,  and  he  logically  tells  of  Johnson's  "  selection  by  Lincoln  " 
for  the  Vice-Presidency  in  1864.  With  Dana's  direct  corrobo- 
ration  of  my  statement  added  to  the  strongly  corroborative  facts 
herein  given,  I  may  safely  dismiss  John  G.  Nicolay  and  the  dis 
pute  his  mingled  ignorance  and  arrogance  have  thrust  upon  me. 

A.  K.  M. 


NICOLAY   TO    McCLURE. 

To  the  Editor  of  The  Philadelphia  Times  : 
I  will  not  reply  to  your  personal  abuse;  it  proves  nothing  but 


464  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

your  rage  and  wounded  vanity  at  being  exposed  in  a  gross  his 
torical  miSvStatement. 

You  asserted  that  President  Lincoln  opposed  the  renomination 
of  Hannibal  Hamlin  for  Vice-President.  I  refuted  that  assertion 
by  calling  attention  to  the  written  record  wherein  Lincoln  in  his 
own  handwriting  explicitly  states  to  the  contrary.  You  now  re 
assert  your  statement,  or,  to  put  it  in  other  words,  you  accuse 
President  Lincoln  of  acting  a  low  political  deceit  and  with  his 
own  hand  writing  a  deliberate  lie.  The  country  will  not  believe 
the  monstrous  implication. 

Allow  me  to  restate  the  facts.  I  was  at  the  Baltimore  Conven 
tion  as  a  spectator.  The  chairman  of  the  Illinois  delegation, 
Hon.  B.  C.  Cook,  had  a  conversation  writh  me  about  the  course 
of  certain  disaffected  leaders  in  Illinois.  That  conversation  I 
reported  to  the  President  in  a  letter  to  Major  Hay,  my  assistant 
private  secretary,  in  part  as  follows: 

"  What  transpired  at  home  and  what  he  has  heard  from  several 
sources  have  made  Cook  suspicious  that  Swett  may  be  untrue  to 
Lincoln.  One  of  the  straws  which  lead  him  to  this  belief  is  that 
Swett  has  telegraphed  here  urging  the  Illinois  delegation  to  go 
for  Holt.  .  .  .  Cook  wants  to  know  confidentially  whether  Swett 
is  all  right;  whether  in  urging  Holt  for  Vice-President  he  reflects 
the  President's  wishes;  whether  the  President  has  any  preference, 
either  personally  or  on  the  score  of  policy;  or  whether  he  wishes 
not  even  to  interfere  by  a  confidential  indication.". 

Upon  this  letter  President  Lincoln  made  the  following  indorse 
ment  in  his  own  handwriting  : 

"Swett  is  unquestionably  all  right.  Mr.  Holt  is  a  good  man, 
but  I  had  not  heard  or  thought  of  him  for  V.-P.  Wish  not  to 
interfere  about  V.-P.  Cannot  interfere  about  platform — conven 
tion  must  judge  for  itself." 

This  written  evidence  is  quoted  in  our  history,  and  no  amount 
of  denial  or  assertion  to  contrary  can  overturn  it. 

In  trying  to  evade  its  force  you  assert  that  Lincoln  called  you 
to  Washington  and  urged  the  nomination  of  Johnson,  and  that 
you  returned  to  Baltimore  to  work  and  vote  in  obedience  to  that 
request,  against  your  personal  predilections.  Let  us  examine 
this  claim.  The  official  proceedings  of  the  convention  show  that 
you  were  one  of  the  four  delegates  at  large  from  Pennsylvania, 
the  others  being  Simon  Cameron,  W.  W.  Ketchum,  M.  B.  Lowry, 
while  the  list  of  district  delegates  contains  the  names  of  many 
Other  eminent  Pennsylvanians.  The  proceedings  also  show  that 


APPENDIX.  465 

you  acted  an  entirely  minor  part.  You  were  a  member  of  the 
Committee  on  Organization  and  presented  its  report  recommend 
ing  the  permanent  officers  which  were  elected.  With  that  pres 
entation  your  service  and  influence  ended,  so  far  as  can  be  gath 
ered  from  the  proceedings. 

Of  other  Pennsylvania  delegates,  William  W.  Ketchum  was 
one  of  the  vice-presidents  of  the  convention.  E.  McPherson  was 
on  the  Committee  on  Credentials,  A.  H.  Reeder  on  the  Committee 
on  Organization,  M.  B.  Lowry  on  the  Committee  on  Resolutions, 
S.  F.  Wilson  on  the  Committee  on  Rules  and  Order  of  Business, 
S.  A.  Purviance  on  the  National  Committee,  while  General  Simon 
Cameron  held  the  leading  and  important  post  of  chairman  of  the 
Pennsylvania  delegation.  So  again,  among  those  who  made 
motions  and  speeches  were  Cameron,  Thaddeus  Stevens,  A.  H. 
Reeder,  C.  A,  Walborn,  Galusha  A.  Grow,  and  M.  B.  Lowry,  but 
beyond  the  presentation  of  the  routine  report  I  have  mentioned 
your  name  did  not  give  forth  the  squeak  of  the  smallest  mouse. 
Is  it  probable  that  Lincoln  among  all  these  men  would  have 
called  you  alone  to  receive  his  secret  instructions? 

It  is  a  matter  of  public  history  that  Simon  Cameron  was  more 
prominent  and  efficient  than  any  other  Pennsylvanian  in  the 
movement  in  that  State  to  give  Lincoln  a  second  term,  and  that 
on  the  i4th  of  January,  1864,  he  transmitted  to  the  President  the 
written  request  of  every  Union  member  of  the  Pennsylvania  Leg 
islature  to  accept  a  renomination.  This  and  his  subsequent  open 
and  unvarying  support  left  no  doubt  of  Cameron's  attitude.  How 
was  it  with  you  ?  I  find  among  Lincoln's  papers  the  following 
letter  from  you: 

FRANKLIN  REPOSITORY  OFFICE, 

CHAMBERSBURG,  PA.,  May  2,  1864. 

SIR:  I  have  been  amazed  to  see  it  intimated  in  one  or  two  jour 
nals  that  I  am  not  cordially  in  favor  of  your  renomination.  I 
vshall  notice  the  intimations  no  further  than  to  assure  you  that 
you  will  have  no  more  cordial,  earnest,  or  faithful  supporter  in 
the  Baltimore  Convention  than  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  K.  McCijJRK. 
To  the  President. 

That  is,  only  a  month  before  the  Baltimore  Convention  you 

felt  called  upon  to  personally  protest  against  accusations  of  party 

disloyalty.     But  this  is  not  all.     When  the  time  came  to  make 

the  nominations  for  Vice-President,  Simon  Cameron,  chairman 

30 


466  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation  and  one  of  the  earliest  and  most 
persistent  friends  of  Lincoln,  himself  nominated  Hannibal  Ham- 
lin  for  Vice-President,  while  the  whole  vote  of  Pennsylvania  was 
on  the  first  ballot  cast  for  Hamlin's  nomination.  So  also  the 
Illinois  delegation  cast  its  entire  vote  for  Hamliu  on  the  first 
ballot.  Does  it  stand  to  reason  that  Lincoln  called  upon  you  to 
defeat  Hamlin  and  nominate  Johnson,  and  gave  no  intimation  of 
this  desire  to  the  chairmen  of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation  and 
of  the  Illinois  delegation  ? 

And  once  more,  is  it  probable  that  if  Lincoln  had  desired  the 
nomination  of  Johnson  he  would  have  allowed  Swett,  "one  of  the 
President's  most  intimate  friends,"  to  urge  the  nomination  of 
Holt  ?  Dare  you  venture  the  assertion  that  Lincoln  was  deceiv 
ing  Cameron,  deceiving  Cook,  carrying  on  a  secret  intrigue 
against  Hamlin  and  another  secret  intrigue  against  Holt,  and 
that  on  top  of  the  whole  he  was  writing  a  deliberate  lie  to  us  ? 
That  may  be  your  conception  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  but  it  is  not 
mine.  That  may  be  your  system  of  politics,  but  it  was  not  his. 

JOHN  G.  NICOLAY. 


McCLURE   TO    NICOLAY. 
[From  The  Philadelphia  Times,  July  12,  1891.] 

To  JOHN  G.  NICOLAY: 

The  public  will  be  greatly  surprised  that  such  an  undignified 
and  quibbling  letter  as  yours  addressed  to  me  could  come  from 
one  who  claims  to  be  the  chosen  biographer  of  Abraham  Lincoln. 
It  must  so  generally  offend  the  dispassionate  opinion  of  decent 
men  that  answer  to  it  is  excusable  only  to  expose  several  se 
verely-strained  new  falsehoods  you  present,  either  directly  or  by 
the  suppression  of  the  vital  parts  of  the  truth. 

Had  you  known  anything  about  the  inside  political  movements 
in  the  White  House  in  1864,  you  would  have  known  that  my  let 
ter  to  Lincoln,  quoted  in  your  defense,  was  written  because  of  a 
suddenly-developed  effort  in  this  State  to  divide  the  lines  drawn 
by  the  then  bitter  Cameron  and  Curtin  factional  war  for  and 
against  Lincoln.  The  Cameron  followers  claimed  to  be  the 
special  supporters  of  Lincoln,  and  attempted  to  drive  Curtin  and 
the  State  administration  into  hostility  to  the  President.  My 
justly-assumed  devotion  to  Curtin  was  the  pretext  for  declaring 
me  as  either  restrained  in  my  support  of  Lincoln  or  likely  to  be 


APPENDIX,  467 

in  the  opposition.  The  moment  I  saw  the  statement  in  print  I 
wrote  the  letter  you  quote  to  dismiss  from  Lincoln's  mind  all 
apprehensions  about  either. open  or  passive  opposition  from  Cur- 
tin's  friends.  Had  you  stated  these  facts  you  would  have  been 
truthful.  As  you  probably  did  not  know  of  them,  you  may  be 
excused  for  not  stating  them;  but  your  ignorance  can  be  no  ex 
cuse  for  the  entirely  false  construction  you  put  upon  my  letter. 

Equally — indeed  even  more  flagrantly — false  is  your  statement 
of  only  a  minor  part  of  the  truth  about  the  action  of  the  Penn 
sylvania  delegation  at  Baltimore  in  1864.  You  say  that  General 
Cameron  cast  the  solid  vote  of  the  State  for  Hamlin.  Had  you 
told  the  whole  truth,  ignorant  as  you  seem  to  be  of  the  force  of 
important  political  facts,  you  would  have  known  that  your  as 
sumption  that  Johnson  had  no  votes  in  the  delegation  was  untrue. 
Had  you  desired  to  be  truthful,  you  would  have  added  that  Gen 
eral  Cameron  cast  the  solid  vote  of  the  delegation  for  Johnson 
before  the  close  of  the  first  ballot.  Were  you  ignorant  of  this 
fact  ?  or  have  you  deliberately  attempted  to  so  suppress  the  truth 
as  to  proclaim  a  palpable  falsehood  ? 

The  Pennsylvania  delegation  was  personally  harmonious,  al 
though  divided  on  Vice-President.  In  the  Pennsylvania  caucus 
an  informal  vote  put  Johnson  in  the  lead,  with  Hamlin  second 
and  Dickinson  third.  Cameron  knew  that  Hamlin's  nomination 
was  utterly  hopeless,  and  he  accepted  the  result  without  special 
grief.  He  urged  a  solid  vote  as  a  just  compliment  to  Hamlin, 
and  it  was  given  with  the  knowledge  that  it  could  not  help  Ham 
lin  and  that  a  solid  vote  for  Johnson  would  follow.  The  solid 
vote  for  Johnson  was  the  only  vital  vote  cast  for  Vice-President, 
and  that  record,  accessible  to  every  schoolboy,  you  studiously 
suppress  to  excuse  a  falsehood. 

I  was  a  doubly-elected  delegate  to  the  Baltimore  Convention, 
having  been  first  unanimously  chosen  as  a  district  delegate  with 
out  the  formality  of  a  conference,  and  when  a  district  delegate  I 
was  one  of  two  delegates  elected  at  large  on  the  first  ballot  by 
the  State  Convention.  What  I  did  or  did  not,  or  how  important 
or  unimportant  I  was  as  a  member  of  the  convention,  is  an  issue 
that  I  have  not  raised  or  invited.  I  stated  the  simple  fact  that 
Lincoln  had  sent  for  me,  had  urged  me  to  support  Johnson,  and 
that  I  had  done  so.  Had  Lincoln  chosen  to  confide  his  wishes  to 
another  than  myself,  I  would  not  have  imitated  his  secretary  and 
charged  him  with  deceit  and  falsehood  because  he  did  not  tell  me 
all  his  purposes.  He  did  not  trust  you  with  what  you  probably 


468  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

could  not  have  understood  had  he  told  you,  but  that  is  no  reason 
why  you  should  accuse  him  of  deceit,  intrigue,  and  "writing  a 
deliberate  lie. ' '  He  wrote  you  the  exact  truth  in  the  only  paper 
you  have  as  the  basis  of  your  inexcusable  misconception  of  his 
language.  In  it  he  says  that  "  Swett  is  unquestionably  all 
right;"  and  the  only  thing  he  could  have  been  right  about  in  the 
matter  was  in  his  active  opposition  to  Hamlin's  renomination. 
Your  history  is  quite  right  in  quoting  Lincoln,  but  he  cannot  be 
justly  held  responsible  for  the  want  of  common  understanding 
of  one  of  his  biographers  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  after 
his  death. 

For  answer  to  your  undignified  and  unmanly  efforts  to  belittle 
my  relations  with  Lincoln,  I  refer  you  to  your  more  discreet  co- 
biographer,  Mr.  Hay.  He  refused  to  sustain  your  interpretation 
of  Lincoln's  note  on  the  Vice-Presidency.  He  added  that  the 
dispute  is  a  question  of  veracity  between  you  and  me,  and  he 
speaks  of  me  as  "evidently  armed  with  his  enviable  record  of 
close  intimacy  with  our  illustrious  Lincoln."  One  of  you  is 
lying  on  this  point :  is  it  Mr.  Hay  or  is  it  you  ? 

Had  you  sought  the  truth  as  an  honest  biographer,  you  could 
have  obtained  it  without  offensive  disputation,  not  only  from  me 
so  far  as  I  knew  it,  but  from  such  living  witnesses  as  Charles  A. 
Dana  and  Murat  Halstead,  and  from  the  recorded  testimony  of 
General  Cameron,  Colonel  Forney,  and  others  who  know  much 
of  Lincoln  and  but  little  of  you.  Instead  of  seeking  the  truth, 
you  flung  your  ignorance  and  egotism  with  ostentatious  inde 
cency  upon  the  bereaved  household  of  the  yet  untombed  Hamlin, 
and  when  brought  to  bay  by  those  better  informed  than  yourself, 
you  resent  it  in  the  tone  and  terms  of  the  ward-heeler  in  a  wharf- 
rat  district  battling  for  constabulary  honors.  I  think  it  safe  to 
say  that  the  public  judgment  will  be  that  it  would  have  been 
well  for  both  Lincoln's  memory  and  for  the  country  had  such  a 
biographer  been  drowned  when  a  pup.  Dismissed. 

A.  K.  M. 


NICOLAY    TO    McCLURE. 

WASHINGTON,  July  n,  1891. 
To  COL.  A.  K.  McCLURE,  Editor  Philadelphia  Times: 

I  will  not  allow  you  to  retreat  in  a  cloud  of  vituperation  from 
full  conviction  of  having  made  a  misstatement  of  history.  I 
need  only  to  sum  up  the  points  of  evidence, 


APPENDIX.  469 

You  allege  that  Mr.  Lincoln  called  and  instructed  you  to  op 
pose  Hamlin  and  nominate  Johnson. 

1.  This  is  proven  to  be  a  misstatement  by  Lincoln's  written 
words:  "  Wish  not  to  interfere  about  V.-P.;  cannot  interfere  about 
platform — convention  must  judge  for  itself." 

It  is  not  a  question  between  your  assertion  and  my  assertion, 
but  between  your  assertion  and  Lincoln's  written  word. 

It  is  proven  to  be  a  misstatement  by  the  testimony  of  Hon. 
B.  C.  Cook,  chairman  of  the  Illinois  delegation,  who  says  :  "  Mr. 
Nicolay's  statement  that  Mr.  Lincoln  was  in  favor  of  Hannibal 
Hamlin  is  correct.  The  dispatch  which  is  published  this  morn 
ing  was  sent  to  me  in  reply  to  an  inquiry  to  Mr.  Lincoln  in  re 
gard  to  the  matter.  It  read:  '  Wish  not  to  interfere  about  V.-P. 
Cannot  interfere  about  platform — convention  must  judge  for 
itself.' 

"I  went  to  see  Mr.  Lincoln  personally,  however.  There  are 
always  men  who  say  the  Presidential  candidates  prefer  this  man 
or  that,  and  they  do  it  without  the  slightest  authority.  It  was 
so  in  this  campaign.  It  was  reported  that  Andrew  Johnson  was 
Mr.  Lincoln's  choice,  and  it  was  my  business  to  find  out  whether 
it  was  or  not.  We  were  beyond  all  measure  for  Mr.  Lincoln  first, 
last,  and  for  all  time.  Had  he  desired  Mr.  Johnson  he  would 
have  been  our  choice,  but  he  did  not. 

"  As  the  dispatch  indicates,  Mr.  Lincoln  was  particularly  anx 
ious  not  to  make  known  his  preferences  on  the  question  of  his 
associate  on  the  ticket.  But  that  he  had  a  preference  I  positively 
know.  After  my  interview  with  him  I  was  as  positive  that  Han 
nibal  Hamlin  was  his  favorite  as  I  am  that  I  am  alive  to-day. 
The  fact  is  further  proven  by  the  action  of  the  entire  Illinois 
delegation,  which  was  a  unit  for  Mr.  Hamlin,  and,  as  I  stated 
before,  we  were  at  his  service  in  the  matter." 

2.  It  is  proven  to  be  a  misstatement  by  Colonel  Hay,  who  says: 
"  I  have  nothing  to  say  about  Mr.  Nicolay's  assertion  nor  about 
this  telegram,  but  I  do  corroborate  the  statement  that  Mr.  Lin 
coln  withheld  all  opinion  calculated  to  influence  the  Baltimore 
Convention   of  1864."     And   further:   "I  stand  simply  by  the 
proposition  contained  in  our  History.  .  .  .  For  several  days  be 
fore  the  convention  the  President  had  been  besieged  by  inquiries 
as  to  his  personal  wishes  in  regard  to  his  associate  on  the  ticket. 
He  had  persistently  refused  to  give  the  slightest  intimation  of 
such  wish.  ...  It  was  therefore  with  minds  absolutely  untram- 
meled  by  any  knowledge  of  the  President's  wishes  that  the  con- 


47°  LINCOLN  AND -MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

vention  went  about  the  work  of  selecting  his  associate  on  the 
ticket." 

3.  It  is  proven  to  be  a  misstatement  by  the  action  of  Simon 
Cameron,  chairman  of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation,  in  nomina 
ting  Hamlin  as  a  candidate  for  Vice-President  and  casting  for 
him  the  whole  fifty-two  votes  of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation. 

4.  It  is  proven  to  be  a  misstatement  by  your  own  action  in  the 
Baltimore  Convention,  when,  at  the  first  vote  for  Vice-President, 
after  the  supposed  instructions  which  you  claim  to  have  received 
from  Lincoln,  and  having,  as  you  say,  "returned  to  work  and 
vote  for  Johnson,"  you  as  a  member  of  the  Pennsylvania  dele 
gation  voted  for  Hannibal  Hamlin  for  Vice-President.     If  you 
did  this  willingly,  you  betrayed  Lincoln's  confidence  and  instruc 
tions  which  you  alleged  to  have  received.     If  you  did  it  unwill 
ingly,  you  proved  yourself  a  political  cipher — a  pretended  agent 
to  manipulate  a  national   convention   who  had    not    influence 
enough  in  his  own  delegation  to  control  his  own  vote.     The  first 
roll-call  was  decisive  in  showing  Johnson's  strength  against  the 
Pennsylvania  vote  (yourself  included),  and  it  shows  that  you 
contributed  nothing  for,  but  everything  against,  the  result  you 
say  you  were  commissioned  to  bring  about.    Subsequent  changes 
still  on  the  first  ballot  (for  there  was  no  second)  were  simply  the 
usual  rush  to  make  the  choice  unanimous,  in  which  Pennsylvania 
did  not  lead,  but  only  joined  after  the  rush  became  evident,  just 
as  Maine  and  Illinois  did. 

JOHN  G.  NICOLAY. 


TESTIMONY  OF  LEADING  POLITICAL  ACTORS. 


LINCOLN  ADVISES   JUDGE   PETTIS. 
[From  The  Philadelphia  Times,  Aug.  I,  1891.] 

HON.  S.  NEWTON  PETTIS,  who  was  an  active  supporter  of  Lin 
coln  at  the  conventions  of  1860  and  1864,  and  who  has  been  Con 
gressman,  Judge,  and  Foreign  Minister,  was  personally  advised 
by  Lincoln  in  1864  to  support  Johnson  for  Vice-President.  The 
following  is  his  testimony  on  the  point: 

MEADVILLE,  July  20,  1891. 
HON.  A.  K.  McCLURE: 

DEAR  SIR:  Your  favor  of  last  week  reached  me  at  Washington, 
asking  for  a  copy  of  Mr.  Hamlin's  letter  to  me  in  1889,  and  in- 


APPENDIX.  471 

stead  of  a  copy  I  enclose  the  original,  which  you  can  return  to 
me  at  your  convenience. 

You  will  remember  the  circumstances  connected  with  it,  for  we 
spoke  about  it  shortly  after.  On  the  morning  of  the  meeting  of 
the  Baltimore  Convention  in  1864  which  nominated  Mr.  Lincoln, 
and  immediately  before  leaving  for  Baltimore,  I  called  upon  Mr. 
Lincoln  in  his  study  and  stated  that  I  called  especially  to  ask 
him  whom  he  desired  put  on  the  ticket  with  him  as  Vice-Presi- 
dent.  He  leaned  forward  and  in  a  low  but  distinct  tone  of  voice 
said,  "  Governor  Johnson  of  Tennessee." 

In  March,  1889,  I  spent  an  hour  with  Mr.  Hamlin  in  Washing 
ton  at  the  house  of  a  friend  with  whom  he  was  stopping  while 
attending  the  inauguration  of  President  Harrison  in  March  of 
that  year. 

Among  other  matters  I  casually  mentioned  the  expression  of 
Mr.  Lincoln  the  morning  of  the  meeting  of  the  Baltimore  Con 
vention  in  1864,  not  supposing  for  a  moment  that  it  was  any 
thing  that  would  surprise  him.  You  can  imagine  my  annoyance 
at  the  remark  that  it  called  out  from  Mr.  Hamlin,  which  was: 
"Judge  Pettis,  I  am  sorry  you  told  me  that."  I  regretted  having 
made  the  statement,  but  I  could  not  recall  it. 

Later  in  the  year  I  noticed  a  published  interview  had  with  you 
in  which  you  had  made  substantially  the  same  statement  from 
Mr.  Lincoln  to  you  very  shortly  before  the  meeting  of  the  con 
vention,  which  I  clipped  and  with  satisfaction  enclosed  to  Mr. 
Hamlin  in  verification  of  mine  to  Mr.  H.,  stating  that  your  state 
ment  to  the  same  effect  as  mine  made  to  him  in  the  March  before 
had  relieved  me  from  fear  that  he,  Mr.  Hamlin,  might  have  some 
times  questioned  the  accuracy  of  my  memory,  and  the  letter  I 
now  send  you  was  Mr.  Hamlin's  reply. 

Yours  very  truly, 

S.  NEWTON  PETTIS. 


HAMLIN'S    LETTER   TO   PETTIS. 

THE  following  is  Mr.  Hamlin's  letter  to  Judge  Pettis,  the  orig 
inal  of  which  is  now  in  our  possession : 

BANGOR,  September  13,  1889. 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  Have  been  from  home  for  several  days,  and  did 
not  get  your  letter  and  newspaper  slip  until  last  evening.  Hence 
the  delay  in  my  reply. 


47 2  LINCOLN  AND' MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

When  I  met  and  conferred  with  you  in  Washington,  and  yon 
told  me  of  your  interview  with  Mr.  L.  (Lincoln),  I  had  not  the 
slightest  doubt  of  your  correctness.  The  remark  that  I  made 
was  caused  wholly  because  you  made  certain  statements  of  Mr. 
L.  which  I  had  seen,  but  which  I  did  not  believe  until  made  posi 
tive  by  you.  I  was  really  sorry  to  be  disabused.  Hence  I  was 
truly  sorry  at  what  you  said  and  the  information  you  gave  me. 

Mr.  L.  (Lincoln)  evidently  became  some  alarmed  about  his  re 
election  and  changed  his  position.  That  is  all  I  care  to  say.  If 
we  ever  shall  meet  again,  I  may  say  something  more  to  you.  I 
will  write  no  more.  Yours  very  truly, 

H.  HAMUN. 

HON.  S.  N.  PETTIS,  Meadville,  Pa. 


LINCOLN,   CAMERON,   AND   BUTLER. 

THE  following  letter  from  General  Butler,  and  the  added  ex 
tract  from  his  magazine  article  on  the  same  subject,  explain 
themselves: 

BOSTON,  July  14,  1891. 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  A  few  years  ago  I  was  asked  to  write,  as  my 
memory  serves  me,  for  the  North  American  Review,  while  under 
the  editorial  management  of  Mr.  Allen  Thorndike  Rice,  my 
reminiscences  of  the  facts  in  relation  to  the  interview  between 
Mr.  Cameron  and  myself  which  took  place  at  Fort  Monroe  some 
time  in  March,  1864,  as  I  remember.  It  might  have  been  a  little 
later,  but  it  must  have  been  before  the  4th  day  of  May,  1864,  be 
cause  I  went  into  the  field  on  that  date,  and  did  not  see  Mr. 
Cameron  during  the  campaign.  My  recollection  is  that  the  arti 
cle  was  entitled  "Vice-Presidential  Politics  in  1864."  I  should 
say  that  the  article  was  written  five  or  six  years  ago. 

I  cannot  now  add  anything  that  I  know  of  to  what  I  said  then. 
I  meant  to  tell  it  just  as  it  lay  in  my  memory,  and  certainly  did 
so,  wholly  without  any  relation  to  Mr.  Hamlin,  because  I  under 
stood  it  had  been  determined  on  by  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  friends 
that  somebody  else,  if  it  were  possible,  should  be  nominated  in 
stead  of  Mr.  Hamlin.  Of  the  reasons  of  that  determination  I 
made  no  inquiry,  because  the  whole  matter  was  one  in  which  I 
had  no  intention  to  take  any  part.  Yours  truly, 

BENJ.  F.  BUTLER. 

A.  K.  McCuJRE,  Esq. 


APPENDIX.  473 

GENERAL   BUTLER'S   STATEMENT   IN   MAGAZINE. 
[From  the  North  American  Review  for  October,  1885.] 

"Within  three  weeks  afterward  a  gentleman  (Cameron)  who 
stood  very  high  in  Mr.  Lincoln's  confidence  came  to  me  at  Fort 
Monroe.  This  was  after  I  had  heard  that  Grant  had  allotted  to 
me  a  not  unimportant  part  in  the  coming  campaign  around  Rich 
mond,  of  the  results  of  which  I  had  the  highest  hope,  and  for 
which  I  had  been  laboring,  and  the  story  of  which  has  not  yet 
been  told,  but  may  be  hereafter. 

"  The  gentleman  informed  me  that  he  came  from  Mr.  Lincoln; 
this  was  said  with  directness,  because  the  messenger  and  myself 
had  been  for  a  considerable  time  in  quite  warm  friendly  relations, 
and  I  owed  much  to  him,  which  I  can  never  repay  save  with 
gratitude. 

"  He  said:  '  The  President,  as  you  know,  intends  to  be  a  candi 
date  for  re-election,  and  as  his  friends  indicate  that  Mr.  Hamlin 
is  no  longer  to  be  a  candidate  for  Vice-President,  and  as  he  is 
from  New  England,  the  President  thinks  that  his  place  should  be 
filled  by  some  one  from  that  section;  and  aside  from  reasons  of 
personal  friendship  which  would  make  it  pleasant  to  have  you 
with  him,  he  believes  that  being  the  first  prominent  Democrat 
who  volunteered  for  the  war,  your  candidature  would  add  strength 
to  the  ticket,  especially  with  the  War  Democrats,  and  he  hopes 
that  you  will  allow  your  friends  to  co-operate  with  his  to  place 
you  in  that  position.' 

"I  answered:  'Please  say  to  Mr.  Lincoln  that  while  I  appre 
ciate  with  the  fullest  sensibility  this  act  of  friendship  and  the 
compliment  he  pays  me,  yet  I  must  decline-  Tell  him,'  I  said 
laughingly,  'with  the  prospects  of  the  campaign,  I  would  not 
quit  the  field  to  be  Vice-President,  even  with  himself  as  Presi 
dent,  unless  he  will  give  me  bond,  with  sureties,  in  the  full  sum 
of  his  four  years'  salary,  that  he  will  die  or  resign  within  three 
months  after  his  inauguration.'  " 


CAMERON'S   DECLARATIONS. 

THE  following  is  an  extract  from  an  interview  with  General 
Cameron  taken  by  James  R.  Young,  now  Executive  Clerk  of  the 
Senate,  in  1873,  revised  by  Cameron  himself  and  published  in  the 
New  York  Herald  in  the  summer  of  that  year: 


474  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

"  Lincoln  and  Stanton  thought  highly  of  Butler,  and  I  will 
now  tell  you  of  another  fact  that  is  not  generally  known,  and 
which  will  show  you  how  near  Butler  came  to  being  President 
instead  of  Andrew  Johnson.  In  the  spring  of  1864,  when  it  was 
determined  to  run  Mr.  Lincoln  for  a  second  term,  it  was  the  de 
sire  of  Lincoln,  and  also  that  of  Stanton,  who  was  the  one  man 
of  the  Cabinet  upon  whom  Lincoln  thoroughly  depended,  that 
Butler  should  run  on  the  ticket  with  him  as  the  candidate  for 
Vice-President.  I  was  called  into  consultation  and  heartily  en 
dorsed  the  scheme.  Accordingly  Lincoln  sent  me  on  a  mission 
to  Fort  Monroe  to  see  General  Butler,  and  to  say  to  him  that  it 
was  his  (Lincoln's)  request  that  he  (General  Butler)  should  allow 
himself  to  be  run  as  second  on  the  ticket. 

"  I,  accompanied  by  William  H.  Armstrong,  afterward  a  mem 
ber  of  Congress  from  the  Williamsport  district,  did  visit  General 
Butler  and  made  the  tender  according  to  instructions.  To  our 
astonishment,  Butler  refused  to  agree  to  the  proposition.  He 
said  there  was  nothing  in  the  Vice-Presidency,  and  he  preferred 
remaining  in  command  of  his  army,  where  he  thought  he  would 
be  of  more  service  to  his  country. ' ' 


A   LATER   CAMERON    INTERVIEW. 

THE  following  interview  with  General  Cameron,  taken  by 
Colonel  Burr  a  few  years  before  his  death,  was  carefully  revised 
by  Cameron  himself.  It  is  not  only  a  repetition  of  General  But 
ler's  statement,  but  it  tells  how,  after  Butler  declined  the  Vice- 
Presidency,  Lincoln  carefully  considered  other  prominent  War 
Democrats,  and  finally  agreed  with  Cameron  to  nominate  John 
son: 

"I  had  been  summoned  from  Harrisburg  by  the  President  to 
consult  with  him  in  relation  to  the  approaching  campaign,"  said 
General  Cameron.  "  He  was  holding  a  reception  when  I  arrived, 
but  after  it  was  over  we  had  a  long  and  earnest  conversation.  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  been  much  distressed  at  the  intrigues  in  and  out  of 
his  Cabinet  to  defeat  his  renomination ;  but  that  was  now  assured, 
and  the  question  of  a  man  for  the  second  place  on  the  ticket  was 
freely  and  earnestly  discussed.  Mr.  Lincoln  thought,  and  so  did 
I,  that  Mr.  Hamlin's  position  during  the  four  years  of  his  admin 
istration  made  it  advisable  to  have  a  new  name  substituted.  Sev 
eral  men  were  freely  talked  of,  but  without  conclusion  as  to  any 


APPENDIX.  475 

particular  person.  Not  long  after  that  I  was  requested  to  come 
to  the  White  House  again.  I  went  and  the  subject  was  again 
brought  up  by  the  President ;  and  the  result  of  our  conversation 
was  that  Mr.  Lincoln  asked  me  to  go  to  Fortress  Monroe  and  ask 
General  Butler  if  he  would  be  willing  to  run,  and,  if  not,  to  con 
fer  with  him  upon  the  subject. 

"General  Butler  positively  declined  to  consider  the  subject, 
saying  that  he  preferred  to  remain  in  the  military  service,  and  he 
thought  a  man  could  not  justify  himself  in  leaving  the  army  in 
the  time  of  war  to  run  for  a  political  office.  The  general  and 
myself  then  talked  the  matter  over  freely,  and  it  is  my  opinion 
at  this  distance  from  the  event  that  he  suggested  that  a  Southern 
man  should  be  given  the  place.  After  completing  the  duty  as 
signed  by  the  President,  I  returned  to  Washington  and  reported 
the  result  to  Mr.  Lincoln.  He  seemed  to  regret  General  Butler's 
decision,  and  afterward  the  name  of  Andrew  Johnson  was  sug 
gested  and  accepted.  In  my  judgment,  Mr.  Hamlin  never  had  a 
serious  chance  to  become  the  Vice-Presidential  candidate  after 
Mr.  Lincoln's  renomination  was  assured." 


JOHNSON'S   SECRETARY   SPEAKS. 

MAJOR  BENJAMIN  C.  TRUMAN,  a  well-known  Eastern  journalist, 
and  now  manager  of  the  California  exhibit  for  the  coming  Chicago 
Fair,  testifies  in  the  following  conclusive  manner  on  the  subject: 

CHICAGO,  July  25. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  McCujRE: 

We  met  in  New  Orleans  the  year  of  the  fair,  as  you  may  re 
member.  I  am  the  man  recently  quoted  in  the  Tribune  in  rela 
tion  to  the  Lincoln-Hamlin  controversy,  but  I  did  not  wish  to 
volunteer  conspicuously  in  the  dispute.  I  was  private  secretary 
of  Andrew  Johnson  in  Nashville  in  1864.  I  saw  and  handled  all 
his  correspondence  during  that  time,  and  I  know  it  to  be  a  fact 
that  Mr.  Lincoln  desired  the  nomination  of  Johnson  for  Vice- 
President,  and  that  Brownlow  and  Maynard  went  to  Baltimore  at 
request  of  Lincoln  and  Johnson  to  promote  the  nomination. 

Forney  wrote  to  Johnson  saying  that  General  Sickles  would  be 
in  Tennessee  to  canvass  Johnson's  availability,  and  that  Lincoln, 
on  the  whole,  preferred  Johnson  first  and  Holt  next.  I  do  not 
know  that  General  Sickles  conferred  with  Johnson  on  the  sub 
ject,  and  it  is  possible  that  General  Sickles  was  not  advised  by 


476  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

Lincoln  at  the  time  he  sent  him  on  the  secret  mission  what  he 
had  in  view,  for  Lincoln  may  at  that  time  have  been  undecided 
in  his  own  mind.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  after  General 
Sickles  returned  and  reported  to  Lincoln,  Lincoln  decided  to 
favor  the  nomination  of  Johnson. 

I  went  out  to  Tennessee  with  Johnson  in  March,  1862,  and  had 
charge  of  his  official  and  private  correspondence  for  four  years. 
I  wrote  at  his  dictation  many  letters  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  was 
cognizant  of  all  Mr.  Lincoln's  communications  to  him. 

When  he  was  made  Military  Governor  and  Brigadier-General, 
I  was  appointed  on  his  staff  along  with  William  A.  Browning  of 
Baltimore,  who  died  in  '66.  It  was  Colonel  Forney  who  obtained 
the  position  for  me,  and  he  was  in  close  confidential  relations 
with  Johnson  during  the  entire  period  I  speak  of. 

Very  truly, 
BEN  C.  TRUMAN. 

JONES   SPEAKS   FOR   RAYMOND. 

HENRY  J.  RAYMOND  was  editor  of  the  New  York  Times  in 
1864,  of  which  George  Jones  was  then,  as  now,  the  chief  owner, 
and  their  relations  were  of  the  most  confidential  character.  Ray 
mond  was  the  Lincoln  leader  and  the  master-spirit  of  the  Balti 
more  Convention  of  1864.  He  framed  and  reported  the  platform; 
he  was  made  chairman  of  the  National  Committee;  he  wrote  the 
Life  of  Lincoln  for  the  campaign;  and  it  was  his  leadership  that 
carried  a  majority  of  the  New  York  delegation  for  Johnson  even 
against  Dickinson,  from  Raymond's  own  State,  because  he  was 
in  the  confidence  of  and  acting  in  accord  with  the  wishes  of  Lin 
coln.  Raymond  has  long  since  joined  the  great  majority  beyond, 
but  Jones  thus  incisively  speaks  for  him: 

SOUTH  POLAND,  ME.,  July  17,  1891. 

MY  DEAR  COLONEL  McCLURE:  Your  letter  has  been  forwarded 
to  me  here.  I  have  read  the  contention  about  the  Vice-Presi 
dency,  and  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  you  are  absolutely  in  the 
right  in  your  statement  of  the  facts. 

I  had  many  talks  with  Raymond  on  the  subject.  Dickinson's 
friends  never  forgave  him,  although  he  made  Dickinson  U.  S. 
District  Attorney  afterward  to  compensate  him  for  the  loss  of  the 
Vice-Presidency.  Seward  and  Weed  were  also  with  Raymond  in 
that  fight.  Faithfully  yours, 

GEORGE  JONES. 


APPENDIX.  477 

MARSHAL   LAMON'S   LETTER. 

CARLSBAD,  BOHEMIA,  August  16,  1891. 


HON.  A.  K. 

DEAR  SIR:  The  question  of  preference  of  President  Lincoln  in 
1864  as  to  who  ought  to  be  placed  on  the  national  ticket  with 
himself  is  one  of  doubt,  I  observe  from  reading  the  American 
newspapers,  and  one  which  has,  since  the  death  of  Ex-Vice-Presi- 
dent  Ham!  in,  given  rise  to  nmch  controversy.  At  this  distance 
of  time  from  the  exciting  events  of  that  period  I  had  thought 
that  no  fact  was  better  established  than  Mr.  Lincoln's  politic 
preference  as  a  strategic  skirmish  from  the  beaten  path  to  give 
strength  to  the  party  and  discouragement  to  the  South  .  He  was 
decidedly  in  favor  of  a  Southern  man  for  Vice-President.  And 
of  all  men  South,  his  preference,  as  he  expressed  himself  to  pru 
dent  friends,  was  for  Andrew  Johnson.  This  he  could  not  con 
sistently  make  public,  for  he  occupied  a  delicate  position  before 
the  people,  and  was  apprehensive  of  giving  offense  to  Hamlin's 
united  New  England  constituency. 

To  discreet  and  trusted  friends  with  whom  he  deemed  it  pru 
dent  to  confer  he  urged  that  such  a  nomination  would  disarm  our 
enemies  of  the  Union  abroad,  and  be  a  check  to  the  recognition 
of  the  Confederacy  by  England  and  France  to  a  greater  extent 
than  anything  in  our  power  to  do  at  that  time,  and  if  judiciously 
and  quietly  effected  would,  in  his  opinion,  in  no  wise  jeopardize 
the  success  of  the  party. 

He  believed  that  the  election  of  one  of  the  candidates  on  the 
national  ticket  from  an  insurgent  State,  from  the  heart  of  the 
Confederacy,  that  had  been  restored  to  the  Union  and  had  re 
pented  of  the  sin  of  rebellion,  would  not  only  be  wise,  but  expe 
dient;  and  Johnson  being  a  lifelong  representative  Southern  man, 
who  had  been  Governor,  a  member  of  Congress,  a  United  States 
Senator,  and  was  then  Military  Governor  of  the  State  of  Tennes 
see,  it  was  fitting,  and  would  have  more  influence  in  proving  the 
success  of  the  Union  arms  against  the  Confederate  rebellion  than 
anything  that  had  been  accomplished. 

I  recall  to  mind  the  fact  that  Mr.  Lincoln  sent  for  you,  Mr. 
Editor,  the  day  before  the  National  Convention  was  to  meet,  for 
consultation  on  this  veritable  subject.  To  the  best  of  my  recol 
lection,  you  were  not  in  sympathy  with  the  scheme;  that  you 
opposed  it  and  declared  yourself  in  favor  of  the  old  ticket  of 
1860;  and  I  am  confident  that  at  first  you  were  opposed  to  the 


47$  LINCOLN  AND  MEN  OF  WAR-TIMES. 

nomination  of  Johnson.  But  after  some  discussion  and  hearing 
Mr.  Lincoln's  earnest  reasoning  in  favor  of  his  position,  you 
yielded  your  prejudices  and  seemed  convinced  that  there  was 
philosophy  and,  perhaps,  sound  politics  in  the  proposition.  The 
late  lamented  Leonard  Swett  of  Illinois  was  also  sent  for  and 
consulted  before  the  convention  met;  Mr.  Lincoln  always  had 
great  faith  and  confidence  in  Mr.  Swett's  political  wisdom.  The 
proposition  took  Swett  by  surprise.  He  had  made  up  his  mind 
that  the  old  ticket  of  Lincoln  and  Hamlin  would  be  again  renomi- 
nated  as  a  matter  of  course.  Swett  said  to  him:  "  Lincoln,  if  it 
were  known  in  New  England  that  you  are  in  favor  of  leaving 
Hamlin  off  the  ticket  it  would  raise  the  devil  among  the  Yankees 
(Mr.  Swett  was  born  in  Maine),  and  it  would  raise  a  bumble-bee's 
nest  about  your  ears  that  would  appall  the  country."  Swett  con 
tinued  about  in  this  strain:  "  However  popular  you  are  with  the 
masses  over  the  country,  you  are  not  so  with  the  New  England 
politicians,  because  of  your  tardiness  in  issuing  your  Emancipa 
tion  Proclamation  and  your  liberal  reconstruction  policy.  You 
must  know  that  you  have  not  recovered  from  what  these  people 
think  two  great  blunders  of  your  administration.  In  view  of 
these  facts  I  think  it  a  dangerous  experiment." 

Lincoln  was  serious,  earnest,  and  resolute.  He  produced  argu 
ments  so  convincing  to  Swett  that  he  shortly  became  a  con 
vert  to  the  proposed  new  departure,  and  in  deference  to  Mr. 
Lincoln's  wishes  he  went  to  the  convention  as  a  delegate  from 
Illinois,  and  joined  Cameron,  yourself,  and  others  in  supporting 
Johnson. 

I  recollect  that  Swett  asked  Mr.  Lincoln,  as  he  was  leaving  the 
White  House,  whether  he  was  authorized  to  use  his  name  in  this 
behalf  before  the  convention.  The  reply  was,  "  No;  I  will  address 
a  letter  to  Lamon  here  embodying  my  views,  which  you,  McClure, 
and  other  friends  may  use  if  it  be  found  absolutely  necessary. 
Otherwise,  it  may  be  better  that  I  should  not  appear  actively  on 
the  stage  of  this  theatre."  The  letter  was  written,  and  I  took  it 
to  the  convention  with  me.  It  was  not  used,  as  there  was  no 
occasion  for  its  use,  and  it  was  afterward  returned  to  Mr.  Lin 
coln,  at  his  request. 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  beset  before  the  convention  by  the  friends  of 
the  Hamlin  interest  for  his  opinion  and  preference  for  Vice-Presi- 
dent.  To  such  he  invariably  dodged  the  question,  sometimes 
saying:  "It  perhaps  would  not  become  me  to  interfere  with  the 
will  of  the  people,"  always  evading  a  direct  answer. 


APPENDIX.  479 

However  this  conduct  may  subject  him  to  the  charge  by  some 
persons  of  the  want  of  open  candor,  the  success  of  the  party  and 
the  safety  of  the  Union  were  the  paramount  objects  that  moved 
him.  He  did  not,  by  suppressing  the  truth  to  those  whom  he 
thought  had  no  right  to  cross-question  him,  purpose  conveying 
a  false  impression.  If  this  is  to  be  construed  as  duplicity,  be  it 
so;  he  was  still  "  Honest  old  Abe,"  and  he  thought  the  end  justi 
fied  the  means. 

About  this  time,  and  for  a  short  time  before  this  convention 
was  held,  Mr.  Lincoln  was  exceedingly  anxious  to  bring  Ten 
nessee  under  a  regular  State  government,  and  he  argued  that  by 
emphasizing  it  by  the  election  of  Johnson  to  the  Vice-Presidency 
(not  that  he  had  any  prejudice  against  Mr.  Hamlin)  in  no  way 
could  such  rapid  strides  be  made  toward  the  restoration  of  the 
Union. 

If  the  nomination  of  Johnson  was  a  mistake,  a  misdemeanor, 
or  a  crime,  the  responsibility  of  it  should  rest  where  it  belongs. 
Mr.  Lincoln  was  undoubtedly  blamable  for  the  blunder.  It  may 
be  that  more  calamitous  mistakes  happened  in  the  lives  of  very 
many  eminent  and  good  men  during  those  troublous  times  of  our 
country's  history. 

With  all  my  affection,  admiration,  love,  and  veneration  for  Mr. 
Lincoln,  I  have  never  been  one  of  those  who  believed  him  im 
maculate  and  incapable  of  making  mistakes.  He  was  human 
and  in  the  nature  of  things  was  liable  to  err,  yet  he  erred  less 
often  than  other  men.  He  had  amiable  weaknesses,  some  of 
which  only  the  more  ennobled  him. 

It  is  no  compliment  to  his  memory  to  smother  from  the  closest 
scrutiny  any  of  the  acts  of  his  life  and  transfigure  him  by  full- 
some  deification,  so  that  his  most  intimate  friends  cannot  recog 
nize  the  Abraham  Lincoln  of  other  days.  The  truth  of  history 
requires  that  he  should  be  placed  on  the  record,  now  that  he  is 
dead,  as  he  stood  before  the  people  while  living.  Whatever  mis 
takes  he  made  were  made  through  the  purest  of  motives.  All  his 
faults,  all  his  amiable  weaknesses,  and  all  his  virtues  should  be 
written  on  the  same  pages,  so  that  the  world  may  know  the  true 
man  as  his  friends  knew  him.  With  all  the  truth  told  of  him  he 
will  appear  a  purer  and  better  man  than  any  other  man  living  or 
any  man  that  ever  did  live. 

With  all  that  can  truthfully  be  said  of  him,  Abraham  Lincoln 
has  reached  that  stage  of  moral  elevation  where  his  name  alone 
will  be  more  beneficial  to  humanity  at  large  than  the  personal 


480  LINCOLN  AND  .MEN  OF   WAR-TIMES. 

services  of  any  other  man  to  the  people  of  any  country  as  their 
Chief  Magistrate.  Respectfully, 

WARD  H.  LAMON. 


A   CABINET   MINISTER   TESTIFIES. 
[Gideon  Welles,  in  the   Galaxy,  Nov.,  1877.] 

MR.  HAMUN,  who  was  elected  with  Lincoln  in  1860,  had  not 
displayed  the  breadth  of  view  and  enlightened  statesmanship 
which  was  expected,  and  consequently  lost  confidence  with  the 
country  during  his  term.  Yet  there  was  no  concentration  or 
unity  on  any  one  to  fill  his  place.  His  friends  and  supporters, 
while  conscious  that  he  brought  no  strength  to  the  ticket, 
claimed,  but  with  no  zeal  or  earnestness,  that  as  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  renominated,  it  would  be  invidious  not  to  nominate  Hamlin 
also. 

The  question  of  substituting  another  for  Vice-President  had 
been  discussed  in  political  circles  prior  to  the  meeting  of  the  con 
vention,  without  any  marked  personal  preference,  but  with  a 
manifest  desire  that  there  should  be  a  change.  Mr.  Lincoln  felt 
the  delicacy  of  his  position,  and  was  therefore  careful  to  avoid  the 
expression  of  any  opinion ;  but  it  was  known  to  those  who  en 
joyed  his  confidence  that  he  appreciated  the  honesty,  integrity, 
and  self-sacrificing  patriotism  of  Andrew  Johnson  of  Tennessee. 


GENERAL  SICKLES'   STATEMENT. 
[General  Sickles'  Interview  in  New  York  Times."} 

"WHEN  I  went  South  to  visit  Governor  Johnson  this  sentiment 
was  in  the  air,"  continued  General  Sickles.  "  I  knew  of  it,  but 
I  considered  from  my  past  position  that  it  would  be  indelicate  for 
me  to  invite  the  President's  confidence  on  purely  political  mat 
ters.  It  was  not  my  mission  to  undertake  to  bring  about  changes 
in  Mr.  Johnson's  methods  of  administration  which  should  affect 
his  standing  before  the  Baltimore  Convention.  The  result  of  my 
visit  may  have  had  some  such  effect:  I  do  not  say  that  it  did  not. 
I  reported  to  Mr.  Lincoln  and  to  Mr.  Seward. 

' '  Now,  what  was  the  situation  at  Baltimore  ?  Mr.  Leonard 
Swett  was  President  Lincoln's  shadow.  Whatever  Mr.  Swett  did 
represented  and  reflected  Mr.  Lincoln's  views.  In  the  Baltimore 


APPENDIX.  481 

Convention  Mr.  Swett  at  once  came  out  for  Judge  Holt,  a  Border- 
State  man.  Mr.  Nicolay  sent  word  to  M£  Hay,  who  had  been 
left  to  keep  house,  asking  if  the  President  approved  of  this. 
Now  note  Mr.  Lincoln's  reply: 

"  '  Swett  is  unquestionably  all  right.  Mr.  Holt  is  a  good  man, 
but  I  had  not  thought  of  him  for  Vice-President.  Wish  not  to 
interfere. ' 

"That  tells  the  whole  story.  Mr.  Lincoln  knew  that  Mr.  Swett, 
in  bringing  out  a  Border-State  man,  was  doing  precisely  right. 
The  indorsement  on  that  note  was  for  Mr.  Nicolay 's  eye.  He  was 
not  one  of  the  President's  close  advisers.  He  was  but  a  clerk. 
He  was  not  the  man  whom  President  Lincoln  would  send  to  Bal 
timore  to  take  a  hand  in  shaping  the  convention.  A  tyro  in  poli 
tics  would  see  that  if  the  President  wanted  a  thing  done,  his  own 
secretary  would  have  been  the  last  messenger  sent  to  do  it.  It 
would  have  revealed  the  President's  hand  if  Mr.  Nicolay  had 
been  given  a  mission  in  the  convention. 

"  Colonel  McClure,  Governor  Andrew  G.  Curtin,  Simon  Came 
ron,  and  others  of  that  stamp  were  the  men  whom  Mr.  Lincoln 
relied  on.  So  that  while  the  indorsement  on  the  note  gives  Mr. 
Nicolay  documentary  evidence  for  his  position,  that  very  remark, 
'Swett  is  all  right,'  gives  Colonel  McClure  good  ground  for  his 
position  if  there  were  nothing  else. 

"  Mr.  Seward  and  Mr.  Stanton  were  close  advisers  of  Mr.  Lin 
coln.  They  spoke  their  sentiments  in  favor  of  a  Border-State 
man.  That  they  advised  the  choice  of  Mr.  Johnson  I  do  not 
know,  or  that  the  President  had  chosen  Mr.  Johnson  I  do  not 
know,  but  the  one  expression,  '  Swett  is  all  right,'  is  the  key  that 
unlocks  all  the  mystery  there  is  in  this  present  controversy." 


INDEX. 


Adams,  Charles  Francis — Eulogy 
of  Seward,  60;  as  a  candidate 
for  President,  1872,  326. 

Altoona  Conference — Meeting  of, 
269,  270;  Curtin's  letter  con 
cerning,  note,  270,  272. 

Anderson,  Robert— Relieved  from 
command  by  Sherman,  230. 

Andrew,  John  A. — Changes  vote 
of  Mass,  to  Lincoln,  39;  sec 
onds  Evarts'  motion,  39;  joins 
Altoona  Conference,  269. 

Armstrong,  William  H. — Visits 
Butler  with  Cameron,  118. 

Army  of  the  Potomac — Vicissi 
tudes  of,  356. 

Arnold,  Isaac  N. — On  Lincoln 
and  emancipation,  101;  Lin 
coln's  confidence  in,  126. 

Ashley,  James  M. — Saves  consti 
tutional  amendment  abolishing 
slavery  from  defeat,  109. 

Banks,  Nathaniel  P.— Vote  for 
Vice-President  in  Chicago  Con 
vention,  41;  retreat  across  the 
Potomac,  1862,  394. 

Bannan,  Benjamin — Draft  Com 
missioner  in  Schuylkill  county, 
82,  83. 

Bartlett,  W.  O.— Knowledge  of 
the  Lincoln-Bennett  letter,  92. 

Bates,  Edward  —  Greeley's  sup 
port  of,  30,  315;  votes  received 
in  Chicago  Convention,  39;  in 
Lincoln's  Cabinet,  60. 

Bayard,  George  A. — Given  com 
mand  of  brigade  Pa.  Reserves, 
428. 

Beauregard,  P.  G.  T.— Threatens 
Washington,  67. 

Bennett,  James  Gordon — Offered 
French  mission,  90;  supports 
Lincoln's  re-election,  91;  tati- 
tude  toward  Lincoln,  92. 


Biddle,  Col.  Charles  J.— Goes  to 
relief  of  Col.  Wallace,  256. 

Biddle,  Craig— On  Gov.  Curtin's 
staff,  256. 

Black,  Jeremiah  S. — Becomes  Bu 
chanan's  Secretary  of  State,  172, 
300;  grieved  by  Buchanan's  pol 
icy  toward  S.  C.,  301,  302;  writes 
Buchanan's  answer,  302. 

Blaine,  James  G. — Opinion  of  111. 
Republican  Convention,  1860, 
29;  support  of  Lincoln,  62. 

Blair,  Frank  P.— Supports  Bates 
at  Chicago,  1860,  37;  offers  Gen. 
Sherman  a  Missouri  brigadier- 
ship,  228;  secures  Greeley's 
nomination  for  President,  327. 

Blair,  Montgomery  —  Supports 
Bates  at  Chicago,  1860,  37;  of 
fers  Gen.  Sherman  a  War-De 
partment  clerkship,  228. 

Boyd,  William  H.— His  home  at 
Chambersburg  saved,  420,  421. 

Brown,  B.  Gratz — Nominated  for 
Vice-President,  327. 

Brown,  John— In  Chambersburg 
in  1859,  334,  335,  390. 

Buchanan,  James  —  Stanton  and 
Black  in  Cabinet  of,  172;  mis 
conceptions  regarding  his  ad 
ministration,  297,  298;  estimate 
of,  298,  299;  change  of  policy, 
300;  policy  toward  S.  C.,  301, 
302;  reinforcement  of  Southern 
forts,  302,  303;  impossibility  of 
reinforcement,  304;  proofs  of 
loyalty  of,  304;  patriotic  letters 
of,  305-310;  justice  to,  310,  311. 

Buckalew,  Charles  A.  —  Elected 
to  the  United  States  Senate, 
152. 

Buell,  Don  Carlos  —  An  unre 
warded  hero,  355;  military  ca 
reer  of,  381-383;  campaign 
against  Chattanooga,  383,  384; 


(483) 


484 


INDEX. 


plan  of  campaign  overruled, 
but  censured  by  the  War  De 
partment,  384;  his  removal 
asked,  385;  relieved,  386;  asks 
for  investigation,  387;  myste 
rious  disappearance  of  the  rec 
ord,  387,  388. 

Burnside,  Ambrose  E. — What  it 
would  cost  to  capture  Manas- 
sas,  70. 

Butler,  Benjamin  F.  —  Lincoln's 
first  selection  for  Vice-Presi 
dent  in  1864,  118;  Cameron's 
mission  to,  118;  nomination  de 
clined,  119;  Cameron's  instruc 
tions  to,  regarding  slaves,  161. 

Cameron,  Simon — Candidate  for 
President,  1860,  35,  36;  opposed 
for  Secretary  of  War,  48;  re 
garded  war  as  inevitable,  60; 
David  Davis'  Cabinet  promise, 
89;  advised  arming  the  slaves, 
103,  161;  mission  to  Gen.  But 
ler,  1864,  118;  consents  to  John 
son's  nomination,  119;  relations 
to  Lincoln  in  1864,121,  123,  124; 
estimate  of,  147;  beginning  of 
feud  with  Curtin,  149;  defeats 
Forney  for  the  Senat-,  150,  151; 
defeated  by  Buckalew,  151; 
Presidential  aspirations,  1860, 
152;  the  War  Secretaryship, 
403;  Lincoln's  hesitation  and 
letters,  155-157;  subsequent  ne 
gotiations  and  appointment, 
157-160;  administration  of  the 
War  Department,  160,  161;  offi 
cial  recommendation  regarding 
slavery,  161  -  163;  retirement 
from  Cabinet,  164;  feels  ag 
grieved,  164,  165;  subsequent 
relations  to  Lincoln,  166;  esti 
mate  of,  166-168;  conducts 
campaign  in  Pa.  in  1864,  199- 
201;  conference  with  Sherman 
at  Louisville,  231;  refuses  to  ac 
cept  Pa.  Reserves,  254;  unites 
with  McClure  and  Forney  to 
ask  foreign  mission  for  Curtin, 
263. 

Carter,  Colonel  —  Story  of  his 
burial  at  Chambersburg,  416, 
417- 


Cass,   Lewis  —  Resignation  from 

Buchanan's  Cabinet,  172,  300. 
Chambersburg — Why  destroyed, 
258,  259;  description  of,  334, 
390;  John  Brown  in,  335,  390; 
anti-slavery  sentiment  in,  338; 
Capt.  Cook  in,  343;  the  town 
in  war  times,  392;  Patterson's 
command  at,  393;  alarm  at, 
1862,  394;  Stuart's  capture  of, 
1862,  399;  flag  of  truce  demand 
ing  surrender  of,  401;  surren 
dered  to  Gen.  Hampton,  402; 
Gen.  Jenkins  in,  1864,  407;  Gen. 
Lee  in,  408;  Lee's  council  in 
public  square,  400;  Christian 
burial  refused  to  a  Confederate 
officer  in,  416,  417;  Gen.  Mc- 
Causland's  approach  rumored, 
418;  captured  and  burned,  419; 
"  Remember  Chambersburg!  " 
421;  no  reimbursement,  421, 
422;  after  the  burning,  422. 
Chandler,  Zach. — Distrust  of  Lin 
coln,  62. 

Chase,  Salmon  P.  —  Votes  re 
ceived  in  Chicago  Convention, 
39;  believes  in  peaceable  dis 
union,  60;  nomination  as  Chief 
Justice,  77;  attitude  toward  Lin 
coln,  1861-64,  132,133;  Lincoln 
proposed  to  "decline,"  135,  136; 
strained  relations  with  Lin 
coln,  137;  resigns  from  Cabinet, 
138;  in  retirement,  139;  visits 
Lincoln  in  1864,  140;  appointed 
Chief  Justice,  141;  Lincoln's 
magnanimity  toward,  143,  144; 
legal  attainments  of,  note,  144; 
subsequent  career  of,  144-146; 
bearer  of  Lincoln's  letter  re 
moving  Cameron  from  War 
Department,  164;  Stevens  on 
impeachment  rulings  of,  285. 

|  Childs,  George  W. — At  luncheon 

with  Grant,  205. 

Clay,  Cassius  M. — Vote  for  Pres 
ident  in  Chicago  Convention, 
39;  for  Vice-President,  40. 

!  Cobb,  Howell — Leaves  Buchan 
an's  Cabinet,  300;  his  division 
at  Hagerstown,  1862,  395. 

j  Coffroth,  Alexander  H.  —  Gives 
first  Democratic  vote  in  favor 


INDEX. 


485 


of  constitutional  amendment 
abolishing  slavery,  no. 

Collamer,  Jacob — Votes  received 
in  Chicago  Convention,  39;  let 
ter  on  Sherman's  terms  to 
Johnston,  244. 

Columbia,  S.  C. — The  cry  of  re 
taliation  for  Chambersburg,42i. 

Congress — Acts  prohibiting  sla 
very,  103;  constitutional  amend 
ment  abolishing  slavery  in,  109, 
no. 

Convention,  Democratic  National, 
1864 — Declares  the  war  a  fail 
ure,  225;  anti-war  platform,  324. 

Convention,  Republican  National, 
1856 — Character  of,  27. 

Convention,  Republican  National, 
1860 — Character  of,  27;  Seward 
demonstration,  37,  38;  ballots 
for  President,  38,  39. 

Convention,  Republican  National, 
1864 — Representation  of  insur 
gent  States  in,  120. 

Cook,  John  E. — Hazlitt  mistaken 
f°r,  337;  romance  of  the  cap 
ture  of,  338;  reward  for,  339; 
characteristics  of,  340,  347-3491 
capture  by  Logan  and  Fitz- 
hugh,  342,  343;  taken  to  Cham- 
bersburg,  343;  negotiations 
with  Dan  Logan,  344,  345;  be 
fore  Justice  Reisher,  345;  sent 
to  jail,  346;  plans  for  escape, 
346-350;  the  romance  of  the 
requisition,  351;  surrender, 
trial,  and  execution,  351,  352. 

Couch,  Darius  N. — In  command 
at  Harrisburg,  1863,  412;  has  no 
force  to  meet  McCausland, 
1864,  418;  retires  to  Harrisburg, 
419. 

Crawford,  Samuel  W.  —  Given 
command  of  Pa.  Reserves,  443; 
asks  that  his  division  rejoin  the 
army,  444;  at  Gettysburg,  445; 
with  his  division  in  Va.,  447- 
453;  farewell  to  Pa.  Reserves, 

453,  454- 

Cummings,  Alexander  —  Repre 
sented  Cameron  at  Chicago, 
1860,  153. 

Curtin,  Andrew  G.  —  Supports 
Lincoln  at  Chicago,  1860,  30,  31; 


candidate  for  Governor  of  Pa., 
32,  33;  reasons  for  opposing 
Seward,  33-35;  reasons  for  sup 
porting  Lincoln,  35,  36;  calls  on 
Weed  in  Chicago,  41;  cam 
paign  of  1860,  42;  elected  Gov 
ernor,  43,  47;  conference  at  the 
White  House,  65,  66;  not  a 
party  to  Cabinet  pledges,  89; 
gubernatorial  declination,  1863, 
89,  90;  re-election,  90;  begin 
ning  of  feud  with  Cameron,  149; 
appeals  to  Stanton  for  Jere  Mc- 
Kibben,  177;  offers  McClellan 
cor  mand  of  Pa.  troops,  211; 
brilliant  services  of,  248;  inau 
gural  address,  249;  as  a  popular 
leader,  249,  250;  early  relations 
with  Lincoln,  251;  Pa.  Reserves, 
the  Governor's  call,  252,  25.3; 
refused  by  the  government, 
254;  order  recalled,  but  the 
corps  authorized  by  the  Legis 
lature,  255;  appeals  to,  by  War 
Department,  256,  257;  in  Lin 
coln's  councils,  258;  responsi 
bilities  and  achievements,  258, 
259;  relations  to  Stanton,  259; 
asks  for  exchange  of  prisoners, 
259,  260;  Stanton's  support  of, 
for  re-election,  260,  261 ;  sug 
gests  Gen.  W.  B.  Franklin  for 
Governor,  261;  willing  to  re 
tire,  261-265;  offered  first-class 
foreign  mission,  263;  renomina- 
tion  and  re-election,  265;  de 
votion  to  the  soldiers,  265; 
266;  care  of  soldiers'  or 
phans,  conception  of  scheme, 
266,  267;  appeals  to  the 
Legislature,  268;  suggests  con 
ference  of  War  Governors,  268, 
269;  letter  concerning  the  Al- 
toona  Conference,  note,  270, 
272;  resolution  of  thanks,  273; 
President  Grant  thanked  for 
nomination  of,  as  minister  to 
Russia,  274;  minister  to  Russia 
and  subsequent  services,  275; 
complimentary  vote  in  Cincin 
nati  Convention,  327;  orders 
Capt.  Palmer's  company  to  act 
as  scouts,  395;  advised  of  Lee's 
movement  against  Gettysburg, 


486 


INDEX. 


409,  410;  a  mysterious  dispatch 
to,  410,  412;  identity  of  the 
sender,  412, 413 ;  receives  Meade's 
report  of  Pickett's  repulse,  416; 
care  for  the  Pa.  Reserves,  427. 

Davis,  David — Supports  Lincoln 
at  Chicago,  1860,  37;  visits  Pa. 
Republican  headquarters,  46; 
on  Lincoln's  reticence,  74,  75; 
a  Lincoln  organizer,  88;  Cabi 
net  places  promised  by,  89;  ne 
gotiations  with  Sanderson  and 
Cummings,  153;  the  Cameron 
bargain,  159;  as  a  candidate  for 
President,  1872,  326;  not  nomi 
nated,  327. 

Davis,  Henry  Winter — Vote  for 
Vice-President  in  Chicago  Con 
vention,  41;  distrusts  Lincoln, 
62;  in  opposition  to  Lincoln, 
1864,  117,  139,  322,  323. 

Davis,  Jefferson — Instructions  for 
Hampton  Roads  Conference, 
106;  Lincoln's  wish  for  his  es 
cape,  242. 

Dawes,  Henry  L.  —  Investigates 
the  War  Department  under 
Cameron,  160. 

Dayton,  William  L.  —  Votes  re 
ceived  in  Chicago  Convention, 
39- 

Defrees,  John  S.— With  Lane  at 
Chicago,  1860,  33;  at  Cincin 
nati  Convention,  1872,  327. 

Democratic  Party — Strength  of, 
in  Pa.,  1857-60,  32;  anti-war 
platform  of,  324. 

Dennison,  William — Political  mis 
sion  to  Pa.,  1864,  201;  offers 
McClellan  command  of  Ohio 
volunteers,  212. 

Dickinson,  Daniel  S. — War  Dem 
ocrat,  118,  119,  121,  122. 

District  of  Columbia  —  Slavery 
abolished  in,  103,  280. 

Dix,  John  A.  —  War  Democrat, 
118,  119,  300. 

Doubleday,  Abner — At  the  begin 
ning  of  the  war,  369,  370. 

Douglas,  Stephen  A. — Sustains 
Lincoln's  administration,  62. 

Drexel,  Anthony  J. — Sympathizes 


with  Republican  cause,  1860,  42; 
at  luncheon  with  Grant,  205. 

Early,  Jubal  A. — Orders  burning 
of  Chambersburg,  421. 

Easton,  Captain — His  battery  at 
the  Chickahominy,  431. 

Ellsworth,  Col.  E.  E.— Death  of, 
70. 

Emancipation  Proclamation  — 
Preliminary  proclamation,  100; 
States  and  districts  not  in 
cluded  in,  107;  as  a  war  meas 
ure,  108;  talks  with  Lincoln  on, 
as  a  political  measure,  111-113; 
effects  of,  in  State  elections, 
in;  compensation  for  slaves, 
241. 

Emergency-Men  —  Reynolds  sent 
to  Pa.  to  organize,  396-  never 
serviceable,  407. 

Evarts,  William  M. — Nor  ' --tes 
Seward  at  Chicago,  1860,  37; 
moves  to  make  Lincoln's  nom 
ination  unanimous,  39;  attitude 
on  nomination  for  Vice-Presi 
dent,  40. 

Ewell,  Richard  S. — Drives  Banks 
across  the  Potomac,  394. 

Fenton,  Reuben  E. — At  Cincin 
nati  Convention,  1872,  327. 

Fitzhugh,  Cleggett  —  Assists  in 
the  capture  of  Cook,  342. 

Floyd,  John  B. — In  Buchanan's 
Cabinet,  297,  300. 

Forney;  John  W. — Defeated  for 
United  States  Senator,  150,  151; 
asked  to  promote  Curtin's  re 
tirement,  262,  263. 

Franklin,  William  B.— Suggested 
by  Curtin  for  Governor  of  Pa., 
261. 

Fremont,  John  C.  —  Nominated 
for  President,  27,  28;  vote  for, 
in  Chicago  Convention,  39; 
candidature  in  1863,  91;  procla 
mation  regarding  slaves,  161. 

Gettysburg  —  Lee's  movement 
against,  408;  Benjamin  S.  Hu- 
ber  sent  to  inform  Gov.  Curtin, 
409;  information  from  John  A. 
Seiders,  410;  story  of  an  un- 


INDEX. 


487 


signed  message,  410,  412;  Lee's 

retreat  from,  416;  Pa.  Reserves 

at,  445,  446. 
Gilmore,   Harry  —  Refrains  from 

burning  Colonel  Boyd's  home, 

420,  421. 
Gorham,  George  C. —  Letter    on 

Sherman's  terms  of  surrender, 

245- 

Grant,  Ulysses  S. — Virginia  cam 
paign,  1864,  124;  magnanimous 
treatment  of  Admiral  Porter, 
143;  Stanton's  relations  to,  170; 
early  life,  189,  191;  colonel  of 
the  Twenty-first  111.  V  Is.,  191; 
service  in  Kentucky  and  Ten 
nessee,  192;  antagonized  by 
Halleck  and  McClellan,  192;  at 
Shilph,  193;  inflamed  public 
sentiment  against,  193,  194; 
saved  by  Lincoln,  196-198;  first 
acquaintance  with  Lincoln,  198, 
199;  Lincoln  doubtful  of  his  po 
litical  sympathies  in  1864,  202; 
fidelity  to  Lincoln,  204;  frank 
explanation,  205;  as  a  conver 
sationalist,  206;  in  war  and 
peace,  206,  207;  contrasted  with  . 
McClellan,  217;  thanked  by  Pa.  | 
Legislature  for  nomination  of  j 
Curtin  as  minister  to  Russia, 
274;  indifference  toward  Gree- 
ley,  325 ;  Meade  contrasted  with, 
358;  injustice  to  Meade,  361; 
orders  Thomas  to  attack  Hood, 
365;  requests  relief  of  Thomas, 
366;  congratulates  Thomas  on 
victory  at  Nashville,  368;  treat 
ment  of  Fitz  John  Porter,  374, 
376;  apnreciation  of  Buell,  383; 
asks  for  Buell's  restoration,  387; 

Greeley,  Horace  —  Opposed  to, 
Seward  in  1860,  30-40;  supports 
Bates,  30;  chairman  Oregon 
delegation,  Chicago,  1860,  37; 
offers  Gov.  Morgan  nomination 
for  Vice-President,  40;  not  in 
accord  with  Lincoln,  91;  Lin 
coln's  letter  to,  on  emancipa 
tion,  100;  early  hostility  to  Lin 
coln,  312;  revolt  against  Sew 
ard,  314;  support  of  Lincoln, 
315;  subsequent  estrangement, 
315,  316;  in  favor  of  peaceable 


secession,  316;  "On  to  Rich 
mond!"  cry,  318;  characteristics 
of,  319;  differences  with  Lin 
coln,  319,  320;  attitude  toward 
slavery  and  emancipation,  320, 
321;  opposes  Lincoln's  renomi- 
nation,  321;  supports  Wade  and 
Davis'  arraignment  of  Lincoln, 
322;  part  in  the  Jewett-Sanders 
negotiations,  322,  323;  later  re 
lations  to  Lincoln,  324;  in  po 
litical  revolt,  325;  Grant's  indif 
ference,  325;  choice  of  candi 
dates  at  Cincinnati  in  1872,  326; 
how  nominated,  327,  328;  the 
Democratic  endorsement  of, 
329;  defeat  and  death,  331,  332. 

Halleck,  Henry  W. — Made  gen- 
eral-in-chief,  4;  antagonizes 
Grant,  but  reverses  his  judg 
ment,  192;  ordered  to  the  field 
by  the  President,  107 ;  ordered 
to  Washington  as  commander- 
dn-chief,  198;  belief  in  Gen. 
Sherman's  imbecility,  231;  as 
sents  to  relief  of  Thomas  at 
Nashville,  366;  injustice  to 
Buell,  Chattanooga  campaign, 
384;  explains  why  Buell  could 
not  be  restored,  359. 

Hamlin,  Hannibal  —  Vote  for 
Vice-President  in  Chicago  Con 
vention,  40;  Lincoln  unfavora 
ble  to  re-election  of,  115;  why 
nominated  in  1860,  117;  forces 
demoralized,  122;  Lincoln's  feel 
ings  toward,  128;  no  deceit  to 
ward,  129;  knowledge  of  Lin 
coln's  wishes,  letter  to  Judge 
Pettis,  129,  130. 

Hampton,  Wade  —  Receives  sur 
render  of  Chambersburg,  402. 

Hatch,  O.  M. — A  Lincoln  organ 
izer,  88. 

Hazlehurst,  Isaac — American  can 
didate  for  Governor  of  Pa.,  32. 

Hazlitt,  Albert — Arrested  in  the 
Cumberland  Valley,  337;  the 
romance  of  the  requisition,  351. 

Herndon,  William  H. — On  Lin 
coln's  confidences,  74,  76. 

Hickman,  John — Vote  for  Vice- 


488 


INDEX. 


President  in  Chicago  Conven 
tion,  40. 

Holt,  Joseph  —  War  Democrat, 
118;  receives  Lincoln's  ostensi 
ble  support  for  Vice-President, 
1864,  122;  in  Buchanan's  Cabi 
net,  300. 

Hooker,  Joseph — Urges  a  dicta 
torship  on  McClellan,  223. 

Huber,  Benjamin  S.  —  Carries 
news  of  Lee's  movement  against 
Gettysburg  to  Governor  Cur- 
tin  409. 

Hunter,  David  —  Vandalism  of, 
258,  259. 

Indiana — Doubtful  in  1864,  126. 

Jenkins  —  Captures  Chambers- 
burg,  1863,  407,  408. 

Jewett,  William  Cornell  —  As  a 
peacemaker,  322. 

Johnson,  Albert  E.  H.  Letter 
on  Stanton,  note,  176. 

Johnson,  Andrew  —  Lincoln  fa 
vors,  for  Vice-President,  1864, 
115;  Gen.  Sickles'  mission  to, 
119;  nomination  accomplished, 
122;  Lincoln's  reasons  for  his 
nomination,  128,  129;  Stanton's 
hostility  to,  187;  admonished  by 
Grant,  206;  repudiates  Stanton's 
violent  treatment  of  Gen.  Sher 
man,  240;  Stevens'  dislike  of, 
281,  282;  hostility  of  Stevens, 
285,  286;  attempt  to  supersede 
Grant,  370. 

Johnston,  Joseph  E. — Surrenders 
to  Sherman,  234,  235;  terms  ac 
corded  by  Sherman,  236. 

Jones,  Lieutenant  —  Reached 
Chambersburg  from  Harper's 
Ferry,  392. 

Judd,  Norman  B. — Supports  Lin 
coln  at  Chicago,  1860,  37;  at 
tends  Mrs.  Lincoln  at  Harris- 
burg,  52;  a  Lincoln  organizer, 


Kagi,John  Henry — With  Meriam 
in  Chambersburg,  335,  336; 
killed  at  Harper's  Ferry,  336. 

Kimmell,  Francis  M. — Method  of 


sending  news  of  Lee's  invasion, 
410. 

Lamon,  Ward  H.  —  Dines  with 
Lincoln  and  Curtin  at  Harris- 
burg,  51;  accompanies  Lincoln 
to  Washington,  53;  on  Lin 
coln's  character,  76;  Lincoln's 
letter  to,  at  Baltimore  Conven 
tion,  122. 

Lane,  Henry  S. — Supports  Lin 
coln  at  Chicago,  1860,  30,  31; 
candidate  for  Governor  of  Ind., 
32,  33;  reasons  for  opposing 
Seward,  33-35;  reasons  for  sup 
porting  Lincoln,  35,  36;  elected 
Governor  of  Ind.,  43;  not  a 
party  to  Cabinet  pledges,  89. 

Lane,  Mrs.  Henry  S.  —  Letter 
from,  note,  30,  31. 

Lee,  Robert  E. — Criticism  of  his 
campaigns,  217;  Maryland  cam 
paign  in  1862,  394,  395;  invasion 
of  Pa.  in  1863,  407,  408;  council 
in  public  square  in  Chambers 
burg,  409;  retreat  from  Gettys 
burg,  416. 

Lewis,  Joseph  J. — Protests  against 
Chase  for  Chief  Justice,  141,  142. 

Lincoln,  Abraham — His  nomina 
tion  unexpected,  27;  character 
of  his  support,  27-29;  support 
of  Curtin  and  Lane,  30;  attitude 
toward  slavery,  34;  Pennsylva 
nia's  attitude  toward,  36;  en 
thusiasm  for,  36,  37;  nominated, 
38;  McClure's  first  visit  to,  44; 
sends  Davis  and  Swett  to  Pa., 
46;  letters  to  McClure  destroy 
ed,  48;  invites  McClure  to 
Springfield,  48;  the  interview, 
49;  Curtin's  guest  on  his  way 
to  Washington,  50;  fears  of  as 
sassination,  50,  51;  reception 
and  dinner,  51;  arrangements 
for  the  journey,  51-53;  the  jour 
ney,  54,  55;  his  regrets,  55;  sen 
sational  stories,  56;  arrival  in 
Washington,  57;  distrust  of  his 
ability,  59;  his  fitness  for  the 
Presidency,  60,  61;  difficulty  of 
formulating  a  policy,  63;  epi 
gram  on  the  spoilsmen,  64;  con 
ference  with  Curtin  and  Me- 


INDEX. 


489 


Clure  touching  defence  of  Pa., 
65,  66;  characteristics,  72;  his 
confidence,  how  far  given,  74; 
his  reticence,  77;  intellectual  or 
ganization,  78;  a  man  of  the 
people,  80;  his  political  sagac 
ity,  81;  averts  a  draft  riot,  82, 
83;  in  politics,  85;  Presidential 
aspirations,  87;  no  knowledge 
of  Cabinet  promises,  89;  offers 
French  mission  to  J.  G.  Ben 
nett,  90;  letter  to  General  Sher 
man,  93;  solution  of  mustering-  j 
in  difficulty  in  Pa.,  94,  95;  views 
of  slavery,  98;  Emancipation 
Proclamation,  100;  nswer  to 
Chicago  clerical  delegation,  101;  ! 
waiting  for  victory,  102;  plan 
of  compensated  emancipation,  ' 
103,  104;  Hunter's  order  re 
voked,  104;  compensated  eman 
cipation  at  Hampton  Roads 
Conference,  106;  congratulated 
on  achievement  of  emancipa-  ! 
tion,  no;  Johnson  for  Vice- 
President,  1864,  115;  leaders  in 
opposition  to,  117;  wants  a  War 
Democrat  on  ticket,  118;  elec 
toral  purposes  of,  119,  120; 
manipulation  of  Cameron,  121; 
interview  with  Lamon  and 
Swett,  122;  relations  to  Mc- 
Clure  and  Cameron,  123,  124; 
fears  defeat,  125,  126;  reasons 
for  Johnson's  nomination,  128, 
129;  no  deceit  toward  Hamlin, 
129;  Chase's  attitude  toward, 
132-134;  proposes  to  "decline" 
Chase,  anecdote,  135;  desire  for 
renomination,  136;  doubts,  137; 
strained  relations  with  Chase, 
137-139;  discusses  Stanton  as  a 
possible  Chief  Justice,  142;  mag 
nanimity  toward  Chase,  143, 
144;  relations  toward  Cameron,  i 
147;  the  War  Secretaryship, 
154;  letters  to  Cameron,  155- 
157;  subsequent  action,  157-160; 
exculpation  of  Cameron,  161; 
relieves  Fremont,  and  recalls 
Cameron's  report  touching  sla 
very,  161-163;  letter  removing 
Cameron  from  War  Depart 
ment,  164,  165;  letter  recalled, 


165;  appointment  of  Stanton, 
165,  166;  Stanton's  attitude  to 
ward,  171-173;  attitude  toward 
Stanton,  173;  treatment  of  the 
McKibben  case,  178-181;  for 
bearance  shown  McClellan,  182, 
183;  visit  to  Gen.  Scott  at  West 
Point,  183;  gives  McClellan 
command  of  the  defences  of 
Washington,  184;  compels  Stan- 
ton's  obedience,  185;  never  con 
templated  removing  Stanton, 
186;  pressure  on,  for  Grant's  re 
moval,  193-196;  his  method  to 
save  Grant,  196-198;  asks  Mc- 
Clure  and  MacVeagh  to  co-op 
erate  with  Republican  State 
Committee  in  Pa.  in  1864,  200; 
solicitude  in  regard  to  result  in 
Nov.,  201,  202;  McClure's  in 
terview  with,  regarding  the  sol 
dier  vote,  202,203;  Grant's  fidel 
ity  to,  204,  205;  relations  to  Mc 
Clellan,  208,  210;  McClellan's 
accusations,  215,  216;  trust  in 
McClellan,  218;  McClellan's. po 
litical  and  military  protests  to, 
219,  220;  magnanimity  toward 
Hooker,  223;  fears  success  of 
McClellan's  Presidential  candi 
dature,  224;  views  of  the  conse 
quences,  225;  first  meeting  with 
Gen.  Sherman,  227;  early  esti 
mate  of  Sherman,  230;  later 
confidence  in  Sherman,  234; 
views  of  reconstruction,  236, 
240,  241 ;  instructions  to  Sher 
man,  236,  237;  message  to  Gov. 
Vance,  237;  compensation  for 
slavery,  241;  wish  for  Jefferson 
Davis'  escape,  242;  fears  re 
garding  the  South,  242,  243;  in 
structions  to  Gen.  Weitzel,  243, 
244;  relations  with  Curtin,  251; 
Curtin  in  councils  of,  258;  Cur- 
tin  appeals  to,  for  exchange  of 
prisoners,  260;  offers  first-class 
foreign  mission  to  Curtin,  263; 
approved  Altoona  Conference, 
note,  272;  contrasted  with  Ste 
vens,  277;  methods  in  contrast 
with  Stevens',  279,  280,  284,  285; 
early  policy  identical  with  Bu 
chanan's,  297,  304,  310;  early 


490 


INDEX. 


hostility  of  Greeley  to,  312; 
Greeley's  support  of,  315;  sub 
sequent  estrangement  of  Gree 
dy*  3!5>  3J6;  embarrassed  by 
Greeley,  316,  317;  Greeley  op 
poses  renomination  of,  321; 
Wade  and  Davis'  arraignment 
of,  322;  share  in  Greeley-Jewett 
negotiations,  323;  Greeley's 
later  relations  to,  324;  dissatis 
fied  with  Meade  after  Gettys 
burg,  359,  360. 

Lincoln,  Mrs. — Disinclined  to  the 
secret  journey  of  the  President 
elect,  52;  passes  through  Balti 
more,  55. 

Logan,  Daniel — Account  of,  341; 
capture  of  Cook,  342;  to  allow 
Cook  to  escape,  344-346. 

Logan,  Hugh — Account  of,  341; 
in  Chambersburg  with  Stuart's 
cavalry,  402;  makes  a  bold 
promise,  406. 

Logan,  John  A. — Political  ser 
vices  in  1864,  93;  sent  to  relieve 
Thomas  at  Nashville,  367. 

McCall,  George  A. — Given  com 
mand  of  Pa.  Reserves,  425;  or 
dered  to  hold  Fredericksburg, 
1862,  428;  skillful  conduct  at 
Games'  Mills,  430;  at  Savage 
Station,  433,  434;  captured,  434; 
exchanged  and  resigns,  436. 

McCandless,  William — Wounded 
at  the  Wilderness,  450. 

McCausland,  General — Threatens 
Chambersburg,  418;  seizes  and 
burns  the  town,  419,  420. 

McClellan,  George  B.— Called  to 
the  command,  69,  212;  Burn- 
side  on  his  tardiness,  70;  can 
didature  in  1864,  91;  could  have 
defeated  Lincoln,  124;  Stanton's 
relations  to,  as  Secretary  of 
War,  165,  166;  Stanton's  rela 
tions  to,  170-182;  petulant  mes 
sage  to  Stanton,  183;  in  com 
mand  of  the  defences  of  Wash 
ington,  184,  185,  220;  antago 
nizes  Grant,  192;  as  a  military 
commander,  208;  explanations 
of  failure,  210,  211;  offered  com 
mand  of  Pa.  troops,  211,  425; 


accepts  command  of  Ohio  vol 
unteers,  212;  believes  himself 
victim  of  a  conspiracy,  213-215; 
compared  with  Lee  and  Grant, 
217;  affection  of  his  soldiers  for, 
218;  Lincoln's  trust  in,  218,  219; 
caustic  political  criticism,  219; 
personal  feeling  toward  Lin 
coln,  219,  220;  Lincoln's  treat 
ment  of,  220,  221;  contemplates 
a  dictatorship,  222-224;  candi 
date  for  President,  224,  225; 
Lincoln's  view  of  consequences 
of  election  of,  225;  Stevens'  ha 
tred  of,  282;  information  of 
Lee's  movements  before  Antie- 
tam,  395;  orders  McClure  to 
obstruct  Lee's  advance,  396; 
after  Antietam,  441;  Fredericks- 
burg  report,  432. 

McClure,  Alexander  K.  —  With 
Curtin  at  Chicago,  1860,  33; 
calls  on  Weed  in  Chicago,  41; 
discouragements  in  Pa.  cam 
paign  in  1860,  41,  42;  calls  on 
Seward,  42;  first  visit  to  Lin 
coln,  44;  meets  Davis  and 
Swett.  at  Republican  head 
quarters,  46;  visits  Lincoln  at 
Springfield,  1861,  48;  the  inter 
view,  49,  154,  155;  meeting  at 
Harrisburg,  50;  conference  at 
the  White  House,  65,  66;  on 
Lincoln's  characteristics,  76,77; 
organizes  draft  in  Pa.,  80;  ef 
forts  to  muster  conscripts,  94; 
interview  with  Lincoln,  94,  95; 
Lincoln's  solution,  95,  96;  talks 
with  Lincoln  on  Emancipation 
Proclamation,  111-113;  instruc 
tions  for,  in  letter  to  Lamon, 
122;  delegate-at-large  from  Pa., 
123;  interview  with  Lincoln — 
political  prospects,  1864,  125, 
126;  Johnson's  nomination,  in 
terview  with  Lincoln,  127,  128; 
Chase's  candidature,  Lincoln 
on,  134-136;  Lincoln's  letter  re 
moving  Cameron  from  War 
Department  shown  to,  164;  es 
timate  of  Cameron,  166-168; 
appeals  to  Lincoln  on  behalf  of 
Jere  McKibben,  178-181;  inter 
view  with  Stanton,  179-181; 


INDEX. 


491 


finds  Stanton  gracious,  181,182; 
belief  in  Grant's  failure  at  Shi- 
loh,  194,  195;  asked  by  Lincoln 
to  co-operate  with  Republican 
State  Committee  in  Pa.  in  1864, 
200;  interview  with  Lincoln  re 
garding  the  soldier  vote  in 
1864,  202,  203;  testifies  to 
Grant's  fidelity  to  Lincoln,  204; 
meeting  with  Grant  in  Phila., 
205;  anecdote  of  Lincoln  and 
Sherman,  235;  tribute  to  Cur- 
tin,  248;  seeks  to  promote  Cur- 
tin's  retirement,  262,  263;  rela 
tions  to  Stevens,  292;  in  Cin 
cinnati  Convention,  1872,  325; 
attitude  in  regard  to  Greeley's 
nomination,  325,  326;  supports 
Charles  Francis  Adams,  326; 
disappointed  with  Greeley's 
nomination,  329;  Greeley's 
last  letter  to,  331;  draws 
Meriam's  will,  335,  336;  counsel 
for  Captain  Cook,  3^8,  345; 
meeting  with  Cook,  345,  346; 
interviews  in  the  jail,  346-349; 
first  meeting  with  Gen.  Meade, 
359;  witli  Gen.  Thomas,  369;  as 
a  military  commander,  1862, 
395,  396;  ordered  by  McClellan 
to  obstruct  Lee's  advance,  396; 
warns  Capt.  Palmer  at  An- 
tietam,  397;  plan  to  prevent 
Palmer's  identification,  398; 
hears  of  Stuart's  intended  raid, 
399;  surrender  of  Chambers- 
burg  demanded  of,  402;  meets 
Gen.  Hampton,  402;  meets 
Hugh  Logan,  402;  arrest  by 
otu-irt  ordered,  402,  403;  experi 
ence  with  a  detachment  of  Stu 
art's  cavalry,  403-405;  identity 
of  his  Confederate  guests,  405, 
406;  how  advised  of  Lee's  inva 
sion,  1863,  407;  arrest  of,  again 
ordered,  408;  fails  to  obtain 
Christian  burial  for  a  Confed 
erate  officer,  416,  417;  house  at 
Chambersburg  burned  by  Mc- 
Causland's  cavalry,  419. 

McDowell,   Irwin — Pa.    Reserves 
in  corps  of,  427,  428. 

McKibben,  Jere — Stanton's  treat 
ment  of,  177-181. 


McLean,  John — Votes  received  in 
Chicago  Convention,  39;  rea 
sons  for  Stevens'  support  of, 
281. 

MacVeagh,  Wayne — Assists  Re 
publican  State  Committee  in 
Pa.  in  1864,  200;  bears  Meade' s 
report  of  Pickett's  repulse  to 
Gov.  Curtin,  416. 

Meade,  George  G. — Furloughs 
Pa.  soldiers  in  1864,  203;  an  un 
rewarded  hero,  355;  military 
career  of,  356;  Gettysburg 
campaign,  356-358;  contrasted 
with  Grant,  358;  characteristics 
of,  3595  less  of  the  Lieutenant- 
Generalship,  359,  360;  confi 
dence  and  disappointment,  361, 
362;  contrasted  with  Thomas, 
362;  given  command  of  bri 
gade,  Pa.  Reserves,  425;  at 
Dranesville,  426;  wounded 
at  Savage  Station,  434;  in  com 
mand  of  Pa.  Reserves,  438; 
with  the  Reserves  at  South 
Mountain,  439;  at  Antietam, 
439,  440;  back  to  his  division, 
441;  in  command  of  Fifth  corps, 
442,  443;  sword  presented  by 
Pa.  Reserves,  447. 

Medill,  Joseph — A  Lincoln  or 
ganizer,  88. 

Meredith,  William  M. — Presses 
for  exchange  of  prisoners,  260. 

Meriam,  Francis  J. — Makes  his 
will,  335,  336;  escapes,  337. 

Milroy,  Gen. — Stampede  into  Pa., 
407. 

Morgan,  Edwin  D. — Supports 
Seward  at  Chicago,  1860,  37:  of 
fered  nomination  for  Vice- 
President,  40;  remains  at  head 
of  National  Committee,  41 ;  de 
clined  to  join  Altoona  Confer 
ence,  note,  272. 

Morton,  Oliver  P. — Elected  Gov 
ernor  of  Ind.,  93;  hostility  to 
Buell,  385- 

New  York  Herald — Supports 
Lincoln's  re-election,  91. 

New  York  Tribune — Influence  of, 
in  1860,  29;  not  in  accord  with 
Lincoln,  91;  in  campaign  of 


492 


INDEX. 


1860,    314,    315;    favors    peace 
able  secession,  316. 
Niccolls,     Samuel      J. — At      the 
the  burning  of  Mr.   McClure's 
house,  419,  420. 

Ord,  E.  O.  C. — Given  command 
brigade  Pa.  Reserves,  425;  at 
Dranesville,  426;  ordered  to  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  428. 

O'Rourke,  Captain— Testimonial 
of  Pa.  Reserves  to,  442. 

Packer,  William  F.— Elected  Gov 
ernor  of  Pa.,  1857,  32. 

Palmer,  Capt.  W.  J.— Serves  as 
a  scout  in  Maryland  in  1862, 
395;  continues  to  enter  Lee's 
lines  in  Va.,  397;  arrested,  but 
escapes  identification,  397,  398. 

Parker,  John  B.— On  Gov.  Cur- 
tin's  staff,  256. 

Patterson,  Robert — Asks  for  more 
soldiers,  note,  253;  his  army  at 
Chambersburg,  393. 

Pennsylvania — Campaign  of  1860, 
42-47;  defence  of,  65,  66;  draft 
in,  80;  opposition  in  Schuylkill 
county,  81,  82;  Lincoln  on  poli 
tics  in,  85,  87;  State  draft  of 
1862,  93,  94;  doubtful  in,  1864, 
126;  law  regulating  elections  in 
the  army,  177;  Republican  party 
beaten  in  October  elections, 
1864,  199;  Lincoln's  solicitude 
in  regard  to  the  result  in,  in 
Nov.,  201,  202;  the  soldier 
vote,  202,  203. 

Pennsylvania  Reserves— Gov. 
Curtin's  call,  252;  Gen.  Patter 
son's  letter,  note,  253;  their  ac 
ceptance  refused,  254;  the  com 
mand  authorized,  255;  begin 
active  service,  256,  257;  organ 
ization  of,  423;  command  given 
to  Gen.  McCall,  425;  at  Dranes 
ville,  426;  with  McDowell's 
corps,  426;  on  the  right  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  army,  429;  in  the  bat 
tle  of  Games'  Mills,  429-431; 
at  Savage  Station,  432;  in  the 
battle,  433-435;  losses  before 
Richmond,  435;  Reynolds  suc 
ceeds  McCall,  436;  join  Pope  at 


Warrenton  Junction,  436,  437; 
at  the  second  battle  of  Man- 
assas,  437,  438;  Meade  in  com 
mand,  438;  at  the  battle  of 
South  Mountain,  439;  at  An- 
tietam,  439,  440;  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  441,  442;  effort  to  with 
draw  for  reorganization,  443; 
Gen.  Crawford  in  command  of, 
443,  444;  march  into  Md.  and 
Pa.,  444,445;  at  Gettysburg,  445 ; 
446;  again  in  Va.,  447;  brisk 
action  at  Bristoe  Station,  448; 
at  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness, 
449,  450;  continued  fighting, 
451-453;  services  ended,  453; 
Gen.  Crawford's  farewell,  453, 
454;  their  return  home,  454; 
tribute  to,  455,  456. 

Pinkerton,  Allan — Convinced  of 
Lincoln's  danger,  50. 

Pomeroy,  Stephen  W. — Sender  of 
the  mysterious  Kimmell  mes 
sage,  412;  letter  telling  the  his 
tory  of,  413-415. 

Pope,  John — Given  command  of 
Army  of  Virginia,  184;  military 
incompetency  of,  373;  prefers 
charges  against  Fitz  John  Por 
ter,  374;  falls  back  from  the 
Rapidan,  437. 

Porter,  David  D. — Grant's  mag 
nanimity  toward,  143;  testi 
mony  to  Lincoln's  instructions 
to  Sherman,  240. 

Porter,  Fitz  John — Lincoln  and 
Stanton  on  judgment  against, 
186;  an  unrewarded  hero,  355; 
military  injustice  to,  371,  372; 
antebellum  and  early  war  rec 
ord,  372,  373;  alleged  dis 
obedience  of  Pope's  orders,  373; 
services  at  Antietam,  373,  374; 
Pope's  charges,  374;  fruitless 
efforts  to  obtain  justice,  374, 
375;  censure  removed,  375; 
Gen.  Terry's  generous  con 
duct  toward,  376;  career  since 
the  war,  376,  377. 

Potts,  Joseph  E.— On  Gov.  Cur- 
tin's  staff,  256. 

Raymond,  Henry  J. — In  Lin 
coln's  confidence  in  1864,  121 


INDEX. 


493 


Read,  John  M. — Vote  received  in  I 
Chicago  Convention,  39. 

Reeder,  Andrew   H. — For    Cam-  \ 
eron    for    President,    1860,    35; 
vote    received    for    Vice-Presi 
dent  in  Chicago  Convention,  39. 

Republican  Party — Formation  of,  ! 
27,  28;   in  Pa.   in   1860,  31,  32; 
in  Ind.,   1860,  32;   campaign  in  | 
Pa.,   1860,  42;    discord    in,    60;  i 
leaders  distracted  in  1864,  117. 

Reynolds,  John  F. — Sent    to    or-  j 
ganize   emergency    men,     1862,  ' 
396;  at  Gettysburg,  415;   given  ' 
command   of   brigade   Pa.    Re-  ! 
serves,  425;  at  Dranesville,  426;  ! 
captured,   431;    exchanged   and 
in  command  of    Pa.    Reserves, 
436;    at   the    second    battle    of 
Manassas,     437,     438;     relieved 
and     ordered     to     Harrisburg, 
438;  with  First  army  corps,  441. 

Rice,  Perry  A.— One  of  Stuart's 
Pa.  prisoners,  402;  death  in 
Libby  Prison,  406. 

Roberts,  R.  Biddle— On  Gov. 
Curtin's  staff,  256,  441. 

Rosecrans,  William  S. — Succeeds 
Buell  in  Tennessee,  386. 

Sanders,  George  N. — As  a  peace 
maker,  322. 

Sanderson,  John  P. — Represented 
Cameron  at  Chicago,  1860,  153; 
confers  with  Lincoln  at  Spring 
field,  157,  158. 

Schofield,  John  M.  —  Joins 
Thomas  at  Nashville,  365; 
order  to  relieve  Thomas,  366; 
reviews  judgment  against  Fitz 
John  Porter,  375. 

Scott,  Thomas  A.— Dines  with 
Lincoln,  51;  arranges  for  Lin 
coln's  journey  to  Washington, 
52,  53;  Lincoln's  letter  remov 
ing  Cameron  from  War  De 
partment  shown  to,  164;  be 
lieved  Gen.  Sherman  a  lunatic, 
230;  on  Gov.  Curtin's  staff, 
256. 

Scott,  Winfield — Warns  Lincoln, 
50;  estimate  of,  in  1861,  65,  66; 
on  the  military  situation,  67,  68; 
in  his  dotage,  69;  Lincoln's  visit 


to,  at  West  Point,  183  ;  urges 
Buchanan  to  reinforce  South 
ern  forts,  302,  303. 

Seiders,  John  A.  —  Reports 
Rhodes'  movement  from  Car 
lisle  toward  Gettysburg,  410. 

Seward,  William  H.— Before  Chi 
cago,  1860,  28;  why  opposed  by 
Curtin  and  Lane,  33,  34; 
earnestness  of  the  contest,  37; 
indifference  of,  in  campaign  of 
1860,  41;  warns  Lincoln,  50; 
meets  the  President-elect,  57; 
accepts  and  then  declines  office 
under  Lincoln,  59,  60;  disbelief 
in  civil  war,  60;  favors  a  foreign 
war,  61;  favors  Johnson  for 
Vice-President,  1864,  121;  favors 
Cameron  for  War  portfolio, 
159;  Greeley's  revolt  against, 

314. 

Seymour,  Horatio — Nominated 
for  President,  1868,  145. 

Seymour,  Truman — At  Savage 
Station,  435;  at  South  Moun 
tain,  439;  at  Antietam,  440. 

Sheridan,  Philip  H. — Victories  in 
1864,  124;  furloughs  Pa.  sol 
diers  in  1864,  203;  appointment 
as  Lieutenant-General  359-361; 
accusations  against  Warren  at 
Five  Forks,  379;  persistent  in 
justice  to  Warren,  380,  381. 

Sherman,  John — Support  of  Lin 
coln,  62;  visits  Lincoln  with 
Capt.  Sherman,  note,  237;  on 
Lincoln's  views  of  the  restora 
tion  of  State  governments  in 
the  South,  note,  238;  urges  ac 
ceptance  of  Pa.  Reserves,  254. 

Sherman,  William  T. — Furloughs 
soldiers  to  vote,  1864,  93;  cap 
tures  Atlanta,  124;  first  meeting 
with  Lincoln,  227;  declines 
clerkship  in  War  Department 
and  a  Missouri  brigadiership, 
228;  appointed  colonei  Thir 
teenth  regiment  U.  S.  A.,  229; 
character  of,  229,  230;  Lincoln's 
early  estimate  of,  230;  regarded 
as  a  lunatic,  230,  231;  reasons 
for  the  assumption,  231,  252; 
conference  with  Cameron,  231, 
2-?2;  military  services  of,  232- 


494 


INDEX. 


234;  Lincoln's  later  confidence 
in,  234;  Johnston's  surrender 
to,  234,  235;  terms  of,  236;  Lin 
coln's  views  and  instructions, 
236,  237;  John  Sherman's  let 
ter,  note,  238;  assassination  of 
Lincoln,  239;  Stanton's  violent 
rejection  of  Sherman's  terms, 
240;  Gorham's  letter,  note,  245. 

Sickles,  Daniel  E.— Mission  to 
Tennessee,  1864,  119. 

Simmons,  Col. — Goes  to  relief  of 
Col.  Wallace,  256. 

Slavery — Lincoln's  early  attitude 
toward,  34;  position  toward,  as 
President,  98;  Emancipation, 
preliminary  proclamation  and 
letter  to  Greeley,  100;  destruc 
tion  by  Congressional  action, 
103;  in  the  Border  States,  103; 
104;  constitutional  emancipa 
tion,  109;  constitutional  amend 
ment  abolishing,  109,  no;  Dem 
ocratic  votes  for  amendment, 
no;  amendment  ratified,  in; 
compensation  for  emancipation, 
126,  127;  Lincoln's  attitude  on 
Cameron's  and  Fremont's 
actions,  161-163;  compensated 
emancipation,  241. 

Smith,  C.  R— Named  by  Mc- 
Clellan  to  succeed  Grant,  102. 

Smith,  Caleb  B.— In  Lincoln's 
Cabinet,  60. 

Smith,  Captain— Burns  Mr.  Mc- 
Clure's  house  at  Chambers- 
burg,  419. 

South  Carolina — President  Bu 
chanan's  policy,  301,  302. 

Stanton,  Edwin  M. — Nomination 
as  Secretary  of  War,  77;  orders 
the  'military  to  Schuylkill 
county,  81;  orders  superseded, 
83;  supports  Chase  for  chief- 
justice,  141;  considered  by  Lin 
coln  for  chief-justice,  142;  rea 
sons  for  appointment  to  War 
Department,  165,  166;  character 
of,  170,  171;  attitude  toward 
Lincoln,  171-183,  214,  215;  ser 
vices  in  Buchanan's  Cabinet, 
171,  172;  virulent  letters  to  Bu 
chanan,  172,  173;  change  of 
tone,  174;  as  Secretary  of  War, 


174-177;  telegraphic  facilities, 
note,  176;  hatreds,  177;  treat 
ment  of  Jere  McKibben,  177- 
181;  hatred  of  McClellan,  182; 
hostilitv  to  McClellan's  rein 
statement,  184,  185;  disobe 
dience  to  Lincoln,  185;  more 
resentments,  185,  186;  conflict 
with  President  Johnson,  187; 
in  retirement,  187,  188;  Mc 
Clellan's  accusations,  214,  215; 
on  dictatorship,  223;  violent  re 
jection  of  Sherman's  terms  to 
Johnston,  240;  Curtin's  rela 
tions  to,  259;  supports  Gov. 
Curtin  for  re-election,  260; 
subsequent  unfriendliness,  260, 
261;  influence  in  Buchanan's 
Cabinet,  300;  'dissatisfaction 
with  Thomas,  365;  hatred  of 
Buell,  383,  387,  388. 

States'  Rights — Question  of,  62. 

Stephens,  Alex.  H. — Demands 
recognition  of  the  Confederacy 
at  Hampton  Roads  Conference, 
106. 

Stev.ns,  Thaddeus  —  Supports 
McLean  for  President,  1860,  35; 
closes  debate  on.  constitutional 
amendment  abolishing  slavery, 
no;  attitude  toward  Lincoln, 
1864,  126;  contrasted  with  Lin 
coln,  277;  courageous  for  jus 
tice,  278;  as  the  Commoner  of 
the  republic,  278,  279;  methods 
in  contrast  with  Lincoln's,  279; 
280;  abolition  of  slavery  in 
District  of  Columbia,  280,  281; 
reasons  for  sunporting  Mc 
Lean  in  1860,  281;  reluctant 
vote  for  Johnston  for  Vice- 
President  at  Baltimore,  281, 
282;  eagerness  of,  to  enter  Lin 
coln's  Cabinet,  282,  283;  pro 
tests  against  Cameron's  ap 
pointment,  283;  previous  Cab 
inet  disappointment,  283;  con 
flicts  with  Lincoln,  284;  hostile 
attitude  toward  Johnson,  285, 
286;  his  disappointment  over 
his  own  career,  286;  love  for 
his  mother,  287;  the  measures 
formulated  by,  287,  288;  recon 
struction  policy,  288-292;  as  a 


INDEX.  \  ' 


495 


lawyer,  293;    death,    294,    295;  ; 
estimate  of    two    commanders,  | 

396,  397- 

Stuart,  J.  E.  B.— Raid  into  the 
Cumberland  Valley,  3995  arrest 
of  civilians  in  Pa.,  1862,  402. 

Sumner,  Charles— Vote  for  in 
Chicago  Convention,  39;  dis 
trusts  Lincoln,  62;  supports 
Chase  for  chief-justice,  140, 
141;  tribute  to  Stevens,  295. 

Sumner,  Col. — Disappointment 
over  Lincoln's  departure  from 
Harrisburg  to  Washington,  53. 

Swett,  Leonard — Letter  to  Mr. 
Drummond,  29;  supports  Lin 
coln  at  Chicago,  1860,  37;  visits 
Pa.  Republican  headquarters, 
46;  on  Lincoln's  characteristics, 
75;  a  Lincoln  organizer,  88; 
reluctant  support  of  Johnson  at 
Baltimore,  1864,  122;  at  Cincin 
nati  Convention,  1872,  327. 

Taney,  Roger  B.— Death  of,  140. 

Taylor,  Col.— Killed  at  Gettys 
burg,  445,  446. 

Tennessee — Represented  in  Re 
publican  National  Convention, 
1864,  1 20. 

Terry,  A.  H. — Reviews  judgment 
in  case  of  Fitz  John  Porter, 
375;  generous  conduct  toward 
Porter,  376. 

Thomas,  George  H. — An  unre 
warded  hero,  355;  contrasted 
with  Meade,  362;  military  rec 
ord  of,  363,  364;  his  position  at 
Nashville  and  impending  re 
moval,  337-367;  Gen.  Logan's 
mission,  367;  battle  of  Nash 
ville,  367,  368;  vindicated  by  the 
result,  368,  369;  characteristics 
°f>  369,  370;  refuses  nomination 
as  General  by  brevet,  372; 
career  after  the  war,  372,  373; 
requests  recall  of  order  reliev 
ing  Buell,  385,  386. 

Thomas,  Philip — Succeeds  Cobb 
in  Buchanan's  Cabinet,  300. 

Thomson^  John  Edgar — Soldiers' 
orphans'  schools,  267. 

Tilden,  Samuel  J. — Controls  Dem 


ocratic  National  Convention, 
1868,  145. 

Townsend,  Assistant  Adjutant- 
General — Mission  to  Harris- 
burg,  82. 

Trumbull,  Lyman  -Distrust  of 
Lincoln,  62;  reports  constitu 
tional  amendment  abolishing 
slavery,  109. 

Virginia — Lincoln's  instructions 
to  Weitzel,  243;  order  revoked, 
244. 

Voorhees,  Daniel  W. — Defends 
Captain  Cook,  352. 

Wade,  Benjamin  F. — Votes  re 
ceived  in  Chicago  Convention, 
39;  distrusts  Lincoln,  62;  in  op 
position  to  Lincoln,  1864,  117, 
139,  322,  324- 

War  for  the  Union — In  1864,  117; 
military  and  political  situation, 
124;  declared  a  failure  by  Dem 
ocratic  National  Convention, 
225;  Greeley's  war  issues,  318, 

.19- 

arren,  G.  K. — An  unrewarded 
hero,  355;  military  career  of, 
377-379;  Sheridan's  allegations 
at  Five  Forks,  379;  ineffectual 
efforts  t>  secure  justice,  380, 
381;  death,  381. 

Washburne,  Elihu  B. — Meets 
Lincoln  on  his  arrival  in  Wash 
ington,  57;  justifies  Grant's 
conduct  at  Shiloh,  194. 

Washington  —  Threatened,  67; 
McClellan  in  command  of  de 
fences  of,  184,  185. 

Weed,  Thurlow — Greeley's  rela 
tions  toward  1860,  30;  seeks  to 
control  Lane,  note,  31;  Seward 
leader  at  Chicago,  37;  displeas 
ure  over  Lincoln's  nomination, 
40-42;  favors  Johnson  for  Vice- 
President,  1864,  121;  favors 
Cameron  for  War  portfolio, 
159;  relations  to  Seward  and 
Greeley,  315. 

Welles,  Gideon — In  Lincoln's 
Cabinet,  60;  on  Lincoln's  pol 
icy  of  reconstruction,  242-244. 

Weitzel,  Godfrey — Lincoln's  or 
der  regarding  Virginia  Legis- 


W3a 


496 


INDEX. 


lature,  243;  order  revoked,  244. 

Whitehead,  Thomas  W.— Mr. 
McClure's  two  meetings  with, 
406. 

Willard,  Governor  —  Captain 
Cook's  brother-in-law.  344;  ef 
forts  in  Cook's  behalf,  352. 

Wilmot,  David — Republican  can 
didate  for  Governor  of  Pa.,  32; 
supports  Lincoln  at  Chicago, 
1860,  35- 

Wilson,  James  F. — Offers  amend 
ment  to  the  constitution  abol 
ishing  slavery,  109. 

Wilson,  William  W. — Services  as 
a  military  telegrapher,  395. 


Wise,  Henry  A. — Offers  reward 
for  Cook's  arrest,  339;  insists 
on  Cook's  execution,  352. 

Wood,  General — Incredulity  re 
garding  Stuart's  raid,  1862, 
399,  401. 

Woodward,  George  W. — Opposes 
Curtin  for  Governor  of  Pa. 
1863,  90. 

Wright,  John  A. — On  Gov.  Cur- 
tin's  staff,  256. 

Yates,  Richard — Appoints  Grant 
colon:!  Twenty-first  Illinois 
Volunteers,  191;  hc.tility  to 
Buell,  385. 


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McClure,  A.K. 

Abraham  Lincoln  and 


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